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3 results

  • Chapter 10 - Carnap on Probability and Induction

  • from Part III - The Logical and the Linguistic
  • Edited by Alan Richardson, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Adam Tamas Tuboly, Research Centre for the Humanities, Budapest
  • Book:
    Interpreting Carnap
    Published online:
    01 February 2024
    Print publication:
    08 February 2024, pp 192-213

  • Summary

    Rudolf Carnap’s began to write on probability and inductive logic in 1945, marking a surprising shift in his research interests midway through his post-PhD career (1921–1970). His 1950 Logical Foundations of Probability is unquestionably his best-known work in this area, and yet his views afterwards underwent a substantial change over the next two decades, the extent of which was (and remains) often unappreciated. Inevitably some of his views underwent critical examination, both during his lifetime and after, but he was fortunate in being able to benefit in meeting these from the contributions and support of a number of mathematically and philosophically gifted collaborators. This essay traces the origins of his interest, the nature of these shifts, and some of the contributions of the members of his invisible college. Although the special technical contributions of Carnap continue to engage the attention of a small but influential group of individuals, his more general impact was much broader, often shaping as it did the current widespread epistemic and Bayesian view of the field.

  • Achievement and the Value of Knowledge

  • Brian Kim
  • Journal:
    Episteme / Volume 18 / Issue 2 / June 2021
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    20 June 2019, pp. 269-281

  • How does being a knower and possessing knowledge contribute to living well? Some have assumed that the eudaimonic value of knowledge is exhausted by its role as either a means or a final end. On this basis, it has been concluded that knowledge is not always valuable since its value will depend upon the ends that one has. I propose to expand our exploration by considering how knowledge might be valuable in virtue of being constitutive of certain eudaimonic goods. Using achievement as an example of an eudaimonic good, I argue, by way of considering its relations to credit and luck, that knowledge is necessary for achievement.

  • Chapter 12 - False negatives

  • from Part III - In favor of safety over sensitivity
  • Edited by Kelly Becker, University of New Mexico, Tim Black, California State University, Northridge
  • Book:
    The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
    Published online:
    05 September 2012
    Print publication:
    02 August 2012, pp 207-226

  • Summary

    This chapter highlights the central importance of modal dimensions of the nature of knowledge. It focuses on several value problems regarding knowledge, describing the logical landscape of value issues and identifying a special value problem that concerns the relationship between knowledge and its parts. The chapter uses this problem to motivate taking seriously probabilistic accounts of truth-tracking and sensitivity over standard counterfactual approaches. This approaches described here rely on the three-place relation, since they offer stories that are at least initially plausible concerning the nature of knowledge. The probabilistic approach to truth-tracking shows significant promise, and can be used as well to address the original Meno problem concerning the value of knowledge over true opinion. The conclusion to draw from the discussion is that theories of knowledge that rely on sensitivity and truth-tracking conditions can go some distance toward explaining the value of knowledge, but not the entire distance.