

More Thoughts on the Eucharistic Presence

by G. Egner

I am indeed grateful to Professor Mascall and to Fr McCabe for their perceptive and kindly critiques¹ of my article on the eucharistic presence.² To answer them adequately would take more room than even the Editor's generosity would tolerate, so I shall content myself with two things. I shall try to show what I think are the strengths and limitations of their views (in my opinion, although perhaps they will not agree with me, we are closer than might appear). And, in doing this, I shall refer to or cite passages from what I trust is my forthcoming book, *In the Breaking of the Bread*. In this way I shall at least show that the points they raise have not been neglected by me, whatever may be thought of the answers I offer. References to the articles in *New Blackfriars* will be by 'E1', 'E2', 'M' and 'H', with page-numbers. References to the book will be by 'BB', followed by chapter and section.

Let me start by stressing that we are all agreed that no human language or philosophical system is capable of expressing the the eucharistic presence adequately. I make the point with some generality and at some length in BB iii, 1. The remarks about 'amnesia' and 'confrontation' in my article (E2, pp. 406-407) are based on later sections of that chapter, and are consequences of the general thesis that in theology 'not only is our linguistic medium inadequate; it is inadequate to the task of drawing bounds to its inadequacy' (BB iii, 1). The Aristotelian (or any other) vocabulary of change needs maltreatment of one sort or another for its eucharistic employment (see M, pp. 542-543; H, pp. 548-551). Where we differ is in our verdict on the particular 'maltreatment' that is in question. There may perhaps be a distinction in emphasis between Mascall and McCabe at this point, but they agree—and are right to agree—that I consider the maltreatment to have robbed words of their significance. Whether such different verdicts are capable of reconciliation by argument is to me doubtful. McCabe's distinction between analogy and metaphor (p. 549, footnote 2; I offer a cognate one in BB iii, 5) is interesting, but I am sure he would not deny that, while the distinction *records* an acceptance of certain strained uses of language, it cannot *compel* such an acceptance. The evocation may succeed for some but not for all. What is illumination for one will be fruitless darkening of counsel for another. We may have to end by agreeing to differ: so let me suggest in some more detail the

¹E. L. Mascall, 'Egner on the Eucharistic Presence', *New Blackfriars*, December 1972, pp. 539-546; Herbert McCabe, O.P., 'Transubstantiation: A reply to G. Egner', *ibid.*, pp. 546-554.

²G. Egner, 'Some Thoughts on the Eucharistic Presence', *New Blackfriars*, August 1972, pp. 354-359; September 1972, pp. 399-408.

grounds for the position I have taken up. And I begin by asking whether either Mascall or McCabe accepts transubstantiation.

Mascall concedes that there is some difference between what he writes and the theory of transubstantiation as commonly expounded, but regards his own view as a development and interpretation, not as a reduction (M, p. 541). For me, there is a very real distinction between the two opinions. He admits (as Aquinas would) that all the natural qualities of the bread and wine remain, but insists that 'what is of supreme importance after the consecration is that the elements now belong not only to the natural but to the supernatural order; they nourish man for the beatific vision and orientate him towards it' (M, p. 540). Neither in the natural nor in the supernatural order are beings to be thought of in isolation; they are the subject of relations, and in virtue of these are incorporated into the structure of the developing universe (*ibid.*). What is supremely important about an object 'in the place which it holds and the finalities to which it is directed and the energies which it exerts in the total order of God's creation, can rightly be called its substance' (p. 541). Putting aside for the moment the question 'is the consecrated host still bread?', I agree with what Mascall is saying. What is supremely important—indeed, what is supremely *real*, I should want to say—about the consecrated elements is that they are a sharing in the body and blood of Christ.¹ I sympathize, too, with his view that 'the substance' of something should be taken, not just in terms of that object in isolation, but in terms of the wider order in which it exists; that 'neither on the natural nor the supernatural plane are beings to be thought of as merely subjects isolated from all other beings and incapsulated in their qualities' (M, p. 540).

