

(or substantially) different; but only accidentally different. Hence the question, "What is the essence of hot water?" does not arise. If inaccurately asked such a question could mean only one of two things:—1st, "What is the essence of water?" or "What is the difference between cold water and warm water?"

On the authority of the Council of Trent we are told that the difference between the Cross and the Mass is only a modal difference; inasmuch as on the Cross the offering was bloody and on the Altar the offering is unbloody.

Now as "heat" and "cold" differ specifically so do "bloody" and "unbloody" differ specifically. But as the substance hot differs only accidentally and not specifically from the substance cold, so too the Sacrifice in its bloody mode differs only accidentally and not specifically from the Sacrifice in its unbloody mode.

Hence the question: "What is the essence of the Eucharistic Sacrifice?" does not arise. If it is inaccurately asked it can mean only one of two questions: first, What is the essence of Our Saviour's redemptive Sacrifice; or secondly, What is the difference in mode, the accidental difference, between the offering on the Cross and the offering on the Altar?

Hence as there is only *one* Sacrifice there is only one essence. And of this one Sacrifice with its one essence, there are two modes.

But using the word essence in a wide unmetaphysical sense, we may say that the essence of the Cross-Sacrifice as such, is that it is bloody; whereas the essence of Altar-Sacrifice is that it is unbloody. Yet it will be at once seen that this is to give, not the essence of the Sacrifice as Sacrifice, but the essence of its mode, as bloody or unbloody.

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GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFT UND WAHRHEIT NACH DEN SCHRIFTEN  
VON LORD ACTON. By Ulrich Noack. (Frankfurt a/M.:  
Schulte-Bulmke; RM. 10.—.)

KATHOLIZITÄT UND GEISTESFREIHEIT. By Ulrich Noack.  
(Schulte-Bulmke; RM. 8.50.)

These two studies of Lord Acton as a historian and as a Catholic are from the pen of a German scholar, who, although a Protestant, seems able to enter so understandingly and almost lovingly into the teaching of the Catholic Church, that at times he has to take her part against his own hero, Lord Acton—as for instance in the case of the dogma of Papal Infallibility. The author seems for all that quite content to remain a Protestant—an attitude which perhaps can psychologically be explained by that of the late Archbishop Söderblom of Upsala, for whom Catholicism was one—

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but only one of many—Christian systems of piety and thought, each closed and coherent and quite admirable in itself.

Thirty-five years have passed since Acton's death: and after all that has happened in the meantime it seems almost unkind to disinter these twin enthusiasms for Whiggism in England and *Wissenschaftlichkeit* in Germany, which Acton identified with Freedom and Truth. The "heroic study of records," which he learnt during his student years in Germany, and which henceforth he preached as the only method worthy of a scientific historian, remains true as a maxim, though the maxim has become a mere commonplace. But the almost mystic import of such words as "*quellenmässig*" (*ex ipsissimis fontibus*) and *Wissenschaftlich* has turned musty: for however needful it is to know in order to understand, it is realized by a post-Victorian generation that knowing is not an end in itself but a means to understanding. Nor is knowledge truth, as Acton and his teachers so often seem to think: only an interpretation of known facts can be true or untrue. Ranke used to exhort his students to have method, not genius: which almost reads like an epitaph for this cult of *Wissenschaftlichkeit*.

For the cult is dead and gone—certainly in contemporary Germany. Acton's assumption (which reads like a passage from Haeckel or Spencer) that "the methods of Science are so rigid, that they cannot be bent, and her conclusions so certain that they cannot be dissembled" makes one smile—a trifle sadly, when one thinks of the brave old days of one's youth when Science knew everything, and certainly knew everything better. In England Mr. Wells keeps up the scientifically preserved youthfulness (or puerility) of that sort of thing: but in England, thank God, the human touch and a sense of humour have never been lacking and "scientism" has consequently never been taken so seriously or ever been exalted into a mystic faith. In Germany, where it had led to a rationalism which set up individual reason as the Ultimate, the pendulum has now swung back to the other extreme—a contempt for the intellect and a collectivistic regimentation of what thought there is allowed to be. Brawn, not brains, is the watchword, and the Ultimate is the Reason of State. What greater irony could there be, than to quote to-day Acton's words that "only in Germany does Science possess dignity, freedom and authority," or to be reminded that Montalembert in 1870 hailed Germany as "the only true bulwark against servile fanaticism"?

"Servile fanaticism" was the expression used by the "Liberal" Catholics of the day to characterize those who voted at the Vatican Council for the dogma of Papal Infallibility: to-day it is the Vatican which is truly and universally seen as "the only true bulwark against the servile fanaticism" of our Black, Brown or Red dictatorships. To us who witness the actual phase of the

age-long struggle for the supremacy of the Spiritual over the Temporal, it is almost unbelievable that a great Liberal like Acton, who lived and was ready to die for "Truth" and "Liberty," should have said of Gregory VII, that the dying Pope's words at Salerno ("*Dilexi justitiam et odivi iniquitatem: propterea morior in exsilio*") represent "the last cry of a disappointed and despairing fanatic."

Though it may indeed seem almost unkind to dig up these things, dead and buried long ago, it does perhaps serve some good purpose, if only to make us realize, how things look in historical perspective, and how quickly the cocksureness of to-day may turn into the pitiful absurdity of to-morrow.

Herr Noack's book is based entirely on Acton's writings and letters and is done with meticulous care. Perhaps here and there his rendering of shades of meaning from English into German is not very happy: "evidence," for instance, is not "*Beweiskraft der Zeugenaussage*," but "*Beweismaterial*"; "a crooked canon" is not "*Krummes Gesetz*," but "*verkrümmte Richtlinie*"; and "the vacant record of incoherent error" is not a "*lustleerer*," but a "*gedankenleerer*," "*Bericht unzusammenhängenden Irrtums*."

H. C. E. ZACHARIAS.

THE MODERN MIND. By Michael Roberts. (Faber, pp. 277; 8/6.)

MEN AND TENDENCIES. By E. I. Watkin. (Sheed & Ward, pp. 316; 10/6.)

"In our own age," writes Mr. Roberts, "many people have tried to live without religion and without poetry . . . Leaving one part of their nature uncultivated, and having no language in which to speak of that part, many of them fall victims to sentimentality, and quack religions," (p. 261). It is the thesis of his book that irreligion has been brought about by this lack of language which, in its turn, is caused by an unfortunate turn of events in the sphere of philosophy: the triumph of realism over nominalism. And the first thing that strikes one in the author's elaboration of his thesis is precisely the oddity of his judgments in regard to the history of philosophy. For St. Thomas, for example, "only deductive logic was valid . . . it was a position which could not be held against the discovery of new facts"; he postulated a God "to help him to tidy up his thought"; Thomism (the author is careful to speak of it always in the past tense) was concerned with a "passive intellectual satisfaction." What is more important in this context, there is no recognition of the fact, cardinal to the author's thesis, that Thomist realism is as unlike the absolute realism with which he is in fact concerned as it is unlike nominalism; and that it does precisely avoid rendering