This chapter identifies the track record of the regime – its recent history of compliance – as a key driver of the decisions of states to abide by their nonproliferation commitments. The argument begins with the simple idea that the regime is based on a fundamental bargain among member states: each member is willing to comply only so long as others do. When states join the regime, they do so with some expectation about its performance—the extent to which other states ultimately will abide by their commitments. There is often significant uncertainty surrounding this expectation, however, and new information about the performance of the regime will help resolve uncertainty and influence compliance. The track record of the regime provides the best source of such information. As time passes with few violations, states will in turn be more likely to comply themselves. Evidence of rampant noncompliance, on the other hand, will make states more likely to cheat. This logic is reflected in Japan’s consideration of nuclear weapons development over the years and is supported by statistical tests using data on nuclear weapons programs by NPT members.

The relation between neutrality and the use of force is better to be kept within the law of armed conflict rather that the law on the use of force between States. This means that the right of self-defence cannot be the indispensable legal basis for the use of force between belligerents and neutrals. On the contrary it appears that neutral due diligence has been relied on as a basis to expand the scope of the right of self-defence. The latter is admissible as the basis for resort to force only in the case of resistance of a neutral State to repel belligerent violation of its territory or by a belligerent that fully complies with its duties under the law of neutrality.

Chapter 2 explores the ILC framework of international responsibility. The aim of the analysis is to identity rules which govern the allocation of international responsibility in a multi-layered structure where sovereignty is shared between different subjects of international law. This study argues that the purpose of both the ARIO and the ARSIWA is to determine whether a subject of international law is internationally responsible. If the question of responsibility arises in the context of a multi-layered structure, such as that of the EU, additional questions arise. The allocation of international responsibility within an international body falls outside the scope of the ARIO framework. Instead, this book suggests looking for guidance in the rules of organisation and the international dispute-settlement practice in which these rules operate.