But does not transubstantiation involve just this isolation? To begin with, it has no essential link with the supernatural life at all, since God could certainly transubstantiate the bread into a stone (In 4 *Sent.* dist. 10, art. 1, ad 8). Just as 'isolated' a solution is offered by Aquinas to the objection that the dimensions of Christ's body are not compatible with those of the host. There is no talk in his answer of any wider context of significance, no appeal (sound or unsound) to supernatural considerations at all. The 'specific totality' of a substance, he replies, is contained equally in a large or small example of it—the whole nature of copper in a large or a small coin, the whole nature of man in a tall or a short one. But Christ is present, not by way of quantity, but by way of substance in the Eucharist. *Ergo* . . . (ST 3. 76. 1 ad 3). The answer, of course, is fallacious. 'Being copper' or 'being a man' are just a different sort of predicate from 'being

¹Am I refusing to say 'what is supremely real about the consecrated elements is that they are the body and blood of Christ'? I am not. I write the phrase in the text because it situates the eucharistic presence within the ritual context that gives its primary sense. That sense can then entitle us to make the other assertion: but to *start* from the assertion that the host is the body of Christ is to make the ritual into a devotional adornment of what is essentially a quasi-physical transformation. See E2, p. 405 and see below, p. 179.

Christ': David may be just as much a man as Goliath, but neither he nor anyone else can be just as much Goliath as the Philistine (BB iii, 1). The fallacy, however, interests me less than the *style* of the answer. It is concerned with how we describe objects, and the description is not thought of as going beyond the object itself. Even the coins are considered, not as parts of a currency, but as composed of a particular metal: and the substantial presence of Christ is, rightly or wrongly, considered as analogous to the 'presence', if that be the word, of a specific nature in its exemplifications. 'Encapsulation' could hardly go much further. But we should not be surprised at this characteristic of transubstantiation as traditionally conceived (and as such attacked by me). The theory may be an abuse of terms drawn from Aristotelian natural philosophy, but the general flavour of that philosophy haunts it still: the 'paradigm-case' of change remains the blacksmith hammering out his brass ball or, more elusively, prime matter receiving successive forms (E1, pp. 355-356). Wider contexts, let alone a supernatural calling, are alien to the whole business. Just as alien to it, and with more serious consequences, is the notion of *sign*, but more of that in a moment. Let me say something now of McCabe's defence of the theory.

Here again, I feel more at ease with what my critic writes than with what he claims to be defending. McCabe points, as Aquinas did, to an analogy between transubstantiation and creation. The inexpressibility in Aristotelian terms of creation he rightly stresses (H, pp. 547-548); and I am sure I can take his remarks (H, p. 551) as insisting just as rightly that creation goes beyond any scheme or vocabulary we could devise at all. Perhaps I can best place my disagreement with him by using the distinction he draws (H, p. 549) between words of which the meaning involves a reference to the context in which they are learned, and words which, while learned in one context, can be applied elsewhere: I accept the examples he offers—'off-side' for the former, 'foul' or 'skill' for the latter. For me, the Aristotelian vocabulary of change is too context-bound for its eucharistic employment to make any sense. 'Creation' does indeed go beyond the Aristotelian or any other way of expressing change: whatever terminology we use, we shall not be able to seize in words the total dependence we wish to convey. But the impotence of words here is that of language as a whole: we might say that it is the whole Aristotelian framework that has shown itself to be inadequate, and the inadequacy is conveyed in the talk of dependence in *esse* or in existence—which, as McCabe correctly points out, is not of a piece with the vocabulary of act and potentiality, and does not express ideas of which we have an adequate grasp (H, p. 551). It is not so with transubstantiation. Were the introduction of the term no more than a confession of linguistic breakdown, I could accept it (I even recommend this course at BB i, 4 to readers who wish to reconcile my views with Trent's approval of the word). But there is

more to the term than that. As I tried to show in my article (E1, pp. 356-358), Aristotle's account of change is already open to the abuse of hypostatization, and it is precisely this abuse which gives to the eucharistic account in Aquinas whatever content it appears to have. With creation, I would say, we kick away the ladder we have climbed, as good philosophers should when striving to express the transcendent; with transubstantiation, we stand firmly on its rungs and try to hoist ourselves up by our own boot-laces.

