

AUTHORITARIANISM AND
POLITICAL CULTURE IN
ARGENTINA AND CHILE
IN THE MID-1960S*

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The rise of authoritarian regimes in Latin America has fueled a long-standing interest in the social bases of democratic and authoritarian political systems. One commonly asserted explanation posits a close relationship between political structure and political culture, holding that authoritarian regimes are likely both to stem from and to perpetuate authoritarian political cultures (Kornhauser 1959; Inkeles 1961; Lipset 1960, 1981). Some theorists have applied this thesis to Latin American politics, linking, for example, Argentina's frequent experiences with authoritarian governments with the presumed authoritarianism of its citizenry (Fillol 1961; Alexander 1968; Lipset 1960, 1981).

A recent study of political culture in Mexico (Booth and Seligson 1984, 106–24) presents a persuasive challenge to the political culture argument. These researchers found no evidence of an authoritarian political culture among their sample of middle- and working-class urban Mexicans. Despite the almost universally acknowledged fact that Mexico has an authoritarian political system, the subjects in Booth and Seligson's study were, on average, almost as democratically oriented as a comparable sample from New York City. The discovery of "a largely democratic culture within an essentially authoritarian regime" led the researchers to question the long-running argument associating regime type with political culture (1984, 118).

Booth and Seligson's empirical challenge to the political culture thesis is based on one type of case: a stable polity under the centralized control of a single party. Is the observed lack of association between political structure and culture an idiosyncratic feature of this type of case, or does it reflect a more general tendency? If parallel analyses based on two alternative regime types produced similar findings, this result would support the latter interpretation.

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The present article extends this line of investigation to two cases, Argentina and Chile during the mid-1960s, which differ substantially both from one another and from present-day Mexico. Argentina exemplifies an unstable political system whose vacillations between authoritarian and democratic governments have been punctuated by frequent military interventions. Even before the military takeover of 1966 and despite certain democratic trappings such as popular elections, Argentina was essentially an authoritarian regime whose leaders limited the political participation of Peronists and other mobilized groups (O'Donnell 1973, 117–21). Chile in the mid-1960s was by contrast a stable constitutional democracy with a competitive party system. This study tests for the presence or absence of an authoritarian political culture within each of these contexts. If the thesis linking political structure with political culture is correct, then the analysis should reveal an authoritarian culture among Argentines and more democratic orientations among Chileans.

Proponents of the theory linking authoritarian political structure and culture have frequently claimed that authoritarianism is most pronounced among the lower classes (Kohn 1969; Milbrath 1965). S. M. Lipset has emphasized “the profoundly antidemocratic tendencies in lower-class groups” (1960, 121), which arise because “the lower-class way of life produces individuals with rigid and intolerant approaches to politics” (1960, 89). Aspects of lower-class life that presumably generate authoritarianism include low education, limited participation in voluntary associations, economic insecurity, and infrequent exposure to the mass media (1960, 100–101).

A number of empirical studies have concluded, however, that the observed association between class position and authoritarianism is spurious and is attributable to other variables associated with lower-class status. Booth and Seligson, for example, found that education, rather than class, was the key determinant of two of their three indicators of authoritarian attitudes (1984, 116). This finding is consistent with those of Lipsitz (1965) and Zeitlin (1967). Zeitlin (1967) also isolated a second factor—limited political participation—that overrode the influence of social class. Similarly, Hamilton (1972) discovered that controlling for rural background eliminated the apparent relationship between authoritarianism and social class. He suggested that authoritarianism tends to arise in “backward” rural areas and to be transported into the urban working-class milieu through rural-to-urban migration (1972, 438). Hamilton concluded that “‘class’ is not a significant factor” contributing to authoritarianism and that “the appropriate line of inquiry is to discover the sources of intolerance within each of the classes” (1972, 403).

The present analysis proceeds along the lines suggested by Ham-

ilton. It tests for the existence of an authoritarian political culture and explores the social factors associated with authoritarianism within the Argentine and Chilean working classes. In this respect, this study contrasts with investigations such as Booth and Seligson's that measure and compare authoritarianism across social classes. Some caution must be employed, therefore, in comparing its findings with those of Booth and Seligson and other multiclass analyses. The limitation of the present study is that it can neither assess whether an authoritarian political culture is present throughout Argentine and Chilean society nor consider whether such a culture, if it exists, reflects the influence of social class. Nevertheless, if the assumption of most exponents of the political culture thesis is true that the working class is the primary locus of authoritarian political culture, then the best place to begin looking for it is within the working class. If Argentine workers are found to have more democratic values than the political culture argument would predict, such a result will call into question the accuracy of this argument. The chief advantage of this design is that it includes a large number of workers from various walks of life and from rural as well as urban areas. This variation will facilitate exploring which, if any, aspects of working-class existence are related to authoritarian political culture. Also, because this study is based on comparable samples representing contrasting political systems, it provides a way not only to evaluate the relationship between political structure and culture but to consider whether authoritarianism is linked to the same social structural conditions in two different political contexts.

This study employs a social structural definition of "working class" (Dahrendorf 1959; Hill 1977). The working class is assumed to comprise individuals excluded from positions of authority within organizations, from financial profits derived from property ownership, and from opportunities to acquire possessions or to develop skills of high market value. Thus the working class includes lower-level workers in manufacturing and service occupations as well as agricultural workers paid in wages.

