Group Violence

Some Hypotheses and Empirical Uniformities

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Definition of Terms and Review of Existing Approaches

Since group violence is but one of several means of conducting conflict, explanation for its occurrence must be embedded in a comprehensive theory of conflict. Yet violent conflict is so topical and important that an effort to reflect on it sociologically is well worth undertaking at this time even in the absence of a comprehensive theory of social conflict. Indeed, Max Weber (1947: 133) has written that "the treatment of conflict involving the use of physical violence as a separate type is justified by the special characteristics of the employment of this means and the corresponding peculiarities of the sociological consequences of its use." In this essay, I shall avoid definitional and typological exercises, and concentrate rather on specific, testable hypotheses and empirical uniformities of group violence that have been put forward and commented upon at various times. I shall also present some data and findings bearing on the hypotheses that, while not "testing" them in rigorous fashion, will do more than simply provide plausible illustrations that can always be found whenever a large body of historical and contemporary cases is carefully searched. The final aim of the paper is to link up these hypotheses and uniformities in more systematic fashion than is presently available although the paper does not spell out a systematic theory of group violence. At this stage of theory when a plausible case can be made for a large number of hypotheses, it is important to spell out the specific conditions under which specific hypotheses are thought to be applicable.

There are several aspects of my approach that bear some brief preliminary comments. First, I do not start with a typology of conflict (e.g., revolution,

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rebellion, riot, coup d' état, guerrilla war, and so on) nor do I break up the topic by the social categories of the participants (peasant rebellions, race riots, labor wars). The reason is not that such typologies and distinctions are unimportant, but that a satisfactory theory of group violence ought to have some general applicability. Furthermore, when group violence breaks out, it is seldom clear until after some time has elapsed what type of conflict is actually taking place, and it may indeed change over time. There is also some theoretical gain in being able to explain differences of magnitude in group violence between urban and rural conflict and labor and race conflict with reference to variables common in all situations.

Second, I do not differentiate between legal and illegal use of physical violence as a basic category of analysis, even though Weber's (1958: 78) and others' definitions of the state rely so centrally on this distinction. The reason is that group violence is the result of interaction between two or more groups in a conflict process, one of which may be the state or its agents, and a theory ought to apply the same concepts and variables to all the parties locked in conflict. Moreover, the authorities often initiate violence under circumstances where its use is perceived as illegitimate and uncalled for, and this then becomes a further and often predominant issue in the conflict. The use of illegitimate violence by the authorities, whether provoked or not, is also a topic of interest in itself, and ought to be therefore explained as part of the theory.

Third, I avoid explanations based on psychological or social-psychological variables implying aggressive drives such as the "disposition to violence" of certain groups or a propensity to violence which is manifested in the national character. The reason is that many explanations based on these alleged dispositions or propensities are actually spurious insofar as they are no more than a statement of an empirical uniformity (e.g., low levels of group violence in recent British history) rephrased in tautological terms that really beg the question (e.g., peaceful British national character). Even if measures of aggressive tendencies independent of the occurrence of group violence are developed, the present approach seeks to exhaust the explanatory potential of sociological variables before these dispositional concepts are invoked. It is precisely the facile and exaggerated notions about innate aggression, irrational drives, the herd instinct and similar formulations, popular especially since the French Revolution in accounts of group violence and crowd behavior, that the present approach is meant to avoid and supplant. These remarks do not apply to other psychological and social-psychological concepts, variables, and processes. It is scarcely possible to come to terms with the question of group violence without discussing grievances, hopes, frustrated expectations, relative deprivations, ideologies, legitimacy, and a host of other attitudinal, motivational, and state of mind concepts.

For purposes of this paper, Coser's definition of social conflict (1967: 232) as "a struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources, in which

the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate other rivals" is adequate. The hypotheses on group violence developed below, however, are not meant to be applicable to all cases of conflict. Specifically, wars between states are excluded at one end and microconflict, such as gang wars, at the other. A borderline case would be protracted internal war or guerrilla war with outside intervention. In this situation, the hypotheses are applicable only to the initial stages of conflict. Since the distinction between legal and illegal use of force was rejected earlier, violence here simply means the employment of physical coercion for personal and group ends. By social turmoil, social disturbances, civil disorders, or some equivalent terms, I mean any episode of collective behavior, not necessarily violent, in which a group of people express grievances, voice demands, stage meetings, marches, demonstrations, or sit-ins, draft petitions, try to prevent or block the execution of unpopular actions, destroy property, assault other individuals or groups, and the like. The group itself I will refer to as protesters unless they are called by more specific designations such as strikers, demon-strators, squatters, or rioters. By agents of social control I mean the rank and file executors of the orders of the authorities or the government, namely police, troops, militia, national guard, yeomanry, constables, and the like, including their immediate commanders in the field situation.

Violence is a means used to pursue conflict, one of several means, and the same conflict can be simultaneously conducted using several means. Dimensions of conflict that readily come to mind are its duration, scale (measured by the number of participants in the confrontation and its geographic spread), intensity, and the magnitude of violence. Intensity, as Dahrendorf (1959: 211) points out, refers to the "energy expenditure and degree of involvement of conflicting parties. A particular conflict may be said to be of high intensity if the cost of victory and defeat is high for the parties concerned." Intensity stands for the importance attached to the issues under dispute by the parties to the conflict. Intensity is probably going to be a particularly difficult variable to measure. The magnitude of violence might be measured simply by the total number of casualties, fatalities, and injuries that result from it, although some researchers persuasively argue for the inclusion of property damage as well. The total magnitude of conflict will probably have to be constructed as an index with duration, scale, intensity, and magnitude of violence as its component parts. For a much more comprehensive discussion of the dimensions and measurement of conflict, the reader is referred to the interesting monograph of Tilly and Rule (1965). In any case, these are only meant to be suggestions for measurement, since a rigorous testing of hypotheses will almost always involve variations and improvisations in measurement techniques depending on the availability of data and the specific circumstances of the conflict process. In this paper I shall concentrate on the magnitude of violence as a key dimension of conflict and as the dependent variable of interest.

Conflict is an everyday, normal, ongoing, institutionalized process most of the time. Conflict theorists ask however: (1) under what conditions conflict will tend to increase and decrease; (2) under what conditions conflict will tend to be violent rather than nonviolent, and what accounts for the magnitude of violence; and (3) what consequences violence has for conflict regulation and institutionalization, its consequences (if you prefer, functions) for the conflict groups, the individuals in the conflict groups, and the social system. This paper will deal primarily with the second question.

The Likelihood of Violence

Although the same set of conditions that can account for an increase in conflict may well be able to account for an increase in the likelihood of violent conflict and the magnitude of violence, a number of theorists specify intervening variables between these two steps. Just about every theorist points out that increased social change or rapid social change produces dislocations, strain, grievances and an increase in the normal levels of conflict and the likelihood of violence. Some see a direct link between the magnitude of strain, social dislocation, grievances on the one hand and the magnitude of conflict and of violent conflict on the other. Others acknowledge this causal link but emphasize in addition the importance of intervening variables, in particular, social control variables such as the reaction of the authorities or the ruling strata to the grievances and demands of the protesters. One might further note that some stress the importance of long-range intervention and reforms by the ruling groups as a response to increased conflict while others focus more on the immediate tactical response of the agents of social control during the confrontation process, particularly if magnitude of violence is the variable of interest. Here are some representative views expressed by influential social theorists on these matters.

Smelser (1963: 48-49) holds that while "the more severe the strain, the more likely an episode of collective behavior," still "we should not search for specific causal laws such as 'economic deprivation gives rise to hostile outbursts,' " since social strain comes in a bewildering variety of concrete forms, and "any kind of strain may be a determinant of any kind of collective behavior." Elsewhere, he has emphasized that the translation into action of a specific combination of social strain and conduciveness depends "above all on the behavior of the agencies of social control" (1964: 122). Specifically, he argues that if disturbed groups are provided access to channels that influence social policy, their response will tend to be peaceful and orderly, whereas if access is blocked, the reponse will tend to be violent and even take on at times bizarre and utopian forms (1968: 143). Ted Gurr (1967: 5, 11-12) draws heavily on the frustration-aggression theory and hypothesizes that "the more severe the relative deprivation, the greater the magnitude and likelihood of violence." Yet he too

recognizes in a subsequent hypothesis that "the likelihood and magnitude of civil violence varies inversely with available, institutional mechanisms that permit expressions of non-violent hostility." Writing on urban racial violence in the United States, Grimshaw (1960: 119) holds that

> there is no direct relationship between the level of tension and the eruption of social violence. While assaults in the accommodative structure doubtless lead to an increase in tensions, violence is constrained by the strength and mode of application of external agencies of control, in particular the police.