Let me buttress that analogy (metaphor?) with some texts. I admire with McCabe (H, p. 548) the refusal of Aquinas to make 'nothing' a material out of which God creates things. I am less happy with his phrase 'the "change" from non-existence to existence' (H, p. 551), although he is not very happy about it himself. I am still less happy with the text of Aquinas at ST 3. 75. 8 where he says that creation, transubstantiation and natural change have in common an order of terms—being after not-being, the body of Christ after the substance of bread, and (e.g.) something white after something black. Here, we are getting all too close to making creation into a change, and transubstantiation into an extended version of natural change. Indeed, Aquinas goes further in the same article, and says that in natural change the same matter or subject remains while in the Eucharist the same accidents remain. Are we not 'context-bound' in a way here that makes the maltreatment nothing more than maltreatment?

For consider the lengths to which Aquinas is driven in order to manipulate the terms he is maltreating. At ST 3. 77. 1, obj. 2 he puts forcibly the objection that, since the definition of an accident involves existing in a subject, not even a miracle can circumvent this. His answer is an odd inversion of the ontological argument. Existence itself is not part of any definition; so all we can say is that *it pertains to accidents so to exist*; but in the Eucharist their independent existence comes from divine power, not from their own nature; so there is no contradiction. By any standard this is no answer. Definitions, true enough, do not include existence—by saying what we mean by 'flying saucer', we do not assert that there are any. But (as the objection says) definitions do state what must be the case *if what they define exists*, under penalty of there not being anything so defined at all. The reply is no more than an appeal to omnipotence in order to justify a 'subsisting accident', precisely the appeal which the difficulty was meant to call into question (BB i, 6). Now this reifying, this *hypostatization* of appearances is of a piece with a danger that is present in the Aristotelian account of change as such (E1, p. 356). It is no accident that Aquinas can describe natural change as 'the changing of the object's form', or as being 'a conversion in which different forms succeed each other in the same subject' (ST 3. 75. 4), even though for Aristotelian philosophy it makes no sense to talk of forms changing or passing away (see again E1,

p. 356). Whatever be the merit of conceiving transubstantiation as a creative breakdown of language, the trouble is that the language itself already is liable to break down; not for any mysterious reason but from the way it is constructed.

And what account does transubstantiation give of the ultimate fate of the hypostatized accidents or appearances? In Aristotelian terms, when bread digested or left to corrupt ceases to be bread, the prime matter is actualised by other forms. But here we have no bread, only its appearance, and so no prime matter. What is there left when a host corrupts? The solution Aquinas prefers (ST 3. 77. 5) is that the (now subsistent) 'dimensive' quantity' of the bread is miraculously made the subject of subsequent forms, so that all that could be generated from the matter is generated from the dimensive quantity without (Aquinas adds) any new miracle being involved. I respect, at all events, this economy in miracles. I pass over the eerie, Borgès-like picture of a world in which lurk the products of these and subsequent changes—apparently substantial but in fact only accidental. I am even prepared to be accused of unfairness in taking so recondite a problem as grounds against the theory of transubstantiation. I simply wish to display that theory as enmeshed in a whole web of technical terms which make some (if platitudinous) sense in their original context, but which here find themselves hypostatized into metaphysical clockwork. The theory of transubstantiation confronts us with much more than the hinting at a 'distinction in existence', if I may so express what McCabe writes (H, pp. 550-551). I simply cannot accept his description of the theory as an instance of 'the very creative act of breaking the rules that captures the illumination we wish to convey' (H, p. 549). Of course, I do not deny the necessity of such breakage in theology where, as he puts it, 'talk has, in an important sense, lost its bearings, or cut loose from its moorings' (H, p. 548). The trouble with transubstantiation is that it has *not* cut loose from its moorings; it carries with it a whole battery of interrelated terms, and misuses them to engender metaphysical grotesques like those we have been considering—grotesques, moreover, that are already a potential danger in the Aristotelian philosophy of change.

I have to distinguish the views of both my critics from the account of transubstantiation I have been attacking. That account I have taken, not only from Aquinas (BB i, 2-4; iii, 1, 4; iv, 3; etc), but from modern scholastic authors (BB i, 5-6). I concede—insist, in fact—that there is a difference between what Mascall and McCabe write and that account, and I think it would be of interest to see how far their versions of the theory might be developed. But the traditional account deserves consideration on its own terms (and 'terms' is the word: how much more, and more embarrassingly, *terminological* it is than McCabe's creative rule-breaking or Mascall's wider context of God's providence!). Quite rightly, McCabe rejects an account of