Argentine and Chilean Political Culture

Discussions of Argentine political culture almost unanimously agree that its authoritarian nature impedes democratic government. A frequent theme is that Argentines lack a sense of community spirit and thus are unable to cooperate in achieving shared political goals (Gillin 1966, 26; Murena 1968, 247; Pendel 1968, 264; Fillol 1961, 3). Portrayals of Argentine national character stress the mutual suspiciousness and defensiveness that characterize interpersonal relationships (Ortega y Gasset, as quoted in Kirkpatrick 1971, 117; Fillol 1961, 9). Such predispo-

sitions are assumed to inhibit the spirit of trust and compromise that many consider essential to the democratic process. Silvert argued, for example, that Argentines consider politics to be a zero-sum game in which one group's benefit automatically entails a loss for all others (1967, 350). Mistrust in the political system and its leaders is assumed to be widespread among Argentines, who consider political corruption to be an inescapable fact of life (Fillol 1961, 8).

One key aspect of Argentine political culture, many analysts agree, is a preoccupation with social hierarchy and authority. It has been argued that one result of their Latin cultural heritage is the Argentines' conservative worldview that envisions political representation not as a basic human right but a privilege contingent upon one's position within the social hierarchy (Silvert 1967, 351; Gillin 1966, 29). In his analysis of the cultural constraints on economic progress in Argentina, Thomas Fillol (1961) stressed the negative consequences of Argentine attitudes toward authority. He argued that Argentines tend to be highly autocratic leaders who view their subordinates as inferior and untrustworthy. At the same time, they are reluctant to challenge the authority of their superordinates, even though this submissiveness frequently evokes feelings of anxiety and rage (1961, 19). Argentine culture, Fillol further claimed, tends to produce a personality type that is both aggressive and dependent, one that derives satisfaction from both dominating and being dominated by other people (1961, 23–24). Like others (Gillen 1966, 26; Silvert 1967, 350; Pendel 1968, 261), Fillol believed that Argentine political culture has been shaped by a deeply rooted tradition of *caudillismo*, or personalistic leadership (1961, 18). George Pendel, a British scholar of Argentine history, argues that the central theme of Argentine political life has been "the conflict between imported democratic ideas and the local tradition of personalistic leadership" (1968, 260).

Argentine political culture, it has often been argued, predisposes individuals toward a passive, fatalistic orientation toward political events. Fillol maintained that Argentines tend to view natural and social phenomena as highly unpredictable and generally beyond the scope of purposive human control (1961, 12). Such a sense of impotence engenders political alienation and apathy (1961, 20) and leads Argentines to resign themselves passively to political crises (Gillin 1966, 39). It also reduces individual and collective motivation to formulate and pursue common political goals (Fillol 1961, 22).

Most discussions of Argentine political culture have been broadly interpretive and descriptive. An important exception is the empirical investigation that Jeane Kirkpatrick undertook in 1965 and published in 1971. Kirkpatrick used a stratified national sample to compare supporters of the Peronist party with other segments of Argentine so-

ciety. She concluded that an authoritarian political culture, although most pronounced among Peronists, was in evidence throughout Argentine society. A considerable proportion of her sample (between 35 and 57 percent) "exhibited a distinctive impatience with political discussion and a preference for government by a strong man" (1971, 216). Eighty-five percent agreed that "people will take advantage of you whenever they can," leading Kirkpatrick to conclude that interpersonal mistrust and a tendency to view oneself as a victim was widespread in Argentine society (1971, 218). A sense of political impotence was expressed by over half of the sample, who felt they had no input into governmental decisions (1971, 161). These and similar findings led Kirkpatrick to assert that "Peronists were the largest political group with a predisposition to support autocratic institutions. But such predispositions were found elsewhere in Argentine society, a fact that helps to account for the multiple types of support available to autocratic leaders" (1971, 221).

Images of Chilean national character differ significantly from those typically used to depict Argentines. Often characterized as the "Englishmen of South America," Chileans have been viewed as less imaginative, passionate, and emotional but more practical, patient, and thoughtful than Latin Americans elsewhere (Gil 1966, 32). The prevailing image of Chileans has been one of "a serious, disciplined, and strong people [with] practical good sense" (Gil 1966, 33), who are "generally independent and temperate of character, prodigal, hospitable [and] cautious" (Cabero, quoted in Gil 1966, 31). A 1957 study of 1,640 men and women in Santiago provided empirical evidence confirming that Chileans tended to describe themselves in terms consistent with this image (Gil 1966, 31).

A number of analysts have linked Chile's stable democratic government prior to 1973 with a political culture that reflected and reinforced these general characteristics. As Halperin expressed the idea, "The stability of the democratic regime is to be attributed not to economic or sociological factors but to something so completely intangible as mere tradition" (1965, 27). The assumption was that at the core of Chilean political culture was a moderate, legalistic, and pragmatic approach to politics, a respect for the constitution, and a belief in the legitimacy of the political system (see Zeitlin 1968, 223). Chileans were proud of their democratic and nonviolent political heritage (Gil 1966, 32), and they were "anxious to remain within institutional norms" (Silvert, as quoted in Gil 1966, 33). It was argued that although Chile had produced its share of would-be demagogues, they had found little support among the Chilean people. One Chilean writer attributed this resistance to the prevailing atmosphere (*ambiente*) in Chile: "The strong habit of respect for the laws of the land has withstood any sympathies

there might be for an aspiring caudillo; the high Chilean character has rejected the unconditional submission of the courtier" (Cabero, quoted in Zeitlin 1968, 224).

Two investigations during the 1960s of attitudes and values of lower-class Chileans yielded findings consistent with these portrayals. A 1965 study of two Santiago squatter settlements uncovered evidence of orientations that many consider essential to the democratic process (Goldrich 1970; Goldrich, Pratt, and Schuller 1967). Relative to a comparable sample from Lima, Peru, the Chileans were found more likely to view their political system in a favorable light, believing that it was fair, beneficial to them, and deserving of their support; they were also more likely to support a parliamentary system of politics and less likely to condone violence as a political technique. Goldrich developed a measure of "politicization" that had four components: first, "salience," the awareness of and psychological involvement in politics; second, "efficacy," the image of oneself as an active political agent; third, "access," the belief in one's accessibility to decision-making channels; and fourth, "participation," the direct and active involvement in politics. The majority of Chileans in the two squatter settlements (67 and 68 percent) earned high scores on three or more of these dimensions, as compared to 52 percent and 44 percent of the Peruvians. These findings suggested that active participation in and support for the Chilean political system was widespread among individuals previously considered marginal to Chilean politics.

