Nuisance is one of the oldest and most interesting in the law of torts. It developed early in the common law to protect a person’s interest in land. The emergence and rise of the modern tort of negligence has posed a challenge to the precise scope and relevance of the tort of nuisance. An action in nuisance covers conduct of the defendant that is excessive, substantial, and unreasonable, which interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her land. Nuisance covers both physical and non-physical damage.

There are two types of nuisance: private nuisance and public nuisance.

Since liability in nuisance is strict, the defendant must establish his or her defence, once a prima facie case has been established. A defendant is only liable for a harm that is foreseeable; thus, foreseeability is essential to establish the tort of nuisance. The tort of nuisance protects the pleasure, comfort and enjoyment derived by a plaintiff in the occupancy and use of both public and private rights in land. This chapter considers the elements of each tort.

Chapter 4 turns to an elucidation of a plaintiffs pleading burden in alledging a public nuisance claim. In modern 20th century jurisprudence, as defined by the ALI Restatement (Second) of Torts, a public nuisance claim involves four elements that a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendants affirmative conduct (2) caused an unreasonabel interference (3) with a right common to the general public (4) this is abatable. The ALI Restatement (Second) public nuisance elements are derived from the common law extant at the time of drafting the restatement. Many states have codified these elements, or similar elements, in thier general public nuisance statutes. This chpater examines the competing ways in which courts have interprtede these elemts, particularly what constitutes a commonly held publci rigt. Courts also have diagreed concerning what constitutes an unreasonable interference with a public right. The chapter concludes with an exploration of of the judicial trend towards greater flexibility in defining public nusiance more expansively than the common law doctrine and statutory interpretations.