

# Reading a Quieter, British, Heidegger

Laurence Paul Hemming

Fergus Kerr, after a recent conference on St. Thomas Aquinas in the Netherlands, remarked on how a certain understanding of Heidegger's history of being is now all but taken for granted in the Catholic theological imagination. Certainly the trajectory of the history of reason traced by the Holy Father in his recent encyclical letter *Fides et Ratio* would seem to owe more than just a little to Heidegger's influence.<sup>1</sup> Yet the genealogy of this influence is not easy to trace, nor is it direct. Heidegger's work arguably exercises an influence more on those who have never read him, or at least not deeply, than on those who have (John Paul II must be counted among the latter). The increasingly common use of the word *ontotheology* by theologians, coined by Heidegger in a course of lectures on Hegel in 1930, though with roots at least as early as a course on Leibniz in 1928, and used by him in written texts at least until 1962, is testimony enough; but so is the fact that the vaguer uses of this term become progressively more detached from their precisely definite origins in the very occasions of becoming commoner.

British resistance to Heidegger's work has meant that North-Americans interpreters are much more decisive for how Heidegger is understood in English. Their emphasis has tended to be on explanation and clarification, or the minute piecing together of a narrative framework into which his thought can then be fitted. Fr. William Richardson's monumental work on Heidegger set both a tone and a framework for reading Heidegger whose reverberations still predominate.<sup>6</sup> Certain kinds of orthodox interpretations have prevailed under the technically impressive work of people like Hubert Dreyfus, John Sallis, David Farrell Krell, Theodore Kisiel, John van Buren and John Caputo, amongst others, which has led to talk of the American 'Heidegger industry'. Each, in varying degrees, has kept a reserve towards Heidegger's thought. Others, Richard Wolin, and most notoriously Victor Farías, have been unrepentantly hostile. Nevertheless, I cannot think of a single text by an American writer (although surely there must be some) that even entertains the suspicion that American recoil at Heidegger's Nazism is as much an effect of American political preoccupations as it might represent any serious engagement with Heidegger's work. American academics above all are too often ill-equipped and over-protected to overcome the introspection and lack of self-questioning that are features of political reflection in the United States.

The political liberalism and socio-economic underpinnings of American university culture have so much been taken as a self-evidence, that it has rarely understood the need to justify or assert itself. Heidegger himself was not bashful in offering assistance toward self-understanding. Consider this passage of Heidegger from 1936, comparing America to the Soviet Union:

... seen metaphysically [they] are the same: the same hopeless frenzy of unbridled technology and rootless organisation through the average man. Once the furthest corner of the globe has been taken by storm technically and can be exploited economically; once any incident, in any place, at any time, becomes accessible as fast as you like, once you can simultaneously 'experience' the assassination attempt of a king in France and a symphony concert in Tokyo, once time is nothing but rapidity, momentariness, and simultaneity, and time as history has vanished from all *Dasein* of all peoples, once a boxer can count as the great figure of a nation, once the tallies of millions at mass meetings are a triumph, then, yes then, there still looms like a spectre over all this uproar the question: what for? where to?—and what then?'

Heidegger did not waver from his view. As late as 1966 he commented on the domination of American and Western life by the planetary movement of modern technology (a term directly derived from his conversations with Ernst Jünger from 1930 to 1938) to say that 'I am not convinced that it is democracy'.<sup>8</sup> Before American readers take offence all over again at these challenging texts, it should be borne in mind that Heidegger understood the cause of it all to lie in Europe (especially the Europe of the early nineteenth century), and European forgetfulness of all that is essential (*wesentlich*), so that Europe itself has reduced everything to 'a blind mirror that no longer mirrors, that casts nothing back'.<sup>9</sup> All of this Heidegger actually traces to the collapse of *Geist*, a word almost impossible to translate into English, but which Heidegger indicates as a unity with the resonances of spirit, intelligence, depth, religion, and culture—all things which in the emerging of the very state of affairs he describes in this text have been broken down into regions which can be manipulated and consciously reshaped for immediate human purposes. Europe's spiritual decay has resulted in a land and a situation where everything is reduced to the usable, the manipulable, the *useful*. In this context it is hard to hear without irony the question posed by Hubert Dreyfus to a recent conference in London: 'so what can we use Heidegger for?'.<sup>10</sup>