Analogous findings have been reported by Portes, who also surveyed lower-class Santiaguinos (1976, 201–37). The dominant approach to politics among the individuals in his 1969 study was one of moderation rather than radicalism. Seventy-five percent of his sample agreed that "the best way for a progressive government to attain power is through democratic elections" (as opposed to a "popular revolution"); and 66 percent agreed that "force does not lead anywhere. To achieve true social change it is necessary to seek the cooperation of all" (1976, 212). Support for the democratic process appears to have been the norm among the Chilean lower classes during the 1960s.

In sum, discussions of Chilean national character depict Chileans as manifesting values, understandings, and expectations that constitute what Wilde has labeled as the "infra-democracy" supporting democratic government (1978, 33). This characterization contrasts markedly with the characterization of Argentines as possessing an authoritarian political culture that hinders democracy. If these contrasting portrayals of Argentine and Chilean political culture are accurate, then data based on comparable samples of workers from the two countries should reflect this hypothesized difference.

Data

The data used here were collected in 1965 by Inkeles and Smith (1974), who studied the structural sources of modern attitudes among workers in Argentina, Chile, and four other developing countries.¹ Although the questions were designed to measure modernity, the data can also be used to construct indicators of political attitudes like authoritarianism.

Samples for each country contain comparable numbers of respondents from three occupational groupings. The Argentine sample includes 98 agricultural workers, 663 industrial workers, and 56 urban service workers; the Chilean sample contains 109 agricultural workers, 703 factory workers, and 106 urban nonindustrial workers. The industrial worker subgroup comprises workers of both urban and rural origin with varying levels of skill and experience who work at diverse types of manufacturing. The urban nonindustrial subgroup includes craftsmen, transport workers, street vendors, domestic servants, and other service workers. All the Chilean cultivators and three-fourths of the Argentine agricultural workers were wage laborers, each of whom worked at a single agricultural enterprise. Although their contracts usually provided them with small plots for growing produce for personal consumption, these agricultural workers were clearly not independent peasants. Like the industrial and service workers in the samples, these cultivators' monetary remuneration, lack of authority and property, and relative powerlessness in the market system classify them as members of the "working class" according to the definition employed in this study.²

Measuring Authoritarianism

Many previous studies appear to have employed invalid measures of authoritarianism. The F-scale, which Adorno et al. (1950) designed to measure authoritarianism, has been the object of substantial criticism (Hyman and Sheatsley 1954, 107; Christie 1954, 182). Originally developed to measure authoritarianism within the middle classes, the F-scale has been shown to be an invalid indicator of authoritarianism among working-class respondents (Miller and Riessman 1961, 268). Other scales, such as that developed by Eysenck (1954, 149–52), lead to similar difficulties when applied across class lines (Miller and Riessman 1961, 269). Critics have also suggested that because the F-scale was originally developed as a personality indicator, it is inappropriate for use as a measure of political values and attitudes (Miller and Riessman 1961, 264).

In order to avoid these measurement problems, the present in-

investigation employs an alternative scale developed specifically to measure authoritarianism within the working class. In this study, authoritarianism is considered to be a constellation of systematically related attitudes, and the scale used to measure it was constructed in a manner that tests and reflects this assumption. A survey of the literature to discover the most frequently used theoretical and operational definitions suggested that authoritarianism involves: first, intolerance of people whose backgrounds, norms, or beliefs differ from those of one's in-group; second, submissiveness to persons occupying socially approved authority positions; third, traditionalism, or the tendency to automatically uphold the customary norms, values, and styles of expression of one's society and to resist social and cultural change; and finally, fatalism, or the belief that the success or failure of human efforts depends on forces beyond the scope of human control. Appendix 1 lists indicators of these attitudes.

A series of factor analyses were used to construct identical authoritarianism scales for the Chilean and Argentine samples.³ Appendixes 2 and 3 present the results of the factor analyses for the items comprising traditionalism, intolerance, submissiveness, and fatalism. The factor analyses revealed a single factor for each of the four sets of items;⁴ the results were similar for both the Chilean and Argentine samples. The unidimensional factor structures indicated that a common dimension underlies each of the four sets of items, justifying combining items in each set to form measures of traditionalism, intolerance, submissiveness, and fatalism.⁵

Having constructed indices for the attitudes assumed to constitute authoritarianism, it was then necessary to determine whether the four attitudes do indeed cluster together empirically. Appendix 3 presents the results of this test. For both the Argentine and Chilean samples, factor analyzing the four scales together revealed a single significant principal component. The observed unidimensional factor structure demonstrated that the four attitudes cohere empirically to form an identifiable constellation of authoritarianism. Thus the four scales were combined to produce a composite index of authoritarianism.

Results

Table 1 presents the mean scores for authoritarianism and its four component attitudes for the Chilean and Argentine samples. A positive score indicates the presence of an attitude, while a negative value represents its absence. Although the range of authoritarianism scores is fairly large—10.5 for the Argentine and 9.3 for the Chilean samples—the mean scores for both groups are very close to zero. Average scores on traditionalism, intolerance, submissiveness, and fatalism tend to be

slightly negative. These results show no evidence of an authoritarian political culture among Chilean or Argentine workers. Argentines in this study are much less authoritarian than one might expect given the nature of their political system. In fact, they are slightly less authoritarian than Chilean workers, although the difference between the means of the two samples is not statistically significant.⁶ These findings challenge the expectation that political culture reflects and reinforces political structure. They are, however, wholly consistent with the results of Booth and Seligson's study. Just as these researchers found little evidence of widespread authoritarianism in Mexican political culture despite Mexico's authoritarian government, I have found little indication that such values predominate within the nondemocratic Argentine political system. Argentines were just as democratic as Chileans, who in 1965 were members of a constitutional democracy. These data show no evidence of cultural differences that might be expected to correspond to the divergent regimes in Argentina and Chile during the mid-1960s.

