This chapter focuses on the new gas directive and regulation (the Gas Package) from the perspective of the hydrogen ‘revolution’, and the importance allocated to its future role in the ongoing energy transition and in the achievement of the ambitious net zero target by 2050. Particular attention is given to key regulatory concepts and pillars in the new Gas Package, aimed at creating the conditions for a more cost-effective transition and creating an internal market in hydrogen and low carbon gases: these are unbundling, tariff regulation and third-party access. The chapter first describes these concepts as developed by the new measures and questions whether these concepts, which have been effectively transposed from natural gas regulation to hydrogen regulation, are suitable to achieve a cost-effective transition to a decarbonised gas market. In particular, the chapter will examine whether the proposed terminology, although fundamental, is sufficiently clearly and comprehensively defined in the new measures. Second, the chapter questions whether the new Gas Package establishes the necessary stable regulatory framework for incentivising hydrogen investment, by highlighting where the Gas Package could have been more comprehensive but also flexible in its treatment of concepts such as unbundling, on the tariff regime and third-party access provisions. It also queries whether the challenges of regulatory balancing can be adequately dealt with by way of the ‘regulatory holiday regime’ as proposed in the Gas Package.

After looking at how software was created and consumed in the 1960s and, as this changed, how it gave rise to questions about the role intellectual property might play in the emerging software industry, Chapter 5 looks at the contrasting ways that patentable subject matter was seen within the information technology industry and how these views were received within the law.

This chapter looks at the process of restructuring of energy governance in CEE countries, focusing on common patterns and differences in terms of market opening, competition and patterns of ownership. Here it maps efforts towards the liberalisation of the energy sector and explains the enduring variation in political and economic institutions across countries. The challenge of liberalising energy markets while ensuring energy security is discussed in more detail, looking in particular at the implications for the complicated relationship with Russia. Finally, the chapter asks to what extent this restructuring, however incomplete, has permitted an opening of the structure of energy governance to new actors.

Chapter Two identifies the current legal and regulatory arrangements related to China’s electricity sector by examining the institutions and governing authority, pricing and tariff regulations, and investment approval. These regulatory aspects often determine the market features and characteristics of an electricity system. This chapter provides the foundation for understanding the design of critical supporting mechanisms adopted by the Renewable Energy Law and their implementation, which are discussed in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter Five delves into fuel switching in the context of market and law reform in China’s gas sector. With the objective of increasing natural gas supply and consumption, the reform of the gas sector in China has taken a significant step forward since December 2019, with the establishment of an independent pipeline operator (i.e. PipeChina) and the promulgation of essential regulations on tariffs and third-party access. This chapter discusses the overall regulatory governance of China’s gas sector, assessing the extent to which market reform and newly promulgated regulations can drive the desired outcomes of increasing natural gas supply and consumption to accelerate fuel switching.

Describes the rationale for, and approach to, regulation of the telecommunications industry. Considers the effects of restructuring policies, net neutraility, and investment in next-generation networks

Decentralization of the energy sector means the breaking-up of the sector and its vertically integrated enterprises and/or global cartels by separating its distinct functions (extraction, transmission and sale), thereby allowing for increased competition in the market. This chapter uses two case studies to illustrate the challenges the decentralization of largely vertically integrated energy markets poses for international trade law, including international trade law’s inability to deal comprehensively with the production quota practices of global energy cartels such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The chapter then studies regional energy market decentralization policies (in this case the European internal market), focusing on the panel report in EU – Energy Package, and considers which WTO rules facilitate such policies and which constrain them.

We provide evidence that both ‘first nature’ and ‘second nature’ geography matter for long-run growth. This is complemented with two new case studies on Japan and European regions over the entire twentieth century, which allow us to sharpen our focus on the role of geography, given that institutional and cultural differences within countries will be more limited than across countries. Both case studies suggest that second nature geography is essential. In the last decades, metropolitan regions around the capital cities grew faster, while others, including many former industrial regions, started to fall behind. On a global level, this is mirrored in an increasing role for market access. This evidence ties into Baldwin’s idea of the two ‘unbundlings’ of production since 1800.

Examines the reform of Central Asia’s energy utilities in the light of the principles of corporatization, unbundling and privatization defined in the reform textbook literature and advocated by development banks. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan restructured, or are in the process of restructuring, their national energy (mainly electricity) utilities. Although restructuring has, at least to some extent, improved payment collection rates, it has generally failed to transform the utilities into financially viable entities. Chapter 4 therefore discusses Central Asia’s corporate reform process, and examines the institutional and geopolitical obstacles that have stalled this process. As illustrated by the discontinuation of the restructuring of the Kyrgyz gas utility following its purchase by the Russian state-owned company Gazprom, strategic investment in energy utilities can end reform initiatives. The analysis demonstrates that, in regions of high geopolitical importance, privatization can be an obstacle to reform rather than a force for good.