The average English-speaking protestant or unbelieving city-dweller has too easily assumed an access to these the writings of the son of a Catholic sexton from a remote Schwabian village (more a humbler kind of yeoman than the peasant he's sometimes been denoted).<sup>11</sup> Uprooted from their native soil in every sense, Heidegger's works have come into English often hammered into cacophonous shapes by translators (whose warnings

to match their work against its German source have been all too quickly overlooked) wrestling with a neologising German full of puns, ironic wit, and innuendo. Detached from the classical education their author took for granted, the Catholic seminary training which was also a large part of his schooling, and the tradition of German philosophy in which he was so thoroughly steeped, they have been at best a perplexity. A stamina beyond the ordinary is required to get the punch lines in Heidegger's jocular asides—still greater is demanded by his more serious work.

It is against this background that Fergus Kerr has engaged with Martin Heidegger's work. As a British reader of Heidegger, Kerr's Scholastic theological training is certainly closer in form to Heidegger's than many Catholics could claim. Kerr's origins, like Heidegger's, are not in the city. He has a more nuanced, subtler, understanding of Heidegger's political engagement that European origin can sometimes more easily lend itself to, and his consideration of Heidegger's period as Rector of the University of Freiburg after Hitler's accession to power is one of the most sensitive and sympathetic in print. He goes further even than Rüdiger Safranski's otherwise intrepid biography of Heidegger in noting 'it may be hoped that in future references to his involvement with Nazism attention should also be paid to the manner of [Heidegger's] disengagement: it took a certain courage and manifested a certain lucidity'.<sup>12</sup> Kerr was writing before the latest and sharpest phases of the 'Heidegger affair': Safranski is all too self-consciously writing in their wake. Whatever else Safranski's caution represents, it suffers from the way so much contemporary evaluation of the German experience of Nazism has become worked into something the more disgraceful and less well discerned the more distant we are from it.<sup>13</sup> Heidegger's admonitions to his students might play a role for us as well. Certainly, we should perhaps better heed Heidegger's posthumous observation that—without the benefit of hindsight—he was not so wise at the time as to see what it would all lead to.<sup>14</sup>

Kerr notes the extent to which Heidegger's lecture courses throughout the 1930s and 1940s were implicitly, and often enough explicitly, critical of Nazi philosophical and political concerns. His lecture courses from this period often begin with circumloquacious dullness until the worst of the spies had left in boredom, upon which the meaning of a term like '*Gleichschaltung*', a key term of Nazi ideology, might be discussed, or the question 'A People (*Volk*): What is That?'.<sup>15</sup> Heidegger's whole reflection on the nature of the Greek *polis*, which stems from this time, is an explicit challenge to the Nazi ideology of the *Volk*.<sup>16</sup> Kerr tells us that Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche above all 'offer an alternative interpretation of the significance of the philosophical texts which the Party had misappropriated'.<sup>17</sup> A glance at the discussion in these lectures of Nietzsche's 'alleged Biologism' and "Biological"

interpretation of knowledge' confirms the extent to which Heidegger's critique went right to the heart of the Nazi misadventure with Nietzsche.<sup>18</sup> Heidegger's remarks on this period, given to *Der Spiegel* in 1966 but not published until after his death in 1976, and so after Kerr's remarks, corroborate Kerr's interpretation more closely than much subsequent interpretation has dared allow. In particular Heidegger suggests: 'All who could hear, heard that this was a confrontation with National Socialism'.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, Kerr does not exonerate Heidegger: 'he was no hero'; there can be no doubt that Heidegger also made his own incommensurable accommodations with the regime.<sup>20</sup>

