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This chapter reviews the Framers basic design principles, including separation of powers, federalism, and a frank recognition that all governments are and must be coercive. It then presents a simple baseline for describing voter (un-)happiness with whatever policies the government adopts. The chapter ends with a detailed roadmap of succeeding chapters.
This chapter begins by arguing that rule of law exists in the probabilistic sense that dispassionate judges often reach similar legal conclusions for reasons that appear to be universal across humans. Well-designed legal systems amplify these probabilities so that majority opinion quickly hardens into clear rules. Still, the question remains why judges should elevate rule of law above their own personal preferences. The answer seems to be that the legal communities they serve value and reward predictable outcomes. Still, the strength of this incentive varies from one era to the next, and is almost always weaker in highly polarized eras. Politicians threats to pack or otherwise hamstring the Court can compromise its rulings. Despite this, the Court remains an indispensable check on Congress, the Executive Branch and, through the antitrust laws, private power.
The Federalist remains the best single account of how American democracy is supposed to work. That said, it remains incomplete. While generations of scholars from Alexis de Tocqueville to Anthony Downs have worked hard to fill these gaps, America's constantly-changing society and political institutions continue to encounter new puzzles and challenges. We Hold These Truths provides a comprehensive survey of recent scholarship about the Framers' vision, stressing how long-established political patterns can abruptly change as voters become more polarized, and even lead to feedbacks that amplify public anger still further. Developing a theory of American democracy for the age of the internet, Trump, and polarization, this study mixes modern social science with a detailed knowledge of history, asking where the Framers' scheme has gone wrong – and what can be done to fix it.
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