EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF REDISTRIBUTION UNDER AUTOCRACY

The Case of Peru's Revolution from Above

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Abstract: Who benefits and who loses during redistribution under dictatorship? This article argues that expropriating powerful preexisting economic elites can serve to demonstrate a dictator or junta's loyalty to their launching organization while destroying elite rivals out of government that could potentially threaten the dictator's survival. Expropriation also provides resources for buying the support of key nonelite groups that could otherwise organize destabilizing resistance. An analysis of the universe of fifteen thousand land expropriations under military rule in Peru from 1968 to 1980 demonstrates the plausibility of this argument as a case of redistributive military rule that destroyed traditional elites and empowered the military. Land was redistributed to "middle-class" rural laborers who had the greatest capacity to organize antiregime resistance if they were excluded from the reform. This finding directly challenges a core assumption of social conflict theory: that nondemocratic leaders will act as faithful agents of economic elites. A discussion of other modernizing militaries and data on large-scale expropriations of land, natural resources, and banks across Latin America from 1935 to 2008 suggests that the theory generalizes beyond Peru.

How do nondemocratic regimes that choose to expropriate decide who to target, and why do they redistribute confiscated assets to certain groups while neglecting others? Case-study accounts and formal theoretical work have identified several plausible hypotheses to explain patterns of redistribution under dictatorship, including ideological orientation (Verdery 1991) and the ideological mobilization of subaltern sectors against entrenched elites (Laclau 1977; Canovan 1981), "father of the poor" strategies used to cultivate popular support for a regime (Levine 1998; Turits 2003), and staving off the threat of revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2006). These explanations have shed important light on how either the composition of a regime's inner circle or the presence of external threats can condition regime behavior.

Nondemocratic leaders' responses to the dual challenges posed from within and outside the regime, however, are often intertwined. Expropriating powerful preexisting elites can simultaneously demonstrate a dictator's loyalty to his support coalition while also providing resources to reduce the threat from below

I thank the Comisión de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal (COFOPRI) in Lima, Peru, for collaborating on data gathering during fieldwork, and Katerina Nikolova for assistance with classifying expropriation decrees. I would like to thank Jim Fearon, Steve Haber, Peter Klaren, David Laitin, Beatriz Magaloni, Dan Masterson, Enrique Mayer, Cynthia McClintock, Victor Menaldo, Jonathan Rodden, Dan Slater, Paul Staniland, and three anonymous *LARR* reviewers for helpful comments.

Latin American Research Review, Vol. 50, No. 2. © 2015 by the Latin American Studies Association.

https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2015.0024 Published online by Cambridge University Press

and buy the support of key groups that could organize resistance to the autocrat's rule. Viewed from this perspective, redistribution under autocracy arises from intraelite splits and competition among factions, and it serves two complementary functions in consolidating a dictator's rule.

This article develops a theory to explain patterns of redistribution under autocracy, outlines the theoretical bases for alternative explanations of autocratic redistribution, and then empirically examines support for these explanations in the historically prominent case of redistributive military rule in Peru. From 1968 to 1980, Generals Juan Velasco Alvarado and Francisco Morales Bermúdez and their coalitions implemented a set of radical reforms known as the "revolution from above." Amid this wide-ranging experiment with "state capitalism," one of the most significant projects was a land reform program that destroyed landholding elites in favor of rural laborers. Roughly fifteen thousand properties were expropriated and redistributed, constituting 45 percent of all agricultural land. Although the reform left out key sectors of the rural poor, many peasants benefited materially, and it drastically changed land tenure relations in Peru. According to prominent Peru scholar Enrique Mayer (2009, 3), "It was the first government ever to execute significant income distribution in a society of great inequalities. It completed the abolition of all forms of servitude in rural estates, a momentous shift in the history of the Andes, akin to the abolition of slavery in the Americas." The urban middle class also gained from pro-worker industrial laws; expropriations in the urban and natural resource sectors; and employment, pension, and health benefits driven by the expansion of the state.

What explains how Peru's military regime targeted its land redistribution? Using original data on the universe of land expropriations along with data on land tenure and landholdings, I demonstrate that the regime targeted the largest, most influential landowners for expropriation, redistributing to peasant workers but leaving out the poorest rural inhabitants—landless workers and indigenous communities. Furthermore, expropriation and redistribution was not focused on the areas that had previously formed the greatest threat of revolution.

The findings are indicative of a pragmatic military regime that pursued its own autonomous interests while undercutting its rivals and solidifying its support base. This poses a direct challenge to influential recent scholarship such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003) that assumes that nondemocratic leaders will act as faithful agents of elites. These authors assume that economic elites and their political or military allies will enter a coalition to repress the masses and will jointly choose policies such as taxes and transfers, thus eliminating the possibility of an autocratic regime acting contrary to elite interests. Boix (2003, 214–219) briefly discusses redistributive left-wing dictatorship but argues that these regimes are rare, typically arise when the poor take power through revolution, and are ineffective at implementing redistributive reforms. For Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 939n2), "dictatorships that are against the interests of the richer segments of society . . . fall outside the scope of our model."

This article demonstrates that nondemocratic leaders can and frequently do destroy the power of economic elites and operate in power according to autono-

https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2015.0024 Published online by Cambridge University Press

mous interests. The Peruvian military had long been manipulated by powerful elites who had acted to regulate its budget and training curriculum, called on them to overthrow threatening democratic regimes, and then used their ownership of the press and lucrative export sector to coordinate opposition and pressure military rulers that deviated from their desired policies (Gilbert 1977). Consequently, the military leaders Velasco and Morales Bermúdez sought to "break the back of the oligarchy" with the land reform program to diminish elite influence over the military's institutions, budget, and actions: the key concerns of their military support coalition. Upon destroying landed elites, Generals Velasco and Morales Bermúdez doubled the military's size and more than quintupled its funding. Land was redistributed to "middle-class" peasants who had worked on expropriated estates and had the greatest potential to organize against the regime had the reform excluded them or been broadened to include the landless poor. This dual-pronged strategy, benefiting both the military support coalition and the most organized rural threat from below, was politically effective. Velasco ruled for seven years and Morales Bermúdez for five years, compared to most autocratic leaders in Latin America from 1935 to 2008, who survived in office for less than two years.

The divergence between preexisting powerful elites in Peru and the coalition that brought Velasco to power is not uncommon in autocratic rule. Nondemocratic leaders and powerful elites often have disparate interests that are manifested under autocratic rule (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Bermeo 2010; Conaghan and Malloy 1994; Stepan 1978). Indeed, Huntington (1968) argues that militaries in modernizing countries are often the key forces for progressive change, as they overturn oligarchic or monarchic governments and adopt radical programs of social reform that cultivate a middle class. Many dictators and juntas, therefore, have interests antithetical to those of preexisting elites and strong incentives destroy the potential threat that they pose to their rule (Bienen 1985; Gilbert 1977; Nordlinger 1977; Trimberger 1978).

