

## AMERICAN THOMISM.

THOMISTIC PSYCHOLOGY. By R. E. Brennan, O.P., Ph.D. (Macmillan; \$3.00.)

Dr. Brennan will already be known as the author of a remarkable essay in psychological synthesis (*General Psychology*, cf. BLACKFRIARS, 1937, pp. 757-762), published a few years ago, which aimed at the incorporation of the results of modern research into one organic body of psychological doctrine based on the philosophical system of Aristotle and St. Thomas. Despite its narrow-sounding title, his latest work is no less ambitious in spirit and scope. As Professor M. J. Adler observes in a Preface, ' . . . in the writing of this book, he (Dr. Brennan) has never lost sight of his fundamental aim to unify psychology by properly conceiving its subject-matter and rightly ordering its philosophical and scientific parts.' For this reason Dr. Brennan's book should be of interest not only to students of St. Thomas, but to all those who are concerned as to the ultimate fate of scientific psychology. It has long been evident that if the latter is to survive at all as an independent science, it must be based on a sound metaphysic. The divorce of scientific psychology from speculative philosophy may have had certain advantages from the point of view of technique, but on the whole it has only led to uncertainty and confusion; while the consequent concentration on phenomena has tended to reduce psychology to the level of pure physiology. Hence the urgent need of some kind of synthesis between scientific and philosophic psychology, which is being felt and voiced by many psychologists to-day. Dr. Brennan's work will go far to fulfil such a need. His whole aim is to present St. Thomas's psychology as a perfectly balanced synthesis, based on a true appreciation of the nature of living being, especially of man, as a psycho-physical unity, a besouled organism, a creature composed of matter and spirit, whose operations fall within the scope of scientific investigation, but whose fundamental nature is the proper study of philosophy. The bulk of the book is taken up with this presentation, which follows the lines of St. Thomas's treatise *De Homine* in the *Summa Theologica*. It is preceded by a shorter account of Aristotle's *De Anima*, designed to show the Aristotelean derivation of St. Thomas's doctrine while bringing out the anthropological emphasis of the latter as against the more animistic approach of Aristotle. The book ends with an Epilogue on the state of modern and contemporary schools of psychology, in which Dr. Brennan shows how the principles of the Thomistic synthesis can be used as 'a basic set of tools for working over and measuring the value of the data of experimentation and scientific observation.' There is an admirable page-and-line bibliography, containing a wealth of reference to relevant authorities both classical and modern. Altogether, we are again indebted to the author for a valuable and timely

contribution to the task of building up a unified and stable science of psychology.

EGBERT COLE, O.P.

ST. THOMAS AND ANALOGY. By the Rev. G. B. Phelan. The Aquinas Lecture, 1941. (The Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, Wis.; \$1.50.)

It is good to find popular attention turned to the question of analogy, so little mentioned in modern manuals, so much insisted upon by Cajetan. The difficulty, however, of delivering a short lecture, upon a subject so complicated and contentious, to an audience unversed in philosophical niceties, must be evident to all. In face of it Fr. Phelan has to spend nearly half his time in simple preparation of the ground, and to use language that at times does not avoid a certain confusion; it would be possible, for instance, to think that the 'realm of essence' was being (pp. 7-8) marked off from 'the realm of metaphysical abstraction' (as if *esse* was the object of metaphysics); or that the 'clarity and distinctness' that he so rightly rejects is one proper to essences rather than to *mathematica*.

When at last, vague uses of the term analogy having been set aside, he feels able to plunge into the heart of his subject, he has little space in which to point to the difficulties that must arise; he can but sketch an outline. He deals first, and (surprisingly) at comparative length, with analogy of inequality, at which point we wonder why he chooses such elaborate examples when Cajetan would have any genus do. Passing to analogy of attribution, perhaps the most difficult type to understand, he straightly maintains that though 'logically valid' it is 'too weak to bear the weight of metaphysical predication' (p. 28), and he later denies it any probative part in metaphysical demonstration; he could not be expected, in such a lecture, to enter more deeply upon this controverted point, but its difficulty might, with advantage perhaps, have been indicated; we do not entirely agree with his conclusion. Analogy of proper proportionality is rapidly and competently outlined in several places, and is distinguished, as alone metaphysically valid, against all other analogies, these either not realising the *analogum* intrinsically in each *analogatum*; or, if they do, doing so in 'the same manner of mode'; here again (p. 25) the enforced brevity leads to a certain confusion, since neither of these qualifications apply to metaphorical analogy, of which however no mention is made until later.

There is the old difficulty of English renderings for Latin words. The lecturer uses analogue (pp. 37, 58), analogate (p. 28), even analogies (p. 29), all to render *analogatum*, which has a confusing effect on the inexperienced reader, and leaves nothing for *analogum*, except 'analogated perfection' (pp. 27, 28). This latter phrase, moreover, has a rather unfortunate use in n. 55, when it takes the place, in translation of an admirably clear passage from Maritain, of '*la chose*