Chapter 5, in parallel to the preceding one, focuses on the other, elected chamber of the Estates Assembly (or Parliament) and discusses Hegel’s characteristic notion of a representation of interests, along with the broader societal conditions for successful representation. The chapter first reconstructs and contextualises the electoral mechanism as envisioned by Hegel and elucidates the political significance of corporation membership, which connects Hegel’s civil society and state. In this context, special attention is paid to the exclusion of women, while Hegel’s purported negligence of farmers is refuted. The chapter then sets out the conditions Hegel considered necessary for the successful representation of societal interests, which include freedom of the press and trials by jury, notwithstanding his ambivalent attitude towards public opinion. The final section shows that these very preconditions were under siege at the time Hegel was writing, following the politically motivated murder of Kotzebue and the institution of the so-called Karlsbad decrees. The direct bearing of these circumstances on the publication of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right rounds off this contextual study.

The peculiar purpose and population of the Australian penal colonies presented a raft of problems for the administration of justice and the maintenance of discipline. There was a perceived need for a simplified and more coercive system of law, which however coincided with a desire that local law and justice be fairly applied and keep pace with metropolitan legal reforms. That bred numerous tensions and confusions. This chapter considers how the need to control convict populations in colonial New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land invited a myriad of compromises and peculiarities, including a chaotic application of English transportation law and the assumption of vast and informal powers by colonial magistrates. Although there was a broad shift over time towards the normalising of colonial justice and discipline, the imperial and local governments were slow to correct local informalities, injustices, and deviations from metropolitan law and practice.

Australia is unusual in lacking a formal bill of rights. Nevertheless, rights protections have developed, initially in the context of the emergence of settler colonialism within the British Empire. While Indigenous people were only gradually brought within the status of subjecthood, and have continued to be denied fundamental rights, early settlers including convicts had a well-developed sense of their rights as freeborn Britons. The development of the jury system, self-government and democracy were the context for a rights regime associated with a colonial liberal order in the second half of the nineteenth century. From the late nineteenth century, Australia developed a system of social rights based on the elevated status of the male breadwinner. Through the first half of the twentieth century, the British basis of rights claims remained dominant in Australia, but from the 1940s Australia was gradually drawn within an international human rights order, in a manner that strengthened the ability of marginalised groups to make rights claims through appeals to international standards and covenants. Despite the continued absence of a constitutional or legislative bill of rights, governments and courts have been active in recent decades in developing rights protections across a wide domain.