

THE DIALECTICS OF ABUNDANCE

It is customary to view the development of the Western economies as a straight line, leading from scarcity in the 19th century to affluence and abundance in the 20th. This interpretation neglects the dialectical reversal that took place and is taking place within a continuous development. The relative affluence and abundance of the Western economies is indeed the result of the economic system with all its institutions and its value-attitudes which emerged during and after the Industrial Revolution in the West. At the same time, this affluence was accompanied by a change in the character of its institutions, and especially also by a change in the underlying value-attitudes and in the style of life which it prescribes. The development was and is a truly dialectical one: the economics and psychology of scarcity and its institutions brought about an economics and psychology of affluence which is, in some respects, the antithesis of the economics and psychology of scarcity. This antithesis begins to undermine the institutional, psychological, and moral bases of the original system. A dialectical reversal is under way which shakes the foundations of our economic and moral order.

Scarcity and affluence are of course relative and culture-bound

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concepts. When using them here I simply refer to the undeniable fact that in the West the volume and variety of goods per head of the population has increased tremendously during the last hundred and fifty years. This development from relative scarcity to relative affluence was also characterized—as will be discussed below—by a changing attitude towards scarcity and abundance. What matters in the context of this paper is that affluence and abundance are a value only if viewed from the point of view of scarcity; and that, with relative scarcity and poverty on the wane, affluence and abundance lose much of its meaning. This leads to a different evaluation of economic activity and towards what is being considered the “good life.” Our high evaluation of affluence and abundance stems from the values of the acquisitive society and the free market system. If we want to understand the problems of the future we will have to emancipate ourselves from these ideas.

Economic ideas (whether elaborated in “scientific” systems, or presented in the vulgarized form of enunciations by businessmen, politicians and in the mass media) have not only the function of describing and explaining reality but they reflect a system of values; they also try to deal with value conflicts and tensions inherent in the society and economy. Since the days of the *Wealth of Nations*, economic and business ethics was in conflict with the precepts of Christian ethics. The latter was and is antichrematistic and otherworldly; the former is acquisitive, activist, and directed at the manipulation and control of the external world. Everything that is a virtue in the light of business ethics is a sin, hybris and concupiscence in terms of Christian beliefs. Historically the two conflicting value systems were synthesized in the Protestant-Puritan-inner-directed, achievement-oriented value system, that emerged from the 16th to the 19th centuries in the West. Predestination, salvation, economic success, individualistic competition, the bourgeois virtues of hard work, thrift, and self-control, disciplined rational pursuit of profits were harmonized in one unified ethos.¹

Adam Smith presented a model of the economic order with the

¹ Walter A. Weisskopf, *The Psychology of Economics*, 1955, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, ch. 2.

acquisitive orientation as the cornerstone. He tried to prove the essential interdependence of (1) individual economic self-interest (2) the free market and (3) the common good. His ideas of the natural harmony of interests justified individual economic freedom by trying to prove that a free competitive market would promote the common good through an invisible hand. It is of utmost importance for the understanding of our present situation to realize that Adam Smith justified *individual* economic freedom from the *social* point of view; individual economic freedom is good because it accomplishes the *common* economic good.

Adam Smith—and with him many chambers of commerce and associations of manufacturers—tied economic liberty to acquisition. The common good is realized by individual economic liberty only if economic freedom is restricted to the pursuit of acquisition. In order to prove this, Adam Smith had to assume that acquisition, the striving for more and more profits, gains, money and wealth, is a natural trait of all human beings, a natural drive. If that were so, freedom to acquire more and more is freedom as such. The free market allows the individual to exercise this innate instinct and, at the same time, harnesses individual economic action for the promotion of the common good.

This ideology gave meaning to the free enterprise system and *justified it morally*. It gave economic man a good conscience. He could now pursue economic “egoism” with the knowledge that, *no lens volens*, he promoted the public good. He could strive for acquisition of more and more without the feeling that he is an egoistic miser. The labor and work ethic, reflected in the classical labor theory of value, justified morally the prices he charged and the income he earned; economic rewards appeared to be commensurate with individual effort, therefore, based on merit. In neo-classical thought, interest was justified in a similar way by the idea that the lender postpones and sacrifices immediate consumption and thereby has earned compensation in the form of interest as reward for the sacrifice of waiting. Neo-classical thought also justified the inequality of wages and other forms of income because they were corresponding to the individual’s productive contribution.

