

IDENTITY, LEVERAGE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAS

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- UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICA: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP?* By EDMUND GASPAR. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978. Pp. 90. \$2.75.)
- CONFLICT, ORDER, AND PEACE IN THE AMERICAS: PART 1: DIALOGUES ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES.* Edited by NORMAN V. WALBEK and SYDNEY WEINTRAUB. (Austin, Tex.: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 1978. Pp. 125.)
- CONFLICT, ORDER, AND PEACE IN THE AMERICAS: PART 2: ANALYSES OF THE ISSUES.* Edited by MICHAEL E. CONROY and NORMAN V. WALBEK. (Austin, Tex.: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 1978. Pp. 167.)
- ISRAEL-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS.* By EDY KAUFMAN, YORAM SHAPIRA, and JOEL BARROMI. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1979. Pp. 256. \$19.95.)
- EL ORDEN INTERNACIONAL Y LA DOCTRINA DEL PODER.* By JUAN A. LANÚS. (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Depalma, 1978. Pp. 142.)
- DERECHOS HUMANOS Y RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES.* Edited by WALTER SANCHEZ G. (Santiago: Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanísticos, 1979. Pp. 240.)
- WORLD CHANGE AND WORLD SECURITY.* Edited by NORMAN C. DAHL and JEROME B. WIESNER. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978. Pp. 174. \$14.95.)
- THE FUTURE OF U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS.* By TOM E. DAVIS. (Buffalo: State University of New York, Special Studies No. 85, 1977. Pp. 21.)
- HEMISPHERIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNITED STATES: PAPERS FROM THE NEW WORLD CONFERENCE.* Edited by JOSEPH S. TULCHIN. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. Pp. 445. \$22.50.)
- CAPITALISM AND THE STATE IN U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS.* Edited by RICHARD R. FAGEN. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1979. Pp. 446.)

There has been much discussion about a "North-South conflict," or a "North-South dialogue." How has the emergence of this polarity af-

fects Latin America's international position? We are also witnessing the consolidation of a particularly ruthless and repressive system of military dictatorships in the area. Has Latin America also reached a new stage of internal crisis? We might further ask: How are these international and internal events related?

These grave issues are increasingly engaging the attention of distinguished and careful scholars; at the same time, they inevitably bring to the surface deeply rooted biases. Intentions notwithstanding, a social scientist who attempts to grapple with these issues is immediately revealed as a partisan. That is not an entirely unfortunate development. Some years ago, I suggested in this journal that since an advocacy-oriented social science already exists, it might become intellectually more rigorous were the advocacy brought into the open ("Language, Values, and Policy Perspectives in Inter-American Research," *LARR* 10, no. 3 [1975]:177-90). Recent publications have only confirmed that conviction.

The issue of Latin America's evolving international position provides a case in point. Scholars who write from a U.S.-oriented perspective are understandably troubled by recent developments. Edmund Gaspar, formerly a Hungarian diplomat and now a naturalized U.S. citizen, is one such scholar. "The Latin American nations," he writes, "have obviously reached a crossroads where they must choose between their affective cultural and economic bonds with the West and the magnetism of a leading role in the Third World." This "is the crux of the crisis of the inter-American system" (p. 4). The task facing U.S. policymakers is to insure "continuation of the close historical relationship between the two Americas," so that Latin America does not "drift toward the new horizons of a vaguely defined Third World alignment" (p. 90).

There is much of value in Gaspar's historical perspective, particularly in his treatment of such issues as the Monroe Doctrine and the Alliance for Progress. In one sense, his advocacy is also open and acknowledged. He sketches out two policy options and indicates his preference. Yet to reduce the options to these two is itself a bias, and not necessarily a conscious one. Any analytical perspective that assumes the necessity of "infusing new life into the Western Hemisphere idea" necessarily limits one's intellectual and political exploration of other possibilities.

Gaspar's chosen option, moreover, leads him in contradictory directions. While applauding the Carter administration's human rights policy, he nonetheless allows his preoccupation with "outside aggression" to cause him to recommend further buildup of the "hemispheric security system." How continued military buildup is to square with the

human rights emphasis he does not explain. Indeed, he warns, "A human rights policy tied to retaliation in the area of military aid may bring about a shift in the Latin American military dictatorships' orientation in foreign policy," and "even sporadic penetration by Soviet military influence could create fissures in the hemispheric defense system that must be avoided" (p. 83).