In the same spirit, Hodgkin (1957: 187) predicted that in Africa

> whether national movements in particular territories employ violent or non-violent, revolutionary or constitutional methods to gain their objects seems likely to depend primarily upon the attitudes of the colonial regimes, the flexibility of their policies, their willingness to make substantial political concessions, and generally upon tactical considerations.

Dahrendorf (1959: 213) also thinks that when oppressed groups are allowed the right to organize and voice their grievances, the chances of violent conflict are decreased. Coser (1967: 106-107) and Heberle (1951: 385-387) formulate hypotheses and generalizations along the same lines. Turner (1964: 126) emphasizes the importance of the general public as well as the authorities when he writes that "the public . . . observes, interprets, and labels the movement. The public definition affects the character of recruitment to the movement, the means which the movement is able to use, and thus the strategies which the movement evolves and the kind of opposition it encounters." While one can easily lengthen the list of supporting quotations, Killian (1964: 450) sums it up appropriately: "Whatever the influence of other variables, the influence of the opposition and of the public reaction to a movement cannot be over-emphasized."

The great merit of all these views is that they do not look upon the values, goals, ideology, and especially the means of conflict used by a protest group as a fixed, constant quantity. Instead, the means used to pursue conflict are the result of a process of interaction between the conflict groups. In particular, the reception of the protest groups and the reaction of the authorities and agents of social control are singled out as very important. If the authorities are unresponsive, block channels of communication, do not provide the opportunity for peaceful protest, refuse to make concessions, and so on, the likelihood of violent conflict increases. While the magnitude of strain, type of strain, and the number of grievances account for the increase of conflict and threaten to overload and break down the existing institutions of conflict regulation, the magnitude and forms that conflict is likely to have are explained primarily with reference to the interaction between authorities and protesters. Still, the above

viewpoints must be criticized for their lack of specificity since responsiveness or unresponsiveness, open or blocked channels of communication and influence, access or lack of access to decision makers are rather ill-defined, global conceptions that stand for complex social structures and processes. Moreover the above views assume that if the authorities are responsive and act in good faith, they are able to undertake effective reforms to relieve social strain and meet the grievances of the protest group. But what if reforms are ineffective or only partially effective? It is a commonplace that concessions and reforms can be "too little, too late." Furthermore, repression may under certain circumstances be an effective means of stopping a protest movement at its start with little violence. But how can one sociologically come to terms with the notion of an effective combination of the carrot and the stick for handling social disturbances and for defusing a potentially violent or revolutionary situation?

This issue has been discussed most recently by Huntington (1968: 362 ff.), who starts with de Tocqueville's observation on these matters, or what I would like to call de Tocqueville's paradox. In his discussion of the antecedent of the French Revolution, de Tocqueville (1955: 176-177) observes that

> it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out. On the contrary, it oftener happens that when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it. Thus the social order overthrown by a revolution is almost always better than the one immediately preceding it, and experience teaches us that, generally speaking, the most perilous moment for a bad government is one that seeks to mend its ways. Only consummate statecraft can enable a king to save his throne when after a long spell of oppressive rule he sets out to improve the lot of his subjects.

De Tocqueville's paradox has been noted in numerous instances in history and in the contemporary world, for instance in connection with increased social disturbances and urban racial violence in the United States concurrent with and following the most comprehensive social, economic, and political legislation and reforms to improve the condition of Negroes since the Reconstruction Era, and the East European anti-Soviet, anticommunist upheavals following shortly upon de-Stalinization and a period of relative "liberalization" in the Soviet orbit initiated after Stalin's death. Crane Brinton (1957: 40) long ago pointed out a more specific variant of de Tocqueville's paradox when he observed in his discussion of the antecedents of the English, American, French, and Russian revolutions that

> one of the most evident uniformities we can record is the effort made in each of our societies to reform the machinery of government. Nothing can be more erroneous than the picture of the old regime as an un-regenerate tyranny, sweeping to its end in a climax of despotic indifference to the clamor of its abused subjects.

Another student of revolution, Pettee (1938: 94) refers to the process of attempted reforms by an old regime as "erratic reformism":

> Erratic reformism is the only policy open to a ruling class divided in its attitudes, or strapped by unwieldy institutions . . . in Russia, the utmost repression and occasional barbarism was accompanied by spasmodic reforms in industry and agriculture and politics. The result of such reforms and reaction mixed might well be called the quickest way to make a revolution. The result is to cramp the privileged classes without relieving the exploited . . . . To the cramped, the reforms have an appearance of being forced concessions, and the reactionary measures an appearance of betrayal.

The paradox is, of course, less surprising if one recalls that the reform attempts tend to be half-hearted and ineffective because of institutional weakness and deliberate efforts by certain groups to undermine them. A period of liberalization after a long period of oppression allows the surfacing of long-dormant grievances and demands going far beyond those initially voiced to and anticipated by the authorities; it allows the mobilization of discontented groups and expectations of reforms that cannot be realistically instituted in a short time. The subsequent, half-hearted attempts to crack down upon the activities of the freshly mobilized groups creates a situation favorable to social disturbances on a wide scale.

Contemporary students of conflict are well aware of the consequences of erratic reformism. Eckstein (1964: 54) argues that a sudden relaxation of repression and the institution of a liberal policy after a regime has driven its opponents underground and inflamed their enmity creates a favorable context for violent confrontation. Smelser (1968: 114), in a similar vein, writes that "the type of response on the part of authorities that aggravates and intensifies an episode of collective protest is harshness and rigidity that alternates with evident weakness." On the other hand, "an agent of social control who is firm but patient, consistently prohibiting certain types of protest but consistently permitting and giving serious consideration to others . . . tends to contain the protest." It is immediately apparent from these quotations that the question of reform in the face of demands and social disturbances is an exceedingly complex topic, much neglected in contemporary theories of conflict, and not adequately captured by concepts such as open or blocked channels of communication, access or lack of access of disturbed groups to the authorities or ruling groups, or their responsiveness or unresponsiveness. Moreover to introduce qualifying terms such as "effective" and "ineffective" reform, access, or responsiveness into these hypotheses is to beg the question itself.

ECONOMIC FACTORS AND THE STRUCTURAL LOCATION OF GROUP CONFLICT

The relationship between social change, social strain and grievances, the authorities' response and the likelihood of social disturbances is further

complicated by another and related set of issues also first raised by de Tocqueville (1955: 175-177) when he pointed out that the years preceding the outbreak of the French Revolution witnessed an increase, not a decrease, of economic prosperity.

> In 1780, there could no longer be any talk of France's being on the [economic] downgrade; on the contrary, it seemed that no limit could be set to her advance . . . . Twenty years earlier there had been no hope for the future; in 1780, no anxiety was felt about it . . . . It is a singular fact that this increasing prosperity, far from tranquilizing the population, everywhere promoted a spirit of unrest. The general public became more and more hostile to every ancient institution, more and more discontented . . . . Moreover, those parts of France in which the improvement in the standard of living was most pronounced were the centers of the revolutionary movement.

Even Marx, whose views are usually contrasted with those of de Tocqueville and who, in his theoretical works, tended to uphold the misery theory of political upheaval (deepening economic crises, falling profits, lower wages, increased exploitation and misery of the working class linked to increased revolutionary potential) took a much more flexible and varied approach in his brilliant case studies and commentaries on contemporary French and European political upheavals. Yet ever since Marx and de Tocqueville, there has been a continuous debate by historians and social scientists on just what are the precise links between economic changes and social conflict—in particular revolutionary outbreaks. There is no need to review this long controversy about the primacy or importance of economic as opposed to other factors. It is sufficient to recognize that economic changes broadly viewed are such a common, perennial, and central component of social change that a discussion of social change, social strain and social dislocations, grievances, and protest cannot proceed without thorough examination of economic processes. Short- and long-term economic trends, particular sequences of long- and short-term up- and downswings, migration patterns, rural-urban demographic shifts, the effects of the introduction of new technologies and novel modes of production and other structural economic changes, changes in the cost of living, of wages, of the cost of basic foods, and a host of other economic facts and processes have received close scrutiny by students of social conflict. Moreover, not only changes in absolute terms, but relative gains and losses have been discussed and the concepts of relative deprivation, rising expectations, or some other social-psychological concepts such as hope and cramp have been invoked to assess the reactions of various groups and social classes to absolute and relative economic gains and losses. The literature on these topics has grown immense. The conclusion that several diverse patterns of economic change must bear some direct and indirect links to social disturbances, and that these links are mediated by some intervening social-psychological processes is inescapable but not very helpful. I shall briefly review the major points in one of the most valuable papers on this

topic by an economist and then list some of the most common patterns of economic change frequently linked to increased protest activity on the part of negatively privileged social strata and social classes.