All these beneficent results were brought about by the free, self-regulating, competitive market in which prices, wages, and

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incomes were driven by competition to a just and fair level. The entire system was also justified on utilitarian grounds as leading to a maximum national “produce” (Adam Smith). Thus, the individual, whatever his position, could lead a meaningful life in such a society, pursuing his economic self-interest and performing his economic duties.

Edward Mason has stated that “it seems to be a fact that the institutional stability and opportunity for growth of an economic system are heavily dependent on the existence of a philosophy or ideology justifying the system in a manner generally acceptable to the leaders of thought in the community.”² I would add that such a philosophy or ideology must also be acceptable to the common man who may not understand all of its ramifications but by whom this philosophy is absorbed in a cruder and vulgarized form. The philosophy of the free market, developed by traditional economics, was and is not merely a “scientific” discipline but a moral and social philosophy or ideology, unconsciously intended to bolster the morale of individuals living under a free enterprise system.

In the history of economic thought this ideology was more and more translated into “scientific” language by classical and neo-classical economics. A business ethos was formulated in rationalistic and utilitarian terms. What originally was a moral justification of the acquisitive attitude became now a rational calculus based on expedient rationality and aiming at efficiency. The latter was defined as maximization of monetary or psychological gains. Rational efficiency became a moral imperative in technology, in business and in economic practice and theory.³

This type of economic and technical rationality rested on the assumption of a “scarcity of means in relation to ends”. The term “scarcity” is misleading. Means of production such as land, labor, and capital (the usual classification of factors of production in economic textbooks) may be relatively abundant and yet “scarce” in the sense that these means are “limited” and “finite” in an ontological sense. Human time and energy and natural resources

² Edward Mason, “The Apologetics of Managerialism,” in *The Journal of Business*, The University of Chicago, Vol. XXXI, No. I, January, 1955, 1.

³ Walter A. Weisskopf, “The Changing Moral Temper of Economic Thought,” in *Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie*, Vol. XXI, No. I, 1961, 1-20.

may be relatively scarce or abundant as the case may be but they are always finite and not infinite. The “scarcity” assumed by economists assumes, however, that these finite means are confronted with an infinite *unlimited number of ends*. This assumption that needs are unlimited, is culture-bound and the prevalent orientation of capitalist and industrial society. The *basic needs* in all societies are of a biological nature, and clearly *not unlimited*. People need a certain amount of calories, of clothing and shelter to survive. Such physical needs are subject to the principle of homeostasis according to which a certain balance and satiety is reached which sets a definite limit and end to the urge for need satisfaction. Max Weber has repeatedly stressed the *irrational* element in the acquisitive orientation (his “spirit of capitalism”) which consists in just this “endlessness” of the striving for more and more money, gains, wealth, and possessions, *regardless* of their need-satisfying capacity. This is what socialists have had in mind when they talk about use-value versus exchange-value. From the point of view of “use-value” there is a final point where needs become satisfied. The very term “need” implies this. Hunger has to be eliminated by the intake of food; but the endless “more and more” in the intake of food is physiologically irrational as every pie-eating contest clearly shows. The striving for more and more (to prove one’s salvation in the 16th century or to prove one’s worth and superiority in the struggle for existence in the 19th century) is propelled by a Faustian dynamics which is a Western characteristic, incomprehensible even today to the Eastern world.¹

Why does modern economic thought stick to this obviously time—and culture—bound idea of unlimited ends? Because *only under the assumption of limited means and unlimited ends can the acquisitive orientation be justified*. Only under the assumption of continuous, essential, ontological “scarcity” is economics a legitimate discipline because it allegedly can give answers to the quest for an optimum allocation of scarce resources to alternative ends. Only the assumption of scarce means and unlimited, infinite ends can serve as a basis for the rational calculus aiming at maximization of gains. Only under this assumption can the high value of technological and economic rationality be maintained.

¹Walter A. Weisskopf, “The Changing Meaning of Economic Action,” in *Festschrift für Walter Heinrich*, Graz, 1963, 263-275.

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What economic thought tries to explain and defend is a certain image of man, of human conduct and behavior which has become the central value complex of industrial society and which is under attack, and in the process of disintegration today.