Gaspar's preoccupation with hemispheric solidarity likewise limits his economic analysis. Sympathetically tracing what he calls the "economic bondage of Latin America," he wisely cautions against a rigid defense of traditional U.S. concepts of property rights. Yet at the same time, "as a quid pro quo for a stronger security system," he recommends "generous U.S. trade concessions" and a preferential customs pattern that would tie Latin American economies even more closely to that of the United States. Nowhere does he consider in detail the role of U.S.-based multinational corporations, either in respect to Latin America's "economic bondage" or in respect to his suggested systemic revisions (pp. 89–90).

Nor, indeed, does Gaspar grapple fully with the relationship between military and economic considerations. Noting that Latin American military dictatorships "are not such servile instruments of U.S. policy," he points out that from 1968 on, the Peruvian military "expropriated U.S. property, pursued a leftist political course, and in 1976 bought sophisticated Soviet weaponry" (p. 56). Leaving aside for the moment what constitutes a "leftist political course," his analysis ignores two key points. First, Peru has been the exception (and even the Peruvian military were beginning to change course in 1976). Second, military supply and property expropriation are by no means the only, or even the most, significant aspects of the economic situation. In the long run, market relationships, technological dependency, and the labor question are interrelated issues of even greater magnitude. For detailed analysis of these issues, one must look elsewhere.

In this connection, the first volume of the *Conflict, Order, and Peace* series provides a key link to internal events. Jacques Chonchol, former minister of agriculture in the Allende government, advances the notion of the "national security state." The construct is not entirely new. Over a quarter of a century ago, Arthur Ekirch wrote about "national security and the garrison state." What Chonchol proposes, however, has more far-reaching implications. In his view, the national security state, which developed in the 1970s, is both a more severe and more universal form of repression, and also more directly linked to the "actual model of capitalistic growth." The new state, in short, is at once a military and an economic model; it is also one which necessitates both a permanent subordination of labor and civilian political institutions and a permanent

clash with important elements in the churches. Conversely, it necessitates a permanent alliance between "multinational companies and local elites."

Needless to say, Chonchol's perspective is stoutly resisted by his copanelist, former C.I.A. Director William Colby. In Colby's view, the role of the military is far more benign. When Latin American military leaders come to the U.S. Army training school in Leavenworth, Kansas, he notes, "The School teaches them two things, decision-making and organization. And they go back to countries where those two particular capabilities are frequently in very short supply" (p. 32). Hence U.S.-trained military have an "enormous impact," but primarily a positive one. As for multinationals, while they do "produce profits," they also provide investment, salaries, and training "to develop people to do the jobs that are necessary [to] add to the gross national product of the country." Beyond this, Colby looks to "foreign assistance," governmental and private, to provide a "nonexploitative but controlled effort to develop less-developed countries" (pp. 35–36).

In one sense, the Chonchol-Colby "dialogue" illustrates the futility of the format itself. It is not a dialogue at all, but two combatants speaking past each other to the audience. Chonchol raises a point about military regimes being "against integration, against self-reliance"; Colby responds with a peroration in praise of private production in agriculture. The rest of the volume is replete with similar nonresponses. Nonetheless, while talking past each other, the combatants do raise important issues. Chonchol makes a key connection between military and economic structures, while Colby raises the question of the role of external "assistance." To be sure, Colby does not mean to treat the issue as a question, but rather to offer external "assistance" as an answer. That his impact is inadvertent, however, does not in any way lessen its significance.

Indeed, the entire volume is replete with inadvertent questions. In the second dialogue, Arnold Harberger of the University of Chicago and Enrique Iglesias of ECLA discuss development strategy. While Harberger concentrates on technical issues, Iglesias centers on international political relationships. Neither really endeavors to relate the two. Even so, their relationship is crucial. It was Harberger who, with Milton Friedman, went to Chile in 1975 and provided a blueprint for the military government's anti-inflation strategy. Unfortunately, Harberger's comments on that are not included in this volume. Nonetheless, the decision to furnish technical assistance to such a government is profoundly political, and the two issues cannot be so easily separated as Harberger implies. On the other hand, while Iglesias puts much energy into analyzing Latin America's international economic position, he puts relatively little into grappling with the kind of domestic policy decisions that Harberger addresses. The result, again, is a certain amount of talking

past each other. Despite this, however, the question of how politics and technical issues relate is still a crucial one.