In an article entitled "Rapid Economic Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Mancur Olson, Jr. (1963) points out that "economic growth . . . can significantly increase the number of [economic] losers," e.g., increase the absolute number of people whose standard of living has fallen, despite an increase in the average per capita income of the entire population. Moreover, in the early phases of economic growth, there is a tendency for increased inequality of incomes to come about as well. Rapid economic growth is frequently associated with changes in methods of production, new technologies, the type of labor and skills demanded and the geographic configuration of production. While some groups may therefore gain—and indeed gain a lot economically—other groups may lose in relative and even absolute terms if they are located in economically declining regions, in firms or industries caught with outdated technologies, and with outdated skills. Furthermore, levels of consumption may decline with economic growth when capital accumulation curbs spending through forced savings, taxation, or some other means. Olson also points out that economic growth as a long-term trend is often associated with short-term downswings, and for particular groups wages may rise slower than prices, increased unemployment may occur, and indeed short-run wage losses may occur as well. While Olson also stresses the potential for political unrest among groups that are economic gainers and the possiblity of rising expectations experienced by these groups, a central contribution of his analysis for sociologists is that nothing in economic theory contradicts the possibility of an increase in the number of economic losers during a period of economic growth, and that such growth might be associated with changes in the relative economic position of social strata and other population groups. A major conclusion of his paper is that detailed information on the impact of economic changes (both growth and decline) upon specific groups is needed for understanding the potential for social and political upheaval of different groups, strata, and classes in the population. Knowledge of aggregate national economic trends alone or comparative analyses of countries based on aggregate figures can lead to misleading inferences. Unfortunately, as Lawrence Stone (1965: 169 ff.) has pointed out, economic data sufficiently disaggregated and complete are difficult to come by even in the present, let alone locating data on state of mind variables such as relative deprivation, expectations, and aspirations for the past. As a result some researchers engage in the risky and often tautological business of inferring relative deprivation from the occurrence of social disturbances and then find their hypotheses on the relationship between these two variables confirmed. Here then follows a brief outline of the kinds of economic changes that commonly produce grievances and frequently result in social disturbances and protest among the lower social strata and classes.

Groups that are economically at the margins of subsistence will react at once to a short-term increase in food prices or a diminished food supply. Such shortages and price increases, often localized, occur frequently after a time of crop failures or of war. The protesters' response is typically the food riot, consisting of attacks upon grain hoarders or merchants and bakers who are holding back their grain stocks or selling them at a high price, forced food sales at the preshortage price, and the prevention of grain transfers out of a given locality after food supplies have been requisitioned elsewhere (Rudé, 1964). When such grievances and disturbances coincide with dissatisfaction among other social strata, the lower classes can be mobilized by them beyond the initial limited aims for the provision of cheap food. Writing about the French Revolution at a time when from twenty-five percent to ninety percent of the daily wages of urban working people were spent on bread (depending on their trade and skill level), Rudé (1959: 200) noted:

> Perhaps not surprisingly [an inquiry into the causes of social unrest among the *menu peuple*] reveals that the constant motive of popular insurrection during the Revolution, as in the 18th century as a whole, was the compelling need of the *menu peuple* for the provision of cheap and plentiful bread and other essentials, and the necessary administrative measures to insure it.

An effective response of the authorities in such a situation is to provide food supplies at the usual price, often by means of price control. The lack of support by the working people of Paris for Robespierre and the Jacobins at the time of their fall in 1794 was due in large part to the inability to assure a stable cost of living by means of wage and price controls (Rudé, 1959: ch. 9).

In the case of rural social strata, one should be careful to distinguish between peasants who are only marginally involved in commercial production for the market and farmers who are independent owner-vultivators producing commercial crops, often for export. Such farmers, especially single-crop farmers producing an export crop, are vulnerable to the fluctuations in the world market prices of their crops, and in particular to a drop in prices after a period of boom when they may have become excessively dependent for income on one particular crop. Examples of the processes of mobilization among farmers under such circumstances are the Populist movement in the American West in the 1880s and 1890s (Hicks, 1961: ch. 3), the disaffection and susceptibility to right-wing and Nazi appeals of farmers in North Germany in 1928 and later (Heberle, 1945), and the positive response of African farmers to nationalist movements in many colonies in the late 1950s and early 1960s after a drop in world market prices of cotton, coffee, cocoa, and other tropical crops following the World War II and early 1950s boom period.

Peasant disaffection on the other hand occurs most frequently over the issues of land shortage and an attempt by landlords to extract an increased economic surplus that frequently violates traditional norms of equity and distribution

(Moore, 1966: ch. 9). The occasion for peasant disturbances is provided by demographic pressure and the behavior of the landlords. Landlords may attempt to increase their income from rents and other extractions from the peasantry under pressure of conspicuous consumption and indebtedness in cities of the court. Gerschenkron (1964: 184) points to the attempt by the French nobility before the French Revolution to increase the peasant's financial burden and to revive some rights and claims on land that had not been exercised for a long time. Under such circumstances peasants are convinced that their grievances are legitimate. Peasant revolts resulting from these issues are extremely common. For China, for instance, Shu-ching Lee (1951: 512) reports that in a small border region between Kiangsi and Fukien, approximately the size of Iowa, an investigator found from local records 76 instances of peasant revolt, led mostly by tenants, over a period of some 180 years between 1448 and 1627. Another occasion for revolt occurs when a landlord class seeks to exploit its estates in a more rational and profitable fashion by consolidating land, evicting tenants, and seizing lands traditionally held in common ownership by the peasant community, as occurred at the time of the Mexican Revolution (McNeely, 1966). Furthermore, demographic pressures in rural areas often force peasants to become squatters or otherwise seize the uncultivated lands of neighboring landlords. Of course a part of the surplus population may migrate to the cities in search of industrial employment, but this alternative may not always be present or may become unattractive during periods of industrial depression and urban unemployment. For the peasant putting more land or unused land under cultivation using traditional techniques of production in order to increase or maintain his income is a more attractive and realistic alternative than to use more advanced agricultural technology on his existing holding, for which he may lack the skill and the capital. All of these forms of economic and demographic pressures operated on peasants in Russia before 1905 and led to widespread land seizures, illegal grazings, arson of manors, forest destruction, and other forms of peasant disturbances (Gerschenkron, 1964: 191).

Land reform is too broad a term to describe an effective response on the part of the authorities to meet peasant land hunger. Tilly (1964: 196) has shown in the case of the Vendée that the sale of church lands during the French Revolution became an occasion for increased disaffection among the peasantry when the prosperous farmers and bourgeois living in small towns managed to outbid the small tenants and farmers and grab most of the desirable land that rural people felt was rightfully theirs. Effective land reform means the transfer of available land (not only marginal land) to the peasants themselves. Land reform is likely to be successful if the landlords are foreign nationals: e.g. German barons in the Baltic area, Polish aristocracy in Lithuania, Hungarian nobility in Yugoslavia, and Turkish Bulgars in parts of Rumania, as was the case in the post-World War I period in Eastern Europe (Gerschenkron, 1966: 94). The nationalization of land and the impressment of tenants and small landholders

into collective farms or state farms will also be highly unpopular solutions and will be resisted, although in these cases the state and its agents of social control may be strong enough to put down resistance, as happened in Soviet Russia. Nationalization of land is likely to be an acceptable solution in situations where the majority of rural working people had been a propertyless, wage earning, rural proletariat rather than an independent class of smallholders.