Ever since Jevons and Marshall introduced the use of mathematics into economic thought—even already implicitly in Ricardo's mechanical model—the image of human conduct that underlies all economic analysis is one of deliberate, conscious, intentional, completely knowledgeable weighing of utilities and disutilities, leading to an optimum maximization point which determined the goal of economic action. The individual is supposed to establish a stable and permanent scale of preferences in which all marginal utilities are known and can be compared with each other. The man of economic theory is a person who is burdened with constant consciousness, awareness, calculation, comparisons between greater and smaller advantages and disadvantages and with an overwhelming burning desire towards economic success expressed in terms of maximization. This kind of rationality can only be justified if scarcity of means and infinity of ends is assumed; only then does the burdensome striving towards efficiency and maximization make sense.

Thus, the system that emerged in the Western economies consisted of a combination of (1) the acquisitive value-attitude, (2) technical and economic rationalism, and (3) the free competitive market. Acquisitive and rational individuals would compete with each other so that their rational economic self-interest resulted in the benefit of the whole and would allocate scarce resources in such a way that not only individual but social utility would be maximized. Not only the individual but also the market and the national economy is supposed to “act rationally” and to allocate resources optimally like an individual trying to maximize his advantages. In the idea of economic growth for the entire economy accomplished through the optimum allocation of resources the *individual* virtues of acquisition and economic rationality are projected into the *collective* whole which thus becomes a reflection of the individual, the individual microcosmion and the social macrocosmos thus being harmonized and identified.⁵

⁵ See note 1, ch. 17.

This ideology was undermined by a series of events before and after World War I: the growth of big business, its market power, and the countervailing growth of government control and trade-unionism; the disruption of the free market system through and after World War I, the abandonment of the gold standard, growing protectionism, administered monetary systems, and control of domestic economies through central banking, tariffs, etc.; and finally the Great Depression which undermined the belief in the naturally beneficial powers of the free competitive market.

The emergence of big business and its market power led to the growing recognition that the economy is regulated not by the invisible hand of the market but by the "*visible hand*" of corporate and governmental bureaucracy. The "automatic" economy gave way to the manipulated, administered, and segmentally planned economy. This was recognized in the early thirties in the theories of imperfect and monopolistic competition which represented not a complete break with the laissez-faire philosophy but which amended it to include elements of administration and planning. Keynesian thought destroyed the remnants of the laissez-faire creed because it was recognized that the economy does not automatically lead to an equilibrium of full employment and that counter-cyclical measures are necessary to accomplish this goal.

All these developments raised the *question of goals, values, ends, and meaning of economic activity*. This was an inevitable development as soon as the visible hand replaced the invisible one. What was the visible hand of corporations and governments supposed to do? What should be the standards and values for the economy? And who should make the decisions that are now recognized as necessary because the free competitive market does not make them any more?

This is a reflection of a general trend in modern Western thought and history: a development from a belief in a stable value system towards value relativism and then back to the question of the ultimate good. The entire history of Occidental thought from Plato to Hegel was based on the belief in a realm of ideas and ideals, a realm of the "*unum, verum, and bonum*," the one, the true and the good. This was expressed in a multitude of ways: in the Platonic *agathón*, in the One of Plotinus, in the Spirit of Hegel. From Hegel onwards, this belief began to disintegrate, a

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disintegration that was already prepared by the Reformation, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment. Nietzsche's cry: "God is dead" is the most grandiose manifestation of the insight that without the belief in a "*unum, verum, and bonum,*" complete nihilism of ideas and ideals must set in, a nihilism of which we have seen the horrible results in National Socialism. The trend has not come to a stop with the defeat of the Nazis; it continues in the positivism and scientism of our days, and it is the unconscious basis for the military and technological insanities of our time. The road away from nihilism is the re-discovery of a realm of ideas and ideals as an essential element in human existence (but not in the form of a naïve belief in a heavenly father who exists physically above the clouds).

