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1 results

  • Chapter 3 - The Value of Envy

  • Sara Protasi, University of Puget Sound, Washington
  • Book:
    The Philosophy of Envy
    Published online:
    01 July 2021
    Print publication:
    15 July 2021, pp 66-93

  • Summary

    This chapter illustrates that envy’s ethical dimensions are varied and complex. A paradigmatic case of vicious (spiteful) envy that is both morally and prudentially bad is slowly altered. The details relevant for the normative assessment are changed, while the core psychological features are left untouched, so that in succession there is a case of envy that is morally bad but not prudentially bad (aggressive), a case of envy that is prudentially bad but not morally bad (inert), and finally a case of envy that is neither prudentially nor morally bad (emulative). Through the different variations, the emotional episode keeps satisfying all the conditions set out in the definition of envy, and thus should be recognized as such. The chapter ends by arguing that emulative envy can be a virtuous emotion, and highlighting the taxonomy’s implications for moral education.