Another aspect of the situation forms the centerpiece of the second volume in the series. A collection of written papers with commentaries, the latter volume revolves chiefly around the issue of violence in contemporary Latin American society. Marina Bandeira of the Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace of Brazil sensitively dissects the social, economic, and cultural violence imposed by ruling local minorities in alliance with "the industrial-military complex of the Western World." At the same time, she raises "painful but unavoidable questions" about "some Latin Americans, labelled leftists," who have imposed so-called Marxist-Leninist violence upon the masses in lieu of reaching out on a more voluntaristic basis. She contrasts such imposed violence with the trend toward "basic communities," whose "essential characteristic is that nothing is imposed." Like Gaspar, Bandeira appears to beg the question of what is "leftist." Nonetheless, in the articulation of the issues, and in the openness and honesty of her advocacy, she provides an example of how constructive an advocacy-oriented social science can be. Richard Graham of the University of Texas provides a brief, sensitive, and respectful commentary.

In a more extended analysis, James Petras and Dale Tomich of the State University of New York at Binghamton skillfully relate international and internal aspects of violence. They locate violence "in the context of the historical formation and organization of productive systems." Attacking Louis Hartz' notion of a peaceful, "liberal tradition" in U.S. history, they trace the relationship between violence and capital accumulation in the North American past, and proceed to analyze the impact of that relationship on inter-American relations. In particular, they stress the rise and decline of "national" bourgeois class rule and its gradual replacement, in a context of increasing violence, by "joint rule," which they describe as "the union of national and foreign capital, landed and industrial capital—and the violent suppression of the claims and organizations of the masses." In this regard, they likewise stress the central role of the state, as well as that of "para-state activity." Violence, they suggest, "has been the midwife of capital accumulation." Thus "the condition of liberation from the yoke of U.S.-centered capital accumulation is violent struggle" (pp. 91–136, esp. pp. 92, 94, 115, 130–31).

The contrast between Bandeira's perspective on violence, on the one hand, and that of Petras and Tomich on the other, is of course disturbing. Obviously, the last word has not been said on the subject. Taken together, however, the two volumes in the *Conflict, Order, and Peace* series force the reader to consider carefully the relationship between violence and social and economic change, and the "Western Hemisphere idea." This in turn raises a further question regarding the

contrast between Latin America's hemispheric and Third World identities. The latter implies an anti-U.S., or at least an independent, military and economic position. The former, as linked to the concept of the national security state, implies dependence on power centers within the United States. Or does it? What in fact is the relationship between Latin America's emerging international position and such extrahemispheric nations as Israel?

Here the volume by Kaufman, Shapira, and Barromi sheds important light. A standard, easy, and not very helpful answer often given by self-styled "leftists" (again that troublesome term) is that Israel is merely an extension of U.S. imperialism, and that a close relationship with Israel merely signifies a connection by proxy with the imperial metropolis. As Kaufman and colleagues show, Israel's relationship with Latin America cannot be subsumed under any such simplistic formula. If anything, that relationship provides a prism through which one can observe a far more complex international pattern than is at first apparent.

In 1948, they note, when the modern state of Israel came into being, Latin American governments tended to see Israel not as "a problem of the cold war (East/West) but . . . [as] an anticolonialist issue (North/South)" (p. 3). Since then, Latin American perceptions of Israel have undergone many changes, particularly with the decline of bipolarity and the emergence of "nonalignment." On one hand, since 1967 Cuba has been consistently critical of Israeli foreign policy, even breaking diplomatic relations in 1973. On the other, during the early 1970s the Peruvian military developed close ties with Israel. Meanwhile, Brazil, while firmly in the pro-U.S. camp, experienced growing economic links with Arab nations in the same period, links which culminated in Brazil's U.N. vote against Zionism in 1975. It would appear that Arab oil money has been as potent a factor as ideology in the evolution of Israeli-Latin American relations.

Overall, the trend has been toward increased Israeli-Latin American trade, mirroring "the desire of the latter for reduced economic dependence on the United States and hence a broadening of its relations with other countries." While the volume of trade is often small, Israel nonetheless provides key technological and organizational services to a variety of countries. From the Israeli point of view, it is all part of a reaching out beyond the confines of North America. From the Latin American perspective, however, policy toward Israel, and toward the Middle East in general, reflects a much broader issue. How important are ideological alignments when national power and national security are at stake? Do ideological labels have any significance in a world of domestic and international power politics?

