

pears in the psyche as an instinct'), of morals, (the sexual instinct 'cannot be made to fit in with our well-meaning moral laws') etc. Had he been more empirical (or more scientific, in a narrow sense) we would not have had the curious treatment of energy in the essay on psychic energy.

Some theologians of distinction have apparently had little difficulty in accepting Jungian psychology, but it is difficult to see how this can be done. Perhaps the clue lies in distinguishing between scientific and intuitive psychology. There is little evidence that Jung's ideas are scientifically grounded, yet for all that they have something of the illuminating power of great poetry or great drama. Perhaps Jung is aware of this. In an important passage in the *Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche* he says: "The essence of that which has to be realized and assimilated has been expressed so trenchantly and so plastically in poetic language by the word "shadow" that it would be almost presumptuous not to avail oneself of this linguistic heritage," and again '... the much needed broadening of the mind by science has only replaced medieval one-sidedness ... by a new one-sidedness, the overvaluation of "scientifically" attested views.' But if one can submit to the barrage of psychological intuitions implicit in Jung's poetic vision, it is possible to learn a good deal about human nature from his works. It is possible however that Fromm is right, and that in the long run Jung is more destructive of genuine religion than Freud.

The other work under review, Meseguer on dreams, is a strange mixture of flashes of insight alternating with dead-pan assertions of great shallowness. How does the author know that in dreams 'Colours may appear the following night, but forms usually take several days'? How can anecdotal evidence be taken seriously in what purports to be a serious work ('A friend of mine ...', page 60; 'this reminds one of an even more curious example ...', page 63). It is hard to treat seriously an author who appears to be impressed by Dunne's *An Experiment with Time*, or who uncritically accepts the reality of telepathy, telesthesia, etc. Above all, it is hard to accept the pseudo-scientific presentation of such ideas as 'the theory of original spirituality,' 'the law of progressive impregnation,' or the very strange section on dreams and spiritual direction.

E. F. O'DOHERTY

THE CONCEPT OF MAN, edited by S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju; Allen and Unwin; 42s.

This book is described as a 'study in comparative philosophy.' It is in fact an ambitious attempt to study the concept of man in the light of Greek, Jewish, Chinese and Indian thought. The time will come, one may hope, when every serious philosopher will feel it his duty to study Chinese and Indian thought, along with Greek and Hebrew, and this work is to be welcomed as a pioneer effort in this direction. Dr Raju, besides contributing a long study on Indian thought, provides an introduction and a conclusion, in which he attempts a synthesis of the different points of view.

The choice of Jewish rather than Christian thought is open to question. Judaism has never like Christianity and Islam developed a philosophical tradition, of its own, and Dr Heschel, of the Jewish theological Seminary in New York, who contributes an essay on Jewish thought, gives no more than his own original and interesting but still personal interpretation of the biblical view of man. He conceives of man as at once 'dust of the earth' and 'image of God,' not so much a 'part of the universe' as a 'partner of God.' This brings out in an interesting way the peculiarly biblical conception of man.

Professor Wild of Harvard University writes on Greek thought, studying the concept of man in the Sophists (especially Protagoras as far as his thought can be known) then in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and finally in its influence on Mohammedan and Christian thought. The last section is the weakest and is no more than a bare sketch of what could well have been made the subject of two separate studies.

The study of Chinese thought by Professor Chan of Dartmouth College is outstanding and is perhaps the best thing in the book. This is partly because Chinese thought is more profoundly humanist, more completely centred in man than any other. The central idea of the Chinese view of man is found in its conception of 'jen'. Jen, which is generally translated 'love' means literally 'man-to-manness' and has been well translated as 'human-heartedness'. It is interesting to note that the meaning of jen was later extended to include the whole universe, so that it could be said, 'the man of jen regards the universe and all things as one body'. There is therefore a wonderful universality in the Chinese view of man, which is beautifully expressed in a famous inscription: 'Heaven is my Father, the Earth is my Mother, and all human beings are my brothers.'

Dr Raju has set himself a difficult task in dealing with Indian philosophy and has made it more complicated by including Buddhist and Jain as well as Hindu philosophy. The result is that the ordinary reader is likely to be rather confused by the number of conflicting systems which he passes in review, and presents in considerable detail. However, he provides a summary at the end of the chapter of the Indian concept of man, which gives it some coherence. The difficulty in the Indian view is, of course, that Indian philosophy, unlike Chinese, always seeks to go beyond the limits of human nature and to enter the divine. Dr Raju wisely emphasizes, however, the importance of the concept of 'dharma' and the emphasis on ethical development especially in the tradition of the Mimamsa school as opposed to the better known Vedanta. He also emphasizes that even in the Vedanta transcendence of personality does not necessarily mean loss of personality. There is a sense in which even in the Advaita of Sankara and the Nirvana of Buddhism the ultimate goal may be said to be the absolute plenitude of personal being and not its extinction.

But it is here that the greatest weakness of the book comes out. There is no serious study of the concept of personality anywhere in the book. If a study of the Christian concept of man had been included, it would have shown how the idea of the person (with all its theological implications) is central to the concept

of man. Dr Raju argues convincingly for the idea of Spirit as something transcending man, which has the power to unite all men in ultimate 'inwardness' which is the goal of evolution. But the Spirit is never conceived in a fully personal manner and man's union with God is therefore never properly conceived as a personal union. Yet it must be said that his attempted synthesis of the different points of view is profoundly suggestive. One can only wish that there were more theologians prepared to make a study of Chinese and Indian thought and to integrate these conceptions with the Christian view of man.

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MONTESQUIEU, by Werner Stark; International Library of Sociology and Reconstruction; Routledge and Kegan Paul; 25s.

Although Dr Stark's book professes a rather limited and technical aim—the discussion of Montesquieu as a pioneer of the sociology of knowledge—no better book for the general reader has ever appeared on Montesquieu. It is a pity it had to come out in this particular series, since even the informed reader who may have suffered from the clotted language of some sociologists might decide to pass the book by. Let it be said at once that their fears are largely unfounded. Dr Stark can, and usually does, write in a lucid, sensitive and immediately-intelligible style. Where he uses technical terms they are often his own, and he explains them; even occasional paragraphs of 'sociologese' are not insurmountable, and, as they occur mainly in the second half of the book, by that time the reader will be so absorbed in the personality of Montesquieu, as developed by Dr Stark, that he will not allow them to stand in his way. All the same, slight as they are, they are a pity; for Dr Stark himself is deeply rooted in the humane European tradition to which Montesquieu belonged—but the latter had the advantage of living in an age before technical jargon began to ruin prose.

Dr Stark has also followed Mill's injunction to put himself in a posture of sympathy with his author: not that this was really necessary, for an alternative sub-title for the book might well have been 'A man to like and admire.' Yet he is not bemused by Montesquieu: he tells us candidly when he shuts his eyes, when he gets carried away by rhetoric (like Erasmus), and when he is dabbling in theories. It seems astonishing that this wise and sympathetic character should have been dismissed so curtly in the text-books as a cranky Frenchman who (mistakenly) believed English government to be based on the separation of powers and that geography and climate governed morality and politics. Even a casual reading of the *Esprit des Lois* disabuses one of the first and makes one highly dubious about the second. Dr Stark shows us a man maturing visibly under the influence of experience, travel, and interested detachment. Our first reflection must be what a mistake it is to read only one work, even if the greatest, when we wish to understand a man's thought; our second, that even when young he could observe that he did not see why the manners and customs of one country should be preferred to those of another (if not contrary to morality). How wise