Kerr's sympathy for Heidegger has never led him to the kind of broad, expository work that followed in the wake of his affection for Wittgenstein. His considerations have been fragmentary and full of their own ambiguous appreciations. Some of his earliest researches were focused on Heidegger, and yet were never completed. At the time, surely, so much that has been necessary to a deep understanding of Heidegger was simply unavailable. Yet his insights have often been spectacularly confirmed by later published work. I know of no other commentary on *Being and Time* from this period (1974) that so clearly explains the fundamental issue in the text to be working in the same province as Aristotle's use of the pre-Socratic term *phronesis*. Yet Kerr notes: 'What happens in effect is that by reversing the Aristotelico-Thomistic conception of the priority of contemplative reason (theory) over practical reason (practice) Heidegger makes Aristotle's 'man of practical wisdom' (*phronimos*) the hero of *Sein und Zeit*.'<sup>21</sup> The underlying thinking that Kerr identifies here (though without reference to Aquinas) is laid out in full in the first division of Heidegger's 1924–25 lectures on Plato's *Sophist*, an essential part of the working out of the background of *Sein und Zeit*, but published only in 1992.<sup>22</sup>

Heidegger's collected works, currently projected to run into 102 volumes (many yet to be published) only began to appear in 1976. There have really been only two real books—*Being and Time*—a fragment of a larger, incomplete work, and the so-called *Kantbuch* of 1929, whose status in his thought Heidegger put into question in the preface of the second edition in 1950.<sup>23</sup> The rest of the material is mainly essays, short lectures, courses of lectures of great clarity and pedagogical flair, and un-edited texts of astonishing density.

If Kerr's ambiguity toward Heidegger has not resulted from his consideration of Heidegger's political engagement, it appears to spring from two other sources: in the first instance has been his struggle to reconcile Heidegger's thought with Anglophone philosophy's rejection of it. Gilbert Ryle's 1929 review of *Sein und Zeit* has exercised him on more than one occasion.<sup>24</sup> Kerr devotes almost the entirety of his 1982 extended review of *The Piety of Thinking*, a collection of English translations of

Heidegger's work published in 1976, to the question.<sup>25</sup> The title, 'The Use of Heidegger', in contrast to Dreyfus, refers to Heidegger's concern with and understanding of language, contrasted to Wittgenstein and to the analytic or 'Fregean' tradition's own concerns and analysis. Kerr breaks off, with the promise 'to be continued', perhaps because such a discussion cannot be successfully concluded, at least, not before analytic philosophy has undergone deeper changes than it has already done even since Kerr's observations were made.

If the first ambiguity belongs to the sphere of Kerr's professional interest in philosophy, the second is perhaps much closer to home, and perhaps for that reason is the source of Kerr's fascination with Heidegger and his tentativeness toward him. On more than one occasion Kerr has considered Heidegger's roots in Scholasticism and neo-Thomism, his seminary training, and his break with the Catholic Church. He presents a careful analysis of what Heidegger himself referred to when he said that 'philosophical research is and remains atheism'.<sup>26</sup> Kerr notes that 'according to Heidegger, it is Christian theology which bears responsibility for leading our understanding of ourselves so far off the track that our sense of ourselves as human beings is lost in variations on the myth of the worldless "I"'.<sup>27</sup> The problem as Heidegger understood it, however, is not strictly speaking one of *theology's* making, but of *philosophy's*. It is when theology is absorbed into philosophy, and most importantly when Christian theology is conflated with Plato's and Aristotle's philosophical use of the term *theologia*, and this too is bound up into philosophy's work, that metaphysics becomes ontotheology. It is no accident that this term was coined in relation to Hegel, and is best known from when it reappears in the sections of what was published in English as *Identity and Difference* in relation to Hegel.<sup>28</sup> It is Hegel who identified the absolute movement of *Geist* with its culmination in Christian revelation. Absolute subjectivity and the person of Christ become one and the same thing. Is this the moment in the early nineteenth century when Europe's decay reached its fulfilment, the very moment when faith and philosophy become *fused*? Is the modern manifestation of the West, the era of the planetary domination of technology (what we would call globalisation), nothing other than the production and manifestation of the death of *Geist*?