If they do not, this might at first suggest that social scientists are better off shedding ideological analyses and going back to a more tradi-

tional approach based on the nation-state concept. There has, in fact, been something of a trend in that direction in Latin America itself. The Lanús volume is a case in point. It is thoughtful, erudite, and sweeping in its historical perspective. The author, a former Argentine diplomat, has a strong background as both participant in, and observer of, international politics. Yet his conclusions immediately reveal the anachronistic nature of the approach itself. "Los Estados," he writes, "son las únicas realidades permanentes en la vida internacional, y cada uno de ellos debe considerarse diplomática y legalmente igual" (p. 134).

States may well be permanent realities, but in our modern world they are far from being the only permanent realities. Multinational corporations are quite as real, and as permanent (if permanent means extending as far into the future as one can foresee). Indeed, their very activities render obsolete Lanús' insistence on "el respeto a la soberanía e integridad territorial," as well as his call for "erradicación del uso de la amenaza como instrumento de una política exterior" (pp. 135–37). Sovereignty and territorial integrity mean little in the context of international violence; threats are indeed central to the maintenance of "security," as Chonchol uses the term, but they are not threats against governments or states so much as against unorganized masses of people. Moreover, these days it is the multinationals which are frequently the real sources of the threats. When they do not stand behind states, they often as not march ahead of them.

The same realities that make obsolete the traditional nation-state approach to international politics also make a shambles of analyses that look to the nation-state for domestic enforcement of "human rights." Here the ICHEH volume, edited by Walter Sanchez G., provides an example. On one hand, publication in Chile, in 1979, of a scholarly work dedicated to human rights bespeaks a certain fortitude. On the other, the work itself is disappointing in terms of both data and conceptualization. Predictably, one contributor lauds "un notable mejoramiento de los derechos humanos" in Chile during the preceding two years. Less predictable, perhaps, but no less disappointing, is the lengthy analysis, in English, by Louis Sohn of Harvard Law School. Relegating the Chilean situation to one paragraph, Sohn dutifully reports the 1975 and 1976 U.N. General Assembly resolutions condemning human rights violations in that country, but says little beyond that. There is no effort to relate difficulties in human rights enforcement to the complex relationship between government, "para-state" organs and such influential bodies as multinational corporations. The entire conceptual framework is remarkably divorced from the issues raised by Chonchol, Bandeira, and Petras and Tomich.

It would appear, then, that the traditional nation-state approach is open to serious criticism for purposes of both international and do-

mestic political analysis. Other factors, both within and beyond national borders, may well be more important than the state machinery itself. The question remains, however, as to the relationship between ideology, national, supranational, and infranational forces. Here the *World Change and World Security* volume, edited by Dahl and Wiesner, raises important points.

Two alternative positions are clearly stated, one by Willy Brandt, the other by Georgi A. Arbatov of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The "smouldering North-South conflict," Brandt argues, is not a conflict that ultimately centers on ideology. The "industrial states under Communist rule," he notes, like their capitalist counterparts, "bear responsibility for what happens in the world." They, too, would be "well-advised to prepare themselves for international discussions and negotiations on raw materials, trade, and development aid" (p. 19). The implication is that their identities as industrial nations are of far greater import than their ideological identities. Arbatov states the contrary position. Ideology is the dominant consideration, and "free enterprise . . . offers no prospects for the overwhelming majority of the countries of the Third World" (p. 97).

There is nothing remarkable, in the abstract, about the two positions. What is remarkable, if that is the right word, is the shallowness with which both positions are developed throughout the volume. Brandt barely does more than mention his, and then goes on to other issues. Arbatov, as befits a self-styled "Marxist-Leninist," develops the theoretical position more fully; as a ranking Soviet official, however, he carefully refrains from turning the analysis upon those countries which have chosen a path congenial to Moscow. The result is an essentially self-serving one.

Indeed, apart from variously unsatisfying treatments of the "energy crisis" in its relationship to the North-South conflict, the only essay in the volume that even attempts to tackle the issues systematically is that written by Roberto Campos, the well-known Brazilian economist. For Campos, the postwar era has been marked by three overlapping confrontations: "the *ideological* confrontation of the Cold War, the *political* confrontation of decolonization, and the *economic* confrontation involved in the so-called North-South dialogue" (p. 73).