Beyond enhancing the understanding of autocratic redistribution, the theoretical argument advanced here also has observable implications for the study of democracy. In addition to implementing policies that condition the likelihood of democratization and democratic stability such as weakening rural patron-client relations and expanding the middle class (e.g., Ansell and Samuels 2010; Moore 1966), a redistributive dictator can make powerful elites more wary of autocratic rule and therefore more likely to support democracy, particularly if they can disproportionately influence policy (Albertus and Menaldo 2014). The potential for a nondemocratic leader to favor a support coalition distinct from preexisting elites can deter those elites from mounting a coup if they imperfectly control a dictator's behavior or potential countercoups and dictator cycling. It can also lead elites to support a more predictable, mildly redistributive democracy over the prospect of irregular leader replacement and possible reformist autocratic rule. Democratic transition in unequal states where elites are powerful (e.g., Colombia and Venezuela in 1958, Brazil in 1985) are less surprising under this account than current literature anticipates.

https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2015.0024 Published online by Cambridge University Press

EXPROPRIATION AND REDISTRIBUTION UNDER AUTOCRACY

Recent literature on the political economy of autocratic rule suggests that the most serious threat faced by dictators or juntas emanates from within their support coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Svolik 2012).[1] To survive in office, therefore, a dictator must consolidate his authority by cultivating the favor of this group. Yet how does the dictator's launching organization (LO) of individuals who helped him grab power learn to trust him, especially if the dictator took power by overthrowing and thus betraying the previous leader?

Expropriation is one powerful policy that dictators can avail to reduce their political insecurity. This strategy is particularly useful given common problems of incomplete information at the outset of a dictator's rule: the costs of honoring promises made during coup planning, private appeals by economic elites to deliver the dictator rents in return for respecting the status quo at the expense of his LO, and the dictator's risk acceptance for generating benefits for the LO in ways that raise popular resistance and the likelihood of a countercoup.

Expropriation and Coalition Building amid Splits between the Launching Organization and Preexisting Elites

Expropriation of preexisting elites (PE), the individuals privileged under the previous regime, can help a dictator preserve his ability to act independently in the future by eliminating rivals with long-standing power. The LO also benefits from this policy when distinct from the PE. By expropriating the PE, the dictator reveals that he intends to remain loyal to his LO. He not only forgoes the loss of rents and political support from the PE but also accepts the risk of being left with no support if the LO turns its back on him. The degree to which the LO benefits from expropriation is therefore an increasing function of the strength of the PE. Simply expropriating nonelite groups or buying off the PE is ultimately self-defeating, as this leads the LO to fear that the dictator plans to maintain the PE as a hedge against LO members or to enjoy rents from the PE, rendering him less accountable to the LO. This would incentivize the LO to withdraw support from the dictator, thus destabilizing his rule.

Expropriation can also serve the complementary function of providing resources to reduce pressure from below and win the support of key nonelite groups that have the potential to organize resistance to the dictator if their interests are neglected. Dictators who face potential opposition or require cooperation from important groups in society to sustain their rule will be more likely to yield policy concessions to these groups (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). In developing states, where land is a key component of wealth for both rich and poor, converting rural laborers to smallholders through land redistribution can turn otherwise aggrieved peasants into a conservative force supporting the status quo over movements that threaten property ownership (Ansell and Samuels 2010; Huntington 1968).

1. Although this section uses the term *dictator* to signify the autocratic regime leader, decisions may be made in consultation with a small number of co-conspirators, a junta, or a ruling circle.

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The theory advanced here therefore sheds light on both the targets and the beneficiaries of expropriation. When a dictator's LO diverges from the PE, dictators have an incentive to target powerful preexisting elites to reduce these elites' capacity to threaten the autocrat's rule. Destroying the PE also demonstrates to a dictator's LO that he is willing to rely on them for his political survival. Finally, expropriation of the PE can be used to provide resources to reduce an organized threat from below. Redistribution under autocracy is therefore a consequence of intraelite splits and competition among factions, and it can elongate a dictator's tenure by (1) consolidating his coalition and (2) eliminating external threats.

Expropriation When the PE and LO Overlap

When the support base of the regime is drawn largely from preexisting elites, in contrast, expropriating the PE is unlikely. Expropriation in this case would undercut the dictator's only supporters and almost certainly spell his removal. Dictators with an LO drawn from the PE—such as Pinochet in Chile, the Somozas in Nicaragua, and the most recent military regimes in Argentina—are therefore likely to serve as agents of the PE and forgo expropriation.

Alternative Explanations of Expropriation under Dictatorship

In contrast to existing predictions that a dictator will engage in regressive redistribution when time horizons are short (e.g., Olson 1993), the theoretical argument here predicts that dictators will target powerful preexisting elites rather than the poor when empowered by an LO drawn from outside the ranks of elites. Furthermore, because doing so helps a dictator demonstrate commitment to his supporters and therefore consolidate his rule, redistribution should occur early in a leader's tenure.

The theoretical argument advanced here also contrasts with explanations of redistribution under dictatorship that result from revolutionary pressure. This alternative logic assumes that dictators act as faithful agents of a unified economic elite and that democracy poses a greater redistributive threat (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2006, Boix 2003). Redistribution under dictatorship therefore occurs only when a high revolutionary threat pushes elites to accede to some redistribution to avoid a worse revolutionary outcome.

Several other important contributions relax this assumption about the relationship between a dictator and existing elites, focusing instead on internal regime dynamics. Some point to ideology as a key determinant of pro-poor redistributive policies under dictatorship. Verdery (1991), for example, highlights redistribution as a central legitimating principle in the socialist economies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Soviets during this period of Peru's history, in competition with US capitalism, substantially influenced theories and strategies of development in developing Latin American countries and beyond. Similarly, Laclau (1977) and Canovan (1981) associate the redistributive emphasis of traditional populist policies, often implemented under dictatorship, with an ideological discourse underscoring the gulf between "the people" and the elite

https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2015.0024 Published online by Cambridge University Press

as justification for providing material benefits to the former. Others argue that redistribution to the poor is pursued for instrumental reasons: to court the lower classes as a regime's support base (Levine 1998). And if poorer constituents are easier to please than rich ones given diminishing marginal utility of income, a dynamic documented in the clientelism literature, the poorest individuals should be the chief benefactors. Although these theories both shed light on the beneficiaries of redistribution, predicting redistribution to the poorest segments of society, they have less specific predictions for the targets of expropriation.

MILITARY RULE AND LAND REDISTRIBUTION IN PERU

The historically important case of military rule in Peru serves to illustrate in detail one case in which a junta that seized power acted to destroy powerful and potentially threatening preexisting elites in favor of its launching organization and then redistributed the seized assets to key sectors of the population. Peru's economy until the 1960s largely revolved around land: according to census calculations, 50 percent of the economically active population in 1965 was involved in agriculture. But there was long-standing pressure for land reform. The 1961 census demonstrates the severe inequality in landholdings. The largest 1 percent of landowners held 80 percent of private land, whereas 83 percent of farmers held properties of five hectares or less, representing only 6 percent of total private land. Land tenure relations varied widely but were archaic in many regions, the most notorious being in the semifeudal haciendas of the highland sierras. In the sierra haciendas, indigenous campesinos cultivated small plots for family consumption on the owner's land in exchange for labor on the hacienda, typically during seeding and harvesting times, when campesinos most needed to tend to their own plots. Furthermore, these *colonos* were not free to move, and the owner could rotate or retract the land at his discretion. Peru lagged its peers on a number of social and economic dimensions in the 1960s despite its level of income per capita (Palmer 1973), and many professional Peruvians attributed this to the lopsided and archaic agrarian structure.