Heidegger did indeed refer to Hegel as the 'fulfilment' of metaphysics, but only in prosecution of his sustained critique of philosophical subjectivity, the very critique which, taken up by figures like Karl Rahner and Eberhard Jüngel (each heavily indebted to Heidegger), Kerr refers to in the opening pages of *Theology after Wittgenstein*.<sup>29</sup> Cartesian Subjectivity itself springs from a work whose very title, *Mediations on First Philosophy*, is a reference to, and critique of, Aristotle's 'first philosophy' which is 'theology'.<sup>30</sup> Descartes provides the basis for this fusion, which

Hegel fulfils and Nietzsche all too well exposes in its enormity. The reading of Heidegger which has captivated Kerr and tantalised many Catholics too quickly assumes that in developing his critique of metaphysics Heidegger is working out of a Scholastic or neo-Scholastic ground. Kerr argues that 'there is a sense in which Heidegger's work is substantially a deconstruction of neo-scholastic ontological metaphysics'.<sup>31</sup> If this is true, it really is only because Heidegger is destructuring what laid out and made this metaphysics possible, and so what was already in place before it. Heidegger was too close a reader of the actual texts of Aquinas, of Plato, and especially Aristotle, not to be led into what provided the basis for them. He understood all too well that if Scholasticism was not itself a philosophy of subjectivity, it had prepared the way for it, precisely in the extent to which it also was working out of a ground laid down by Plato and Aristotle in their own interpretations of what preceded them. It is only when we understand this, that we can make sense of the outrageous comment that in the matter of truth, 'Nietzsche is unwittingly in perfect agreement with *Thomas Aquinas*'.<sup>32</sup>

It is in forcing a wedge between philosophy and theology that Heidegger was at his most determined. *Philosophy*, or the thinking of being, could never be conflated with *theology's* reflection on faith in God as creator of the heavens and the earth. This is the reason for Heidegger's extraordinary polemic at the beginning of his lectures entitled in English 'An Introduction to Metaphysics'. Taking Leibniz's question 'why are there beings at all instead of nothing' he remarks that anyone for whom the Bible is divine revelation already has the answer to this question: 'God himself "is" as the uncreated creator'.<sup>33</sup> He does not mean by this, however, that the believer cannot think. Rather, that the term 'uncreated creator' and the ascription of being to God are themselves both formulae and fruits of metaphysics, they are ontotheological propositions masquerading as matters of faith. It is what he says after these remarks, however, that is more important. First, that faith must genuinely expose itself 'to the possibility of unfaith' or it is not faith, by which Heidegger means that faith must always be *mine*, it cannot consist in things which I have merely been handed down, rather I must be handed over to what faith teaches.<sup>34</sup> The implications for what tradition means, and who is handed over to what, are irresistible here. Second, the beginning words of the book of Genesis represent no answer to Leibniz' question: 'Quite aside from whether this sentence of the Bible is true or untrue for faith, it can represent no answer at all to our question, because it has no relation to this question'.<sup>35</sup>

Both in *Immortal Longings* and in 'Getting the Subject back into the World' Kerr suggests that for Heidegger it is the Bible that is at fault in producing an understanding of God from which something like ontotheology results. It is easy to see why, when reading Heidegger's jibes

and asides, such a view would seem to be correct. Heidegger's point is simply that the Biblical texts, and by implication the Church and its whole dogmatic teaching (which elsewhere he does not spare) can never form the basis of a philosophical reflection on the world. That they have formed such a basis, and the extent to which that basis is taken to be decisive for philosophical thinking, is apparent to anyone who has read the *General Scholium* to Newton's third edition of the *Principia Mathematica*.<sup>36</sup>