By the 1970s, Campos argues, the first of these confrontations had become somewhat muted in practice, the second was "coming to an end," and the third was clearly ascendant. This does not mean, however, that ideology is unimportant in the ongoing international economic confrontation. After a biting indictment of the "institutionalized hypocrisy" of certain "free-market" industrialized countries, Campos turns his wrath on the ideological "escapism" and "demonology" indulged in by many developing nations. He has especially harsh words

for dependency theory, "invented in Latin America and subsequently exported to other areas." Such theory "attributes distorted consumption patterns and alienated class attitudes to the influence of international capitalism." Dependency theory, he notes, "appears to relegate policy-makers and administrators within developing countries to the humiliating positions of puppets or idiots" (p. 81).

Complementing the escapism of dependency theory is the new demonology, aimed primarily as the "much-maligned multinational corporations." Although there is "a pittance of truth" in various criticisms of these organizations, "the fact remains that multinationals are the best instrument so far devised to achieve the transfer of technology, to tap international capital markets, and to promote interregional trade." Moreover, "it is not beyond the capability of even the weakest of the developing countries to cause multinationals, by negotiation, persuasion or compulsion, to reconcile their global strategies with rationally defined national interests." Campos notes that he "cannot escape the impression that the level of prepotency of multinationals is a direct function of the degree of incompetence of governments" (p. 82).

No doubt there is at least a "pittance of truth" in Campos' criticisms. Yet his own vulnerability becomes apparent when he sets up his alternative analytical framework. Citing the "different faces of authoritarianism," Campos notes that "many of the authoritarian regimes within the Third World can be described as 'authoritarian-liberal'—if you pardon the contradiction of words—as opposed to 'authoritarian-totalist.'" Presumably Brazil under the military exemplifies the former. In any case, "the task of humanizing authoritarianism may be more relevant for the majority of developing countries than importing Western patterns of democratic organization." Sophisticated on the surface, the formula neatly evades the issue of the role of violence in its relation to capital accumulation, national security, and ideological identity. Ultimately, all Campos can prescribe is "a genuine, as distinct from a rhetorical, acceptance of the concept of interdependence." Meanwhile, his claim as to the relative power of weak governments and strong multinationals remains a mere claim (pp. 85–86).

The relationship between the various elements thus remains somewhat labyrinthine. In such circumstances, another attractive alternative is to pull away from such semimystical concepts as security, identity, and ideology, and lean heavily on the realm of the "practical." This usually means centering one's attention on economic "realities." Here the study by Tom Davis provides a hard-headed, pessimistic, and thus particularly challenging approach. Davis bluntly looks to the 1980s to provide "many sources of friction in inter-American relations." A decline in the rate of export expansion for Latin American products, a consequent decline in Latin American "credit worthiness," and accom-

panying curtailment of growth in imports will all increase social tensions in Latin America. In response, "Latin American governments will be forced to limit political participation and suppress dissent." At the same time, even the more pro-U.S. governments will become more "nationalistic" and "protectionist." Latin America as a whole will move toward a greater degree of collective bargaining with the U.S. on economic issues (pp. 1–2).

As one moves through Davis' predictions, one is struck by a recurring theme, namely the tendency of governmental and private agencies alike to adopt measures that are attractive in the short run and counterproductive in the long run. Sometimes these measures are taken (or at least publicly justified) on ideological grounds, sometimes for mundane considerations of financial gain. Davis conspicuously refrains from attempting to assess the relative importance of motives. At the same time, he shows that the impulse to self-destruction is present on all levels and in many situations.

This is not to say that he is merely pessimistic. He lists a "battery of proposals" to reduce problems, proposals that have been "on the table" for some time. They include "unilateral trade concessions, commodity agreements, extension of debt maturities, creation of SDR's to assist LDC's, increased 'official development assistance' as a fraction of G.N.P., etc." These involve "some sacrifice (and frequently income transfer) on the part of the OECD countries," but it is clear that unless the price is paid, Latin American governments will retaliate in painful if ultimately self-destructive ways. Davis' final proposal, the "collaborative development of appropriate nuclear technology for peaceful applications," he terms possibly "the single most important measure that could be taken to safeguard our [U.S.] national security" (pp. 20–21).

Because of its conciseness and bluntness, Davis' analysis is one of the most impressive of those herein reviewed. It also has the merit of setting his analysis in a global context. The results are noteworthy, especially in so brief a treatment. Even so, Davis, too, leaves the reader hanging in certain respects. What will be the popular reaction to further "suppression of dissent"? How might that reaction affect economic trends? What will be the political role of ideology in mobilizing popular forces? What will happen to levels of violence? It is not his purpose to address these questions, and to raise them is therefore not a criticism of him. Nonetheless, the questions remain. What is given, what is negotiable, and what are the elements that will determine which is which?