the eucharistic presence that makes God trick us—‘so that while all our criteria for decision make us think it is bread, he has secretly switched the ‘inner reality’ to make it zinc or flesh’ (H, p. 552). But what else do accounts of transubstantiation say than that the ‘inner reality’ has been so switched? True enough, Aquinas denies that our senses are deceived, since the accidents are really there and it is for the intellect (aided by faith) to pronounce upon the substance (ST 3. 75. 5 ad 2). Sense can be attached to that distinction (BB ii, 5), but a eucharistic context invites us, all too persuasively, to make transubstantiation into a mutation of some inaccessible *Ding an sich*, and the distinction itself into a divorce between appearance and reality that I have declared to be ultimately sceptical in its consequences (E2, p. 404; BB ii, 5). It is easy to adduce a cloud of witnesses in the same sense. Newman (a bad omen, here as elsewhere, for reasoned belief) cannot see what is to hinder transubstantiation since substance is unknowable, and he praises a rising school of phenomenalism in science. Clark (in a talk delivered during Vatican II) makes a distinction between ‘the empirical level of phenomena and the metempirical level of ultimate substance’ (where the change occurs) on the grounds of a wish to avoid phenomenalism and (as he honestly admits) because of the exigencies of eucharistic theology (BB ii, 5). For Colombo, now a cardinal and the Pope’s ‘personal theologian’ (the oxymoron is not of my own devising), ‘the change takes place between realities which are “au-delà” of “physically” attainable realities; it takes place between “transphysical” realities, that is specifically metaphysical ones’ (BB ii, 5).¹ There is no hinting at the unsayable here, no talking in terms of what is most important about the eucharistic elements in the whole context of God’s call: there is just specious muddle.

But there is more wrong than muddle: there is what I have called (BB iii, 4) a confusion between signs and disguises. The whole setting of the theory of transubstantiation is ‘physics’, even if abused physics: ritual and ritual significance are only adjuncts to what it displays as the heart of the matter. But whatever else the Eucharist is, it is ritual; and that is where we must start. Mascall writes that ‘transubstantiation has often been conceived in terms of destruction rather than of transformation and of elevation’ (M, p. 545). I think he points to a greater danger where he writes on the same page that ‘it was a weakness of the “older theology” that it failed to see the real, and not just arbitrary, relation between the inner reality of the Eucharist and its material embodiment’. I have already blamed Aquinas for making the ‘appearances’ in the Eucharist

¹To show that my objections to such language are not simply idiosyncratic, I notice that, in the debate between Selvaggi (a Roman Thomist) and Colombo in the fifties, the former accused the latter of a phenomenalistic view of knowledge, and of departing from the notion of substance found in Aquinas (the matter is elaborated in BB i, 5, 6). That terminology of Colombo’s should have found its way into the encyclical *Mysterium Fidei* is lamentable. My ‘dangerous’ at E2, p. 408, refers to that.

into what I persist in regarding as a camouflage for cannibalism.¹ I now point out that such an idea of disguise is out of place in eucharistic theology. If A is a sign of B, A is not a disguise of B; conversely, for A to be a sign of B, A can and must still be A, or the sign itself would be deceptive. If A is a sign of B, we cannot treat them as rivals, as if we had to choose between them, for sign and signified are not so related. There may be a rivalry in interpretations of a sign: I may wonder whether an 'X' on a scrap of paper means a kiss, an unknown, or the rejection of a solution. But, faced with a sum adorned by a teacher with 'X', I cannot say that he is disguising his verdict (as he might be with 'Well Tried'), or that the 'X' is not really an 'X' but a condemnation. A sign is not a disguise; we must respect the sign for what it is; we must respect the reality both of what signifies and of what is signified by it (BB iii, 4).

Now the Eucharist is obviously not a sign in the way that an 'X' beside a sum is. But, before I elaborate that denial, let us see what happens if we talk about the Eucharist as if it were not a sign at all, but a perceptible disguise of what is imperceptible. (On what follows, see BB iii, 4). Disguises, unlike signs, are rivals to their correlates. Their whole purpose is to provoke us to assert the presence of one object where we should be asserting the presence of another. They could never do this unless they competed for our assertion with what they disguised, and unless they were present to us in the same way.