This excursion into the field of philosophy and metaphysics is in no way irrelevant to our topic. The development of economics and of the economy reflects this general trend from value-absolutism to value-relativism and back to attempts to think rationally again about values, or better, about the good. The free market philosophy of classical and neo-classical theory reflects a transition from the belief in the good to value-relativism. In the system of Adam Smith the free market brings about prices and incomes which are considered to be fair and just, that is, good. That is still the case in the neo-classical thought of Marshall and his contemporaries. There, the automatic self-regulating market was justified because it realized the good. Twentieth century economic theory turned more and more to value-relativism and subjectivism: all subjective needs, wants, desires and tastes are economically accepted as far as they create monetary demand. Economists began to refrain from value judgements about the goodness or badness of production and consumption. The free automatic self-regulating market was supposed to take care of this problem. Any interference with the free market was bad because it restricted freedom. Freedom was here interpreted merely as "freedom from" economic restrictions by governments. Freedom became, in economics and in the political thought of the West, an empty concept of being free from external restrictions without regard to what the individual was supposed to attain with this freedom.

The problems presented by corporate and governmental bu-

reaucratic administration and planning uncovered the fallacies of this comfortable philosophy. The question of the good raised its lovely head again. If corporations and governments administer the economy, they will have to think about and to know what they want to accomplish. This requires an idea of what is good; and such an idea cannot be arrived at rationally without the belief in a realm of the true and the good even if it has to be admitted that men in their finite imperfection can never attain certainty about the substance of goodness.

So far we have treaded on familiar ground; the disintegration of the free market and of the belief in its beneficiality forms the main content of economic polemics since the great depression of the thirties. What may be new in our interpretation is the interconnection of this trend with value relativism and its slow reversal in Western intellectual history. Corporate capitalism and the welfare state was accompanied by emergence of economic "irrationalism." This is but another way of saying that the syndrome composed of the acquisitive attitude, "rational" technological and economic calculus, and the interpretation of the economy as a giant conscious, allocation robot is in the process of change and disintegration. This trend is tied in with corporate capitalism and the welfare state also because of the *affluence* and *relative abundance* which came about in the Western economies after World War II.

The term "affluent society" was coined and popularized by Galbraith. He criticizes the overemphasis on the increase in productivity and in overall production. The problem of scarcity and of an "optimum allocation of scarce resources" is less important when scarcity declines. What becomes more important is *not how much more* is produced year by year but *what* is produced. The core of Galbraith's argument in *The Affluent Society* is that not enough is produced in what is usually called the public sector and too much is produced for the private sector.⁶ However, he avoids the final conclusion from this analysis which would be public direction of investment, channeling more resources into the public sector, a function which in his opinion, the automatic self-regulating market mechanism does not perform.

⁶ J. K. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1958.

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What Galbraith actually has done—and this is of importance for our discussion—is to *re-introduce moral questions into economics*. He has raised the question of the individual and social “good.” He condemns many of the goods produced by private industry as not necessary and as obviously morally inferior. What is important is not Galbraith’s subjective moral judgments but the fact that he uses moral arguments in a tract on economics. The re-introduction of moral questions, indeed of questions of ultimate meaning, is a main problem in the affluent society. Galbraith’s stress on the public versus the private sector involves an abandonment of the market allocation and raises—but does not answer—the problem of ends of economic activity. But there is more at stake than the beneficiality of the free market and of our present allocation mechanism. At stake is the ultimate meaning of the acquisitive attitude, of the technological and economic calculus and of economic action as it was interpreted in the past.

A question arises today as to the value and beneficiality of economic growth as such, and of a possible conflict between the *quality of life* and the *quantity of production*. Doubts arise about what Bertrand de Jouvenel called “*la civilisation de toujours plus*.”⁷ Economists will have to ask themselves such questions as: can there be too much production of “bad” goods and too little of production of “good” goods? Can there be too much economic activity and too little time and energy left for non-economic purposes such as contemplation, enjoyment of nature, of the senses, for love, friendship and worship, for public service of a non-economic nature?

