We often describe actions as good, bad, right, wrong, fair, unkind, deserved, disrespectful, a bit much, and so on. This article asks: Do these terms describe facts about our actions? And do those facts tell us to perform certain actions and refrain from performing others? If so, what exactly does that mean? And, if not, what are we doing when we describe actions in these various ways?

Commonsense morality divides acts into those that are right and those that are wrong, but it thinks some wrong acts are more seriously wrong than others, for example, murder than breaking a promise. This has several implications. If an act is more seriously wrong, you should feel more guilt about it and, other things equal, you are more blameworthy for it and can deserve more punishment; we may also need to consider serious wrongness when choosing in conditions of risk or moral uncertainty. This paper examines how one act can be more seriously wrong than another, and, when it is, what makes this so. More specifically, it considers a number of different views about the ground of serious wrongness and explores the possibility that this may be different when acts violate deontological versus consequentialist duties. It also asks whether there is a parallel concept that admits of degrees on the side of rightness, one of being, as we can say, more importantly right. It aims to expand the scope of deontic theory from binary questions about right versus wrong to ones whose answers admit of degrees.

This paper provides an analysis of the statement, made in many papers and reports on the use of gene editing in humans, that we should only use the technology when it is safe. It provides an analysis of what the statement means in the context of nonreproductive and reproductive gene editing and argues that the statement is inconsistent with the philosophical commitments of some of the authors, who put it forward in relation to reproductive uses of gene editing, specifically their commitment to Parfitian nonidentity considerations and to a legal principle of reproductive liberty.

But, if that is true it raises a question about why the statement is made. What is its discursive and rhetorical function? Five functions are suggested, some of which are more contentious and problematic than others. It is argued that it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the “only when it is safe” rider is part of a deliberate obfuscation aimed at hiding the full implications of the arguments made about the ethics of gene editing and their underlying philosophical justifications.