Kenneth Burke

THE SEVEN OFFICES

I

There is no end to possible theories of motivation, with their corresponding ways of defining and classifying motives. Our hero can do what he does because he is of some particular religion, race, nationality, social class, historical tradition, occupation, personality type, or glandular make-up or has been psychologically wounded in one or another of the ways specified by the various competing experts. If we say that he did as he did because of the situation in which he was placed, there can be endless variation in our terms for what he did; and the situation in which he did it can be interpreted in terms of varying scope, ranging from a view of his act as done against a background of one or many gods more or less actively concerned with his conduct or against a purely secular background of "nature" ("environment" variously interpreted); or we may place his act with reference to the most minutely particular of circumstances, as when explaining exactly why Mr. Q., Republican, retired, Yale graduate, wearing glasses, and just having quarreled with his wife, turned his car exactly as he did in the particular combination of factors that made up one particular traffic accident. In view of such a motivational jungle, a good basic proposition to have in mind when contemplating the study of motives would be: Anybody can do anything for any reason.

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Thus there is a sense in which this article, which would propose one more terminology of motives, is like focusing upon one leaf in a jungle and proclaiming exultantly, "This is *the* leaf. This is *it!*" But, first, by way of apologetic introduction, let us explain our motivational simplification by explaining how we got to it.

Recently, teaching a course in the theory of language, I used as text a book on philosophies of education, *Modern Philosophies and Education*, edited by Nelson B. Henry.[1] Students and teacher alike were struck by the pragmatic fact that, despite the great differences of outlook among the various *philosophies* we considered, when the authors got to the subject of the *pedagogical methods* that they thought implicit in their philosophic positions, they all seemed to wind up by recommending much the same procedure: teaching by means of the guided critical discussion (a loose schoolroom variant of the procedure used by Plato in his Socratic dialogues). Insofar as all the essays had *education in general* as their aim, they could tend to agree on means. But, insofar as each essay differed specifically from the others in its *doctrinal* emphasis (or "orientation"), the same method was reached from different starting points. Thus in effect each philosophy "grounded" the *method* in different sets of *principles*.

The situation suggested a happy analogy with the situation in the United Nations (where, by the nature of the case, delegates with a considerable range of motivational backgrounds agree on a kind of procedural charter common to the lot). And whereas some people are inclined to think that no true peace can prevail in the world until or unless all the world unites in a common set of ultimate beliefs, does not the machinery of the United Nations suggest that nations might sufficiently agree on methods while still greatly differing as to the routes by which they approach these methods? They might all congregate in the same clearing, though they come to it by many different paths through the jungle.

Here would be a good instance of the liberal ideal: a sufficiently peaceful world of many varied motivational centers, each with its own unique character, but all brought together, somewhat like an assortment of portraits in a portrait gallery.

But would this mere conglomeration be enough? Whatever the differences, there must be some notable elements common to the lot; otherwise, agreement even on methods of procedure would be impossible. What, then, of the necessary elements in common? How chart *these?*

1. *Modern Philosophies and Education: The Fifty-fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, Part I. Prepared by the Yearbook Committee, John S. Brubacher, Chairman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.

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II

First, obviously, there would be the *generically human* element. Whatever else this world forum is, it is a congregation of word-using (symbol-using) animals, assembled from many regions, and relying above all upon the attribute that most sharply distinguishes this species of animal: *Talk*. Just as the philosophies of education, all being systems of talk, gravitated toward a procedure best adapted to a mixture of freedom and authority in Talk (the "guided critical discussion" of the Socratic dialogue), so this body accepts, above all, principles of order imposed upon it by the genius of Talk.

But we cannot stop there. Talk is too universal a human motive. For our scheme of motives, for guiding our notion of what we call the "Seven Offices," we need something less highly generalized, yet without descending to such extreme localization of motives as we get when asking exactly why one particular person does one particular thing on one particular occasion.

To be sure, since man is the typical talking animal, a major concern of education should be the question: "What does it mean to be a talking animal? What are the advantages, *and the possible risks*, of this particular resourcefulness? To what extent does language free us, and to what extent enslave us, even divorce us from our 'home' in nature?" Education should devote major attention to this problem, unquestionably. Yet there are notable respects in which such a concern is too general, as regards the *administrative* attitude suggested in our title, the "Seven Offices." Talk is too "grand" a motive.