Kerr has noted the extent to which Heidegger 'repeatedly mocks the notion of the Cartesian self in such terms that it gradually becomes clear that his implication is that only a god would fit the picture'.<sup>37</sup> If this is correct, it is all the more so because of the seriousness with which Heidegger tackles the question of the place of God: Heidegger returned to Nietzsche's discussion of the death of God repeatedly. Always, however, Heidegger is keen to stress that it is the God of metaphysics, the God of ontotheology, that has been declared dead. Moreover, this does not mean that humanity, even insofar as it seeks to, can supplant the place of God. 'Never can man put himself in the place of God, because the essence of man never reaches the essential realm belonging to God'.<sup>38</sup> How can one not hear in this a questioning of the claims for the absolute movement of *Geist*, the absolutisation of which unravels into a world dominated by technology and unable to face the question of God?

At the same time, Heidegger is at pains, precisely because philosophy is the thinking of being, the 'science of being insofar as it is being'<sup>39</sup> to separate the thought of being from the understanding who God is. Thus in a 1951 seminar to the 'Old Marburgers', the former pupils of Bultmann, he says 'I believe that being can never be thought as the ground and essence of God'.<sup>40</sup> Heidegger's point is precisely as Kerr identifies it in relation to Rahner (at the beginning of this discussion). God's granting of God takes place in the realm of being, but cannot be derived from being, in advance of God's self-gift and self-disclosure. Being is always the being of being-human, and yet being is nothing human in itself. Nor even is being an alternative source or site of meaning from that which God grants. Being is always already a human concern.

The perplexity that Catholics in particular routinely experience in reading Heidegger, and that Kerr's work exemplifies, is well illustrated by Kerr's identifying that 'we entertain secret aspirations to divinity. To say that one is never ground of one's own being (*causa sui*) and that one is never the total actualisation of one's possibilities (*actus purus*) is, in traditional theological language, to say that one is not God. Our way of being in the world could seem so defective only because we compare it, unwittingly no doubt, with the way of being and knowing appropriate only to God'.<sup>41</sup> The problem with these sentences, the problem that Catholics are so often left with, is that Kerr's view only holds as an explanation of



Heidegger if *actus purus* and *causa sui* are proper names for God: they are not. They are *metaphysical*, and so *ontotheological*, names for God. For Heidegger, here is the *very attempt* to think being as the essence and ground of God. If we entertain aspirations to divinity, at the same time, we are busy producing the god whom we aspire to be. The traditional theological language for God names no God—it names only something that has been produced within the being of being-human! Our aspiration is simply to the highest possibility of ourselves, *which obscures God's self-disclosing*, and which stands in place of all divinity. Hence Heidegger's caustic comment that: 'Where there is force and power, there is finitude. Hence God is not powerful, and 'all-powerfulness' (omnipotence) is, properly thought, a concept that dissolves like all its companions into thin air and the unthinkable. Or otherwise, if God is powerful, God is finite and in any case something other than that which is thought in the common representation of God who can do anything and so is belittled to an ordinary essence.'<sup>42</sup> To think of God as omnipotent *as such* obscures who the God might be, who alone might bring himself to self-gift. In consequence of this, must omnipotence disappear from our discourse about God? Or rather is it not that, for the Christian at least, God might be omnipotent *for me*. That I might have faith in such a God is not the same as saying that God is omnipotent *as such*, or that God is omnipotent whether I believe it or not. It speaks only of my way into God, not the essence of God in God's self. This is precisely the point Heidegger makes in relation to God as creator of the world, and in the question of faith's belonging to the danger of unfaith. It is *my* being which is at stake in relation to faith in God, not being as such.