Among the urban working class three major groups have to be distinguished: unskilled recent rural migrants into cities in search of employment; working people in established and growing industries; and the "preindustrial" skilled workers and independent artisans and craftsmen who are losing their economic base because of competition from new methods of production. It is the last named group that has been particularly noted for its participation in social and political disturbances, at least in the Western European context (Rudé, 1959: ch. 13). Starting in the late eighteenth century, as a result of the industrial revolution, artisans and craftsmen have been a numerically declining stratum, threatened with being reduced to ordinary wage workers, economically insecure and caught in a spiral of downward social mobility, even while they were trying to maintain their economic grip and social status. Long-term economic growth did not benefit them, since it increased prosperity mainly in the new manufacturing and industrial sectors. Reform legislation regulating hours of work, conditions of work, safety, female and child labor seldom benefited them and more often than not represented a further immediate loss of income because of their reliance on family labor. Many of these groups sought a solution to their economic problems in the revival of preindustrial curbs on competition, price and wage controls, and other measures which were totally counter to the broader social and economic changes taking place and which were therefore not instituted. Because of a tradition of corporate association and collective action, these groups were susceptible to rapid mobilization to defend their interests.

On the other hand wage workers in new and growing industries did benefit directly from long-term economic growth and labor legislation but were hurt by unemployment and wage cuts during depressions. These wage earning groups, however, were subject to strain and grievances, most often manifested in strikes, over the reluctance of employers to restore wage levels when prosperity returned, over conditions and hours of work, over the right to form trade unions and engage in collective bargaining (which was itself a result of the workers' conviction that there was no other effective means of protecting their employment security, wage levels, and standard of life), and over the issue of job security when employers tried to hire unskilled workers, often recent migrants, to replace them. Especially explosive outbursts occurred when unskilled strike breakers, often drawn from an ethnic or racial minority, were introduced after workers had gone on strike against their employer, as was typical of United States industiral conflict. An increase in the standard of living of the working class, industrial legislation in the area of hours, child labor, hygiene, and safety,

the recognition of the right to collective bargaining, and other reforms instituted during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were the appropriate long-term responses that directed labor conflict into increasingly peaceful and institutionalized channels.

As for recent rural migrants with low skills, who are everywhere known to contribute a disproportionate share to all the social patholgies associated with the growing industrial city, a great deal depended on the opportunities they had for temporarily returning to their families in rural areas who provided them with an economic cushion in difficult times. At any rate, this group has not figured as prominently in large-scale collective disturbances, especially of a political sort, as the previous two groups, and has even at certain times been coopted by the ruling class to fight against other working class protesters as was the case with the Mobile Guard in Paris during the 1848 revolution (Rudé, 1959: 173), whereas at other times they have acted as strike breakers for employers. In effect, recent migrants are often so close to the margins of subsistence that they are very vulnerable to economic pressures, react positively to economic opportunities even when it means breaking the rank of working class solidarity, and are reluctant to take the economic risks that protest activity entails.

Noneconomic grievances, often coupled with the presence of economic grievances, also figure in lower-class social disturbances and are important in understanding the protest activities of economically privileged groups such as merchants and professionals and especially students and intellectuals. The last two groups often supply the ideological, organizational, and leadership resources that facilitate mobilization among the working class and peasants for protest activity.

The preceding paragraphs are not meant to be an exhaustive list of all types of strain and grievances, but only of the more common patterns of economic grievances that affect the lower classes who so frequently make up the bulk of participants in social movements and confrontations and who are likely to make up the majority of victims of group violence.

HYPOTHESES: STATEMENT AND DISCUSSION

Assuming that a situation of conflict or increased conflict exists as a result of economic and other changes—some of which were listed in the preceding section—what hypotheses and empirical generalizations can one make about the probability of violent conflict, and the magnitude of violence (measured roughly by the number of casualties)? Hypothesis 1 is that

the protesters use violent means only after they have attempted other nonviolent means of seeking redress for their grievances.

Alternately (hypothesis la)

> the protest group waits for some time for reforms designed to reduce social strain to take effect, and only after these reforms have proved ineffective do they resort to violent means of protest.

Still another variation (hypothesis 1b) is that

> the authorities or ruling groups break a promise or agreement of reform, and thus provide little or no opportunity for nonviolent means of instituting desired changes before protest groups initiate violent actions.

For instance, Huntington (1962: 25) states that the Huk leaders in the Philippines first attempted to achieve their goals by peaceful means, but when the legislature refused to seat seven elected Huks, their leaders returned to the countryside to spark a revolt. Writing about the Zapata rising in Mexico in 1910-1911, McNeely (1966: 155-157) reports that Zapata's native village had a long record of contentions over its land rights, that the new governor paid little attention to the villagers' petitions despite the fact that their legal claims were upheld as valid, and that legal action by villagers in Mexico City also failed to produce results. Only after these institutional channels were exhausted did the uprising start. Concerning the Luddite outbreaks in England in 1811, Darvall (1934: 47-48, 64) explicitly states that the stockingers and weavers first tried to negotiate their grievances over wages, the rent of frames, the truck system, and other matters with the hosiers, but without any positive results. As for the June days in Paris during the 1848 revolution, the working people of Paris did not start erecting barricades until after Louis Blanc's Luxembourg Commission and the national workshops (the two major gains the Paris working people achieved after the overthrow of the July monarchy and one of the main sources of employment and livelihood for them at a time of economic depression) were dissolved and the workers given a choice of enlisting in the army, draining marshes, or remaining in Paris without work or pay (Rudé, 1964: 172). Examples can be multiplied, and in any case are only meant to be illustrative and suggestive.

A second set of hypotheses deals with some circumstances under which the casualties will be many in number rather than few in number. Hypothesis 2 is that

> in violent confrontations the authorities' actions produce the bulk, or at least more than half, of the casualties.

A subhypothesis (2a) is that

> violence is more often initiated by the authorities and their agents than by the protesters, as when peaceful demonstrations, marchers, petitioners, peaceful assemblies, and the like are broken up and attacked.

Of course, protesters often initiate actions which are illegal and coercive, but not destructive of life and property, such as squatting on land or cultivating land illegally, refusing to pay taxes, occupying factories and mines, or refusing to disperse, which represents a challenge to the authorities. I do not mean to imply that the authorities will randomly and lightly initiate violence as a rule. Another subhypothesis (2b) is that

> when the confrontation is not directly between the protesters and the authorities, but between two hostile population groups, such as employers and employees, or whites and blacks, the casualties tend to be higher when the authorities either openly side with one group against the other, or refrain from intervening in the situation and thereby legitimize the actions of the aggressor.

Moreover (hypothesis 2c)

> the magnitude of casualties will be greater if the agents of social control know that they will not be held accountable for the casualties they produce during repression.

This often happens when public opinion favors repression during a period of "Red" scare, of nationalism and jingoism, of religious enthusiasm, or of similar waves of fear and hostility during which the protesters have been identified as "Reds," "traitors," or "infidels" and "heretics," to cite some common examples. In other situations, social disturbances may occur in outlying areas, usually rural, with poor communications, so that little information about casualties and the details of the confrontation filters out other than through government-controlled sources. It may also happen in situations where the judiciary is subordinate to the executive branch and in any case is not much influenced by an unorganized public opinion. Another variant on this theme (hypothesis 2d) is that

> if the protesters belong to a negatively privileged or "pariah" social category, such as a religious minority or peasants, who have not enjoyed full citizenship rights and have traditionally been violently repressed, casualties will tend to be high,

again because public opinion supports repression, and because of low accountability for the use of force by the agents of social control. Finally, as Donald J. Black has pointed out to me, (hypothesis 2e)

> the probability of violence decreases to the extent that a third impartial party intervenes as buffer or mediator in the conflict.

This is in fact the rationale behind the U.N. peacekeeping force as it was put into operation in Cyprus and elsewhere.

We note, for instance, from the National Advisory Commission (1968: 68-69, 107, 115-116 fn. 20, 164) that in the 1967 urban riots in the United States, of

the 83 persons who died in the 75 disorders studied, only about 10% were public officials, and that the overwhelming majority of the civilians killed were Negroes, most of these shot by the police or other agents of social control. In Detroit, rioters were responsible for three deaths at most, whereas the police and national guard accounted for between 27 and 30 deaths. In summarizing the detailed casualty figures resulting from popular disturbances between 1730 and 1848 in Western Europe, Rudé (1964: 255-256) concludes that "destruction of property, then, is a constant feature of the pre-industrial crowd; but not destruction of human lives . . . . From this balance sheet of violence and reprisal, it would appear, then, that it was authority rather than the crowd that was conspicuous for its violence to life and limb." During the Paris Commune of 1871, in contrast to the several hundred troops of the Versailles regiment killed and the 63 hostages shot by the Communards, at least 20,000 Communards were killed, shot as prisoners, or subsequently executed by the authorities, not counting the number of imprisonments and deportations to penal camps (Postgate, 1962: 286).