Still with the example of the United Nations in mind, and asking what more specifically might be the end of education, we might next ask ourselves: With what other specifically human faculty, what other distinguishing aptitude, is the speechifying faculty radically interwoven? And the answer is: The tool-using faculty (or, above all, the tool-making faculty—for there is a sense in which many animals can be said to use rudimentary tools, but you have moved into the realm of the exclusively human animal when you get to the more involute stage where things are used as tools for the making of tools for the using and making of tools, and so on). A Detroit factory would have a fantastic time indeed trying to get itself planned, built, and managed without the technical terminologies needed for assembling its equipment and materials, for indicating their proper use, and for keeping the necessary records (since the ac-

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countant and the file clerk are as indispensable to a factory as the machinist).

The very ungainliness of the technical words which technology has added to our vocabulary helps us to realize how closely the developments of technology are tied to such resources of conceptualization and naming as go with the ability to use and invent words. So, for our next step, combining thoughts of verbalization in the United Nations with thoughts of the tieup between man as toolmaker (*Homo faber*) and man as verbalizer (*Homo sapiens*), we come to this proposition: The ideal question for education *today* (as distinct from education "always") would be: "How adapt man to the needs of world-wide empire progressively made necessary by the conditions of technology?"

III

At this step an aside is in order. Note that, in going from "tool-using" or "toolmaking" to "technology," while heading in the direction of a concern with "offices," we have also gone from the "universal" or "generic" to the "global." (That is, we are somewhere in between a "grand" view of motives and the *particularized* view.) We use the term "world empire" with relation to technology because technology's vast and ever changing variety of requirements means in effect that areas hitherto widely separated in place and cultural affinity are *integrally* brought together. If a factory in New Jersey establishes some connection whereby it uses, for one of its processes, raw material produced in a remote area of Africa, then to that extent a portion of Africa and a portion of New Jersey are joined in "technological empire." Each area is in effect "annexed" to the other, within the conditions of this transaction.

"Empire," as so conceived, is *not* identical with "absolute rule." We do not imply that one central governmental authority is needed for such shifting kinds of "technological annexation." *On the contrary*. Our term, "technological empire," as so conceived, involves simply the notion that technology establishes, however waveringly, the conditions of world order. And the United Nations would seem to be the institution that comes nearest, as regards man's generic verbalizing trait, to a liberal solution of the problem—though one might grant that in world order there is always at least the *temptation* to round things out by a corresponding centrality of authority, a temptation that should itself be a subject for warnings on the part of educators concerned with teaching man how to dis-

count such urgent forms of hierarchal imagining and ambition as are especially stimulated by "imperial" situations.

We are now ready to begin.

IV

On considering the "global scene" from the standpoint of technology, our next problem was: How best categorize, or classify, the motivational field *from this point of view?* A notable element in technology itself gives us the cue: the element of *use*. Thus, in what may be a modified brand of post-utilitarianism, we shall approach our subject from the standpoint of use, however broadly we may interpret the term (a broadening indicated by our term "offices"). But there is another matter to be considered. Ideally, for our over-all motivational chart of "offices," we should adopt as many terms as are necessary, but no more than are sufficient.

Along the lines of early Roman concerns with the motives of world order (though the Roman notion of the *orbis terrarum* was more ideal than actual) we take it that the desired terminology of motives should have a strongly *neo-Stoic* cast. And thus, combining the Stoic idea of service with the technological idea of use, we shall guide our choice of over-all terminology by asking, "What do people do for one another?" Once this matter were decided, the next consideration would be: "What kinds of motives help or hinder such (ideally) 'fraternal' services?"

Of the seven "offices" that we thus tentatively propose (in line with the principle that we should have just enough terms and no more), the terms we would propose are not related to one another in a fixed or absolute order of relative worth. That is, they can be evaluated variously, depending upon the point of view from which they are approached. So we must be content with merely listing them, in somewhat arbitrary order, and then we shall comment on them briefly. The basic offices (their number still tentative) that people perform in their relations to one another are: govern, serve (provide for materially), defend, teach, entertain, cure, pontificate (treat in terms of a "beyond").