Now the recognition of any significance, while not to be identified with the ability to penetrate disguises, does presuppose the ability to recognize the presence of reasonably stable objects—we should never learn what sums we had wrong if our teachers marked them with an 'X' in invisible ink. But *this* ability is not in its turn dependent on another, yet more fundamental type of recognition. Material objects of a fairly stable nature are present to our perception and understanding in a way that is fundamental to any reasoned activity we undertake. From this conceptual primacy, however, it follows that any weakening of the signifying function of the Eucharist will make the eucharistic presence of Christ look ever more like the presence of a body, in the sense of a presence needing nothing more basic to justify it. Of course, the concomitants of such a presence—dimensional relation and adjacency—are just those which must be (and are) denied by Aquinas of the Eucharist. The tension set up here cannot be resolved as long as the eucharistic presence is

¹See the quotation from ST 3. 75. 5 at E2, pp. 405-406. Not, of course, that Aquinas was the first to write so. We find in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, on which he wrote a commentary, that the appearances survive 'lest the mind abhor what the eye beholds, for we are not accustomed to eating raw flesh and blood. Since it is not lawful to chew Christ, he gave us his body and blood in a sacrament (*mysterio*)', 4 *Sent.*, dist. 11. Of course, Peter, like Aquinas, would deny that we do to Christ invisibly what we do to meat visibly. But I am concerned with the content and coherence of what they say, and am concerned to mend matters by something more than selective amnesia (see on all this BB iii, 3-4).

expressed in ways drawn from natural philosophy rather than from ritual. Nor is it likely to be resolved. We have an understandable and praiseworthy motive for conceiving Christ's eucharistic presence as being, though imperceptible, of the same order as the presence of what is deemed to disguise it. To conceive it so is to conceive it as analogous to the unique graciousness of his presence among those with whom he walked and talked in Galilee. What I call the 'Galilean' presence is simply a hallowed example of the most vivid and most basic presence we have yet encountered.

Yet. Because there is a more basic presence still, of which we can here speak only in the words that have lost their moorings, in words that go beyond what is perceived to the summoning of man, body and soul, to the beatific vision. That we are members of his body; that he lives in us; that he is the vine and we the branches—the presence and union that are hinted at in such phrases will not reach perfection until we, body and soul, know as we are known. That is why we have been given a tangible and effective sign of them in the Eucharist, and why the Eucharist is essentially an *esca viatorum*, a food for our journey. In it, we show forth the Lord's death until he comes; and are related to our redemption and its consummation in the sign that is Christ given up for us. His presence in us and our union with him are both signified and effected by the rite that he himself instituted. But a 'Galilean' presence needs no sign, for it is the most fundamental form of presence we have on earth. The Eucharist could be only its admittedly miraculous disguise.¹

Is the consecrated host still bread? It will be clear by now why I reject the reasons offered for a negative answer by those who defend the traditional version of transubstantiation. So let me end by considering briefly the reasons given by Mascall and McCabe for saying that it is not. For Mascall, the creative efficient causality of God means that what he says 'goes': the new status of the consecrated host makes calling it bread almost comical—more so than persisting in calling a banknote a piece of paper (M, p. 545). Let me suggest here a distinction between two questions one might ask about a bank-note: 'What is this?' and 'Is this a piece of paper?'. To answer the second in the affirmative does not commit us to answering the first by 'A piece of paper'. The former question is concerned to situate the object in its full reality—to give its 'quiddity' or 'ti esti'; the form of that question does not anticipate the kind of answer it can receive. But the second question does do this: the 'Yes' or 'No' it requests are determined and limited to a particular alternative. I agree that if the first question be asked of a consecrated host, the

¹One of the theses in my book (BB iii, 3; iv, 1, 4; and see E2, p. 406) is that belief is to be discerned in patterns of ritual activity to which I give the name of 'cultic pictures'. One such 'picture' can illustrate this paragraph. The New Missal has a special 'Eucharistic Preface' which talks in the eschatological terms I have suggested. For the *Missale Romanum*, the preface used on such occasions was that of Christmas.

answer must be 'the body of Christ'.¹ But I also assert that to the question 'Is this bread?' asked of a consecrated host we must answer 'Yes', just as we should have to answer 'Yes' if we were asked of a bank-note 'Is this paper?'.

Which, of course, is the trouble. Because that makes my view look as if I were making the 'new context' of the host into the kind of 'new context' that paper receives by being currency. Such contexts are man-made and a function of human activity, and the Eucharist is neither. If I can call the older view docetist for its denial, mine can be called socinian for its affirmation.