Kerr's conclusion, that 'Heidegger's version of getting the subject back into the world thus displays a deeply ambivalent attitude towards Christian theology'<sup>43</sup> is true only if we accept that this does not entail either that Heidegger therefore displays a deeply ambivalent attitude towards Christian *faith*, or even the opposite. He says little enough of faith: for Heidegger, it is theology, and then only in its relation to philosophy, that is under the spotlight.

The confusion, in large part, that so many of us have experienced in reading Heidegger arises out of what we think Heidegger is doing when he takes transcendence apart. We have been taught to assume that God is the end of transcendence, even named God as *the Transcendent*. Heidegger consistently criticises the notion of transcendence as it is derived from Plato's *epekeina*, the stretching over and beyond. For Heidegger, humanity is that which *is* as *transcending*. Transcending is here better understood as 'worlding', not where I world, but where 'it worlds for me'. World is the *there* wherein I find myself, the there that being is for me. This is the real meaning of *Dasein*. Not being-there, but being-the-there. The fourfold, into



which both too much and too little has been read, is the 'clearing' of being wherein human being takes its place and finds itself—it is humanity as transcending and returning to itself: the place where God may also be self-granting. Surely such a granting for Christians would have to be the coming into being of Jesus, the irruption into what I know of my being that Jesus is the Christ, the only-begotten of the Father?

As Fergus Kerr has noted all too well, above all, lines of research arising out of Aristotle were central to Heidegger's researches, from before *Being and Time* and forwards. The difficult and tentative place that Kerr has held open for Heidegger in English-speaking, and especially theological, circles has been all too precious, and yet no easy place to be. Heidegger continues to confront us with the riddles and difficulties that thinking is, that thinking ourselves *is*. A young German student, now Professor, having been given the chance to converse with the master himself, could after a few questions contain himself no longer and asked, 'but Herr Professor Heidegger, what of God?' Heidegger's reply is full of difficulty and riddle, alluding as it does to Aristotle's understanding of divinity as the *thinking on thinking*, and yet returning the question to the questioner all over again: 'the question of God?—*that* is the most thought-worthy'.

- 1 Cf. John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio*, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Rome, 1998. Translated as *Faith and Reason*, London, CTS, 1998. See esp. §§72–91.
- 2 Kerr, F., Rahner 'Retrospective III: Transcendence or Finitude' in *New Blackfriars*, Vol. 62, No. 735, p. 377.
- 3 Heidegger, M., *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes in Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 32, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1988 (1980), p. 4. 'Die Hegel ebensowenig kannte wie Kant'.
- 4 Cf. *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1987 (1962), pp. 76–78.
- 5 See, for just one example, the introduction to Heidegger's lectures on Schelling in 1936. (Heidegger, M., *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit in Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 42, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1988, pp. 7–13. English translation by Stambaugh, J. as *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom* [from the edition published by Niemeyer Verlag], Ohio, Ohio State University Press, 1985, 4–11.) The subjects of Heidegger's lectures were all male.
- 6 Richardson SJ, W., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, Dordrecht, Nijhof, 1963.
- 7 Heidegger, M., *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1998 (1953), p. 28 ff. 'Metaphysisch gesehen [sind sie] dasselbe; dieselbe trostlose Raserei der entfesselten Technik und der bodenlosen Organisation des Normalmenschen. Wenn die hinterste Ecke des Erdballs technisch erobert und wirtschaftlich ausbeutbar geworden ist, wenn jedes beliebige Vorkommnis an jedem beliebigen Ort zu jeder beliebigen Zeit beliebig Schnell zugänglich geworden ist, wenn man ein Attentat auf einen König in Frankreich und ein Symphoniekonzert in Tokio gleichzeitig 'erleben' kann, wenn Zeit nur noch Schnelligkeit, Augenblicklichkeit und Gleichzeitigkeit ist und die Zeit als Geschichte aus allem Dasein aller Völker geschwunden ist, wenn der Boxer als der große Mann eines Volkes gilt, wenn die Millionenzahlen von Massenversammlungen ein Triumph sind—dann, ja dann greift immer noch

wie ein Gespenst über all diesen Spuk hinweg die Frage: wozu?—wohin?—und was dann?"

