In this chapter, the aim is to visualize wave dynamics in one dimension as dictated by the Schrödinger equation. The necessary numerical tools are introduced in the first part of the chapter. Via discretization, the wave function is represented as a column vector and the Hamiltonian, which enters into the Schrödinger equation, as a square matrix. It is also seen how different approximations behave as the numerical wave function reaches the numerical boundary – where artefacts appear. This numerical framework is first used to see how a Gaussian wave packet would change its width in time and, eventually, spread out. Two waves interfering is also simulated. And wave packets are sent towards barriers to see how they bounce back or, possibly, tunnel through to the other side. In the last part of the chapter, it is explained how quantum measurements provide eigenvalues as answers – for any observable physical quantity. This, in turn, is related to what is called the collapse of the wave function. It is also discussed how a quantity whose operator commutes with the Hamiltonian is conserved in time. Finally, the concept of stationary solutions is introduced in order to motivate the following chapter.

Business groups are ubiquitous in Asia. They are networks of firms bound together through formal and informal family ownership. Some are massive; most are highly diversified, and they are often the dominant players in their home country. Business groups are a uniquely well-suited format for the connections world. Opaque cross-holdings and pyramids of stocks ensure that families can exert effective control, even if their actual shareholdings are relatively small, and provide opportunities for playing reciprocity games with politicians, civil servants and members of other oligarchic dynasties. Although there are examples of efficient and well-run business groups, most are not. Furthermore, while it has often been argued that business groups are a response to institutional and market weaknesses – for example in relation to securing finance – they have not faded with growth and the improvement in institutions. Rather, we show how business groups have become more entrenched in Asia over time and their revenues constitute a huge share of GDP. Such concentrated ownership has also had an impact on extreme wealth, with a staggering growth in the number of billionaires.

The Korean Stewardship Code is remarkably similar to the UK Code in terms of language, although it differs significantly in motivation. A major concern in the UK is institutional investorsʼ dormancy in widely held shareholding. Conversely, a primary purpose of stewardship in Korea is to keep controlling shareholders in check, particularly by curbing tunnelling of controlling family members. This chapter elucidates contents, the enforcement mechanism, the features, impacts and implications of stewardship in Korea and its related shareholder activism. A unique feature in Korea is the National Pension Service (NPS), the largest institutional investor in Korea and the worldʼs third largest public pension fund. As a keen advocate of shareholder activism, the NPS acts as a catalyst in spreading stewardship in Korea. However, since it is a quasi-government agency, the concern is that its investee companiesʼ autonomy may be damaged in the name of stewardship. Another concern is that the government may use stewardship as a powerful policy tool to steer the private sector in line with its own socio-political agenda that has less to do with the financial benefits of the NPS’s beneficiaries.

The disproportionately low level of equity owned by controllers of dual-class firms can incentivise various behaviours in the way that they manage, or cause to be managed, their firms.With controllers feeling less of the consequences from their actions, controllers may be incentivised to ‘tunnel’ profits from the company, pay themselves high executive remuneration, cause the company to take decisions primarily in the pecuniary or non-pecuniary interests of the controller rather than in the interests of shareholder wealth, pass control to unsuitable heirs, block lucrative takeovers and, when takeovers do occur, extract control premia.Management is entrenched, meaning that when controllers take such actions, the public shareholders cannot change the management team.However, controller benefits may not just harm public shareholders, and certain controller benefits can incentivise actions that are neutral or beneficial to shareholder wealth, such as profitable related-party transactions, the bonding of a visionary founder to the firm, maximising takeover value, taking a long-term approach and risk-taking.A dual-class stock tradeoff exists, and if legal regulatory and market constraints can limit the extraction of pernicious controller benefits so that they are outweighed by benign controller benefits, the structure can be net beneficial for controllers and public shareholders alike.