Contents

Acknowledgments				
	PAR	T I SOME CASES, SOME GROUND CLEARING	1	
1	Introduction		3	
	1.1	Three Cases		
	1.2	What Is an Algorithm?	3 8	
	1.3	Algorithms, Ethics, and Autonomy	11	
	1.4	Overview of the Book	14	
	1.5	A Heuristic	16	
2	Autonomy, Agency, and Responsibility			
	2.1	Autonomy Basics	21	
	2.2	Some Distinctions	23	
	2.3	The Key Split	26	
	2.4	Reconciling Psychological and Personal Autonomy	34	
	2.5	An Ecumenical View	37	
	2.6	Objections	39	
	2.7	Conclusion: Related Concepts and Moral Salience of Autonomy	41	
	PAR	T II RESPECTING PERSONS, WHAT WE OWE THEM	43	
3	What Can Agents Reasonably Endorse?			
	3.1	IMPACT: Not an Acronym	45	
	3.2	Autonomy, Kantian Respect, and Reasonable Endorsement	47	
	3.3	Teachers, VAMs, and Reasonable Endorsement	53	
	3.4	Applying the Reasonable Endorsement Test	58	
	3.5	Why Not Fairness?	65	
	3.6	Conclusion	68	

vi Contents

4	What We Informationally Owe Each Other				
	4.1 The Misfortunes of Catherine Taylor and Carmen Arroyo	71			
	4.2 Two Arguments for Informational Rights	75			
	4.3 Relation to the GDPR	86			
	4.4 Polestar Cases	91			
	4.5 Conclusion	95			
	PART III ENSURING THE CONDITIONS OF AGENCY	97			
5	Freedom, Agency, and Information Technology	99			
	5.1 Freedom as Undominated Self-government	100			
	5.2 Three Challenges to Freedom: Affective, Deliberative,				
	and Social	105			
	5.3 Ecological Non-domination, Policy, and Polestar Cases	113			
	5.4 Why Not Manipulation?	116			
	5.5 Conclusion	118			
6	Epistemic Paternalism and Social Media	110			
	6.1 Demoting Fake News	122			
	6.2 Dismantling Echo Chambers	128			
	6.3 Conclusion	134			
	PART IV THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF AGENTS	135			
7	Agency Laundering and Information Technologies				
	7.1 Agency and Responsibility	138			
	7.2 Agency Laundering	141			
	7.3 Facebook and Anti-Semitic Advertising	145			
	7.4 Uber and Driver Management	149			
	7.5 VAMs and Teacher Evaluation	152			
	7.6 COMPAS and Criminal Sentencing	154			
	7.7 Related Concepts and Concerns	156			
	7.8 Conclusion	161			
8	Democratic Obligations and Technological Threats to Legitimacy				
	8.1 Two New Technologies	163			
	8.2 Political Legitimacy: Three Conceptions and a Hybrid View	165			
	8.3 Legitimating Processes	171			
	8.4 Technological Threats to Legitimacy	173			
	8.5 Once More Past the Pole	182			
	8.6 Conclusion	182			

			Contents	vii
9	Conclusions and Caveats			184
	9.1	Further Work		185
	9.2	Caveats: Baseline Issues		186
	9.3	Bigger Pictures		187
References				189
Inde	X		204	