The mantle of agrarian reform was first taken up in the 1930s by the political party Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA). But with a military that largely protected the wealth and power of the preexisting landowning elite, democratic governments proved incapable of implementing even mild land reform until Fernando Belaúnde was elected president in 1963. The military supported Belaúnde as an alternative to APRA and because of their anticipated role in his proposed development program in the eastern jungle highlands. Belaúnde had promised agrarian reform during his campaign, and although an agrarian reform law passed through Congress in 1964, landholding interests successfully added so many modifications to it that it became nearly useless (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980). Belaúnde's term was frustrated by crises. Land invasions and leftist rebellions cropped up in the Andes from 1963 to 1965, and loans from foreign creditors during an economic crisis generated public turmoil toward the end of his term.

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Velasco's Launching Organization

In October 1968, General Velasco seized power from Belaúnde with the help of a military launching organization in a coup that would begin the "Docenio," a period of military rule lasting until 1980. Velasco relied on a core coalition (the "Earthquake Group") with whom he had plotted the coup to construct and guide major policies. The four key colonels in this group were Leonidas Rodríguez Figueroa, Jorge Fernández Maldonado, Enrique Gallegos, and Rafael Hoyos (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980, 43). Civilians at times were drawn closely to this inner circle, but typically for advising on specific issues. The broader set of political elites constituting Velasco's government included army, air force, and navy officers charged with implementing the regime's policies. Key members included José Graham Hurtado, Arturo Valdez Palacio, Rolando Gilardi, Anibal Meza Cuadra, Miguel Ángel de la Flor, Jorge Barandiarán, Luis Barandiarán, Pedro Richter, Javier Tantaleán, Enrique Valdez Angulo, and Luis Vargas Caballero (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980, 43–44; Kruijt 1994; Masterson 1991, 248). Several of these individuals became closer to Velasco over time while others were excluded. In addition, several committed civilians were brought into this group, including Carlos Delgado, Augusto Zimmerman, and Guillermo Figallo.

All of these key supporters were expected to secure the support and cooperation of the broader launching organization—the rest of the armed forces—in exchange for their positions in Velasco's government. Their views were diverse on a range of issues. Henry Pease García (1977) divides these individuals into three loose, shifting "tendencies": bourgeois liberals, progressives, and "La Misión." Philip (1978) categorizes them as revolutionaries, developmentalists, and conservatives. While McClintock (1983, 280) emphasizes that these were tendencies and not clear factions or ideologies, divergent opinions required Velasco to maneuver politically at times to achieve his preferred outcomes. Velasco's key supporters were nonetheless united (particularly the Earthquake Group) against the landed elite and in favor of agrarian reform. They were also united against elites in the industry, finance, and export sectors and favored early redistributive initiatives in these areas.

Although Velasco's launching organization did not have an explicit, cohesive ideology, most officers did nonetheless support agrarian reform on the basis of principle. Why were Velasco's officers predisposed toward reform (Philip 1978)? Most key officers came from Peru's provinces, born to largely impoverished families (Kruijt 1994, 46). This was true of the entire Earthquake Group. Rodríguez Figueroa and Gallegos had humble Cusco roots; Fernández Maldonado was born in a small town in remote Moquegua; and Hoyos was from Cajamarca, initially joining the army as a volunteer soldier. Military education shifted while these officers climbed the military ranks, particularly in the Center for Advanced Military Studies (CAEM) and the army's Intelligence School. Both CAEM and military intelligence introduced changes toward more merit-based promotion and emphasized the military's role in economic and social development (including agrarian reform) as key to fostering stability and national autonomy. This threat

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was not lost on entrenched elites. Belaúnde's Prime Minister Pedro Beltrán, the president of the powerful landowners' National Agrarian Society, ordered CAEM to cut nonmilitary matters from its curriculum (Kruijt 1994, 39). This angered military officials, who interpreted Beltrán's actions as an encroachment similar to the elite's tight monitoring of its budget and to their past use of press ownership and export sector dominance to cajole military rulers into complying with their desired policies (Gilbert 1977).

Threats to political stability in Peru in the late 1950s and 1960s brought the military in direct contact with Peru's backward agrarian structure and the landed elites that dominated it, deepening its sense that landed elites must be eliminated and its resentment of manipulation at the hand of these same elites. Hugo Blanco's farmers' union movement in the La Convención and Lares valleys in the late 1950s resulted in land invasions that ultimately required army intervention. The highly unequal distribution of holdings, archaic land tenure relations, and appalling conditions of the poor convinced many officers that Peru was overdue for agrarian reform. In anticipation of land reform under Belaúnde in 1963, peasants again launched large-scale land invasions in the Andes in 1963–1964. Yet landed elites relentlessly opposed change, dramatically watering down Belaúnde's 1964 land reform in Congress. A rural guerrilla movement in the Andes in 1965 again required a military response, and Belaúnde's reform failed to respond effectively to rural demands. These events helped solidify the ideas of officers surrounding Velasco regarding reform.

Expropriation and Redistribution under Velasco

The military regime under Velasco forged a more interventionist, statist economic policy as it built "state capitalism." The military quickly seized the International Petroleum Company's Talara installations upon taking power. It subsequently expropriated foreign mining companies and privately owned Peruvian companies deemed to be in its national interests, including banks, utilities, fishing enterprises, and major newspapers. The regime created state enterprises with monopoly privileges that hobbled private businesses in the export sectors of cotton, sugar, minerals, coca, and petroleum marketing (Saulniers 1988). Furthermore, it created manufacturing laws (e.g., the Industrial Community Law) that specified worker participation in profit distributions, worker shareholding, and participation in company management in all industries.

One of Velasco's most prominent initiatives among these, the agrarian reform Decree Law 17716 of 1969, was aimed squarely at preexisting elites. The law stipulated that all landholdings larger than 150 hectares on the coast and larger than 15 to 55 hectares in the Sierra (depending on the location) were subject to expropriation without exception.[2] Those in violation of labor laws were subject to expropriation regardless of property size, and capital assets on expropriated landholdings, such as mills, agricultural equipment, and even animals, were also

2. Landholding limits were lowered to fifty hectares on the coast and thirty hectares in the highlands in a 1975 revision to the law.

https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2015.0024 Published online by Cambridge University Press

to be expropriated. Compensation was based on the property value previously declared by the landowner for tax purposes, often well below market value, and reimbursement was primarily paid in long-term government bonds that became next to worthless against very high inflation at the end of the 1970s.[3] Only in early 2014 did the government take the first definitive steps toward compensating remaining bondholders in response to a 2013 Constitutional Court ruling, which set compensation at a small fraction of the originally low valuations.

Unlike land reform efforts under previous governments, Law 17716 drastically altered land tenure relationships and property ownership. To deepen the political support of reform beneficiaries and harness this support to bolster the regime, Velasco created the Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA), an agricultural-sector organization that beneficiaries were pushed to join in order to defend the regime's progress. Yet opposition to the CNA grew from groups that did not benefit from agrarian reform. Some of these individuals joined the Confederación Campesina Peruana (CCP), which at times grew faster than the government-sponsored CNA. Furthermore, Velasco implemented several policies in the agrarian cooperatives that diminished rural support and redistributed less to the urban poor.