Let me try and fail to avoid this trap and to express what I take the eucharistic presence to be by considering McCabe's position here. I am very largely in agreement with it. My talk of the 'concentric analogies' within which the eucharistic presence is to be understood (E2, p. 405) is meant to focus that divine action which he well describes as the taking over of our signs by God and their becoming the language of God himself (H, p. 554). Where I differ is in denying that this taking over of signs into the divine language cancels their meaning in our own. What it does, of course, is display the provisional and incomplete nature of the account we give of things. The older view attributes this to an imperceptible mutation within the bread. McCabe makes it a declaration that our criteria no longer apply. I make it a sign-giving activity by God that respects the criteria we have, while making the shared rite into a union with the incarnate Word that is not indicated by eating in the way that fellowship is, but is far more real than any eating could be. God does not deny our language in talking his own. If he did, we could not understand him.

Do we differ? Some might like to effect a reconciliation by making an affirmative answer to the question 'Is the host bread?' a *gaucherie* that misleads by its very justifiability.² I am more eager myself to point out that questions over differences in theology are just as much victims of linguistic breakdown as any other part of theological discourse, but I make one observation. McCabe stresses the oddity of 'This is the Body of Christ', and its difference from 'This is bread' (H, p. 553).³ I quite agree—but if they are different in type, why is one supposed to cancel the other?

¹Which, once more, is not to say that the eucharistic presence of Christ is to be expounded by asking that question and answering it affirmatively. Isolate the question from ritual activity, and we are back to our armchair physics.

²One can go to A. E. Housman for an instance of what I have in mind. 'That Pope was a poet is true; but it is one of those truths which are beloved of liars, because they serve so well the cause of falsehood. That Pope was not a poet is false; but a righteous man, standing in awe of the last judgment and the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone, might well prefer to say it' (*The Name and Nature of Poetry*. Need I say that I dissent from Housman's view of Pope?).

³He writes there that the denial that the host is bread is the touchstone of Catholic orthodoxy, but that the heart of the teaching is that it is the body of Christ. I note with interest that one friendly dissenter distinguished the two propositions more sharply—a person 'might go for ten years believing the latter without ever explicitly asserting the former'.

My final paragraph must consider Mascall's warning about the dangers of 'secularizing' eucharistic belief (M, p. 546). I am wholly at one with him here, and hope that my book will show that I am at least alive to the dangers, whether or not I remain unscathed. I draw on BB iv, 5 for some concluding remarks at this point. The very flatness of behaviouristic or ethical reductions of the Eucharist makes them both specious and unsatisfying.¹ But if some newer thinkers decode eucharistic ritual as ethics, it is just as true that older thinkers decoded it as physics; and, decoding it thus, were obliged by a sense of fittingness to unsay or to forget results of their decoding. My own suggestions, I should like to think, amount to letting ritual communicate as ritual—a programme that is a good deal more arduous than it sounds. There, for the present, I leave it.

Me and the Monks

by Joyce Galbraith

My reactions to all priests and monks are based partly on my own early memories of my convent school and on my father's healthy anti-clericalism. 'Feudal barons . . . that's what they are, nothing but feudal barons', he used to roar about the Irish bishops of the thirties and I think he still would have said it had the rooms been bugged and the threat of the salt mines hanging over him. Still, he realized that you couldn't, at that time (and possibly even now in Ireland), beat City Hall or rather the Archbishop's House and so he sent me to the care of the nuns. I have written about my hatred of their mixture of hypocrisy, snobbery and sanctimonious smugness elsewhere. All I can say on the credit side of my attempted brain-washing is that its harshness was like Commando training in that nothing, I feel, will ever be quite as bad again. My school days left me with the shaky idea that the Almighty was a Furious Old Man for most of the time and that there just *might* be a hell, so I went to Mass on Sundays to pacify him and I gabbled daily prayers as if presenting a shopping list.

Years in England practising as a psychiatrist diluted whatever bits of bogus religion I had left. This worried me at first, so conditioned was I to the crackles of hellfire if you didn't go to Mass. I was a

¹One thinks of the passage in the article 'Transubstantiation' in *Sacramentum Mundi* (Vol. 6, p. 294) where a eucharistic analogy is drawn with the putting of the bricks of one building to a new finality in another. An adequate comment on such theology is that it bores.