In going to standard historical sources one can produce similar figures for the discrepancy in magnitude of casualties produced by the authorities on the one hand and the insurgents, rebels, or protesters on the other in confrontations such as the June Days of Paris in 1848, the Russian Revolution of 1905-1906, the Mau Mau uprising, the Nyasaland disturbances of 1959, and so on. So far as the authorities initiating or escalating violence is concerned, history is filled with such examples. The precipitating event of the February 1848 revolution occurred when 50 to 100 demonstrators were killed or wounded by troops as they marched in support of the parliamentary opposition after the authorities had banned a large public banquet planned by the opposition in Paris (Rudé, 1964: 167). The precipitating event in the Russian revolution of 1905 occurred on Bloody Sunday when an immense procession of unarmed workers in their Sunday clothes, chanting church hymns and led by Father Gapon, sought to present a petition to the Czar and were attacked by the troops and the Cossacks, resulting in a massacre of about 1,000 petitioners. It should be pointed out that in conformity with hypothesis 1, Father Gapon had attempted before this event to seek redress of the workers' grievances through bureaucratic channels and had gotten nowhere.

In the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 (United Nations, 1957: 81-83) one of the precipitating events occurred when students, on the evening of October 22, demanded that the radio station broadcast their resolutions to the Hungarian people and were fired upon by security police inside the radio building after student representatives had already entered the radio building to negotiate with the officials of the radio. In a subsequent aggravating incident on October 25, a huge crowd of several thousand peaceful people, many of them women and children, were waiting for Prime Minister Nagy to appear when a number of flag-carrying demonstrators appeared in the square and the security police and

possibly also Soviet troops opened up on everybody with machine guns, killing anywhere from 300 to 800 people.

Police partiality with an aggressor group during clashes between two population groups seems to result in inciting the aggressors to further violence, in prolonging the disturbances, and in the escalation of weapons used. There are all productive of a larger number of casualties than if the authorities had intervened impartially to separate the two sides. For example, waskow (1967: ch. 10) has pointed out its importance in the 1919 race riots, and Lee and Humphrey (1943: ch. 4) for the Detroit riot of 1943. Furthermore, in communal or religious riots producing a very large number of casualties, the police or military actually join the aggressor group during the clashes, are directly responsible for many casualties, and often make weapons and ammunition available to one side, as happened in the Ibo massacres in Northern Nigeria in 1966 and the anticommunist massacres in Java in 1965. In these instances of communal riots the agents of social control did not play the part of the impartial buffer associated with lower casualties, as stated in hypothesis 2e. In some of the above confrontations, moreover, the protesters were drawn from negatively privileged groups (hypothesis 2d) and the agents of social control were operating in a tradition of low accountability for the casualties they produced (hypothesis 2c). The perfunctory manner in which inquests are often conducted—as they were in Los Angeles after the 1965 riot—to establish the cause and responsibility in the deaths resulting from police action is well described in Conot (1967: ch. 53).

Aside from these hypotheses which deal with the circumstance of confrontation, the social status of the protest group and the restraints operating on the agents of social control, other related hypotheses might be formulated, some, for instance, dealing with the relative social status separating the protesters and the agents of social control, the group membership overlap between them and past history of hostility and recriminations, and the capacity for repression of the authorities in the sense of their command over resources, their ability to organize an apparatus of social control, and the absolute size of this apparatus. Is violence more likely to erupt, and casualties likely to be higher, when Cossacks face peasants than if troops made up of peasant conscripts face them? Are they to be higher if black demonstrators or rioters are confronted by a white or a mixed white and black police force and other agents of social control in the United States? Are they likely to be higher if troops drawn from rural areas in France face the Paris working people than if troops are made up of urban recruits, and so on? The answers may well be in the affirmative in all these instances, but at this point I have simply not explored these matters in sufficient depth to formulate a set of clear and meaningful hypotheses. The evidence is, in any case, complicated. For instance, it is doubtful that there was less violence in the United States labor conflict when native employers, agents of social control, and armed guards were facing native, English-speaking workers than when they were facing immigrant workers of Southern and Eastern European origin.

Another set of hypotheses dealing with the magnitude of violence has to do with the ecological and technological aspects of the confrontation, although these matters have received little attention in the social science literature and are especially difficult to state unambiguously in terms of hypotheses. I would like to formulate (hypothesis 3) nonetheless that

> when two population groups are locked in conflict, and when a majority group attacks a numerical minority, casualties will be especially high if the minority group does not live in compact settlements but in small clusters dispersed among the hostile majority.

This ecological pattern existed in several instances of large-scale communal or tribal warfare productive of very high casualties, such as the Hindu-Moslem clashes on the Indian subcontinent at the time of partition, the clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the Ibo massacres in Northern Nigeria, the Tutsi—Hutu clashes in Ruanda-Urundi, the anticommunist massacres in Java, and rural violence in Colombia in the 1950s. On the other hand, compact settlement of a population group in a particular geographic area to the exclusion of other groups makes for the possibility of secession and civil war, as in Biafra and Buganda in 1966.

Access to weapons and the disparity of weapons technology also are important and independent factors in the production of casualties. According to hypothesis 4

> if only one side has access to modern weapons such as firearms, and the other side does not (it has only agricultural tools or spears and arrows) casualties tend to be higher than if there is no weapons disparity.

This occurs often in conjunction with a situation (compare with hypothesis 2b) as in Ruanda-Urundi and Northern Nigeria, where troops armed with modern weapons join one group against the other or make such weapons available to the side they favor. If there is no weapons disparity, access to lethal weapons becomes the crucial technological factor. Modern weapons used in a confrontation in and of themselves are not necessarily more productive of casualties than the use of premodern weapons and agricultural implements. If the groups in the confrontation have premodern weapons within reach in their own homes at a moment's notice and are skilled and accustomed in their use, casualties will tend to be high. Describing the communal riots in India in 1946-1948 that produced close to one million fatalities, Richardson (1960: 43) writes that "communal killing was mostly by sticks, small knives, small axes, swords, spears, with only a few shotguns, rifles, or automatics." Hypothesis 4a then is that

> in the absence of weapons disparity, possession of modern firearms by both sides is not in itself productive of higher casualties than possession of traditional weapons and agricultural implements.

Because access to traditional weapons by a large number of participants in the conflict is more probable in rural than in urban populations, hypothesis 4b is that

> violent clashes in rural areas between two hostile groups will be more productive of casualties than clashes in cities.

Furthermore, as Juan Linz has pointed out, visibility, both social and physical, is higher in rural areas. Group memberships of people in rural areas are well known by all, and potential victims will therefore not be able to disappear socially and physically in the anonymous settings of large cities, as is the case with urban violence. Of course, it often happens that the rural/urban distinction is correlated with ecological and other factors described in the set of hypotheses 2 and 3, all tending to favor higher casualties in the rural context, so that the test of hypothesis 4c might involve practical difficulties of locating enough cases for which the other factors can be controlled. There are other variables that are logical candidates for inclusion in hypotheses, especially the absolute and relative sizes of the conflict groups, or of the protesters and the agents of social control, but little thought has been so far given to "size" variables in the literature, and it may be premature to speculate about them at this point. Furthermore, the effects of size or relative size may well turn out to be less important than another set of structural variables to which I will now turn.

These structural variables concern the number and magnitude of grievances, the degree of of mutually reinforcing, nonoverlapping social cleavages separating the conflict groups, the ideological level of the protesters' demands, the degree of organization of the conflict groups, and, finally, presence or absence of a recognition issue. In each case, we are asking what the relationship of these variables is to the likelihood of violence and its magnitude. For the first three variables, I shall hypothesize no systematic relationship. Hypothesis 5 then states that

> the number of grievances, the magnitude of strain, the magnitude of the frustrations experienced by the protesters, while making conflict more likely and increasing the intensity of that conflict, nevertheless bears no positive (or negative) relationship to the probability of violence and the magnitude of casualties.