The Morales Coup and Subsequent Redistribution

In the face of this discontent, mounting economic problems, a festering territorial dispute with Chile, and Velasco's progressively developing sickness, the military became more factionalized. With the tacit support of many insiders, then prime minister General Morales Bermúdez pushed the ailing Velasco out of office in 1975 (McClintock 1983). Morales at first continued Peru's agrarian transformation, promising not to vary "one millimeter" from Velasco's reforms and initially keeping many key Velasco advisers such as Rodríguez, Fernández Maldonado, Gallegos, and Graham. Many progressives, however, left government as Morales eventually veered right in the face of economic turmoil. Despite these later changes, the support coalition still did not overlap substantially with landed elites (Kruijt 1994). The new minister of agriculture after Gallegos, General Luis Arbulú Ibáñez (July 1976–July 1979), was a longtime military man who declared the agrarian reform "irreversible." Morales therefore never reversed the reform (McClintock 1981), but he did taper its intensity substantially in his later years in office as he "consolidated" the revolution, leading the CNA and CCP to join in two strikes against the military government's agrarian policies.

Morales also changed the industries law, deemphasized social property, devaluated the sol, and entered negotiations with the International Monetary Fund to stabilize the economy in the face of economic crisis and increasing coalitional overlap with remaining urban economic elites who had forged tacit alliances with newly powerful cabinet members such as Parodi and Cisneros. These policies favored economic elites and put pressure on Morales from remaining progressive members of his military support coalition. In July 1977 Morales then quickly

3. According to Mayer (2009), land was compensated at roughly 10 percent of its 1967 market value, and 73 percent of total compensation was in government bonds.

https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2015.0024 Published online by Cambridge University Press

announced upcoming elections to maintain unity within the fractionalized military.

Under Velasco and Morales, roughly fifteen thousand properties were expropriated through agrarian reform, constituting more than eight million hectares and 45 percent of all agricultural land. By 1979, more than four hundred thousand families were spread among 1,800 new agricultural units, mostly cooperatives, averaging more than five thousand hectares each (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980, 263). While many peasants did not prefer cooperatives, their creation enabled the regime to closely monitor production and administration and attempt to subvert politically active cooperative members by empowering technicians (McClintock 1981).

Hypotheses for the Peruvian Land Reform

There is considerable debate among Peru scholars over the generals' motives and intentions for the land reform program. One important explanation is rooted in the military's corporate interests. This argument cites the military's indignation with being manipulated by landed and other economic elites, who had previously acted to modify its changing progressive curriculum and regulate its budget (McClintock 1981, 49; Gilbert 1977). The oligarchy had long relied on the military to overthrow governments that threatened their interests and lead repressive autocratic regimes, as with Sánchez Cerro, Benavides, and Odría (Gilbert 1977, 145–146). Oligarchs took up collections to bribe military figures and support the Odría coup, and explicitly funded military repression of uprisings, collecting funds for improved armaments after the APRA revolt under Sánchez Cerro and buying bonds to finance the brutal repression of guerrilla activities in the Andes in the 1960s (Gilbert 1977, 150–151). Yet they had also used their press ownership and dominance in the lucrative banking and export sectors to punish military rulers who deviated from their desired policies by rallying popular opposition and restricting the flow of government credit. This made Velasco and Morales Bermúdez and their military coalitions wary of these powerful elite families. Velasco and Morales Bermúdez also recognized the importance of empowering the military officers that supported their rule to avoid disaffected officers from conspiring against them, perhaps supported by targeted elites.

Simultaneously, for the military coalition to gain popular support and reduce rural resistance, military rulers had to redistribute land to peasants with the greatest capacity to organize. Strengthening regional and national peasant unions and experiences with repressing rural uprisings in the 1960s made it clear that organized peasants had to be included in the land reform to ease the task of ruling (Malloy 1974). Because expropriated estates were generally adjudicated to those who previously worked on those properties, this anticipates more expropriation in regions that had greater land pressure: more peasants living in labor-dense areas more conducive to collective action.

The main hypothesis therefore anticipates two chief beneficiaries of the reform:

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Hypothesis 1: The military dictators explicitly targeted the oligarchy with its land reform to empower its military launching organization, and redistributed land to the peasants with greatest organizational capacity.

I demonstrate here that this hypothesis is the most consistent with the reform structure and implementation.

Alternative explanations for the military's reform program can be grouped into four different hypotheses, three of which largely track the main existing explanations in the literature for patterns of redistribution under dictatorship: ideological orientation, a "father of the poor" strategy, and staving off revolution. One argument attributes the military's reform to its progressive ideology, citing Velasco's humble origins and the presence of radical high-level colonels in the regime. Upon obtaining power, these actors pushed to "raise mass living standards" to redress historical injustices (Masterson 1991, 231; Philip 1978). A second argument holds that the military regime adopted a "father of the poor" strategy, distributing land to the poor to cultivate lower-class support as a foundation for continued rule (Cotler 1970). Indeed, some saw the creation of the popular mobilization organization Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (SINAMOS) in exactly this light. These hypotheses imply similar observed patterns of land redistribution from wealthier landowners to the mass of poorest rural inhabitants: those who were landless, living in indigenous communities, or sharecropping (Handelman 1975).

A third explanation of the military's land reform points to its concerns over leftist rebellions in the 1960s, which may have led politicians and military leaders to fear recurrent peasant protest and implement change to avoid revolution (Malloy 1974). The most important movement was a guerrilla campaign launched from a series of bases in the Andes in 1965. Viewed by some as a direct threat to national stability and to the military itself, the armed forces explicitly forced Belaúnde to cede total control over antiguerrilla operations, which had strong support among the landed elite (Masterson 1991, 215). The second movement was a series of land invasions from 1963 to 1964. Under the slogan "land or death," roughly three hundred thousand peasants organized land invasions and occupations in the highlands, many of which were repressed violently by the police. According to this account of the reform, the military may have targeted land in restive regions rather than in poor or unequal regions regardless of whether they were visibly unstable.

A fourth hypothesis, unique to the Peruvian case, is that redistribution was aimed at undermining political opposition and support for opposition leaders, particularly those in the political party APRA (Cotler 1970). The Peruvian military was perennially skeptical of APRA's unpredictable political shifts and had a well-known antipathy for APRA dating to the 1930s. The military also feared APRA would steal their mantle of reform if elected, by appealing to the significant populist support APRA still held (Masterson 1991, 233). Consequently, the military may have crafted the reform to strike at traditional APRA strongholds. Indeed, major sugar plantations on the northern coast were some of the first properties to

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be affected, which coincided with *aprista* labor strongholds that had successfully fought for exemption from Belaúnde's agrarian reform.

These explanations for the agrarian reform continue to be debated among Peru scholars. Consistent with the main hypothesis, McClintock (1983) argues that Peru's military selectively targeted the landed oligarchy to eliminate a strategic enemy. While not his focus, Philip (2013, 280) concurs with this point, arguing that after Velasco leveraged economic nationalism to bolster his position, he moved with core supporters to "selective confrontation" against the landed oligarchy. Philip nonetheless attributes some of this to the radical orientation of core officers. Cant (2012), in contrast, argues that the regime implemented the agrarian reform to undercut the threat of insurgency through economic development, and then deployed sophisticated propaganda to articulate aspirations for a more equal, integrated society. Seligmann (1995) contends that the regime had an "ideology of national integration and development" and designed the agrarian reform to integrate indigenous groups into the nation while simultaneously spurring development. And though not directly analyzing the reasons for land reform, Mayer (2009) argues that its design evidenced an effort to spur development and reduce peasant land pressure.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

To test competing hypotheses regarding the military regime's land redistribution program, each of which has different implications for expected patterns of distribution, I conduct an empirical analysis at the department level using data on the targeting and timing of the land reform to determine who were the chief targets and beneficiaries of expropriation. Because of the unique disaggregated data, the analysis represents one of the first empirical studies of a major program of redistribution under nondemocracy that exploits subnational variation in redistribution to find its determinants.