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As regards these seven over-all categories for an "official" terminology of motives or, rather, "duties": whereas they are intended to exhaust the field, they are not mutually exclusive. Any particular act may fall on the bias across their divisions, quite as the divisions themselves do not logically

exclude one another. Thus, when Cicero said that the first office of an orator is to teach an audience, the second to please it, and the third to move or "bend" it, his second office would obviously fall under our head of "Entertain," and his third would fall under "Govern." And, ironically, he notes that the orator should lay the *apparent* stress upon the *first* office (of teaching), whereas the oration is actually designed for the *third* office (of swaying). But let us consider the terms one by one, in the order we have arbitrarily assigned to them.

In this scheme, entries under "Govern" would first of all comprise rulers: emperors, kings, tyrants, dictators, presidents, and the like. Here would belong secondarily managers (managements), labor leaders, ward bosses, moderators, chairmen. The term would also be broad enough to include legislatures and judiciary, since they are functions of government. (Possibly the old Stoic identification between "reason" and "rule" led us to place the term "Govern" at the top of our list, since we hope that the proposed scheme of offices will seem reasonable.)

Insofar as we restrict the meaning of "Serve" to the idea of "providing for materially," then obviously the first entries under this head are agriculture, industry, transportation, and the correspondingly necessary clerical work (a vast item in technology, a still much vaster item in technology under capitalism, since with capitalism we should also include under this same head those bringers of glad tidings who are usually called advertising agents or sales promoters—or should they, perhaps, be classed under "Teach," insofar as they "educate" the public to yearn for things?)

In any case, when one is considering the relation in our society between the categories of "Govern" and "Serve" ("serve" in the sense of "providing for materially"), it is good to remember a distinction Thurman Arnold once proposed when he spoke not only of political government but of "business government."[2] He noted that, so far as sheer *functions* are concerned, a financial dynasty can govern (even while being outside our rules for the political electing of representatives, as the general public cannot vote on the directorship of a corporation, though that corporation can in effect levy *taxes* upon the community, under the guise of the *prices* charged for goods and services). In this sense, business and finance covertly *govern* while they overtly *serve* (a power of the treasury that they further exercise, of course, in their ability to grant or withhold funds for advertising). Labor unions can also exercise a measure of government, insofar as they can affect business policies and methods of production.

2. *The Folklore of Capitalism* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1937).

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Under "Defend" would fall primarily the military and police and secondarily the system of "intelligence" that helps carry out defensive tasks as they are conceived to be (a conception usually narrowed by the distinctive nature of the occupation itself). Insofar as a nation's policies are guided by considerations of "security," the office of *defense* permeates the principle of *governance* ("setting the tone" for them or even actually "taking over"). The susceptibility to such overlapping is indicated in the sheer etymological kinship among the words "police," "policy," "polity," and "politics." Traffic regulation, essentially a function of *service*, is usually performed by police because of need for authority in enforcement (hence, again, the road back to the office of governing).

Under "Teach," besides the obvious main function of formal education, would fall, in general, the institutionalized purveying of information (as with journalism). We have already discussed the ambiguities of advertising in this regard. Speculations in "pure theory" would seem best classifiable under this head; and here would fall those rare but necessary moments in which some few members of a society pause to examine critically the very assumptions or presuppositions on which that society is based (as speculative methods are offered, in the interests of discovery, for systematically questioning principles that are otherwise taken for granted). Teaching has an implied function of government insofar as it inculcates values and attitudes that lead to corresponding modes of conduct. Recall that Plato would have rounded out the symmetry by having the philosopher a king.

In primitive societies there is one sense in which the office of "Entertainment" is very limited, being confined to such functionaries as the tribal bard (and, later, the court fool). But, in another sense, entertainment is implicit in all group rituals (such as ceremonial dances), though they may be rationalized in terms of utility, along lines indicated in the theory of "homoeopathic magic." In our society, where entertainment (including professional sports) has become a major industry, there is the maximum split between activity of the performer and passivity of the observer, as the observer, with many cheap and even free entertainments to choose among, can develop an "amuse me, or off with your head" attitude once possible only to a fabulous jaded oriental monarch.

