

validity of their logical form, establish with certainty the truth of the conclusion they present, inductive arguments establish degrees of probability that something or other is the case. As such, they proffer empirical evidence of some sort or other for the conclusion which they seek to defend, and can differ in the degree of credibility which they inspire. A report by someone prone to paralytic bouts of drunkenness claiming to have seen the Loch Ness monster in the course of a party at the Loch would not inspire credence: it would not count as an inductive argument of any kind. A new photograph of some distant monster-like object in Loch Ness taken by a tourist of sober character would inspire greater credibility. It is unlikely that it would warrant the judgment that it is more likely than not that Nessie exists. It would nevertheless constitute an addition to the body of evidence for the existence of Nessie, perhaps raising the likelihood that the monster exists from 3% to 5%. As such, it is C-inductive proof, part of the C-inductive argument for the existence of Nessie. C-inductive proof increases the likelihood that some state-of-affairs obtains without making it more likely than not. It leaves the likelihood of a claim less slender than it was before, but still slender for all that. P-inductive proofs, by contrast, establish that it is more likely than not that the state-of-affairs they present does obtain. Were a scrupulously scientific expedition to produce subterranean photographs of a monster-like creature lurking at the bottom of Loch Ness, or sonar-echo material usually associated with sea monsters, this would constitute a P-inductive argument for the existence of Nessie if a more plausible explanation was not available. For a discussion of C-inductive and P-inductive arguments, see Richard Swinburne, *The Existence of God* (Oxford, 1979), chapter 1. For an analysis of the distinction in terms of Bayes' Theorem, see Swinburne, pp. 15–19. For Swinburne's assessment of the inductive force of the ensemble of arguments for the existence of God, see *ibid.*, p. 290f.

2 H.P. Owen, *Concepts of Deity* (London, 1971), p. 1.

3 Swinburne, pp. 254–276.

4 Swinburne, p. 290 f.

5 On the development of *jhāna* and the *nimitta* in Theravada Buddhist meditation, see Vajirānāna, *Buddhist Meditation* (Kuala Lumpur: Buddhist Missionary Society, 1975), p. 32ff. and p. 248ff. A less technical discussion can be found in Saddhatissa, *The Buddha's Way* (London, 1971) pp. 76–79. For the appearance of the *nimitta* to someone unversed in the theory of meditation, see J. Hamilton-Marritt, *A Meditator's Diary*, (Harmondsworth 1979), pp. 40–49.

Correction

A line fell out of last month's *Comment*, written by the four Dominicans who were arrested during a demonstration in London on Ash Wednesday. They quoted moral philosophers who have recently been arguing that civil disobedience could be justified as showing that policies of 'nuclear terrorism', because of their extraordinary wickedness, are always outside the law and in fact undermine it. Our writers then said (but we failed partly to print): 'A general call to repentance which does not speak clearly to such an all-pervading corruption of our communality is a waste of breath.'