The Key Explanatory Variables: Land Inequality and Landholding Elite

I argue that the presence of landholding elites was a crucial factor that drove the Peruvian land reform under military rule. This hypothesis suggests that greater land inequality, which captures the presence and power of large landholders through land concentration, should be positively associated with land redistribution. To test this, I utilize information on the distribution of agricultural landholdings from Peru's 1961 national agricultural census, which surveyed more than 850,000 properties. For each department, the number of farms and their total land area was recorded for sixteen different size classifications. A full 70 percent of farms were smaller than 3 hectares, and there were 3,600 farms larger than 500 hectares. I used the distribution and land area of farms in each size category to create a Gini index of land inequality by department, which captures deviation from an equitable distribution, reflecting the degree to which land is concentrated among a few wealthy owners. That this measure captures elite influence is supported by the fact that larger landowners came from wealthier, more prominent

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

Figure 1a Landholding inequality (Gini), 1961

Figure 1b Properties affected by expropriation (log), 1969–1980

elite families (Gilbert 1977). Land inequality is measured prior to land redistribution, thus eliminating the possibility of endogeneity running from expropriation under the military regime to the distribution of landholdings. Furthermore, the distribution of land in 1961 closely represents that at the beginning of military rule in 1968. Only Belaúnde attempted land reform between these years, redistributing only 380,000 hectares to fewer than fifteen thousand peasants (Thiesenhusen 1989, 138). Figure 1A displays the distribution of the land Gini coefficient by department. Inequality was most heavily concentrated in the coastal regions and southern highlands.

I created two other variables to capture inequality and elite presence, since two departments with equivalent Gini coefficients may have different elite presence. These two additional variables directly measure the total number of large landholdings (latifundios) in a department. The first variable is a count of the properties greater than two hundred hectares, and the second a count of properties larger than one hundred hectares. These indicators measure elite power and presence; indeed, the government used landholding ceilings as one of the chief criteria for expropriation. Both are constructed from the 1961 agricultural census.

Measuring Land Reform

I use a rich, original data set on land expropriation to investigate variation in land redistribution under military rule from 1969 to 1980. In collaboration with

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the government agency Comisión de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal (COFOPRI) in Lima, I constructed a list of expropriation decrees in Peru during the years 1969–1980.[4] This information was documented contemporaneously by the Ministry of Agriculture, which kept scrupulous and verifiable records of every government resolution emitted to affect an expropriation and simultaneously published the decrees in newspapers with national circulation to make the information public. There are two main reasons expropriation information was handled this way. First, as is not uncommon in military regimes (Nordlinger 1977), Velasco placed a high premium on order and procedure, which prioritized the creation of clear metrics for reform progress. Second, property expropriations were published to build popular support for the regime. The public was informed of the pace and degree of the reform, and how it affected their own districts. This policy had the additional benefit of reducing corruption in land redistribution, of which there were very few accusations by peasants or officials. Rural social networks and the technical Ministry of Agriculture staff also contributed to low corruption.

After property inspection by a local land reform official who reported to Lima, the Ministry of Agriculture could decree a property in violation of Law 17716 and affect its expropriation. Following the expropriation was a property valuation, which was necessary for later reimbursement in the form of cash and bonds.[5] Importantly, however, few landowners ever recuperated their reimbursement, in large part because runaway inflation in the mid to late 1970s made the bonds nearly worthless, and because they often required a prohibitively complicated set of paperwork to redeem. This reinforced the redistributive nature of the land reform.

Following expropriation, properties were adjudicated as cooperatives or to communities (and in rare cases to individuals), typically to those who previously labored on the estate (see, e.g., Cleaves and Scurrah 1980; Mayer 2009; McClintock 1981). The Agrarian Tribunal was created to deal with litigation associated with the reform. The tribunals did not adjudicate litigation regarding expropriation, however, having ruled expropriation an executive administrative decision to which a judicial opinion did not apply (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980, 154).[6] From 1969 to 1980, roughly fifteen thousand properties were expropriated throughout Peru, constituting more than eight million hectares.

Figure 1B depicts the geographical distribution of properties targeted for expropriation. Expropriation varied widely. The areas most affected by the reform were Peru's northern coastal departments such as La Libertad and Ancash, and the southern highlands of Cusco and Puno. The highland and lowland jungle departments in eastern Peru were largely untouched by the reform.

4. There were, unfortunately, considerable missing data for the area expropriated. Nonetheless, the number of properties expropriated is a valid indicator for the key concept, which focuses on the targeting of landed elites and inequality. This is supported by Peru's relatively bimodal landholding distribution.

5. Separate data on property evaluations linked to expropriation decrees were used to verify expropriations.

6. This was later revised in 1974, but of the 501 adjudicated expropriation cases, 80 percent were ruled against the litigant.

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

Figure 2 Number of properties affected by expropriation in Peru by year, 1969–1980

The timing of the reform also varied significantly. Figure 2 displays the yearly number of expropriation decrees from 1969 to 1980. The reform began in 1969 with a series of high-profile expropriations of the lucrative and sprawling sugar agro-industry on the northern coast. That same year, expropriation began to affect some of the enormous latifundios of the southern highlands, such as Runatullo in Junín. The pace of expropriation increased in 1972 and remained high through Velasco's tenure. Landholding limits were decreased, and the government applied other clauses of the reform law more vigorously, such as illegal labor practices. Expropriation reached its height under the first year of Morales Bermúdez's rule in 1976, then tapered off. Almost all coastal landholdings of more than fifty hectares and highland holdings of more than thirty hectares had been expropriated by the time expropriation declined (McClintock 1983).

Other Independent Variables and Controls

The analysis includes measures to test the four main alternative hypotheses for the military's motivations for land reform and a series of control variables typically hypothesized to affect land redistribution. A proxy for latent pressure from below by rural workers with a capacity to organize is also included.

The first two alternative hypotheses to Hypothesis 1 are pro-poor ideological orientation and the adoption of a "father of the poor" strategy whereby the regime redistributed to poor peasants to cultivate their support for the military's rule.[7] These explanations anticipate land redistribution from wealthier landowners to the poorest rural inhabitants. The poorest peasants were those who were landless, living in indigenous communities, or sharecropping (Handelman 1975;

7. Pro-poor ideological orientation is not the only ideology hypothesis. It is possible the military regime had an antioligarchy ideology, which I discuss later.

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McClintock 1981). I create an indicator of rural poor presence by calculating the percentage of total land under an indigenous or sharecropping tenure regime based on the 1961 agricultural census.[8] These areas should have experienced greater land reform if one of these hypotheses is correct. Other characteristics of the regime and its policies help further distinguish these hypotheses, a point I return to later.

The third alternative account of the land reform holds that the military tried to redress grievances in unstable regions to prevent disorder, violence, and even revolution. The two movements in the 1960s that most concerned elites and the military were a guerrilla campaign in the Andes in 1965 and a series of land invasions from 1963 to 1964. Because guerrilla deaths were never published, I use a dichotomous measure of the presence of guerrilla violence based on military and guerrilla accounts and the secondary literature (Béjar 1969; Ministerio de Guerra 1966; Masterson 1991). I also constructed two measures of land invasions to test the robustness of the results for guerrilla violence. The first is an ordinal measure of land invasion intensity based on accounts in the literature, and the second a dichotomous measure (Béjar 1969; Handelman 1975). Both yielded results similar to those for guerrilla violence.