The affluent society will also have to ask questions about the rate of change, especially in the USA where change is worshipped as progress. If Schumpeter was right to call capitalism the process of creative destruction, one can legitimately ask whether this process can reach such an intensity that the destructive elements may outweigh the creative ones. What is the optimum rate of change from the point of view of human psychology? Is there a threshold for the toleration of change, a limit beyond which eco-

⁷ Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Free University Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 2, August 1959, 15.

conomic and technological change cannot be endured without detriment.⁸

All this puts into doubt the acquisitive attitude and the economic calculus of rational economic man. The questions raised before for the whole economy have also to be answered for the individual. We have come full circle. Max Weber described how irrational the acquisitive attitude appeared to the members of a traditionalistic society in which a "target-income" was circumscribed by traditional customs. Today, under the impact of affluence, we may have again reached this stage in which we are more concerned *with a balanced way of life* than with acquiring more and more regardless of our material and psychological needs. The questions of an optimum rate of acquisition of money income and wealth, of an optimum rate of change, an optimum rate of mobility are even more important for the individual than for the whole economy. The problem of the overabundant private sector versus the starved public sector which Galbraith stresses, has its parallel in the individual sphere. Human well-being requires a balance between acquisition of more money and wealth and of non-economic pursuits and goals of life. Individual well-being does not require more acquisition but a way of life which diminishes the tensions caused by the acquisitive and achievement imperative and the demands of technological and economic efficiency.

Those tensions have to be balanced by non-economic, non-purposive modes of existence. Such needs are discussed in economics under the heading of leisure; but this means merely the absence of work and labor, which implies a negative evaluation. Leisure means simply the time not used for work, or the time for the recuperation from work; it is not considered as an end in itself. There is, however, in urban upper middle class society a trend for leisure and leisure pursuits to acquire a value of their own in activities such as adult education, learning, the arts, the theater, the dance, etc. At present we find a strange mixture of work and non-work in the leisure pursuits of the Western countries: golf

⁸ Walter A. Weisskopf, "Economic Growth and Human Well-Being," in *Quarterly Journal of Economics and Business*, published by the School of Business of the University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 1964, 17-29.

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is played for business purposes, hobbies reflect the production process, social services are rendered in leisure hours, leisure pursuits make use of gadgets which reflect status and prestige, etc. On the other hand, work is more and more permeated with leisure: there are more rest pauses, the office becomes in part a card-playing club, the relation between boss and secretary is patterned after the relation between lover and mistress even if there are no such relations involved. (For the interpenetration of work and leisure, see David Riesman.⁹)

This mutual assimilation of work and leisure may have a deeper reason which is connected with the basic problems of the affluent and abundant society. With its present affluence and its prospective abundance Western industrial society may have reached its goal. When this goal is reached its main institutions and value-attitude system lose their meaning. What remains is the problem of improving the quality of life through a balance between higher and lower needs, economic and non-economic pursuits and the rediscovery of those values which were cherished before the industrial revolution, although they will have to be molded into a pattern appropriate for our society.

What is coming to the fore today is a trend that was present since the beginnings of capitalism and industrialism. The compulsive "irrationality" of the acquisitive attitude and of the utilitarian calculus was attacked by the utopians and by the socialists but mostly from an economic point of view; they shared the economic and rationalistic bias of the prevalent orientation. The romantics, however, criticized it from the point of view of non-economic human values. For them economics was the "dismal science" and economic activity the road to dehumanization and to the destruction of all pre-industrial, aesthetic and communal values.

The young Marx gave to this criticism a modern form through the adaptation of the Hegelian concept of alienation.¹⁰ It is quite significant that there is at present, especially in France, a renaissance of studies of the earlier writings of Marx, which ties in his

⁹ David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950, esp. chapter VII.

¹⁰ Karl Marx, *Die Frühschriften*, Stuttgart, Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1953.

critique of industrial society with the contemporary rebellion against technological and economic rationalism. Marx saw how capitalism fragmentizes the wholeness of man through specialization and division of labor, thus preventing him from realizing all of his potentialities. He stated that “in the communist society nobody has a narrowly circumscribed circle of activity but everybody can train himself in any branch of activity, and only society regulates general production, and makes it possible for me to do this today and that tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, to fish in the afternoon, to raise cattle in the evening, to be a critic after dinner, just as I feel at the moment; without ever being hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.”¹¹

This statement is a critique of the division of labor; but Marx’s earlier writings were also directed against the acquisitive attitude, the utilitarian calculus and against the organization of work in industrial society. The young Marx stressed the intellectual and psychological alienation in industrial society which presses man into too small a mold, thus distorting human nature and cutting off important aspects of human existence. In his later writings Marx restricted alienation to the purely economic appropriation of surplus value by the capitalist; but his original attack was directed against the entire restrictive mode of life imposed by industrial society. Today in the West the economic aspects of alienation and expropriation have become less important because of the relative affluence of the majority. The intellectual and psychological alienation which Marx attacked in his earlier writings is still with us. This explains the shifting emphasis in Marxian studies from the later to the earlier writings.