It is at this point that one must confront the issue of leverage, or how much power various groups or institutions can apply in particular situations. Here the Tulchin volume is of considerable value. Although it is to some extent a *mélange* (as collections of conference papers tend to be), the volume raises a number of points respecting the issue of lever-

age. In this regard, one of the most intriguing contributions is that of Antonio Pasquali in his essay on mass media. Pasquali, who is director of the Instituto de Investigaciones de la Comunicación in Venezuela, argues that cultural and thus political consciousness itself is shaped in Latin America by external forces and their oligarchic domestic allies. "Economic determinism," he notes, "tends to consider the communication/information processes as far removed from the modes and forms of production. The mistake, while typical of industrial-age mentalities, minimizes unconsciously or intentionally the sociopolitical importance of communication and excludes the fact that it may have its own essence, laws, and consequences" (p. 93).

Pasquali cites what he calls the "law of centrifugal acceleration of cultural contamination" (p. 96) which appears to be a cultural expression of André Gunder Frank's thesis on the metropolis-satellite relationship. While his argument is too detailed to be fully explored here, one aspect deserves particular attention. "The Latin American imbalance," he writes, "between university and illiteracy, between cultural dynamics and stagnation, exhibits sui generis aspects that do not allow useful comparisons with any other Third World reality." The imbalance results from a "cultural industry . . . that is hypertrophied and lacks competition; it is a true owner of consciences and director of behavior" (p. 92). The impact on Latin American masses has been such that, like Ulysses' companions, "having been turned into pigs by Circe, [they] wish to continue receiving food suitable for animals" (p. 110). This remains true despite great political provocation.

Apart from its implications for mass mobilization, Pasquali's argument is noteworthy in stressing Latin American uniqueness. The nature and extent of "Northern" control over "Southern" communications implies a hegemony unparalleled elsewhere. Latin American leverage, in short, is uniquely limited. Not surprisingly, Pasquali's perspective is not shared by all his fellow contributors. Luciano Tomassini sees much greater leverage available to Latin Americans as a result of changing international economic realities. Tomassini, of the Instituto para la Integración de América Latina in Argentina, argues that "inter-American relations no longer form a self-contained system, but a dependent variable" (p. 258). A key reason for this is the "relative decline of the international decision-making leverage of the United States" (p. 264). Growing dependency of the U.S., and other industrialized countries, on Third World resources has rendered the old hegemony obsolete.

In one sense, Pasquali and Tomassini are in direct conflict. Assuming that they pull in opposite directions, which will be more powerful, cultural-political or economic forces? In another sense, however, the two treatments have a common theme, namely Latin American uniqueness. International trends that "open the way for a more autonomous

development of the countries of the Third World," writes Tomassini, "have special significance to Latin America because of its previous evolution." Here he stresses the "remarkable intensification of cooperation among Latin American countries" as well as "an increasing coordination of the foreign economic policies of Latin American countries vis-à-vis third nations." To support his argument Tomassini leans heavily on the creation and evolution of SELA, the Latin American Economic System inaugurated in 1975. SELA, he writes, "represents an act of self-assertion by Latin American countries as well as a major step toward coexistence among different regimes, since in SELA are seated together such countries as Brazil, Cuba, Chile, and Mexico" (pp. 270–77).

If one accepts the uniqueness argument as correct, the question then becomes: Does that uniqueness, cultural-political as well as economic, bode increasing independence or subjugation? Of course the uniqueness may be more apparent than real in both respects. In particular, the importance of SELA has been as much denied as affirmed in recent literature. Whether or not one accepts the argument, however, the question remains as to whether one can expect any particular result in the foreseeable future.

Here the article on technology transfer by César Peña Vigas provides an important additional dimension. Referring to technology transfer as a "fortuitous time machine," he argues that when new technology is inserted into a "relatively backward milieu," it does "not get the infrastructural support necessary to maintain it." Thus the new technology gradually becomes obsolete in its new milieu, while those sectors "unaffected by the transfer process" evolve toward a different future. "This phenomenon," he notes, "creates a situation of chronological disorder within the country with different cultural nuclei coexisting within its boundaries" (pp. 288–89). He cites Venezuelan agricultural development as a case study.