The final alternative explanation of the Peruvian land reform holds that redistribution was aimed at undermining support for the political party APRA. To tap whether the regime was trying to undercut a political foe, I measure APRA support using its vote share in the 1963 presidential election, the last national election before the military coup.[9]

Beyond the alternative hypotheses and consistent with the main hypothesis advanced earlier, another major factor that might have impacted the pattern of redistribution was latent pressure from below by rural workers with a capacity to organize if excluded from the reform. I create a proxy for the influence of popular pressure by value added agriculture per agricultural worker. The size of the agricultural sector relative to the number of economically active workers in agriculture captures land pressure, which should be lower when the amount of land and the value of agriculture are high relative to the size of the agricultural labor force. Because peasant pressure and organization can provide problematic resistance to nondemocratic rule in many ways other than outright revolution (e.g., strikes, road blockades), this measure captures pressure differently from the guerrilla violence variable. Yearly agricultural production data are measured in constant 1979 *nuevos soles*, with data from the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, or INEI). The number of economically active workers in agriculture, also from INEI, is measured in 1965. When this measure is included with the rural poor presence, it should tap a greater presence of workers on haciendas, which formed the basis of peasant unions that became increasingly strong and active throughout the 1960s (Handelman 1975).

8. Land under these regimes qualified for reform.

9. Three additional measures yielded similar results: APRA vote share in the 1962 presidential election, in the 1966 municipal elections, and the change in APRA vote share from 1962 to 1966.

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Table 1 Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	N
Properties expropriated	50.88	92.37	0	610	288
Agricultural value per worker	0.24	0.14	0.07	0.83	253
Urbanization	0.54	0.23	0.17	0.99	288
Agricultural production	16.01	11.97	1.26	58.74	253
Income per capita	0.2	0.15	0.05	1.12	253
Rural poor	0.15	0.16	0	0.55	288
Guerrilla violence 1965	0.33	0.47	0	1	288
APRA vote 1963	0.37	0.16	0.12	0.75	288
Land inequality (Gini)	0.91	0.09	0.6	0.97	288
Latifundios (landholdings > 200 ha)	293.25	348.3	2	1645	288

I include a measure of urbanization (from census data) to proxy for the importance of agrarian reformation. Land ownership patterns are less problematic where agriculture has a relatively small economic role and where modernizing elites can therefore challenge or displace landowning interests (Huntington 1968).

The value of agricultural production may also affect redistribution. An underperforming agricultural sector in the context of a traditional land tenure system is often a reason for reform, and the presence and power of landed elites is greater when their income comes from valuable agribusiness (McClintock 1981; Thiesenhusen 1989). Agricultural production data come from INEI.

I include per capita income as an indicator of development, with income measured in constant 1979 *nuevos soles* and taken from INEI. Per capita income may capture demand for land reform (Huntington 1968) and the capacity to implement land redistribution.

A history of heavy expropriation may reduce future redistribution or alternatively signal administrative infrastructure necessary to carry out further reform. I therefore include a measure of prior expropriation, calculated as the cumulative sum of expropriated properties in a department prior to the current year. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the main variables and controls.[10]

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

To investigate the political logic of the Peruvian land reform and its material achievements, I utilize a panel data set of expropriation for Peru's twenty-three departments from 1969 to 1980. The models are ordinary-least-squares (OLS) specifications with panel-corrected standard errors to control for contemporaneous correlation and panel-level heteroskedasticity, and an AR(1) error structure

10. I tested two additional variables that had no measurable effect on expropriation: population and the number of agricultural units. Also, including geographic controls for outlying regions did not affect the main results.

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to address serial correlation arising from temporal dependence between yearly observations.[11] All models include year dummies to control for contemporaneous shocks and exogenous trends in land reform, of which figure 2 is indicative. Because the dependent variable of land expropriations is right skewed, I log this variable to normalize its distribution. I first estimate regression models to test each explanation of land reform individually, followed by a set of encompassing models that jointly test these theories to determine which has the most support.

Model 1 of table 2 includes the rural poor along with the controls. In contrast to the ideology or "father of the poor" hypotheses, the coefficient for rural poor is negative and insignificant. Expropriation was not simply targeted at areas where poverty was higher. This is consistent with much of the literature, noting that some of the poorest segments of the population—many in indigenous communities, those working *minifundios,* and most of the landless—did not benefit from the reform (Mayer 2009; McClintock 1983), nor did the military want to cultivate active popular support among the very poor (Pease García 1977). Furthermore, there is little evidence that Velasco had a radical political perspective prior to becoming president that might have motivated him to redistribute to the poor for ideological reasons. Typical of Peru's military, he had an explicitly anticommunist strain (McClintock 1981, 52–54). The diverse and shifting tendencies in top military circles were far from constituting ideologies (Pease García 1977).

Could the model 1 results be the artifact of a relative lack of available land to expropriate in highland areas where the poorest communities were concentrated, as the prominent economist José María Caballero has suggested (e.g., Caballero and Alvarez 1980)? Several pieces of evidence suggest this is not the case. First, agricultural value per worker is strongly negatively associated with expropriation. Net of accounting for the presence of the rural poor, departments where agricultural value per worker was higher—a proxy for lower land pressure by rural workers with a capacity to organize—witnessed fewer seized properties. Second, the results hold including regional fixed effects for the Coast, Andes, and Selva regions, indicating that land was expropriated in more unequal departments with rural populations that had a greater capacity to organize *even within the same geographical region.* Finally, more land was distributed in the highlands than on the coast, and the "intensity" of highlands reform relative to productive land was lower, indicating that the regime could have gone even farther in the highlands.

Urbanization is positively linked with expropriation in model 1 and income per capita is negative but insignificant. Prior expropriation is positive, as is agricultural production. The latter indicates that regions with more productive elite-led agribusiness—such as the profitable sugar agro-industry—were targeted by the government.

Model 2 tests the revolution hypothesis by introducing a variable for guerrilla violence. Its coefficient is positive and borderline significant but loses significance in models 6–8, suggesting that the military governments seemingly did not

11. Because land expropriation and inequality (or elite presence) may be susceptible to geographically clustered common shocks or trends, I also estimated models using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, with similar results.

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Table 2 Determinants of land expropriation in Peru, 1969–1980

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Agricultural value per worker	−2.851***	−2.695***	−2.506**	−2.731***	−2.121*	−2.979***	−1.997*	−2.478**
	(1.002)	(1.033)	(1.082)	(0.982)	(1.088)	(1.082)	(1.114)	(1.130)
Urbanization	0.908*	0.758*	0.825*	0.934*	1.477***	0.960**	1.576***	1.595***
	(0.489)	(0.458)	(0.444)	(0.477)	(0.534)	(0.453)	(0.467)	(0.445)
Agricultural production	0.060***	0.055***	0.061***	0.061***	0.051***	0.064***	0.043***	0.051***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income per capita	−0.498	−0.519	−0.832	−1.187*	−0.676	−1.051	−0.531	−0.863
	(0.657)	(0.652)	(0.718)	(0.669)	(0.650)	(0.729)	(0.744)	(0.761)
Prior expropriation	0.000	0.000	0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rural poor	−0.144					−0.764	0.396	−0.161
	(0.800)					(0.805)	(0.998)	(0.927)
Guerrilla violence		0.277*				−0.031	0.205	−0.011
		(0.142)				(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.146)
APRA vote 1963			−0.931			−0.409	0.996	1.034
			(0.763)			(0.832)	(1.289)	(1.249)
Land inequality (Gini)				6.094***		6.184***		5.503***
				(1.265)		(1.368)		(1.369)
Latifundios					0.001***		0.001**	0.001**
					(0.000)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	253	253	253	253	253	253	253	253
Departments	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
R^2	0.538	0.538	0.539	0.557	0.548	0.56	0.549	0.566

Note: The dependent variable is the log number of expropriations. All models are OLS regressions; panel corrected standard errors with an AR(1) structure are in parentheses. Constants and time dummies are not shown.
*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$ (two-tailed)

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redistribute property just to redress peasant unrest or in areas where land was scarce and peasant invasions occurred. As McClintock (1983, 288) argues, the pattern of expropriation is not consistent with narrowly countering "communism" or fostering "social peace." While junior officers fighting guerrillas in the 1960s were strongly affected by witnessing the appalling conditions of the poor (e.g., Kruijt 1994), after its successful counterinsurgency campaign the military did not appear as intensely concerned with areas of radical peasant protest and guerrilla agitation, since they were affected last by the agrarian reform.