Although neither Chilean nor Argentine workers display authoritarian values on the whole, it cannot be determined from these average scores whether some sectors of the working class are relatively more authoritarian than others. The large range in authoritarianism scores suggests that such values are not evenly distributed throughout the working class, but appear instead more frequently among some categories of workers than among others. Furthermore, previous studies have concluded that regional differences and varying levels of education and political participation are associated with value contrasts within the working class. In no society is the working class a homogeneous group; rather, it is a diverse composite of individuals with vary-

TABLE 1 Mean Scores for Composite Authoritarianism Index and Four Component Attitude Scales in Chile and Argentina^a

	Authoritarianism	Traditionalism	Intolerance	Submissiveness	Fatalism
Chile	.028 ^b (858) [.049]	-.001 (879) [.017]	.007 (870) [.028]	-.001 (878) [.023]	.004 (871) ^c [.021] ^d
Argentina	.019 (677) [.063]	-.002 (767) [.019]	-.001 (692) [.029]	-.001 (762) [.026]	.000 (756) [.025]

^aStandardized scores are presented for comparative purposes. Analysis of raw scores leads to similar conclusions.

^bAuthoritarianism scores ranged from -5.2 to +5.3 for the Argentine samples, and from -4.6 to +4.7 for the Chilean samples.

^cThe number of cases from which these averages were computed is shown in parentheses.

^dThe standard errors for the distributions are shown in brackets.

ing backgrounds and experiences. Some experiences may be more likely than others to lead individuals to develop authoritarian values or to share an authoritarian political subculture. One way to explore this question is to test for systematic sources of variation in authoritarianism within the Argentine and Chilean working classes.

Appendix 1 lists variables that might be associated with differences in authoritarian values among Chilean and Argentine workers. Multiple-item scales were constructed using the same factor-analytic techniques as those employed for the authoritarianism indices. Two statistical techniques were used to measure the influence of these independent variables on authoritarianism. Multiple regression analysis indicates the combined effects of all independent variables as well as the partial contribution of each when the effects of other predictors are statistically controlled. Path analysis depicts the strength and direction of influence among the variables.

Table 2 shows the effect of cognitive complexity, agricultural employment, and dimensions of socioeconomic status (income, education, father's education, and father's occupation) on authoritarianism.⁷ In both samples, levels of authoritarianism are lower among the more analytically sophisticated, better informed, more literate workers. Education accounts for a significant proportion of the variation in authoritarianism left unexplained by cognitive complexity. Income has no effect on authoritarianism once the influence of education and cognitive complexity has been statistically controlled. The finding that agricultural workers in both the Argentine and Chilean samples are more authoritarian than their counterparts in urban occupations is consistent with Hamilton's thesis that authoritarianism arises in rural areas. In general, both samples show highly similar patterns of association among authoritarianism and these independent variables.

One way to explain the effects of these predictors on authoritarianism is to specify intervening variables through which these effects operate. A common thesis is that authoritarianism results from the tendencies of working-class members to be oriented to the present, to be politically alienated, to have low rates of political participation, and to have limited involvement in mainstream social institutions (Lipset 1960; 1981, 101 and 109). Multiple regression analyses of authoritarianism on these variables indicate their combined and independent effects.

Table 3 shows the results of these analyses. Among Chilean and Argentine workers, authoritarianism declines significantly with both increased institutional integration and heightened political participation. Although orientation toward the present increases the authoritarianism levels of workers in both samples, its effects are significant only among Argentines. Political alienation does not influence authoritarianism once the effects of the three previously entered variables have been

TABLE 2 Results of Multiple Regression Analyses of Authoritarianism on Aspects of Socioeconomic Status, Cognitive Complexity, and Agricultural Employment in Argentina and Chile

Variable	Pearson Correlation Coefficient	Multiple R-squared	Beta	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient	Standard Error of b(Sb)	F-ratio
Argentina						
Cognitive complexity	-.563	.318	-.403	-.700	.079	79.336*
Father's occupation	-.357	.339	-.093	-.181	.079	5.184*
Education	-.429	.347	-.098	-.077	.034	5.077*
Agricultural employment	.345	.345	.089	.458	.198	5.324*
Father's education	-.308	.359	-.086	-.133	.060	4.908*
constant = 1.299						
F = 62.035*						
Chile						
Cognitive complexity	-.354	.126	-.237	-.367	.064	32.781*
Education	-.287	.143	-.156	-.117	.031	13.980*
Agricultural employment	.130	.170	.148	.684	.229	8.921*
Father's education	-.216	.175	.079	-.077	.037	4.281*
Income	-.196	.180	-.056	-.001	.001	1.640
Father's occupation	-.236	.182	.070	.071	.080	.777
constant = .954						
F = 28.543*						

Multiple R-squared values presented are those for the regression equation immediately after the given variable has been entered. Regression coefficients, standard errors of b, and F-ratios presented are those for each variable in the regression equation after all other variables have been entered.

*Starred coefficients are significant at the .05 level.

statistically controlled. The Argentine and Chilean samples reveal highly consistent patterns of association among these variables.