In the same vein, if the conflict groups are separated by a number of nonoverlapping divisions—ethnic, religious, class, cultural-linguistic, and the like—rather than just one such division, conflict is more likely to involve more people, last longer, and have a higher intensity, but will not necessarily be more violent (compare with Dahrendorf, 1959: 213-215, for an extended discussion of this hypothesis). To state this idea as hypothesis 6:

> the number of reinforcing and nonoverlapping social cleavages separating the conflict groups bears no systematic relationship to the likelihood and magnitude of violence.

It may well be true empirically and historically that a number of other factors previously hypothesized as favoring violence is correlated with the last two named variables but I see no direct causal link. In other words, in technical parlance, the relationship is not "spurious," but an "intervening sequence."

The same lack of relationship is hypothesized here for the ideological level of the demands expressed by the protest group. Demands will have a higher ideological level insofar as they are not merely specific measures to relieve particular grievances, such as demands for higher wages, shorter work hours, lower food prices, or the dismissal of a corrupt or hated official. They will have a higher ideological level if they address themselves to major structural changes in the polity and the economy (such as the overthrow of the government) changes in the form of government (e.g., republic rather than monarchy), nationalization of industry and expropriation of private property (such as land backed up by radical philosophic and ideological appeals and justifications). Hypothesis 7 is, then, that

> the ideological level of the demands bears no systematic relationship to the likelihood and magnitude of violence.

Even if hypotheses 5-7 overstate the lack of relationship, the effects of these variables are dwarfed by the effects of the previously named variables and the next two (and last) variables to be considered—organization and recognition—whose importance for conflict theory Dahrendorf (1959: 223-227) has already pointed out. Hypothesis 8, briefly stated, is that

> the lower the level of organization of *both* conflict groups, the higher the likelihood and magnitude of violence.

By level of organization, I mean the degree to which there exists an effective, recognized, stable leadership structure exercising direction and control over the actions of the rank and file participants in the conflict, as opposed to the low level of organization of protest groups that more or less spontaneously collect as hostile crowds after precipitating incidents, and where at most temporary and local leaders may emerge. So far as the degree of organization of the agents of social control is concerned, it is higher than the degree to which networks of communication, chain of command, and troop discipline are maintained. That is more likely to happen if the force is professional, has been trained, or is experienced in handling confrontations with protest crowds. A confrontation likely to be particularly violent is one in which an unorganized, spontaneously assembled hostile crowd faces a disorganized police force, troops, or another unorganized crowd. A corollary of this hypothesis is that (hypothesis 8a)

> if the protest group is split into rival camps and factions with competing leaders, the likelihood of violence is greater than if it is internally united.

By recognition I mean that the authorities, regardless of what position they may take on the substantive issues and demands, recognize the right to protest and are willing to listen to, sit down with, talk to, and negotiate in good faith with the leaders, deputies, representatives, or spokesmen of the protesters. Nonrecognition can be inferred from several indicators that signal to the protest group that recognition is not granted or is in the process of being withdrawn: refusal to receive, listen to, debate, discuss, or negotiate with the representatives of the protesters, arrest of their leaders, harrassment of their organizing efforts through arrest, blacklists, curbs on the right to free speech, and so one. Hypothesis 9 can now be stated:

> If recognition is granted, the likelihood and magnitude of violence tends to be lower than if recognition is not granted or is being withdrawn.

A subhypothesis (9a) is that

> even after violence has already broken out, it is likely to diminish when recognition is granted, but violence is likely to continue if it is not granted.

Some may object to this last hypothesis as self-evident or tautological, since recognition implies that the conflict is on its way to becoming institutionalized and regulated, if not resolved. Indeed, recognition is the major step in institutionalizing conflict. In a broader context than the social movements and episodes of collective behavior here discussed, recognition is analogous to the extension of political and civil rights to previously disenfranchised "new" groups or classes. Yet the above formulation stated in terms of recognition is more precise and measurable than if a hypothesis were worded in terms of the degree of institutionalization of conflict and the likelihood of violence. Furthermore, while recognition in some sense implies that the authorities have been responsive to the protest group and have opened previously blocked channels of communication and influence, similar hypotheses stated in terms of "greater responsiveness of the authorities" and "acceptance of the legitimacy of protest" are less precise than hypothesis 9. For regardless of the substantive issues and demands, lack of recognition may well and often does become the major issue of the conflict, so that even if the authorities promise or institute reforms and changes that will reduce the strain and are thus responsive, the conflict will still remain potentially high on likelihood of violence until the recognition issue is also resolved. Concessions extracted under popular pressures without recognition may perhaps be considered a very low or minimal form of recognition, and as such can lower the likelihood or level of existing violence, but it may not always do so. Furthermore, recognition, in itself, without immediate concessions on substantive issues, or even before reforms can take effect, will have a tendency to defuse a potentially violent confrontation or lower an already existing level of violence. It is nevertheless true, by virtue of hypothesis 1a, that if recognition does not eventually also bring concessions or reforms that will relieve strain on substantive matter, the likelihood of violent conflict is again increased.

Two exceptions are worth noting. There are situations in which the authorities might well grant recognition, but the protesters simply do not demand it because they lack literacy and education, because they lack a tradition of organization and leadership, or because curbs on freedom of assembly, association, and speech make even a rudimentary organization of the protest group unlikely. Hobsbawm's (1959: 108-125) description of the premodern city mob represents such a case of partly institutionalized conflict by means of direct action in which recognition was not yet an issue. According to the traditional conception of urban lower-class people, "if for one reason or another the usual livelihood of the people was jeopardized or broken down, it was the duty of the prince and his aristocracy to provide relief and to keep the cost-of-living down." The urban mob usually rioted against unemployment or a cheap cost of living, not for recognition. Immediate concessions on both these demands were therefore adequate and appropriate responses and would terminate the immediate conflict and stop violence. But as we move into the nineteenth century, the recognition issue assumes more and more importance relative to the substantive demands of the protest group.

The second exception is much more important in the contemporary world. In this situation, a highly organized and ideologically sophisticated group adopts the strategy of protracted violent conflict in order to overthrow the government, as in guerrilla insurgency, often with some foreign support or help. Since recognition is denied to the insurgents, we are led to predict violent conflict; nevertheless, since the insurgents are, or eventually become highly organized, according to hypothesis 8, conflict ought to be less violent than it usually turns out to be. Of course, many insurgencies actually start at a low ideological and organizational level, not much different from other protest movements, and only after recognition is withheld and reforms are ineffective or not instituted at all, do they become full blown, highly organized, ideological guerrilla movements. One might therefore formulate the following hypothesis 10:

> In a contemporary context, if the protest movement goes unrecognized and if it is not crushed by the agents of social control, the movement will tend to become highly organized and more ideological, and the likelihood of protracted, violent conflict will be high.

In other words, under modern conditions, the recognition issue is more basic for the explanation of violence than the level of organization of the conflict groups, although, given any single confrontation in an ongoing conflict, it is still hypothesized that the more organized both sides are, the lower the magnitude of violence and the number of casualties (hypothesis 8).

Support for Hypotheses 5 to 10

The following historical instances provide a few of many available illustrations, although it is difficult to isolate the operation of one variable at a time.

Compare, for instance, the February 1917 overthrow of the Czar with the Bolshevik coup in October 1917. In February, a week-long, unorganized, and spontaneous movement, which started as a protest for bread led by women and gradually developed into a general strike, produced 1, 315 casualties (Pettee, 1938: 102; Trotsky, 1959: 97-173) at a time when almost all revolutionary leaders were in Siberia or abroad, whereas in October, a highly organized and ideological party overthrew the Kerensky government with but a dozen fatalities (Trotsky, 1959: 336-436). This paired comparison would support both hypotheses 7 and 8.