Somewhat ironically, in fact, the military regime's land reform ultimately contributed to Shining Path's rise. With some parallel to Colombia's patchwork titling efforts that backfired (Albertus and Kaplan 2013), subsequent guerrilla activity was concentrated in regions like Ayacucho and Apurímac with less comprehensive reforms, and often in poorer, indigenous peasant communities that were left out of the reform (Hunefeldt 1997). In contrast to the substantial number of peasants who joined or supported Shining Path from marginalized communities neglected by land reform, very few members of the coastal cooperatives—major beneficiaries of land reform—joined. Peasants from more organized communities (e.g., in Puno and the *rondas* in Cajamarca) also tended to resist rather than join Shining Path.

Model 3 includes a measure of APRA's 1963 vote share. The coefficient is negative and insignificant, which suggests that the military did not target the reform at eliminating a longtime political foe. While many initial large-scale expropriations occurred in northern coastal APRA strongholds (*el sólido norte*), further expropriation occurred in the central coast and southern highlands, where APRA had little support. There are also cases like the adjacent departments of Cajamarca and Piura: Cajamarca had more than twice the APRA support but a landholding Gini coefficient ten points lower than Piura, and it experienced less expropriation.

Model 4 introduces a measure for landholding inequality to test the main hypothesis of whether reform was targeted at areas where inequality was highest and the landed oligarchy strongest to reduce their influence over the military. Inequality is positive and statistically significant. Might inequality be a proxy for latent revolutionary potential associated with grievance, leading the military to act as an agent of elites to undercut this threat by redistributing from the middle class or weaker elites to poorer peasants? Model 5 rejects this possibility. A greater presence of large landholders, directly measured as the total number of latifundios in a district, is positively and significantly associated with greater land expropriation. Redistribution was aimed squarely at the most privileged landed elite. Indeed, the military's policies surprised and angered the elite, as Velasco himself acknowledged.

To more effectively target elites while reducing their collective resistance, the regime adopted a policy of stealth. It created landholding ceilings that became gradually stricter over time, winnowing elites by setting those under the limits against those above them, then later redefining the rules (McClintock 1983). This ultimately destroyed the landed elite and their long-standing ability to manipulate the military. A long period of military rule ensued that elites had little capacity to sanction. The military was modernized, doubled in size, and

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its funding more than quintupled (Kruijt 1994). This legacy extended beyond democratization.

Could the model 4–5 findings be explained by an "antioligarchy" ideology held by Velasco? Although this explanation would be observationally equivalent to the model 4–5 statistical results, two pieces of evidence cast some doubt on it. First, while top military circles sought to eliminate the oligarchy, their views were not consistent ideologies but rather shifting tendencies (Pease García 1977). Second, the results for the landholding Gini and the latifundios measure are similar when truncating the sample to the post-1975 period when Morales Bermúdez ruled, despite the fact that few scholars would describe him as being as "antioligarchy" as Velasco. This does not imply, however, that ideas about reform were unimportant. As discussed earlier, there were a host of reasons many officers supported reform out of principle.

Columns 6–8 of table 2 present several encompassing models. The model 6–7 results are largely similar to those of models 1–5. Land inequality and the presence of landed elites remain statistically significant. Agricultural value per worker remains significant, and its magnitude is stable, indicating that expropriation and redistribution were greater where there was more potential for organized rural resistance. Guerrilla violence loses significance, and the other hypotheses similarly find little support. Both inequality and elite presence remain positive and significant in model 8. Even controlling for land inequality, expropriation was more heavily targeted where there were more large landholders, strongly confirming the main hypothesis.

The substantive effect of inequality is significant. Using model 8 coefficients, shifting land inequality from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above while holding other variables at their means yields a twofold increase in expropriation. For the average department, the total difference in expropriation over the twelve-year reform would be about six hundred properties, or an estimated 315,000 hectares of land. The substantive effect of elite presence is similar. An increase in latifundios from its minimum to one standard deviation above its mean results in an estimated 75 percent increase in properties expropriated per year, or 450 over the whole reform period for the average department.

Robustness Tests of Expropriation

To test the robustness of the results to estimation strategy, table 3 displays models that follow the table 2 specifications but use a negative binomial estimator.[12] With the dependent variable as the number of properties expropriated in a given department-year, a negative binomial estimator models cases of land expropriation as event counts. All specifications include year dummies and robust standard errors.

Consistent with the table 2 OLS results, there is little support for hypotheses that the military was ideologically or strategically motivated to help the poor

12. A goodness-of-fit test of the Poisson model indicates overdispersion ($p < .001$). Random-effects Tobit models also yielded similar results.

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Table 3 Robustness tests of determinants of land expropriation in Peru, 1969–1980

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Agricultural value per worker	−6.388***	−5.769***	−4.808***	−5.643***	−4.894***	−6.580***	−6.090***	−6.895***
	(0.966)	(0.954)	(0.981)	(0.870)	(0.869)	(1.153)	(1.084)	(1.152)
Urbanization	3.786***	3.857***	3.633***	3.289***	3.845***	3.558***	4.137***	3.816***
	(0.591)	(0.617)	(0.557)	(0.579)	(0.565)	(0.609)	(0.593)	(0.614)
Agricultural production	0.064***	0.063***	0.062***	0.064***	0.056***	0.072***	0.057***	0.063***
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Income per capita	−4.438***	−5.034***	−5.459***	−4.965***	−4.747***	−4.875***	−3.973***	−3.986***
	(0.975)	(1.016)	(1.136)	(0.996)	(1.002)	(1.106)	(1.085)	(1.122)
Prior expropriation	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001**	0.001***	0.001*	0.001**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural poor	−0.986**					−1.060**	−0.539	−0.731
	(0.483)					(0.517)	(0.521)	(0.513)
Guerrilla violence		−0.0494				−0.249	−0.1	−0.189
		(0.169)				(0.173)	(0.184)	(0.194)
APRA vote 1963			−0.754*			−0.26	0.768	0.977
			(0.458)			(0.545)	(0.712)	(0.780)
Land inequality				9.177***	0.001***	9.516***		8.771***
(Gini)				(2.169)		(2.360)		(2.472)
Latifundios							0.001***	0.001**
					(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	253	253	253	253	253	253	253	253
Departments	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
R^2	0.581	0.467	0.407	0.451	0.428	0.527	0.503	0.513

Note: The dependent variable is the number of expropriations. All models are negative binomial regressions; robust standard errors are in parentheses. Constants and time dummies are not shown.
$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$ (two-tailed)

https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.2015.0024 Published online by Cambridge University Press

above all else. And although the literature provides some support for the idea that counterinsurgency radicalized officers in the 1960s, there is weak statistical evidence that they focused the reform in areas of guerrilla violence that posed a greater revolutionary threat. The only time the APRA variable gains significance, in model 3, it has a negative sign. In contrast, elite presence is positively and strongly associated with land expropriation in models 4–8, whether measured as a landholding Gini coefficient or by the presence of latifundios. As in table 2, greater potential for pressure by organized rural peasants as proxied by agricultural value per worker is linked to greater expropriation, and the magnitude of its coefficient is consistently higher in models that include the rural poor measure. Prior expropriation is now positive and significant. The substantive effect of inequality in model 8 is significant and similar to that in table 2.