Taken in the context of cultural politics, economics, and uniqueness, what Peña Vigas is suggesting is that technology in Latin America has a special mediating role to play between the worlds of culture and economics. Those who can, by virtue of their resource-rich condition, afford the newest, may be setting themselves up for a long-run retardation. That retardation, however, may develop in a unique and paradoxical way, depending on the specific mix of modernity, tradition, distribution of wealth, and cultural awareness. Here he uses a key term. "The national will," he writes, "looms up as a crucial factor if there is to be a change in the destructive tendencies I have analyzed so that the country might steer another course in its production dynamics by the beginning of the next century" (p. 294).

What, precisely, is the "national will"? Is it some kind of modern mystical incarnation of the general will? How does it manifest itself?

Violently? Pacifically? Through the agency of the state? Does it have an ideological component? And is it related to a larger hemispheric or Third World identity? Suddenly the elements heretofore identified appear in more kaleidoscopic pattern than ever.

In a sense, it seems a travesty to discuss only three essays in an anthology the size of the Tulchin volume, especially since a number of others deal at least indirectly with similar themes. Limitations of space, however, as well as the continuity of the argument, must be considered. In addition, there is one element which, while mentioned in various contributions to the volume, does not emerge stage center. This is the recurring element of ideology, and it is in this connection that the Fagen anthology helps round out this particular collection of publications.

Once again Fagen has shown himself to be among our most insightful and successful scholarly entrepreneurs. He has brought together an ambitious and sophisticated collection of writings dealing with one of the most important issues of our time. "No discussion of contemporary capitalism," he writes in the introduction, "would be complete without acknowledging the profoundly important role of the state in the process of accumulation and distribution." If anything, he notes, the "free market" is steadily becoming more and more a myth. "Whether in ostensibly technocratic questions such as interest rates and import quotas, or in openly political struggles such as the smashing of workers' organizations, the state is everywhere involved as an active participant in deciding who wins and who loses. The fiction that the state is actually a neutral arbitrator of the continuing contest for material advantage is probably not now believed by most serious observers of social reality" (pp. 8 and *passim*).

Again, there may be nothing remarkable in the thesis itself. In this case, however, the thesis is developed richly and with engaging depth and subtlety. In particular, the articles by Klare and Arnson, Frenkel and O'Donnell, and Stallings provide striking examples. The volume also contains a number of efforts to make the crucial linkage between ideology and institutions. Not all efforts are equally successful. In their opening essay, Katznelson and Prewitt posit two concepts: "low stateness" and "low classness" in U.S. society. These concepts, they note, "fashion a powerful ideology that organizes public discourse about foreign policy" (p. 34). At the same time, the very language in which this ideology is expressed "does not merely contribute to a masking of state activities; it also helps shape them" (p. 36). Here we have two sets of propositions, one about institutions, one about ideology. Despite the apparent linkage, however, the connection is not really made. If political language really helps mask state activities, then what is happening is not really "low stateness" and "low classness" at all, but rather "perceived low stateness" and "perceived low classness." The authors are

probably right in concluding that “serious challenge” to U.S. foreign policy must come from outside the United States, “most likely from Latin American nations themselves” (p. 40). Their own logic, however, suggests that they are right for the wrong reasons.

The themes of class, state action, and ideology are explored with somewhat greater success by Wolfe and Sanders in their article on “re-surgent Cold War ideology.” In analyzing the activities of the so-called Committee on the Present Danger, they astutely trace the links among capital, labor, and academia represented within the Committee’s ranks. Corporate executives, trade unionists, and social scientists sit side by side. The theme of the article is that the Committee acts to perpetuate something called “Cold War liberalism” (p. 51), legitimizing it as an ongoing basis for U.S. foreign policy long after the conditions that produced it are no longer present. Ironically, Cold War liberalism, while aimed at perpetuating a militant anticommunism, has a strong antibusiness flavor to it, since businessmen are notoriously shortsighted when it comes to understanding the ideological implications of their actions.

Wolfe and Sanders have touched an important point: “What the Committee . . . understands, whereas Carter apparently does not, is that ideology is central to the successful exercise of political power” (p. 75). Thus the Committee was able to influence state action “beyond the point of its historical glory.” What is nonetheless lacking in the analysis is a clear explanation of Cold War liberalism. Here we begin at last to confront what Bandeira calls “painful but unavoidable questions” about elusive ideological labels. What is “liberal”? What is “leftist”? What is “rightist”? And what are the implications of this ideological vocabulary with respect to those elements previously identified, namely violence, the state, regional or global identity, and so on?