These results suggest that authoritarianism may develop among lower-status workers because they have lower levels of political participation, are not tightly integrated into mainstream social institutions, and tend to be concerned with the present rather than the future. An alternative possibility is that the observed associations between authoritarianism and institutional involvement, political participation, and orientation to the present are spurious and result from the tendency for lower-status persons to be more authoritarian and also to have lower rates of social and political participation than their higher-status coun-

TABLE 3 Results of Multiple Regression Analyses of Authoritarianism on Institutional Integration, Present Orientation, Political Participation, and Political Alienation in Argentina and Chile

Variable	Pearson Correlation Coefficient	Multiple R-squared	Beta	Unstandardized Regression Coefficient	Standard Error of b(Sb)	F-ratio
Argentina						
Institutional integration	-.299	.090	-.268	-.673	.129	27.350*
Political participation	-.166	.126	-.125	-.338	.139	5.892*
Present orientation	.149	.137	.114	.245	.109	5.056*
Political alienation	-.033	.149	.019	.027	.120	.053
constant =	-.097					
F = 11.87						
minimum number of cases =	396					
Chile						
Institutional integration	-.216	.047	-.180	-.371	-.096	17.261*
Political participation	-.177	.061	-.127	-.243	.082	8.590*
Present orientation	.114	.068	.079	.160	.087	3.425
constant =	.027					
F = 17.694*						
minimum number of cases =	590					

Note: Multiple R-squared values presented are those for the regression equation immediately after the given variable has been entered. Regression coefficients, standard errors of b, and F-ratios presented are those for each variable in the regression equation after all other variables have been entered.

*Starred coefficients are significant at the .05 level.

terparts. If these variables continue to affect authoritarianism after the influence of socioeconomic status has been statistically controlled, this result will suggest that they are indeed intervening variables in the relationship between socioeconomic status and authoritarianism. Path analysis provides a way to select between these alternative explanations.

Path analysis represents the strength and direction of association among the variables through hypothetical models that depict the direct and indirect linkages among them.⁸ It must be stressed that this study employs path analysis as a heuristic device to depict plausible interrelationships.

Figures 1 and 2 diagram the resulting paths and corresponding path coefficients. Depicting the linkages in this manner helps explain

FIGURE 1 Path Analysis for Authoritarianism and Socioeconomic Status Factors: Argentina





FIGURE 2 Path Analysis for Authoritarianism and Socioeconomic Status Factors: Chile



which of the various aspects of working-class life affect levels of authoritarianism. Although models for the two samples differ somewhat, certain general patterns emerge. Education operates through cognitive complexity to reduce authoritarianism, although education also diminishes authoritarianism directly among Chilean workers. Controlling for

previously entered variables eliminates the effect of institutional integration on authoritarianism. One notable contrast between samples is the impact of political participation, which significantly reduces authoritarianism among Chileans but not among Argentines. These data also indicate that one way in which cognitive complexity reduces authoritarianism among Argentine workers is by reducing their orientation toward the present as opposed to the future.

Discussion

The findings of this study challenge the commonly asserted view that political structure and political culture are closely linked. Both the earlier version of this thesis, which considers regime type to be the direct result of popular values and attitudes (Dicks 1950; Broderick 1957), and the more sophisticated formulation, which posits a reciprocal relationship between political culture and structure (Lipset 1961; Inkeles 1961; Almond 1983), predict the existence of authoritarian political cultures in nations with authoritarian political systems. According to this thesis, values reflecting such cultures should be especially pronounced among the rural and urban working classes. Yet the data in the present study provide no support for this view. Despite the fact that Argentina has had a series of authoritarian governments, Argentine workers in this study show little evidence of an authoritarian political culture. On the whole, they are much more likely to hold prodemocratic values than one might expect on the basis of their political circumstances. They are no more authoritarian than a comparable sample of Chilean workers, who during the mid-1960s were members of a long-standing constitutional democracy.

If regime type were a result, whether directly or reciprocally, of political values, then one might reasonably expect regime transformations to be preceded and reinforced by corresponding changes in political culture. According to this line of reasoning, Chile's transition to authoritarian government in 1973 would have followed and reflected a corresponding emergence of authoritarian values. Social scientists well understand, however, that cultural values change very slowly, typically lagging behind technological and structural innovations (Ogburn 1957). It is improbable that the swift, dramatic change in Chilean political structure was accompanied and motivated by a correspondingly rapid transformation in mass political culture. Rather, the massive buildup of authoritarian values would have occurred gradually, throughout the preceding decade. At the time these data were collected, such authoritarian values—if they existed—should have been in evidence. Yet this investigation found no indication of widespread authoritarian values within Chilean working-class political culture that might help explain

the onset of Pinochet's regime. Perhaps one might object that the respondents in this study were both unrepresentative of the Chilean working class and somehow isolated from the dominant cultural currents in Chilean society, or perhaps that the upsurge of authoritarian popular values occurred unusually rapidly, during the few years following the collection of these data. While either or both of these alternatives are possible, neither is convincing without supporting empirical evidence. It is more reasonable to conclude that the thesis linking political culture and political structure requires reformulation.

These findings are all the more interesting because they closely parallel the results of Booth and Seligson's (1984) study. Their discovery of a generally democratic political culture within the essentially authoritarian Mexican political regime led them to question the political culture thesis. They suggest that Mexico's political institutions are not a consequence of an authoritarian, mass-based political culture and that one must look to other factors in order to explain them (1984, 118–19). Booth and Seligson agree that their conclusions may be disturbing because they fly in the face of what many consider to be established social science wisdom. It is possible that some researchers may offer alternative explanations for Booth and Seligson's findings, perhaps by questioning the reliability of their results because their sample excluded rural Mexicans or by assuming that their findings, although valid and reliable, reflect conditions that pertain only to Mexico's particular type of political system.