News, in its role as the purveying of information, would fall under the head of "Teach." But in its role as "drama" it is a form of entertainment, with stories of persons who actually undergo the sufferings and hardships we should otherwise not dare to be entertained by except in fictions. The

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news gives us a kind of Roman circus in which we behold not merely imaginary victims but real ones. The attitude is made still more apparent in the case of documentary films and news photos assembled and distributed by organizations that regularly comb the entire globe to keep the reader entertained by a daily authentic recital of other people's miseries. (Or should we, along the lines of some remarks in Aristotle on tragedy, say simply that such items have the appeal of the "marvelous"?) News is an adjunct of government insofar as, by selectivity, timing, and emphasis (by placing and headlines), it forms people's view of "reality" and thus influences their judgment as to what would be the proper or reasonable policy in a given situation. Insofar as news thus misrepresents, it is an adjunct of misgovernment.

Entertainment shares with teaching the possible indirect kind of governance that comes with the shaping and intensifying of such attitudes as have their corresponding role in practical conduct. In this sense we might subscribe to Shelley's final sentence in his *Defense of Poetry:* "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world." The symmetry is impaired somewhat by the fact that people often make quite a dissociation between the aesthetic self and the practical self, admiring in fiction many kinds of action and character that are quite alien to them as citizens. On the other hand, even governments are eager to identify themselves with entertainment, as is indicated by the tradition whereby the President tosses out the first ball at the opening of the baseball season in Washington. Often our political contests make more sense when judged as entertainment than as the citizen's rational choice between governmental policies. And the nature of our advertising mediums strongly associates business with entertainment. However, ideas of entertainment vary with different social climates; and presumably in early New England there was a time when the public got its strongest entertainment from a morbid engrossment with trials for witchcraft, quite as with public executions, either witnessed or read about.

Material medicine and hygiene are primary entries under "Cure," with mental therapy and prophylaxis taking on an ever increasing importance. Under "Cure" would also be included the *care* of those suffering infirmity (in sickness, infancy, or age). The overlap between cure and entertainment was explicitly considered as early as Aristotle's *Poetics*, with its reference to the kind of emotional cleansing (purgation, "catharsis") that could result from the sympathetic witnessing of a tragedy. And one can see how "Cure" overlaps upon our last office, "Pontificate," when one recalls how

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the doctor cultivates his "bedside manner," or the psychologist his air of expert attentiveness, as aids to the curative effect deriving, or thought to derive, from his role as a person of higher authority. (Such behavior impinges upon the dramatizing methods of priestcraft.) As evidence of the way in which "Cure" can impinge upon "Govern," think how successfully the officials in control of the American Medical Association have used their positions to block certain social policies in the name of certain business policies.

Though our terms for the first six offices suggested themselves spontaneously, we had trouble deciding upon the term "Pontificate" for the "last" function. But at least one can see why, whatever the arbitrariness of the order among the others, we should keep this one for the end. At first we thought of calling it the office of "consoling." There is a point beyond which no one can "cure" us—and for such inevitable sorrows of separation, of suffering, and of death the only office left is that of solace, insofar as solace is possible. There is a "qualitative break," the passing of a "critical point," when the doctor lays down his duty and the "man of God" (with funeral artist as subofficiator) takes over. Hence, the distinction between "Cure" and "Console."

But when considering the highly verbal nature of the theological doctrines by which all religious creeds and priestly functions are guided, we felt impelled to think of this last office as essentially *terministic*. Whether or not you believe in a "beyond," this office treats man *in terms of* a "beyond." And such treatment is "pontification" in the sense that it "builds a bridge" between two terministically differentiated realms by viewing the "temporal" *in terms of* the "eternal" (or the "natural" *in terms of* the "supernatural").

"Console" has the momentary advantage of placing stress upon the "peace of mind" that is now so popularly associated with religious faith (in case, with understandable humanitarian weakness, one is not capable of vividly imagining the lot of whatever poor devils may be condemned to the tortures of hell). But "Pontificate" has the advantage of leading more directly into other major duties that are clearly connected with a priesthood, most notably the function of *solemnizing* or *formalizing* (as with officiation at a wedding or at the coronation of a monarch). Here, obviously, a contribution of the priestly role is in the modes of *dignification* in terms of which the occasion is *interpreted* and thereby "sanctioned." And this dignification essentially involves the interpretation of a temporal

or natural event in terms of an ultimate eternal or supernatural ground (a "beyond"). So, all told, "bridge-building" seems the best term for this office.