In a different form and from a different point of view, Freud also mounted an attack against the value system and the mode of life in industrial society. His ideas about “discomfort in civilization” and about the repressive forces (the superego and the reality principle, the representatives of society in the psyche) created a similar image of the human situation as the one of Marx: in both cases the individual is alienated from important aspects of his personality. Freud saw the repressed traits in libidinous instincts and

¹¹ Karl Marx, *Die deutsche Ideologie*, in Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA), Berlin-Moskau, Erste Abteilung, Bd. 5, 22, translation mine.

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aggressive drives; Marx found them in repressed creative capacities. They both see in society and civilization forces which alienate man from his totality and repress important human traits.

Both systems imply a revolt against the existing way of life in industrial society. On the surface, Marx seems to be the more revolutionary thinker. His ideas resulted in trade unionism, socialist labor parties and communist economies. Freud never thought of himself as a social revolutionary; but his rediscovery of the demonic and the irrational helped to release forces which changed industrial bourgeois society from within. His ideas undermined the impulse-control (the "worldly asceticism" of Max Weber) required by industrial society.

The present affluence and the possible future abundance in the Western economies have reinforced the external and internal trends of which Marx and Freud were both symptoms and creators. Herbert Marcuse has seen this most clearly. He saw the interrelation between the repressive work discipline required by industrial society and the sexual repression in this society.¹² He also saw that the growing productivity through mechanization, automation (and recently through cybernation) makes possible a release of human capacities in a non-economic and non-technological direction. If repression for the purposes of industrial production and sexual repression reinforce each other, psychological repression in general may be loosened up when work is more and more taken over by machines, automata and electronic feedback mechanisms.

It is significant that Marcuse invokes the spirit of Schiller's Letters "*Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*" (on the Aesthetic Education of Man) to indicate what he himself has in mind: namely a reconciliation of the reality principle, represented by work and impulse control, and the "pleasure principle" which he interprets much more broadly than Freud. It implies the release of sensitivity, fantasy, imagination in art and life, a liberation of the spirit of play and display in the broadest sense.¹³

This shows clearly a tendency of looking for the liberation from alienation not merely in the sexual sphere but in broader

¹² Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, Boston, The Beacon Press, 1955.

¹³ See also I. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, Boston, The Beacon Press, 1950.

aspects of existence, in all those aspects which have been suppressed by industrial society through its emphasis on the acquisitive attitude and the rational utilitarian calculus. In neo-Freudian, humanistic, and existential psychology and philosophy one can find strong trends in the same direction. Lately Kenneth Kenniston has given to these ideas what I consider a most cogent formulation.¹⁴ He talks about the “ascendency of technological values” and the tyrannical demands that technological society imposes on the ego. Technological society (identical with what I call industrial society) represses intuition, sensitivity, insight, inner vision, fantasy, “non-rational” knowledge, feeling, emotions, passions, impulses, and idealism. It favors everything that supports technological and economic values: concentration, coordination, specialized training, dispassionateness, remaining cool under stress, postponing, waiting, conceptualizing; but we do not teach honor, courage, love, wisdom. Kenniston ends with a praise of human wholeness and with pointing to the values of the Athens of Pericles and of the Renaissance.

At this point the economic and the psychological trends of our time merge. The technical and economic system of values which underlies industrial society has been undermined by economic history, and by a change in psychological attitudes as well as by the ideas of economists and psychologists. Affluence and abundance on the one hand, and the dynamics of repressed human capacities on the other hand, push in the same direction: towards a more balanced, or, at least, towards a different way of life in which non-economic, non-technical and “non-rational” values would have a greater chance of actualization than during the past two-hundred years. In the West, however, these trends are locked in a titanic struggle with the still very strong forces of rationalization, automation, computerization and quantification of life. All these trends stand in dialectical interdependence to each other: they are conflicting and antagonistic; at the same time they complement each other. The problem of our future is to achieve a *coincidentia oppositorum*.

¹⁴ Kenneth Kenniston, *The Uncommitted*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1960, esp. pp. 253 ff., 354 ff., 368 ff., 439.