The present findings suggest the contrary—that the lack of association these researchers observed between political culture and structure is neither an artifact of their sample's composition nor confined to regimes such as that in Mexico. The lack of association appears instead to reflect a more general reality. An alternative type of authoritarian political system—that in effect in Argentina in the mid-1960s—shows no indication of being rooted in or reinforcing a mass-based authoritarian political culture. Because the samples on which this study is based do not represent the entire Argentine and Chilean populations, however, caution must be employed in interpreting these findings. They nevertheless cast doubt on the commonly asserted thesis linking political structure and political culture, particularly when interpreted vis-à-vis Booth and Seligson's conclusions. It is unlikely that either the succession of authoritarian regimes in Argentina or the abrupt transition to nondemocratic government in Chile under Pinochet can be attributed to a nondemocratic mass culture in either of these nations. Social scientists must therefore consider alternative explanations for these events.

It is beyond the scope of the present analysis to consider the merits of other approaches, such as the bureaucratic-authoritarianism hypothesis (O'Donnell 1973). Unlike those approaches that offer alter-

native explanations for authoritarian regimes, the present study challenges the political culture thesis in terms of the type of evidence favored by proponents of the thesis. These findings strongly suggest that if a connection exists between Latin American political structures and political cultures, it is clearly more complex and indirect than either version of the political culture thesis has posited.

Even though authoritarian values are not widespread throughout the Argentine and Chilean working classes, they do appear with more frequency among some types of workers than others. My analysis has identified a number of structural factors that help account for this variation. It has also shown that various conditions previously assumed to generate authoritarianism within the working class (Lipset 1960; 1981, 87–126) appear to be unrelated to this complex of values and attitudes. Among the Chilean and Argentine workers in the present study, class origins affect authoritarianism only to the extent that they influence access to formal education. Lack of participation in such mainstream social institutions as voluntary associations or the mass media also has little effect on authoritarianism. Although it may be true that the working-class subculture tends to insulate workers from the institutions of the dominant society, my data challenge the claim that such “isolation” leads to intolerance or fatalism (Lipset 1960; 1981, 101). They similarly provide no support for the thesis that authoritarianism results from economic insecurity (Lipset 1960; 1981, 100). Poorly paid workers in both the Argentine and Chilean samples are no less democratic than their more affluent counterparts. Again, the political alienation that is expected to arise from political isolation and limited access to economic resources (Lipset 1960; 1981, 100) does not lead to authoritarianism.

Among the influences considered in this study, the most critical for reducing authoritarianism among both Argentine and Chilean workers are cognitive complexity and education. Political participation increases prodemocratic attitudes and values among Chilean workers but not among Argentine workers. Class origins and living and working in rural areas are important to the extent that they influence one’s intellectual abilities, the amount of formal schooling, and in the Chilean case, one’s opportunities for political participation.

The finding that authoritarianism diminishes with formal education in both Argentina and Chile speaks to a central issue within the literature on political culture. Perhaps because the first empirical studies of authoritarianism were based on data from the United States and Western Europe, many researchers believed that the link between education and democratic political orientations obtained only in socioeconomically developed nations with fairly stable political systems and deeply ingrained democratic traditions (see Zeitlin 1967, 625). For exam-

ple, Lipset argued that education, although necessary, is not a sufficient condition for the democratic process (1960; 1981, 40); in less developed societies where economic insecurity is widespread and norms of political tolerance are not well established, even the best educated sectors may be fairly authoritarian (1960; 1981, 90). Similarly, Zeitlin speculated that the "typical" relationship between education and political liberalism may fail to hold in a politically unstable nation without a strong democratic heritage (1967, 626). Underlying this view is the assumption that because schools are central agencies of political socialization that transmit norms and values dominant in society, in a nation with a stable democratic political system, the norms and values inculcated through formal schooling will reflect this political tradition. In nations lacking a stable democratic political system, democratic values are not likely to be central aspects of the students' education. This view thus considers the educational institution to be a central ingredient in the relationship between political structure and political culture.

Yet several studies of authoritarianism in Latin America suggest that the negative association between education and authoritarianism obtains despite the nature of the political regime or the level of socio-economic development. Zeitlin found that better educated Cuban workers were less authoritarian than workers with little education (1967, 627). Similarly, Booth and Seligson discovered that education had a significant negative effect on authoritarianism among their sample of urban Mexicans (1984, 116–17).

The results of the present study are interesting in light of this debate because they permit controlled comparisons of this relationship within contrasting political systems. The finding that education reduces authoritarianism among workers from Argentina as well as Chile suggests that this association is stable across different types of political regimes. Education appears to inhibit authoritarianism even in the absence of a long-standing democratic political heritage. Two alternative, but not mutually exclusive, explanations could account for this finding. On the one hand, because these data indicate that most of the effects of education are mediated through cognitive complexity, education may inhibit workers' authoritarianism not by transmitting democratic norms and values but by expanding their reasoning abilities and levels of information. In this case, the importance of education would lie not in its role as a socializing agency but in its capacity to encourage intellectual growth. On the other hand, democratic norms and values might be part of a society's cultural traditions even though its political leaders are not able to achieve and sustain a stable democratic government. Thus a society's schools might transmit democratic values despite the presence or absence of a democratic regime. The latter interpretation, which is in

keeping with the central argument of this analysis, suggests that no close association exists between the nature of a political regime and the political culture of its citizens.

The negative relationship between authoritarian values and intellectual complexity, which is one result of formal education, is also consistent despite differences between the Argentine and Chilean political systems. The idea that analytical skills, information access, and literacy are important preconditions for the openmindedness that counteracts authoritarianism should come as no surprise. Individuals who are informed about the world around them and who possess the cognitive and verbal skills necessary to process this information effectively would be more likely than less skilled individuals to be tolerant of those whose backgrounds or lifestyles differ from their own. Such persons would also be more inclined to question or to think critically about the established traditions or customs of their culture. Cognitive complexity could also provide the independence of thought necessary to avoid unreflective submission to the dictates of authority. Also, information access and reasoning ability could incline individuals to try to control the conditions of their lives rather than resigning themselves fatalistically to their current circumstances. These findings suggest that democratic or authoritarian political values reflect the individual's intellectual abilities—and the structural conditions that further intellectual development—independently of the system of government under which he or she lives.

