## Blackfri**ars**

siderations of individual satisfaction and comfort. It is impossible not to admire the caution, patience and extent of Dr. Dickinson's investigations, his humanity and seriousness, his scrupulous honesty. The book is sponsored by the American National Committee on Maternal Health, Inc.

T.G.

MAN. Papers read at the Summer School of Catholic Studies, held at Cambridge, 1931. Edited by the Rev. G. J. MacGillivray, M.A. (Sheed & Ward; 7/6 net.)

This is another volume in the Cambridge Summer School series, a series which aims at giving an authoritative and popular exposition of Catholic teaching. The present volume, dealing with the nature of man, his origin, his fall with its consequences, his re-creation in grace, is interesting and instructive, although we are of opinion that the first few papers are in parts likely to be above the understanding of those not versed in the technique of philosophy and psychology. But the book will be found of value to those who wish for a wider and deeper knowledge of the fundamental facts concerning human nature and who enjoy a book which provides them with food for thought. Every educated Catholic should be familiar with the doctrine set out in this book.

We venture to take exception to the explanation, given in one of the papers concerning the relation between the intellect and the will in man, an explanation attributed to St. Thomas but which is hardly his. We quote from page 57: 'Now this (inborn and essential) tendency of mind towards truth is nothing more nor less than will . . . . The natural appetite of mind which he (St. Thomas) calls the rational appetite (appetitus rationalis), is will.' Were this true, there would be but one rational faculty in man and not two. St. Thomas understands by a natural appetite that necessary and natural inclination of every faculty for its formal object. But by the rational appetite or will in man he understands an elicited desire of the soul following upon knowledge received through the faculty of intellect, the formal object of the will being the good, as apprehended by reason. (Cf. Quaest, Disp. de Anima, quaest. un. ad 11 and ad 12, where St. Thomas's thought is quite clear and relevant to the point in question; see also Summa Ia, lxxx, art. 1 ad 3, where he explains the difference between natural appetite and animal appetite.)

S.W.L.