

hollowness, as witnessed to by the sumptuous food a certain Benedictine community enjoys (p. 101)—though I doubt if this is peculiar to that monastery—and on the other hand the confusion of poverty with inefficiency, like the English convent whose constitutions forbid anything other than soda for use in washing clothes (p. 164).

The question is, of course, is the religious life doomed to extinction? The figures given by Geoffrey Moorhouse are daunting enough to make considerable contraction a certainty: for example, the unofficial estimate that 2,000 nuns abandoned their vows in the United States in 1967, and the 50 per cent drop in the number of American Trappists in ten years or so. His gloomy figures for the English Dominican drop-out (40 per cent in five years) are not accurate, however. He has been misled by the *Catholic Directory*, which did not include English Dominicans working in South Africa. The challenge has been taken up by many orders, though the response of some betrays a panicky loss of nerve and superficial 'with-it' reformism. Like the connivance of the Dutch Dominican superiors in two of their novices studying

agriculture rather than theology (p. 222). Or the incredibly liberalist and apolitical view of religious life and Christianity witnessed to by the highly praised (and rightly!) founders of Taizé and the Little Brothers: 'Together they have rejected the idea of converting, in any accepted sense, the agnostic or half-believing world. . . . Together they have argued that the Christian duty in the world is unself-consciously to take the next man as you find him and to offer him everything in the way of care and affection that he wants: nothing more or less' (p. 223). The religious' mission to the world is rooted in his vows and prayer life and it is in this basic and difficult area that most of the radical reevaluation of the religious life has to start, but it is a task that can be conveniently avoided by a giddy rush into activism. Geoffrey Moorhouse strikes the correct note on page 180: 'The religious life at present is on the change and it is not a comfortable time for anybody except the ones with unshakable calm and self-possession and hope, with a certain faith and a capacity to endure all things.'

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**IN DEFENCE OF FREE WILL**, by C. A. Campbell. *George Allen & Unwin, London, 1967. 275 pp. 45s.*

This is a collection of philosophical papers by Professor Campbell published over a recent period of 30 years. All are worth reading, but the three chapters on Free Will are perhaps the most important, and this review is concerned with them alone.

We are often in situations of choice between alternatives in which we feel sure (1) that we can do X; (2) that we can do Y; (3) that we can choose between them. And by 'can' we do not mean 'can if . . .' but just 'can'. When we have chosen and done X we say 'I could have chosen and done Y instead', not 'I could have if . . .' ('if I had been a better man', or 'if I had had a stronger will') but 'I could have' meaning 'I was able to'. This, which we may call the common sense view, has often come under attack by philosophers, but Professor Campbell stoutly resists all attempts to water down its claims, or to suggest that anything short of them would suffice to ground our notion of moral responsibility for our actions.

It is customary to attack the common sense view on the following lines: a choice issuing in action is an event in the causal order, hence an effect determined by its total cause, which will obviously include factors in the agent's nature for which he is not fully responsible; or

else it is uncaused, in which case responsibility for it cannot be assigned. In either case the notion of absolute personal freedom of choice and the claim that one could, in any absolute sense, have acted otherwise than he did, are both empty.

In reply it may be admitted that human choices are subject to causal law, but argued that the only freedom presupposed by the notion of moral responsibility is freedom from compulsion, and that this is compatible with subjection to causal law. It may also be conceded that 'could have acted otherwise' should be understood, not in a categorical, but in a hypothetical sense, which is all we need for moral responsibility. Mr Nowell-Smith, for example, has suggested that in order to hold someone morally responsible for an action we need only claim that he could have acted otherwise had he been a different sort of man, or if he had been differently placed; and Moore was inclined to think that all we mean by saying that a person could have acted otherwise is that he *would* have acted otherwise *if* he had chosen to.

Professor Campbell is not prepared to make any of these concessions. He convincingly rejects the views of Mr Nowell-Smith and

Moore, which are widely held to have been refuted in J. L. Austin's Paper 'Ifs and Cans' (*Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1956, re-published in *Philosophical Papers*, O.U.P., 1961). And he evades the dilemma about causality in a way that should be congenial to modern thought about persons. He maintains that it cannot sensibly be said of any single event in an unbroken chain of causal continuity that it might not have happened. Therefore, he argues, free choices cannot have this sort of place in the causal order. Why has it been assumed that they must? As a result of the fallacy of bringing to the interpretation of human action categories derived solely from the standpoint of the external observer. By treating human choices-issuing-in-action as mere *events*, we miss the point that they are also *deeds*. 'It is just the deed (or decision) as *act*, which is the other side of the deed (or decision) as *event*' (p. 53). What we require for a causal explanation of a deed is not another *event* to serve as proximate cause, but simply a *doer*. From our own experience as doers we recognize *ourselves* as the 'causes' of our freely chosen acts in the sense that we are their originators. When considering human acts we need the category of creativity, which is applicable only to persons capable of conscious purpose; we cannot exhaustively analyse human action in simple terms of cause and effect applicable to physical changes.

Professor Campbell develops these views in the essay on 'The Psychology of the Effort of Will', in which he studies the situation of a person faced with an intense desire to do X which he believes to be morally wrong, but who does Y instead by an effort of will exerted against the existing 'set' of his character and conative dispositions. This effort of will, he holds, issues from the self's absolutely free decision to make it: thus it is not, as are character and desires, owned by the self, but is creatively originated by the self—i.e. by the person.

On this theory there is no problem about 'uncaused' choices. What is proposed is that we extend our notion of causality to cover not only those events which are determined by their place in the causal network of physical happenings, but also those which are human actions brought about by agents. We naturally require evidence before we are willing to invoke a new kind of causality for a sub-class of events, and the appeal to introspection is less popular than it used to be. But Professor Campbell might

have supported his claim that we know about 'originative' causality from our experience of ourselves as agents by pointing out that our common sense notion of causality in the physical world is based upon it. Whence do we derive our ordinary working notion of causality as a kind of force or energy exerted by causes to *make* their effects happen, but from our own experience of ourselves as doing things, making things happen by acting out our choices? Our experience of personal choice carried out in action is logically prior to the common sense view of causal relationships between physical events, and much more reliable.

Could the author have made his point more effectively if he had not insisted upon taking as the paradigm case of free choice the overcoming of a temptation? It may be true that the problem of free will gets its urgency for the ordinary educated man from the fact that free will—in some sense—is a pre-condition of moral responsibility. But it does not follow that the phenomenon is best studied in a moral setting. For it is not only in moral predicaments that we experience free choice, and it is arguable that we may get a clearer view of its nature if we consider it as it occurs in the non-moral field, where we are less likely to be led astray by quasi-mechanical models of motives and desires as 'forces' or 'weights', with efforts of will as a kind of energy 'thrown in' to reinforce the weaker motives, and so on.

Surely a better paradigm case of free choice, and one that seems to call for treatment along Professor Campbell's lines, would be that of some spontaneous creative activity, such as musical improvisation. No doubt this is often little more than a procession of clichés dredged up from half-forgotten memories, but masters of the art show (and feel) that they are creatively originating, not of course *ex nihilo*, but from a range of possibilities limited only by the instrument, by their musical imagination, and by their feeling for form. Free will as exerted in our ordinary daily life typically occurs in such a continuous flow of decisive action rather than in the isolated taking of a crucial decision. In order to understand it we need to study it in its ordinary as well as in its more impressive settings; and by so doing we are likely to gain increasing respect for Professor Campbell's views.

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