

authoritative teaching in digestible and inexpensive form.

Undoubtedly the most impressive contributions are those by Nyānaponika himself: a magisterial discussion of Mindfulness and the practice of Bare Attention (*Satipaṭṭhāna*), and an analysis of the genuine doctrine of *Anattā* (Non-self) and *Nibbāna*. Anyone who wishes to learn what Theravāda Buddhism is all about should read these carefully. In the latter essay, the author meticulously distinguishes the genuine teaching from the various exaggerations and distortions that are often passed off as Buddhism, and brings into focus with exceptional clarity the true subtlety of the Enlightened One's doctrine. If I am right in suspecting that the greatest enemy of all religion in the present day is the various parodies of religion (e.g. in the case of Buddhism, theosophy), then this kind of essay is of immense benefit to us all. *Nibbāna* is not a doctrine of eternal life in any sense of 'life' (or 'self') that can be apprehended in terms of worldly experience, nor does experience validate any metaphysical claims on a 'self' apart from the flux of sensations, thoughts, feelings, and so on (in Wittgenstein's terms, 'there is no metaphysical subject'). On the other hand, *Nibbāna* is not a doctrine of non-existence either, nor of annihilation. The combination of ruthless demythologization of human experience and concepts, with an utterly tranquil assurance that there is a way out of the fly-bottle (cynicism and scepticism are as much to be demythologized as credulity and optimism), offers a vision that is valuable for all of us. And for the Christian in particular it is a challenge to recapture the Dionysian insistence that theology must always be both cataphatic and apophatic: we must say that God exists (against atheism), but always in such a way as also to say that God does not 'exist' (and that we are not merely contradicting ourselves or indulging in paradox).

The other essay by Nyānaponika is a thorough exposition of the teaching of Mindfulness and its importance for human well-being at every level. I would earnestly recommend a deep study of this essay to anyone who is concerned with man's spiritual and even his psychological growth. Our Lord warned us that we will have

to give an account of 'every idle word' we speak; I have long felt that the Buddhists can provide a theoretical framework which brings this teaching—which we tend, comfortably, to forget—sharply and practically into focus. It is precisely the 'idle words' that come from the heart and show us who and what we are (and, the Buddhist adds, how everything in us is impermanent and conditioned—and here too they can help us to focus on another forgotten bit of Christian doctrine: we do not know what we shall be, we have not yet received our definitive 'name' or identity; we are not, yet, *real*). If we want to be really sanctified, not just dressed up as saints, we have to face the truth about ourselves in depth; and the truth will set us really free.

On this same theme, there are some very penetrating remarks also by Dr D. M. Burns, an American psychiatrist living in Thailand, in a long essay on 'Nirvana, Nihilism and Satori', in which, as a psychologist, he goes into various aspects of Buddhist teaching and practice, showing how they fit together, and how important they are for us. In particular, his discussion of *satori*, which he compares with Christian conversion experiences, is challenging; he suggests that conversion experiences usually occur where there is already a well-formed subconscious persona waiting to come out: conversion means the emergence of this persona, and the corresponding submergence of the 'old man'. The result is generally an improvement, but there is still an awful lot left under the counter. The 'old man' has not really been faced and converted or neutralized, he is still there, underground, repented of and condemned, and latently perhaps very active, poisoning our subsequent acts and attitudes.

There are, perhaps inevitably, one or two annoying and stupid remarks about Christianity; some of the essays are lightweight, and some passages are boring, and the book is marred throughout by trivial misprints. But on the whole we can only be grateful to Mr Walshe for making these essays more widely available, and for bringing to our notice what seems to be an excellent series of Buddhist publications.

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**BODY AND MIND**, by Keith Campbell. 'Problems of Philosophy' Series. *Macmillan*, London, 1971. 150 pp. £1.95.

The series to which this volume belongs aims at providing simple introductions to the main

problems of Philosophy. Simple introductions are dangerous. The plain man no doubt

talks sense as long as he confines himself to plain talk; but when a philosopher tries to put himself in the plain man's shoes and expound philosophical theories on this basis the nonsense that can emerge is distressing; e.g. (p. 46), 'when you go on holiday you take your mind with you'.

The first half of the book is more distressing in this way than the second. It is in the first half that we are invited to examine what is and what is not compatible with propositions like 'The human mind is a spiritual thing', whose naïveté is no guarantee of their intelligibility. The second half, however, moves into a more detailed discussion of particular philosophies of mind that have recently been canvassed, Behaviourism, Central-State Materialism and the author's *nostrum*, which he calls 'The New Epiphenomenalism'. These discussions are at once more sophisticated and simpler than what has gone before.

These three last chapters are progressive. The Materialist thesis is intelligible as a correction of Behaviourism, and Epiphenomenalism as a correction of *it*. Behaviourism takes the logical connection between descriptions of behaviour and descriptions of mental states to be identity of meaning: the Materialists correctly preserve the logical connection but define mental states as causes of behaviour. The New Epiphenomenalist preserves this *definiens* but insists that it be supplemented by some account of the phenomenal character of mental states.

Unfortunately the Epiphenomenalist throws out the Behaviourist baby with the Materialist bath-water. The baby is the Behaviourists' realization that if words expressing mental concepts are to have meaning publicly observable criteria must exist for their use. Since brain states, as a matter of contingent fact, are not observable by the vast majority of those who use these words, the only observable criteria available are those provided by the behaviour of human and other animals. Descriptions of behaviour must therefore be logically connected with descriptions of mental states. The Materialist bath-water is the view that descriptions of mental states are logically equivalent to some combination of descriptions of overt behaviour and physiologically observable brain-states. Campbell throws out this bath-water by reminding us in no very subtle way of the difference between things like

groaning and agitations of the cerebral cortex on the one hand and being hurt on the other. (Strawson's reminders of the differences between first-person and other-person uses of mental concept words are much less question-begging ways of doing this job.)

Campbell leaves us with mental concepts which are a hybrid of brain-state-cum-behaviour descriptions and phenomenal-property descriptions. The components of the hybrid are detachable. An 'imitation man' could exist all of whose behaviour and physical states perfectly mirrored those of real men, but whose 'mental' states (for Campbell's idiosyncratic use of 'mental' allows him to call them this) lack the phenomenal properties our mental states possess. And the other minds problem is still with us, because we can never know which, if any, of the surrounding objects are real rather than imitation men. Nor is it possible to know which phenomenal properties, in others, are associated with which behavioural patterns.

Campbell has failed to see the power of the Strawsonian solution whereby observable facts provide logically adequate criteria for the ascription of mental predicates, but since these predicates are self-ascribable not on the basis of these criteria they are not logically equivalent to descriptions of the observable facts. This is the way to keep the baby from following the bath-water down the pipe. Campbell's way leaves, as he practically admits, all the old dualist *inconvenients* as *inconvenient* as ever. The barrenness of the land is concealed from the superficial reader by a little high-handed redefinition of 'mental'. That is all.

Strawson leaves no room for Epiphenomenalism, Old or New. The view that the full causal story of any animal's life could be told by mentioning only the physical states and behaviour of his body without the least allusion to 'phenomenal properties' is only intelligible if the descriptions of physical states and behaviour never provide logically adequate criteria for judging those properties to be present. The antecedent of the Epiphenomenalist hypothetical runs like this: 'If there were imitation men . . .' But the existence of imitation men is self-contradictory. Hypothetical propositions with logically impossible antecedents are true but uninteresting. The New Epiphenomenalist thought he was giving us something more than this.

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