The results of this study also support Hamilton's thesis that authoritarianism is a product of rural life (1972, 438), and they specify some aspects of rural existence that lead to authoritarian values. Life in the countryside contributes to authoritarianism indirectly, by impairing opportunities for political participation, by minimizing access to formal education, and by impeding information awareness, reading proficiency, and analytical skills. Thus among the rural workers in these samples, authoritarianism responds not to agricultural employment per se but to the scarcity in the countryside of opportunities for intellectual and political growth.

An important difference between the Chilean and Argentine workers in this study is the effect of political participation. Chilean workers who participate politically are less authoritarian than nonparticipants despite their levels of education and cognitive complexity. By contrast, political participation has no effect on such values among Argentine workers. This difference may indicate one area in which the nature of a political regime influences the way political activities shape values and attitudes. It has been argued that participation in democratic political systems decreases authoritarianism by transmitting norms of give and take, by increasing one's stake in the political status quo, and

by exposing individuals to cross-pressures that give them a sense of the complexity of political life (Lipset 1960; 1981, 104). Yet Zeitlin's (1967) study of Cuban workers led him to question the assumption that the liberalizing influence of political involvement is confined to nations with long-standing democratic governments. Despite the fact that Cuba was not a multiparty democracy in the 1960s, Zeitlin found that workers with little political interest or involvement were more likely to be authoritarian than were politically active workers (1967, 627).

The present findings suggest that authoritarianism may decline more readily with participation in democratic systems than in non-democratic systems. In fairly representative polities like Chile during the 1960s, in which various mobilized groups have at least some access to decision makers and in which opposition parties are fairly free to voice their dissatisfaction, political involvement may lead workers to become less intolerant of opinions and interests different from their own, less fatalistic about their ability to influence their situation, and less willing to submit passively to the directives of powerful groups. By contrast, in less democratic regimes like Argentina during the 1960s, in which political elites insulate themselves from popular demands and outlaw opposition parties, the futility of political participation may afford the politically active worker little reason to become less fatalistic, intolerant, or submissive. This possibility suggests that the degree of legitimacy that an individual attributes to a political system and the capacity of a regime to respond to group demands are important intervening links between a worker's political activities and the political attitudes engendered by such behavior.

If this difference indeed reflects the contrast in the effectiveness of political participation between the Argentine and Chilean regimes, it may constitute one manner in which political culture is indirectly linked to political structure. It should be stressed, however, that this interpretation differs from previous theoretical formulations in a number of ways. It suggests that political culture is not a monolithic mirror of the political system but is instead a complex mixture of political values and attitudes. Such values appear to be shaped by ongoing experiences and varying patterns of exposure to political structure and process. Also, the question of whether or not political values reflect political structure seems to depend on the nature of the regime: although participation in a democratic system such as Chile experienced in the 1960s appears to diminish authoritarian values, participation in a nondemocratic system like that of Argentina does not appear to make individuals more authoritarian. Future studies of the link between political participation and political values in other authoritarian systems will indicate whether this pattern is confined to the Argentine case or reflects a more general tendency. In any event, it would seem that Argentine workers are not

only more likely to hold democratic values than previous discussions of the Argentine “national character” have suggested but that these values are sufficiently resilient to withstand the potentially discouraging influence of involvement in Argentine politics under nondemocratic regimes.

APPENDIX 1 *Indicators for Authoritarianism and Independent Variable Scales*
(Summary)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
Authoritarianism	
Traditionalism	(1) Are traditional and familiar ways of doing things always best, or is it useful to think or exchange ideas about new and different ways?*
	(2) Should a boy be taught to prefer old, traditional ways of doing things or new and modern ways?*
Intolerance	(1) Could you understand the way of thinking of a man with a different religion, such as a Moslem, who comes to this country?*
	(2) Could you understand the way of thinking of a person who lives in another country thousands of kilometers away?*
	(3) If you met a man from a different country, whose religion, customs, and ways of talking differed from yours but who seemed friendly, would you: want to become his friend; want to know him better; not be interested in knowing him?
	(4) How much truth does each religion have? All have some truth; many have part truth; only a few have the truth; only one has the truth.
Submissiveness	(1) Is it incorrect to contradict an old person?*
	(2) How much obligation or duty does a young man have to obey old people?*
Fatalism	(1) Which statement do you agree with more? Someday man will know what causes things like droughts, floods, epidemics; or man can never fully understand these things.
	(2) Are accidents due mainly to bad luck, or can they be prevented by proper care?*
	(3) A boy was fated not to succeed, but he was intelligent, capable, hard-working, and eager to succeed. Can he succeed in spite of his destiny?*
	(4) Does getting into a good position depend on destiny or a person's own efforts?*

Appendix 1 (continued)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
Independent Variables	
Father's education	Total number of years of formal education
Father's occupation	Eight-level, ordinal ranking of occupational prestige
Education	Total number of years of formal education
Income	Total monthly salary in pesos or escudos
Agricultural employment	Farmers vs. industrial and service workers
Urban residence	Total number of years residing in urban area
Institutional involvement	(1) Do you belong to any organizations? (2) How much effort should people make to participate in organizations?*
Political participation	(3) How often do you listen to the radio? (4) How often do you read news in newspapers?*
	(1) Have you ever talked to or written to some governmental official or political leader to tell him your opinion on some public issue?*
	(2) Have you ever gotten so highly concerned regarding some public issue that you really wanted to do something about it?*
Political alienation	(3) If you knew that a law was being proposed that in your opinion is unjust, what would you do? Accept the proposed law; think and talk about the law; make an individual protest; or participate in a collective protest?
	(1) How much are government officials sincerely interested in serving the public instead of merely serving their own careers?*
	(2) Once politicians are elected, do they try to keep their promises, or can you never tell what they will do? (3) How much attention do politicians pay to the opinions of ordinary people like yourself?*
Present orientation	(1) Do you prefer work in which you must make decisions and solve difficult problems?*
	(2) Would you rather plan carefully and arrange your affairs in advance, or let things happen without worrying about the future?*
	(3) Should a boy be taught to plan things in advance or to handle things as they come along?*

Appendix 1 (continued)

Variable	Indicators
	(4) What is your opinion about a man who counts on being able to do each task as it comes up rather than thinking about what he will do in the days ahead?*
Cognitive complexity	(1) Opposites test (2) Literacy (3) Geographical information (4) Political information

*Items are coded to form three- or four-level ordinal scale.