REDISTRIBUTIVE DICTATORSHIP: BEYOND THE PERUVIAN CASE

Peru is far from unique in its history of redistributive dictatorship. Consider table 4, which lists all nondemocratic Latin American leaders that implemented large-scale seizures of land, firms operating in the natural resource sector, and commercial banks from 1935 to 2008. Twelve of eighteen Latin American countries experienced at least one episode of large-scale expropriation under autocracy during this period. Furthermore, the median tenure of the table 4 leaders was 5 years, compared to 1.5 years for all autocratic leaders in Latin America from 1935 to 2008. Many of these cases of redistribution, similarly to the Peruvian case, resulted from a split between preexisting powerful elites and the launching organization of incoming leaders (Albertus, forthcoming; Albertus and Menaldo 2012). That this divergence is not uncommon in autocracy is supported by Huntington's (1968, 203) classic treatment of praetorianism, which holds that militaries are frequently key forces for progressive change in the shift from oligarchy or traditional monarchy to middle-class empowerment: "In these early stages of political modernization, the military officers play a highly modernizing and progressive role. They challenge the oligarchy, and they promote social and economic reform." Middle-class military groups pushed ruling generals and juntas they empowered to implement radical programs of social reform at the expense of the oligarchy in Chile and Brazil in the 1920s, and in Bolivia, Venezuela, El Salvador, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador during and after World War II.

The phenomenon of politically autonomous militaries that introduce large-scale changes attacking preexisting elites and use seized assets to build political support among previously excluded groups is not limited to Latin America (Albertus, forthcoming; Finer 1988). Modernizing, redistributive military takeovers occurred in Syria in 1949, Egypt in 1952, Iraq in 1958, Pakistan and Burma in 1958, Thailand in 1932, and Turkey in the 1920s (Huntington 1968, 203–221). A similar pattern occurred under a host of populist dictators in West Africa following independence (Bienen 1985) and under Haile Miriam in Ethiopia. In these and many other cases, politically autonomous militaries were a prominent feature rather than an anomaly of the political landscape.

Furthermore, as demonstrated by cases such as the Soviet Union, Eastern

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Table 4 Cases of large-scale expropriation under autocracy in Latin America, 1935–2008

Country	Leader	Year took power	Type of large-scale expropriation	Length of tenure in years
Bolivia	Toro	1936	R	1
	Paz Estenssoro	1952	R	4
	Siles Zuazo	1956	L	4
	Paz Estenssoro	1960	L	4
	Ovando Candía	1969	L,R	1
	Torres	1970	L,R	0
	Banzer	1971	L	7
	García Meza Tejada	1980	L	1
	Torrelio Villa	1981	L	0
Brazil	Vargas	1930	B	15
	Medici	1969	L	5
	Geisel	1974	L	5
Chile	Pinochet[a]	1973	L	17
Cuba	Castro	1959	L,R,B	49
Dominican Republic	Balaguer	1961	L	0
Ecuador	Velasco Ibarra	1968	R	4
	Rodríguez Lara	1972	R	4
	Poveda Burbano	1976	R	3
El Salvador	Duarte	1980	L,B	2
Guatemala	Ubico	1931	L	13
	Castillo Armas[a]	1954	L	3
Mexico	Cárdenas	1934	L,R	6
	Ávila Camacho	1940	L	6
	López Mateos	1958	L	6
	Díaz Ordaz	1964	L,R	6
	Echeverría	1970	L	6
	López Portillo	1976	B	6
Nicaragua	Ortega	1979	L,B	11
Panama	Torrijos	1968	L	13
Peru	Velasco	1968	L,R,B	7
	Morales Bermúdez	1975	L	5

Note: Table 4 includes all cases of major expropriation under dictatorship from 1935 to 2008, with regime type coded by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2009). Types of large-scale expropriation are as follows: L = land expropriation exceeding 3 percent of cultivable land in a given year. R = natural resource expropriation in the form of oil, mineral, or gas firms. B = expropriation of foreign or domestic firms in the banking sector.

[a] Leaders who conducted regressive redistribution, returning land to owners expropriated under the previous regime.

Europe after World War II, China, the Kuomintang in Taiwan, Cuba, and Mexico under the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, large-scale redistribution can occur under single-party rule when the launching organization of the party diverges from preexisting elites, even when the military is subordinate to the regime. These autocratic regimes all built new political coalitions with their redistributive policies. The theory advanced here to explain patterns of redistribution under dictatorship can therefore apply to a range of cases beyond Peru.

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CONCLUSION

This article advances a theory to explain patterns of redistribution under autocracy. I argue that expropriating powerful preexisting elites can serve to demonstrate a dictator's loyalty to his launching organization while destroying elite rivals out of government that nonetheless have the capacity to threaten the dictator's survival. Expropriating preexisting elites also serves the complementary function of providing resources to buy the support of key nonelite groups that could otherwise organize destabilizing resistance to the autocrat's rule. An analysis of original data on the targets and beneficiaries of redistribution under military rule in Peru from 1968 to 1980 supports this argument. Redistribution was a dual-pronged strategy to undercut the military's rivals and solidify its support base.

The theory also has observable implications for the study of political regimes. A dictator or series of dictators who implement large-scale redistribution can condition the likelihood of democratic transition and consolidation, yielding unintended positive consequences for democracy. Peru illustrates this dynamic. First, the land reform program abolished traditional land tenure relations, destroying many rural patron-client relations that landlords can use to dominate electoral competition by influencing rural votes (Lapp 2004). Second, that landholding elites were disempowered reduced elite capture of local officials and activists that were used to manipulate election outcomes, a practice that negatively affects the operation and representativeness of democratic institutions (Ziblatt 2009). Third, the power of Peru's oligarchy was significantly diminished, and the landholding elite, who often strongly oppose democracy (Boix 2003; Moore 1966), were largely destroyed. Rural workers directly benefited at their expense. The urban middle class also benefited from pro-worker industrial policy. Both of these factors support democratization (Ansell and Samuels 2010). Although democracy in Peru broke down under Fujimori, McClintock (1999, 356) argued that "the 1992 *autogolpe* was different from Peru's previous democratic breakdowns; it was not a predictable result of social, economic, or political tensions that could not be resolved through the democratic process." Finally, that the most extensive redistribution in modern Peruvian history happened under military rule rather than democracy led many elites to support the transition to a more predictable, mildly redistributive democracy over the prospect of further reformist autocratic rule (Conaghan and Malloy 1994). Furthermore, it has helped deter elites from mounting another coup in country with a long history of elite-driven political instability.

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