One thing that the classic non-naturalists wanted to protect was a specific epistemology. The author's concern is what impact, if any, recent work stemming from the psychology and experimental philosophy literatures should have on this debate. Some of this work, especially from epistemology, is hostile to appeals to intuition, and there are parallel empirical findings in ethics that could justify similar hostility to the appeals to intuition prized by the non-naturalists. He argues that empirical findings may be relevant to particular arguments some non-naturalists give, in particular, to the argument of Prichard, Carritt, and Ross that egoism, Kantianism, and consequentialism give the wrong reasons for some moral judgments. There are two potential objections to the wrong-reasons argument when it is given without support from wrong verdicts. Both objections owe something to the empirical literature. Empirical work may, however, discredit a particular sort of argument, the wrong-reasons argument.