Here the commentary by Oscar Pino-Santos adds an important dimension to the discussion. His coordinating notion is that of “state monopoly capitalism.” Through this notion one can make sense of disparate elements which Katznelson and Prewitt, along with Wolfe and Sanders, mention but fail to bring together. Stateness, classness, and ideology can only be understood fully in terms of their roles within a system in which the state itself has become the central element in perpetuating a monopolistic structure. The institutions and language of politics alike are shaped by, and help to shape, an increasingly powerful but crisis-ridden state. The very idea of a “private sector” becomes increasingly marginal. Violence is primarily the violence of the state; identity is determined by state decision. The “national will,” if there is one, is expressed through the agency of the state. All this is what contemporary capitalism is about.

Even in labelling the system “capitalist,” however, Pino-Santos himself ultimately begs the most important question. Why is this con-

glomeration of forces to be labelled "capitalist" at all? How does that help us understand what is going on in the hemisphere, or in the world? Is this system qualitatively different from what is evolving in the Soviet Union? Perhaps in its North American manifestations, but from the perspective of a peasant in northeastern Brazil? Or, to put it differently, is the appropriation of the "benefits of production" any less "private" to a worker on a Soviet farm collective? How, in short, apart from the existence of supposedly "private" multinational corporations (which of course are not private at all in the way they amass or utilize power), are we to distinguish "state capitalism" from "state socialism"? Is the one any less monopolistic than the other? What is the enemy, and how does one mobilize the masses against it? What does it mean to say the enemy is on the "right," or "left," or "center"?

Suddenly the categories themselves are open to question. How can one speak of the "violence of the left," or the "right," when it is not clear what "left" and "right" mean? In a further commentary on Wolfe and Sanders, Earl Ravenal calls for a U.S. foreign policy of "nonintervention," supported by a coalition of "the left, the peace-seekers, many ordinary businessmen, [and] the remnants of those nasty 'isolationists' out there somewhere beyond the right that is discernible in our generation" (p. 89). We think we know what we mean by "left" and "right." Do we?

Ravenal suggests that "ideologies and counterideologies can be insubstantial—just a screen of verbiage." Indeed, but what if the verbiage is itself the central political weapon of our time? What if language is the fundamental tool used to produce and legitimize leverage, violence, identity, and acceptance of existing production relations? Ravenal suggests that "in an era when the big people are wrong about the big things, the heroes might be the ordinary businessmen who only want to make their deals, get their materials, and sell their goods, and the ordinary citizens who only want to live, eat, and keep some of their money in their own pockets" (p. 89). Is this because ordinary businessmen and citizens have no great leverage, use no violence, and, generally speaking, have no strong political identity? Is it because they have no particular use for political verbiage?

Perhaps, after all, it is Bandeira who tells us what we most need to hear. Perhaps she is not begging the question of what is "leftist" at all, but is rather telling us there is no such thing. Ideological labels are but weapons people use to mobilize support for their own crusade to capture the machinery of the state, violently or otherwise, so as to maximize their leverage over those who do not control that machinery. And regional or global identity, however labelled, is likewise but a device for achieving leverage in an international context, again through the use of state machinery. Only in Bandeira's "basic communities" is there neither

ideological identity, nor violence, nor imposed leverage. And such communities are neither "left," nor "right," nor "center." They merely are.

This is not to say that language yields all the answers. By no means. Yet the moment one steps back and disengages from the language of political actors and social scientists alike, dispassionate analysis of the language yields new questions. Who among them is really pushing regional or global identity, and to what purpose? What is the political motive behind various uses of ideological language? What levels of violence are employed by the various ideologues? What level of monopolistic control do they have, military and/or economic, and how do they use language to justify it?

Suddenly ideologized language seems to go hand in hand with coercion and centralized power. What is basic and voluntary can only occur in a decentralized community. Leverage through the state and its organizational allies (such as the multinationals) can never be basic or voluntary, no matter how garbed in ideological rhetoric. Perhaps that is why state action—North and South, East and West, domestic or international, "capitalist" or "socialist"—is at once so popular and so destructive; it requires no true consent. Perhaps that is also why so little energy is put into building, or studying, basic communities. Perhaps this will change in time. That would indeed be a new stage. Everything else is old themes in new variations.