

cause him to modify or retract—rather, it becomes more central as his defence of it becomes more vehement.' (p.33) She does not take up the task of refuting this fallen-soul theory because 'most scholars would now regard it as having been satisfactorily refuted.' (p.33)

The task she assumes, however, is to demonstrate that the transposition from a disincarnate to an incarnate aesthetics which O'Connell claims to have constructed on his own initiative was in fact achieved by Augustine himself. In doing so he was unhindered by a non-existent theory of a pre-existent soul and was buttressed by the 'theological doctrines which give structure to the whole of Augustine's thinking as a Christian theologian and bishop: creation, man as created in the image of God, Scripture as the Word of God, and most importantly, the Incarnation—the latter being a doctrine which O'Connell curiously neglects despite his emphasis on an "incarnate aesthetics".' (p.363)

In her conclusion the author states that Augustine would agree with Prince Myshiken in Dostoevsky's *The Idiot* when he 'suggested that the world will be saved by beauty.' (p.270) And yet Harrison's sections on sin show that she is quite aware of Augustine's acute consciousness that human freedom can make even beauty a stumbling block, an occasion for turning away from Ultimate Beauty. The fact, however, that he warned his readers and his listeners of the ambiguity of beauty does not justify the conclusion that his theoretical aesthetics failed to include the appreciation of beauty in the temporal world.

Dr. Harrison has not restricted her research to one kind of thinking done by Augustine: the philosophical or the theological. The result is a comprehensive study on the nature of beauty as theorized by a Christian theologian who did not compartmentalize his thought and action. Whatever he said in any work was illuminated by all that he knew in whatever way he knew it. This book is eminently fair to Augustine because it analyzes his attitude towards beauty within the framework of his central teachings and deepest convictions. Both scholars and general readers can be enriched by it.

MARY T. CLARK RSCJ

MOZART. *Traces of Transcendence* by Hans Küng, SCM Press Ltd, 1992, £6.95, pp.xi and 81.

Professor Küng, at the invitations of the Catholic Academy in Freiburg im Breisgau and Swiss Television and the Tübingen Collegium Musicum, ventured like the rest of us in 1991—I myself got a piece into *New Blackfriars* and a few sentences on local radio in Belfast—into the Mozart bi-centenary celebration. After the much that the rest of us have written, Professor Küng says that he will 'attempt to make rather deeper theological soundings into Musical work, in two directions'. The pair of pieces printed in this little pamphlet, 'Traces of Transcendence?' and the 'epic longer version' of 'Opium of the People?', will give pleasure to a variety of folk.

285

Those who do not care for 'the sloppy word' may be pleased that Professor Küng won't let Hans Urs von Balthasar get away with 'the final revelation of eternal beauty', or allow Hans Werner Henze to indulge in talk of a divinity 'come down from heaven'. We are rather to think of 'the painfully dissonant chromaticism and rhythmic harshness of the little Leipzig gigue in G major KV 574'. Then again, those who have nothing against a little sentimental guff may be pleased by Professor Küng's own reference to the 'higher unity' of Mozart's music, which is 'rooted in the freedom of the spirit', and his remembrance of 'a garret in Paris' where there were only a dozen discs, but among these was the Clarinet Concerto KV622 which 'brought a touch of "bliss" to a doctoral student in theology'.

Both untechnical and technical listeners may enjoy together Professor Küng's thesis that 'Mozart's music has relevance for religion not only where religious and church themes or forms emerge, but precisely through the compositional technique of the non-vocal, purely instrumental music'. Mozart is remarkable chiefly, Professor Küng seems to be suggesting, for his transcending of musical categories 'in sonatas, chamber music, symphonies and especially in the operas'. He asks, 'does this transcending of musical categories, of the bounds of genres and modes in the most subtle of all spiritual arts, have anything to do with transcendence in the real sense?'. No hesitation about the sense of 'real' here. 'Certainly' is the answer.

That linkage of 'especially in the operas' with 'transcendence' may lead those—like myself, again—who have an humble delight in opera as music for the tone-deaf to hope that Professor Küng will have something to say to them in their Köchel-less state. He acknowledges an enthusiasm, alongside that 'non-vocal music' which 'really does not need words', for the *Missa Brevis* in C major, the 'Coronation Mass'. This is 'music which expounds the text'. But the further rhetorical question, 'is it just like opera?' gets the dusty answer, 'Certainly not'. Professor Küng has no intention of encouraging opera-goers. He is worriedly aware of such persons falling into some divinization of the performer, 'especially the divinization of the diva'. So he contents himself with a couple of lines about *Figaro* as 'criticism of society', a half-line reference to the 'coronation opera', *Idomeneo*, a footnote on Kierkegaard and *Don Giovanni*, and an acknowledgement that Karl Barth 'also praises *The Magic Flute*'. 'Which of us', he asks himself again, 'would like to be judged solely from our letters?'. Putting aside, for a moment, Newman's understandable desire for just such a judging, it does seem odd, after all Emily Anderson's good work in editing and publishing the Mozart family letters, to ignore the composer's own declaration to his father in February 1778 that 'writing operas is now my one burning ambition', and 'do not forget how much I desire to write operas; I envy anyone who is composing one'.

Dr Bowden's translation is often nicely idiomatic, he is very happy in his use of 'willy-nilly' less so, perhaps, in 'Priests to the lantern!',

amusingly ambiguous in a sentence about 'the religious dimension of his person' and, differently, in two minds again in a reference to the 'Prinzregenten Theatre' in Munich where the first of these lectures was first given.

HAMISH F.G.SWANSTON

GOD, ETERNITY AND THE NATURE OF TIME Alan G. Padgett. *St Martin's Press, London, 1992. pp. xii + 173. £35.00*

In this book, which started life as an Oxford D. Phil under Professor Swinburne, Padgett claims that on philosophical, biblical and scientific grounds the idea of timelessly eternal existence and a *fortiori* of God's timeless existence cannot be true (p 2). The book provides chapters on all these issues, and a final chapter setting forth the author's own distinctive view of God's relation to time, the idea that God is relatively timeless.

On a survey of relevant biblical passages the author argues plausibly that none of the writers gives a verbatim endorsement of God's timeless eternity. But do any of them endorse the opposite? If A teaches that S is P must not A be shown to possess a concept C which A knows or reasonably believes to be the denial of P? To teach that God is in time or relatively timeless (and therefore not timelessly eternal) must not A possess the concept of timeless eternity? Rather implausibly Padgett rounds off his discussion with the claim that the biblical writers point in the direction of relative timelessness.

The heart of the book is in the two chapters in which the author attempts to rebut the claims made on scientific and philosophical grounds that tensed language is reducible to tenseless, and then sets forth his own view. He attempts the reduction because he thinks that the idea of God's timeless eternity entails that a B-series view of time is more fundamental than an A-series (p,81). Recently Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski has argued that since the A-series and B-series views are both theories of time they are irrelevant to divine timelessness. (*The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge*, Oxford University Press, 1991, Ch 2). If this view is correct the issue of the relation of tensed to tenseless discourse would be beside the point.

I am not qualified to comment on the scientific section, but much could be said about the author's philosophical treatment of time. Padgett's chief claims are that the reduction is not successful, and that there is a basic confusion between logical and physical reality embedded in what he calls the stasis view of time, the B-series account. There is room for only a few brief remarks on these claims.

Much ground is covered very rapidly, and there is evidence of some careless writing. It is crucial in such discussion for a clear distinction to be drawn between timeless and temporal bearers of truth, between (using one convention) propositions and utterances. But sometimes 'sentence' is written when 'utterance' ought to be, and sentence-types