- 8 *Spiegel-Gespräch* from *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges in Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 2000, Vol. 16, p. 668. 'Die planetarische Bewegung der neuzeitlichen Technik . . . Ich bin nicht überzeugt, daß es die Demokratie ist.'
- 9 Heidegger, M., *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 35. 'Die einem blinden Spiegel gleicht, der nicht mehr spiegelt, nichts mehr zurückwirft.'
- 10 Dreyfus, H., paper *Could Anything be More Intelligible than Everyday Intelligibility* at the conference *The Philosophy of Heidegger* for the School of Advanced Studies in the University of London, 2nd June 2000.
- 11 Cf. Kerr, F., 'Metaphysics after Heidegger: for his eighty-fifth birthday' in *New Blackfriars*, Volume 55, No. 651, August 1974, p. 350.
- 12 Kerr, F., 'Metaphysics after Heidegger', p. 351. Cf. Safranski, R., *Ein Meister aus Deutschland: Heidegger und seine Zeit*, Frankfurt, Fischer, 1997. Translated by Osers, E. As *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1998. See especially chapters 13 and 14.
- 13 Although anyone needing to be reminded of the situation in Germany from 1918 to 1934—the period that concerns us here—and beyond to 1945 should turn to Michael Burleigh's outstanding recent account in Burleigh, M., *The Third Reich: A New History*, London, Macmillan, 2000, esp. pp. 149–205.
- 14 See, for this, the posthumously published commentary Heidegger wrote in 1945 as *Das Rektorat 1933/34: Tatsachen und Gedanken* from *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges*, p. 376. 'Diejenigen, die damals schon so prophetisch begabt waren, daß sie alles kommen sahen, wie es kam—so weise war ich nicht –, warum haben sie fast zehn Jahre gewartet, um gegen das Unheil anzugehen?'
- 15 Cf. the first lecture course Heidegger gave after resigning as Rector of Freiburg University in the Summer Semester of 1934, published as *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache in Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 38, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1998, p. 11, and *Was ist das, ein Volk?*, pp. 60–70.
- 16 Cf. in particular, Heidegger's lectures on Hölderlin, *Der Ister* and *Andenken* from 1941 and 1942. Published as volumes 52 and 53 in the *Gesamtausgabe*.
- 17 Kerr, F., 'Metaphysics after Heidegger', p. 351.
- 18 Heidegger, M., *Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis in Gesamtausgabe* Vol. 47, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1989, pp. 58 ff. 'Nietzsches angeblicher Biologismus' and pp. 192 ff. 'Nietzsches "biologische" Deutung des Erkennens'. Cf. Heidegger, M., *Nietzsche*, Pfullingen, Neske, 1961, Vol. II, pp. 517 ff. and 590 ff. English translation by Krell, D. F., *Nietzsche by Martin Heidegger*, San Francisco, Harper Collins, 1987, pp. 39 ff and 101 ff.
- 19 Heidegger, M., interview given 23rd September 1966 and published posthumously on the 31st May 1976. Cited from *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges*, p. 665. 'Alle, die hören konnten, hörten, daß dies eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nationalsozialismus war'.
- 20 Kerr, F., 'Metaphysics after Heidegger', p. 351.
- 21 Kerr, F., 'Metaphysics after Heidegger', p. 346.
- 22 Heidegger, M., Platon: *Sophistes* in *Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1992, Vol 19. English translation by Rojcewicz, R. and Schuwer, A., as *Plato's Sophist*, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1997.
- 23 Heidegger, M., *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik in Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1991 (1929), Vol. 3. Cf. xvii. English translation by Taft, R., *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Indiana, Indiana University

Press, 1990, p. xviii.