Consider in addition the Detroit riot of 1967 and the casualties produced by the disorganized police and National Guard, in contrast with the disciplined and well-led paratroopers (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, 1968: 99-102). The paratroopers who followed orders to unload their weapons and remain in evidence on sidewalks and in the street and expended only 201 rounds of ammunition, did not suffer any injuries from gunshot, and inflicted only one fatality. By contrast, the panicked police and National Guard disobeyed orders to unload their weapons, expended thousands of rounds of ammunition, sometimes at each other, were hiding behind walls and shooting out street lights in order not to be visible, and reacted to all conceivable rumors that kept flooding their communications system. Their actions accounted for between 27 and 30 fatalities:

Conot (1967: 218, 229, 234, 278, 325-326, 329, 339, 367) provides furhter evidenct that in the Los Angeles riot of 1965 many fatalities were produced by police when they became disorganized, panicked, and acted on rumor, no matter how incredible those rumors now appear in retrospect. As a matter of fact, the more violent turn of the Negro movement in 1964 and later years can be explained by invoking hypothesis 8. As the Negro movement shifted from the more organized and better-led Southern Negroes to the previously unorganized Northern urban lower-class Negroes whom Martin Luther King and other civil rights leaders were unable to mobilize into their organizations, violence increased considerably. In the same vein, the relatively nonviolent summer of 1968 can also be explained partly in organizational terms. By 1968 in urban ghettoes, radical and militant blacks had managed to create at least a rudimentary organization network and following, and, in addition, many ghetto dwellers themselves had organized into block or neighborhood organizations for pressing their demands or for curbing youth and rioting. It is also possible that the agents of social control were more experienced and organized by the summer of 1968. Thus, unlike those who focus on magnitude of strain and frustration to explain the lower level of violence in 1968, I draw attention to the change in degree of organization of both conflict groups between 1968 and earlier years. There is no evidence that strain and frustration were lower in 1968 than in the previous four summers. Indeed, as formulated in hypothesis 5, these factors do not account for the magnitude of violence in any case.

So far as the recognition issue is concerned, Huntington (1962: 21) has noted that it is a crucial factor in protracted guerrilla wars:

> Insurrectionary war is almost always total. Neither side wants to recognize the legitimacy of the other, and negotiations, much less agreements, imply such recognition. Armistices and peace treaties are possible between governments, but rarely between governments and anti-governments.

Perhaps the most promising area to highlight the importance of recognition comes from comparative labor movements. Taft (1966: 127-134) has noted that a leading cause of violence in U.S. labor disputes was the refusal of management to recognize the union. "In cases where the union is recognized, strikes seldom lead to violent encounters. However, in unorganized strikes or in those which have arisen in an effort to gain recognition, the use of violence is more common." A comparison of the labor movements in the United States with those of Western Europe provides an appropriate illustration for several of the hypotheses under review. The U.S. labor movement was less ideological, less organized, yet more violent than European labor movements. Taft (1966: 127-134) writes that

> it may appear anomalous that the U.S., a country in which class feeling and class ideology are almost entirely absent, has experienced considerable amounts of violence in labor disputes .... With the exception of a small minority, American workers have not been attracted to the various branches of anarchism, communism, socialism, and syndicalism. Yet American history is dotted with clashes between strikers and strikebreakers and police authorities.

Another historian of labor movements, Val Lorwin (1957: 37-39), writes in this connection that

> American workers had to fight bloodier industrial battles than the French for the right of unions to exist and to function. Their political history knew nothing like the "June Days" or the Commune. But the rail strikes of 1877, the pitched battle of Homestead, the Ludlow massacre, were bloodier than Fourmies and Draveil and Villeneuve-Saint Georges .... France had nothing like the private armies, factory arsenals, and industrial espionage service exposed by the LaFollette Committee.... American employers came to recognize the unions only under the multiple pressures of public opinion, administration policy, a reversal of supreme court interpretations, and finally and essentially, worker self-organizations.

In fact, the history of the U.S. labor movement will provide an opportunity to test some of the hypotheses in somewhat more systematic fashion. Suffice it to remark here that it is not likely, as I have expressed in hypotheses 5 and 6, that American workers were under greater or more numerous forms of strain than French workers, or that there were a greater number of nonoverlapping divisions separating labor from management and the agents of social control in this

country than abroad. To account for the greater violence in labor relations in this country it is the recognition issue and the level of organization of the conflict groups that are the most promising explanatory variables.

HYPOTHESES: SUMMARY

Hyp. 1 The protesters use violent means only after they have attempted other, nonviolent means of seeking redress for their grievances.

Hyp. 1a The protest group waits for some time for reforms designed to reduce social strain to take effect, and only after these reforms have proved ineffective do they resort to violent means of protest.

Hyp. 1b The authorities or ruling groups break a promise or agreement of reform, and thus provide little or no opportunity for nonviolent means of instituting desired changes before protest groups initiate violent actions.

Hyp. 2 In violent confrontations the authorities' actions produce the bulk, or at least more than half, of the casualties.

Hyp. 2a Violence is more often initiated by the authorities and their agents than by the protesters, as when peaceful demonstrations, marchers, petitioners, peaceful assemblies, and the like are broken up and attacked.

Hyp. 2b When the confrontation is not directly between the protesters and the authorities but between two hostile population groups such as employers and employees or whites and blacks, the casualties tend to be higher when the authorities either openly side with one group against the other, or refrain from intervening in the situation and thereby legitimize the actions of the aggressor.

Hyp. 2c The magnitude of casualties will be greater if the agents of social control know that they will not be made accountable for the casualties they produce during repression.

Hyp. 2d If the protesters belong to a negatively privileged or "pariah" social category, such as a religious minority or peasants, who have not enjoyed full citizenship rights and have traditionally been violently repressed, casualties will tend to be high.

Hyp. 2e The probability of violence decreases to the extent that a third impartial party intervenes as buffer or mediator in the conflict.

Hyp. 3 When two population groups are locked in conflict and when a majority group attacks a numerical minority, casualties will be especially high if the minority group does not live in compact settlements but in small clusters dispersed among the hostile majority.

Hyp. 4   If only one side has access to modern weapons such as firearms, and the other side does not (it has only agricultural tools or spears and arrows) casualties tend to be higher than if there is no weapons disparity.

Hyp. 4a In the absence of a weapons disparity, possession of modern firearms by both sides is not in itself productive of higher casualties than possession of traditional weapons and agricultural implements.

Hyp. 4b Violent clashes in rural areas between two hostile groups will be more productive of casualties than clashes in cities.

Hyp. 5   The number of grievances, the magnitude of strain, the magnitude of the frustrations experienced by the protesters, while making conflict more likely and increasing the intensity of the conflict, nevertheless bear no positive (or negative) relationship to the probability of violence and the magnitude of casualties.

Hyp. 6   The number of reinforcing and nonoverlapping social cleavages separating the conflict groups bears no systematic relationship to the likelihood and magnitude of violence.

Hyp. 7   The "ideological" level of the demands bears no systematic relationship to the likelihood and magnitude of violence.

Hyp. 8   The lower the level of organization of *both* conflict groups, the higher the likelihood and magnitude of violence.

Hyp. 9   If recognition is granted, the likelihood and magnitude of violence tends to be lower than if recognition is not granted or is being withdrawn.

Hyp. 9a Even after violence has already broken out, it is likely to diminish when recognition is granted, but violence is likely to continue if it is not granted.

Hyp. 10 In contemporary context, if the protest movement goes unrecognized and if it is not crushed by the agents of social control, the movement will tend to become highly organized and more ideological, and the likelihood of protracted, violent conflict will be high.

VIOLENCE IN U.S. STRIKES, 1870s to 1930s

For the purpose of testing some of the above hypotheses, a list of major strikes from the index of Commons (1918; 1935) and other sources for the period 1870 to 1930 in the coal, railroad, iron and steel, mining (other than coal), and cotton and silk (textiles, for short) industries was compiled. Details on each strike for a number of independent variables and violence were ascertained. Commons (1935) is especially thorough in providing information on violence,

often listing fatalities, injuries and property damage in great detail and the circumstances under which these occurred. Because industries differ on so many of the independent variables and other characteristics that are relevant for industrial conflict, it was felt that major strikes in only these five industries would be analyzed so as to exercise some control over spurious variables. At the same time, there is considerable variation on the independent variables between the five industries, as will be discussed below. On an overall level of industrial conflict, we may note that Kerr and Siegel (1954: 211) rate coal as highest on "strike-proneness," textiles as medium-high, and transportation and iron and steel are rated as medium for the United States.