APPENDIX 2 Results of Factor Analysis for Traditionalism, Intolerance, Submissiveness, and Fatalism Scales for Argentina and Chile

Index	Factor Coefficients	Factor Loadings	Communalities
Argentina			
Traditionalism			
Useful to think about new ways	.34513	.40073	.16058
Teach boy to prefer new ways	.34513	.40073	.16058
Intolerance			
Man with strange religion comprehensible	.39617	.60666	.36803
Foreigner comprehensible	.43825	.63425	.40227
Would want to know stranger	.11477	.24588	.06045
Truth in many religions	.13201	.28266	.07990
Submissiveness			
Permissible to contradict the old	.43688	.58864	.34650
Young man should obey the old	.43688	.58864	.34650
Fatalism			
Disasters have knowable causes	.15005	.26183	.06855
Accidents can be prevented	.28141	.43548	.18960
Boy can overcome fate	.12583	.22298	.04972
Success is due to fate	.47831	.59129	.34962
Chile			
Traditionalism			
Useful to think about new ways	.32822	.37459	.14032
Teach boy to prefer new ways	.32822	.37459	.14032
Intolerance			
Man with strange religion comprehensible	.38691	.65744	.53223
Foreigner comprehensible	.52460	.73084	.53413
Would want to know stranger	.07540	.20405	.04164
Truth in many religions	.06322	.18189	.03309

Appendix 2 (continued)

<i>Index</i>	<i>Factor Coefficients</i>	<i>Factor Loadings</i>	<i>Communalities</i>
Submissiveness			
Permissible to contradict the old	.41775	.53982	.29140
Young man should obey the old	.41775	.53982	.29140
Fatalism			
Disasters have knowable causes	.09918	.16137	.02604
Accidents can be prevented	.45763	.53972	.29130
Boy can overcome fate	.11541	.18729	.03508
Success is due to fate	.28606	.39912	.15929

APPENDIX 3 Results of Factor Analysis for Authoritarianism Scales, Argentina and Chile

<i>Index</i>	<i>Factor Coefficients</i>	<i>Factor Loadings</i>	<i>Communalities</i>
Argentina			
Traditionalism	.18078	.31079	.09659
Intolerance	.28714	.43672	.19082
Submissiveness	.14608	.25401	.06452
Fatalism	.44175	.56580	.32013
Chile			
Traditionalism	.17707	.23010	.05295
Intolerance	.22339	.28265	.07989
Submissiveness	.06319	.08619	.00743
Fatalism	.38077	.42785	.18306

NOTES

1. This investigation is confined to the male working classes in Argentina and Chile. The exclusion of women is unfortunate but unavoidable because the samples from which the data derive are limited to men. No assumption is made in this study that its conclusions are equally applicable to women workers. This qualification should be borne in mind despite the fact that brevity has prevented the language employed throughout this discussion from continually alerting the reader to its all-male context. Thus for example, the term "workers" is used instead of "male workers" and "working class" instead of "male working class."
2. Inkeles and Smith designed their samples to yield a predefined number of members of certain occupational subgroups rather than a representative cross-section of each national population. Because the project directors sampled randomly within factories, the industrial worker subsamples are not as susceptible to potential bias as are true quota samples. Agricultural and service workers, however, were selected through quota sampling, and therefore statistical results based on these groups cannot be generalized to the larger populations from which they derive.
3. Factor analyzing the individual components that constitute a scale reveals important information about the index. Factor analysis indicates whether the items do in fact

tap a single common underlying dimension. If the factor analysis reveals only one significant principal component, the variables can be considered to have a unidimensional factor structure. Factor analysis also produces factor coefficients for weighting each item to construct the overall index.

4. The factor analysis procedure employed in this study treats as significant only those principal components with eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1.0. No set of items in the present study had a second principal factor with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or larger. Because insignificant second factors cannot be interpreted, they are not considered in the present analysis.
5. The scales for traditionalism, intolerance, submissiveness, and fatalism were constructed in the following way: each item was standardized by transforming it to its Z-score; then the resulting quantity was multiplied by the factor coefficient corresponding to that item. These products were then summed to produce the scales. The authoritarianism index was constructed using similar procedures.
6. A two-tailed T-test was used to test for a statistically significant difference between the means of the two samples.
7. These analyses employed stepwise inclusion criteria, allowing the best predictor of authoritarianism to enter the regression first, the next best to enter the second, and so on. Whereas the first independent variable to be included explained all it could of the variation in authoritarianism, the subsequent variables accounted for only that variation left unexplained by the variables entered before them. In this way, the multiple regression demonstrated whether a variable entering the analysis at a later step significantly affected the dependent variable even after the effects of initial entrants had been statistically controlled.
8. Path analysis decomposes the linear relationships among a set of variables into a number of links called "paths." The direction of the path indicates the direction of influence between variables, while the size of the corresponding coefficient reveals the magnitude of the influence. An assumption underlying the path diagram is that the influence flows predominantly in one direction throughout the model.

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