- 24 Originally published in *Mind*, Volume 38 (1929), and subsequently in Ryle, G., *Collected Papers*, London, Hutchinson, 1971, Vol. I, pp 197–214. Kerr considers it in 'Getting the Subject back into the World: Heidegger's Version' in Cockburn, D. (ed.) *Human Beings*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 186 and in Chapter 3 of Kerr, F., *Immortal Longings: Versions of Transcending Humanity*, London, SPCK, 1997, p. 46, as well as in Kerr, F., 'The Use of Heidegger' in *New Blackfriars*, Vol. 63, No. 740, February 1982, p. 55.
- 25 Kerr, F., 'The Use of Heidegger'. Cf. in particular p. 65.
- 26 Heidegger, M., *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* in *Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1979, Vol. 25, p. 109 ff. 'Philosophische Forschung ist und bleibt Atheismus.'
- 27 Kerr, F., 'Getting the Subject back into the World', p. 174.
- 28 Heidegger, M., *Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik in Identität und Differenz*, Pfullingen, Neske, 1990 (1957), esp. pp. 31–36. Translated by Joan Stambaugh as *Identity and Difference*, San Francisco, Harper, 1969.
- 29 Kerr, F., *Theology after Wittgenstein*, London, SPCK, 1997 (1986), pp. 7 ff.
- 30 Descartes, R., *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia* in Adam, C. And Tannery, P., *Descartes*, Vol. VII; cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1026a18 ff.
- 31 Kerr, F., 'Metaphysics after Heidegger', p. 346.
- 32 Heidegger, M., *Grundfragen der Philosophie* in *Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1984, p. 102. 'Nietzsche . . . geht . . . ohne es zu wissen, vollkommen einig mit Thomas von Aquin.'
- 33 Heidegger, M., *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 5. 'Gott selbst "ist" als der ungeschaffene Schöpfer.'
- 34 Cf. Heidegger, M., *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 5.
- 35 Heidegger, M., *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 6. 'Ganz abgesehen davon, ob dieser Satz der Bibel für den Glauben wahr oder unwahr ist, er kann überhaupt keine Antwort auf unsere Frage darstellen, weil er auf diese Frage keinen Bezug hat.'
- 36 Newton, I. Ed. Koyré A. and Cohen I. B., *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972, Vol. II, p. 760. 'Elegantissima haecce solis, planetarum et cometarum compages non nisi consilio et dominio entis intelligentis et potentis oriri potuit.'
- 37 Kerr, F., *Getting the Subject back into the World*, p. 178; *Immortal Longings*, p. 47.
- 38 *Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist Tot'* in *Holzwege*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1994 (1950), p. 255. 'Nie kann sich der Mensch an die Stelle Gottes setzen, weil das Wesen des Menschen den Wesensbereich Gottes nie erreicht.'
- 39 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1026a32–33; Plato, *Thaetetus*, 155e4 ff.
- 40 *Seminare* in *Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1986, Vol. 15, p. 437. 'Ich glaube, daß das Sein niemals als Grund und Wesen von Gott gedacht werden kann.'
- 41 Kerr, F., 'Getting the Subject back into the World', p. 189.
- 42 *Aristoteles, Metaphysik  $\theta$  1–3* in *Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1981, Vol. 33, p. 158. 'Wo Kraft und Macht, da Endlichkeit. Daher ist Gott nicht mächtig und 'Allmacht' ist, recht gedacht, ein Begriff, der wie alle seine Genossen sich in Dunst auflöst und nicht zu denken ist. Oder aber, wenn der Gott mächtig ist, dann ist er endlich und jedenfalls etwas anderes als das, was die gemeine Vorstellung von Gott denkt, der alles kann und so zu einem Allerweltswesen herabgewürdigt wird.'
- 43 Kerr, F., 'Getting the Subject back into the World', p. 189.