Measurement presents a real problem. The primary sources, which I did not check, are contemporary newspapers (including those of the unions), labor department reports of the various states, and the frequent state or congressional investigating commissions that were appointed after a period of acute labor violence. Commons (1918, 1935) and the other books I have relied upon are based on these primary sources. I have tried to rate strikes on three levels of intensity of violence—the lowest level, where no violence is mentioned; the next level, where reference is made to clashes, injuries, and property damage, but no fatalities; and, finally, the highest level, where one or more fatalities occurred. Since fatalities almost always occurred when clashes, injuries, and property damage also took place, the underlying variable is here treated as ordinal. It was unfortunately not possible to get sufficient information on the degree of organization of the strikers and the agents of social control, as well as on a number of other variables such as precise ethnic composition of the strikers and social control agents in order to check out degree of overlap of major social categories associated with patterns of group antagonism in the United States. However, since the causes of strikes are always reported, it was possible to check whether a "recognition" issue was present. This variable was also treated as ordinal. The issues at stake might simply be wages, hours, conditions of work, or the like, in which case there was no recognition issue. At the other end, the major issue, or the one explicitly stated demand of the workers before the strike, might be recognition of the union in the sense that they sought collective bargaining rights or the right to organize. In between, there are instances where the employer sought to weaken or "bust" a union, such as discharging union members, discriminating against them in employment, or otherwise harassing union organizing activities, but where recognition of the union was not explicitly demanded (aside from demands to reinstate discharged workers). I lable this in-between category conveniently "union weakening." Since disputes over wages, hours, and conditions were usually present in all the strikes under review, recognition is treated here as an ordinal variable. For reasons stated earlier, I do not control for the number of strikers involved and duration of the strike, although in a more comprehensive investigation it might be desirable to do that at some point.

The findings on the association between presence of the recognition issue and degree of violence are summarized in Tables 1a through 1e separately by industry, and in Table 2 for the entire set of 54 strikes. In Table 2, it should be noted that gamma equals .52, which is fairly high considering the usual magnitudes of association found in sociological research, and therefore hypothesis 9 is supported, though this modest investigation is only a preliminary one. The major contrast is between the first two columns and the last one—wages and hours. There is not much difference on violence in strikes where recognition was an explicit issue, as opposed to being implicit in the attempts of employers to weaken an existing union or to prevent its establishment in the first place by harassing organizers, discharging union members, discriminatory employment practices directed at union members, and the like.

It is worth examining the patterns of violence separately by industry, for some impressionistic support for several other hypotheses can be provided in this manner. In railroads, there is a relatively low incidence of violence. Two exceptions should be noted. The railroad upheaval of 1877 produced over 100 fatalities, although at this early date recognition was not an issue, the strike wave being precipitated by a wage cut at a time of depression. The other major violent confrontation, the Pullman strike of 1894, with 25 fatalities, did involve as one of its causes union-busting activities by Pullman against the American Railway Union. The low incidence of violence in the railroad industry can be accounted for by the fact that after the Knights of Labor declined in the latter 1880s in the railroads, management adopted a policy of favorable treatment of the four major railway brotherhoods—the engineers, the firemen, the conductors, and the trainmen—with full recognition, a high wage scale, and acceptance of union seniority rules (hypothesis 9). Management also tended to accept outside mediation in railroad disputes by governmental bodies (hypothesis 2e), and the brotherhoods did win an eight-hour day in 1917 through national legislation after President Wilson, the Supreme Court, and Congress intervened. Many of the major strikes after the 1880s involved the shop crafts and switchmen, not the four favored brotherhoods (hypothesis 9).

In coal mining, strikes were especially numerous and major strikes tended to be violent throughout the period, the most productive of fatalities being the Colorado coal strike of 1913-1914, during which the Ludlow massacre occurred, and the 1922 strike during which the Herrin massacre took place. Most of the strikes took place in the coal fields of Pennsylvania and West Virginia, and the largest strikes involved hundreds of thousands of miners. The United Mine Workers was successful in getting recognition in the late 1910s in many of the Pennsylvania fields but had rather more difficulty in the decentralized bituminous coal industry and especially in the West Virginia fields. However, in the 1920s unionism was again weakened considerably. Apart from recognition, the relatively high incidence of violence can be accounted for by the frequent practice of employers in importing strikebreakers and armed guards, and in

TABLE 1A

OCCURRENCE OF VIOLENCE BY ISSUE: RAILROAD STRIKES

	Recognition Issue	Union Weakening	Wages, Hours, etc.	Total
Fatalities	1	1	1	3
Violence, no fatalities	0	1	0	1
No violence	0	1	5	6
Total	1	3	6	10

TABLE 1B

OCCURRENCE OF VIOLENCE BY ISSUE: COAL MINING STRIKES

	Recognition Issue	Union Weakening	Wages, Hours, etc.	Total
Fatalities	4	4	1	9
Violence, no fatalities	0	0	2	2
No violence	0	1	6	7
Total	4	5	9	18

TABLE 1C

OCCURRENCE OF VIOLENCE BY ISSUE: IRON AND STEEL STRIKES

	Recognition Issue	Union Weakening	Wages, Hours, etc.	Total
Fatalities	2	1	0	3
Violence, no fatalities	1	0	0	1
No violence	1	0	0	1
Total	4	1	0	5

TABLE 1D

OCCURRENCE OF VIOLENCE BY ISSUE: MINING (other than coal) STRIKES

	Recognition Issue	Union Weakening	Wages, Hours, etc.	Total
Fatalities	2	2	6	10
Violence, no fatalities	0	0	1	1
No violence	1	0	0	1
Total	3	2	7	12

TABLE 1E

OCCURRENCE OF VIOLENCE BY ISSUE: TEXTILES STRIKES

	Recognition Issue	Union Weakening	Wages, Hours, etc.	Total
Fatalities	3	0	2	5
Violence, no fatalities	1	1	1	3
No violence	0	0	1	1
Total	4	1	4	9

TABLE 2

OCCURRENCE OF VIOLENCE BY ISSUE:
ALL INDUSTRIES STRIKES (in percentages)

	Recognition Issue	Union Weakening	Wages, Hours, etc.
Fatalities	75	67	38
Violence, no fatalities	12.5	16	15
No violence	12.5	16	46
Total	100	100	100
Total number	(16)	(12)	(26)

$\gamma = .52$

evicting strikers from company housing and otherwise harassing the activities of the strikers (hypothesis 2a). Easy access to weapons was a factor in arming miners. Local authorities generally sided with the employers and operated in remote mountain districts, with low accountability, and against an ethnic, negatively privileged, immigrant work force (hypotheses 2b, 2c, and 2d).

In the iron and steel industry there are very few instances of strikes from which to generalize from, but recognition was a key issue in major strikes, as United States Steel set the pace in destroying the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers after 1901. It was only in the latter 1930s that recognition was slowly achieved by means of a CIO-sponsored drive.

In mining other than coal, mainly in the Rocky Mountain states, the hypothesis linking recognition and violence is least supported, since almost all strikes tended to lead to violence regardless of the issues involved. The key factors here, present even more than in coal mining, were access to weapons and dynamite by the miners, the universal practice of employers in importing strikebreakers and armed guards, and the support of local authorities for strikebreaking activities (hypotheses 2b, 2c, and 2d). A frequent source of violence was the attack of armed miners upon trains of strikebreakers and the dynamiting of mines employing scabs, the attack of guards and deputies upon the tent colonies of strikers and their families, mass arrests of strikers, their

imprisonment in bullpens, and their forced deportations (hypotheses 2 and 2a). In fact, Western labor conflict in the mining areas comes closest to continuous open warfare, yet lacks ideological issues (hypothesis 7).

In textiles, a relatively decentralized industry with a high frequency of strikes, unionism was hampered by the lack of skilled workers antedating machine production, the immigrant work force in New England after 1900, and the competition of Southern mills with New England. While violence and fatalities occurred frequently in major strikes despite a high proportion of female labor, overall casualties tended to be very low. Textiles is interesting, however, since it is one of the few industries were the I.W.W. and communist-dominated unions were trying to compete with the A.F. of L.-affiliated United Textile Workers in organizing the work force and frequently managed to lead the strikes. While not enough cases are available, it is interesting to note that so far as violence is concerned, it was equally likely to occur when the moderate U.T.W. was involved as when the more ideological I.W.W. and other unions were (hypothesis 7). For instance an appropriately matched comparison is provided during the 1929 drive to organize Southern Textile workers. A strike in Gastonia, N.C., led by the communist-sponsored National Textile Workers' Union resulted in three fatalities, whereas in neighboring Marion, N.C., a strike over similar issues in a factory of roughly the same labor force composition and size led by the U.T.W. (A.F. of L.-affiliated) resulted in six fatalities. The Southern employers, authorities, and local population, of course, tended to perceive all unionization drives as Red-inspired and unpatriotic regardless of whether they in fact were, and the U.T.W. personnel as well as communist labor leaders were frequently assaulted and run out of town by vigilantes and mobs.

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