

CORRESPONDENCE

as a shock to most Hegelians to hear that he did. In this connection I cannot help thinking that Mr. Henson is unwise to rely on McTaggart. That McTaggart's exposition of Hegel was, to say the least of it, unconventional is notorious. If Mr. Henson will turn to p. 123 of the number of the *Journal* in which my article appears, he will find in a review of Dr. Broad's recent essay on McTaggart the following sentence: "Broad admits that if McTaggart's account of Hegelianism be compared with Hegel's writings as a whole, one is impressed with their profound unlikeness, even though one hastens to add that the Swabian 'never meant anything so sensible, or plausible as this'." I am not acquainted with McTaggart's exposition of Hegel, but, if Mr. Henson does not misrepresent it, I thoroughly agree with Dr. Broad.

Turning to a more authoritative exponent, Professor Caird, I find sentence after sentence which tallies with my account, while it belies Mr. Henson's. The universe, we are told, is, according to Hegel, an organic unity in difference. For a key to the understanding of this conception we are referred to self-consciousness. For self-consciousness is a unity which "manifests itself in the difference of self and not-self, that through this difference, and by overcoming it, it may attain the highest unity with itself."

The unity admittedly is not a blank one; it is a unity of different aspects or elements. But I can find nothing about a plurality of real and really different persons existing apparently side by side with the Absolute. What I do find is a constant insistence upon the logical priority of the unity to the differences, expressions such as "reconciled in," "overcome in," "transcended by," being continually used to describe what happens to the differences in relation to the unity. The objective world (I am here quoting Professor Caird) only reaches the "fullest realization of itself in a complete unity," and self-consciousness, upon the model of which the objective world is conceived, is spoken of as "the complete integration" of the differences that it transcends.

Now it cannot, I think, be seriously doubted that these expressions do truly represent Hegel's conception of the one and of its relation to the apparent plurality of the many. And it is precisely this conception that I have endeavoured to criticize on the ground that, if the differences are real, the unity is not really a unity; while, if the differences are apparent only, then the unity is a featureless blank which cannot be made responsible for the appearance of the differences.

Yours faithfully,

C. E. M. JOAD.

LONDON,

January 9, 1929.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Journal of Philosophical Studies*.

DEAR SIR,

A review of my monograph entitled *Phenomenology as a Method and as a Philosophical Discipline* has appeared in the current issue of your *Journal*. Protesting emphatically against the judgment of the reviewer, I request the publication of my reply.

It is obvious that the reviewer has made no effort to understand the monograph. For if he had, there would have been no question concerning its purpose or the public for which it was intended, nor references to a "maze" of materials, nor aspersions concerning the philosophical grasp of the writer. Either the reviewer has not the necessary background to estimate such a work, or he is guilty of a superficial judgment of a carefully prepared essay which has already been well received by men of rank.

It is clear to the reader that the essay is devoted primarily to the exposition of Husserl's philosophy (for example, the entire chapter on the phenomenological method), and that the writer takes the opportunity of viewing certain basic philosophical problems in its light. Some material is introduced in the fifth chapter, on the "Perceptual Object," as well as in the opening chapter, in order to connect with Anglo-American philosophy. The larger parts of chapters two, three, and four (respectively "First Philosophy," "The Phenomenological Method," and "Transcendental

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Logic") represent a statement of Husserl's views as presented in Freiburg in recent years. The second chapter, which contains the most references, illustrates Husserl's method of treating his conception of "First Philosophy" in relationship to the history of philosophy. As for its expository value, I may claim that, where relevant in the essay, there has been an accurate rendering of Husserl's thought, at times an exact reflection of the original. It is unnecessary to point out that the work presents but a part of the materials of phenomenology.

The monograph is herewith cordially recommended to the earnest student of philosophy. Such readers will not expect a profound philosophy to be presented in the form suggested by the reviewer's only quotation. Those at all acquainted with phenomenology will agree that it cannot be presented in tablet form. Husserl has warned against the danger of over-simplification.

Very truly yours,
MARVIN FARBER.

THE UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO,
BUFFALO, NEW YORK,
January 30, 1929.

[This letter has been seen by the reviewer, who does not wish to reply.—ED.]