When we recall that the Roman emperor, by reason of his double role as both pagan deity and head of the secular order, was given the title of *pontifex maximus*, we likewise glimpse the route whereby the priestly office can lead to theocracy. And it is obvious how both the promissory and the admonitory aspects of the priestly office can mesh with the machinery of secular government, insofar as the priestly doctrines may induce a believer to police himself. The old Greek word from which we get our term "therapy" indicates a susceptibility to the overlap of offices, as it applies to employment as a servant or attendant (free employment, as distinct from that of a slave), to divine worship, to fostering or nurturing, and to medical treatment or nursing. Jane Harrison, in her *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*,[3] brings out the word's priestly connotations when she proposes such a range of meanings as "service," "the induction, the fostering of good influence," "tendance, ministration, fostering care, worship, all in one." The word also could be applied to (inferior) military service, to paying court (hence flattering), and to *providing for* in general (a usage that would bring it within the orbit of our second office).

Insofar as priestcraft is the spreader of doctrine, it overlaps upon the category of teaching, though such teaching involves the addition of a terministic dimension that, while it is all-important to this office, may be slighted or even ignored in the purely secular office of teaching. Secondarily, metaphysics would likewise "pontificate," though usually in a somewhat hesitant, or even shamefaced manner, as it seeks to think of man not just empirically but in terms of hypothetical "ultimates" that seem to the metaphysician implied in the nature of human reason. Farther afield, there are vestiges of pontification in mediatory roles generally, whether performed by a priesthood or by secular agents. The technical kinship between religious and temporal mediation is indicated in the traditionally close connection between secular law and supernatural "sanctions."

So much, then, for a general review of our terms for the offices which we perform in the course of our dealings with one another. If these seven terms are well chosen, all human "offices" can be made to fit under these heads, without unreasonable strain. Such would be a neo-Stoically "official" approach to the problem of human motivation.

3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922.

But, when we get this far, there are some related matters crowding in for consideration—so we turn to those.[4]

VI

Note that whereas these seven offices, or "duties," have a motivational slant, they are names for *acts* rather than for the *motives* that lead to acts. One man might govern simply because he felt that he "ought" to; another might govern through a near-mad desire to impose his will upon his subjects; a third would compensate for a secret sense of personal insecurity— and so on. A similar range of possibilities confronts us when we ask about the motives figuring in any of the other offices.

In brief, to each of the offices people bring such traits of personality as may make one person rather than another the best fitted for a given

4. Aristotle's *Politics* is built primarily around his list of political systems. But at two point he offers lists of what he considers the "necessary parts" of a state. The earlier list (iv. iii. 1290^b 21–1291^b 14) contains eight "parts": (1) farmers, (2) craftsmen, (3) traders, (4) manual laborers, (5) warriors, (6) councilors and judges for litigation, (7) the rich, and (8) public servants.

His first four classes would fall primarily under our second category: "Serve (provide for materially)," as would his seventh. His fifth would be our third ("Defend"). His sixth would probably fit best under our heading of "Govern," and similarly with his eighth (in their administrative role they are perhaps the beginnings of what we would now call a "civil service" or "government bureaucracy"). Aristotle also notes that these various offices may be performed by the same person. Indeed, in what looks to me like a solemn academic wisecrack, he notes that all men incline to think themselves capable of carrying on most offices, except that they cannot be both rich and poor (hence the stress he lays upon wealth as the main mark of class distinction).

Our last four categories ("Teach," "Entertain," "Cure," "Pontificate") are omitted. However, in his later and shorter list of occupations, "parts" or *erga* (vii. vii. 1328^b 4–1328^b 24), he adds the priestly function. According to this list, the state's indispensable needs are: (1) food; (2) handicrafts; (3) arms; (4) money; (5) (or, as he puts it, "fifth and first") religious service; (6) ("most necessary of all") machinery for dealing with questions of citizens' rights and interests. Here, by condensing, he has covered more ground under fewer heads. But "Teach," "Entertain," and "Cure" are still omitted.

Perhaps such modern institutions as publicly supported hospitals and "socialized" or semi-socialized medicine now sharpen our notion of "Cure" as a "civic" function. Also, of course, whereas Aristotle was thinking of the "necessary" offices of a *city* specifically, our list is more broadly conceived (in terms of what people do for one another *socially*). And perhaps our long familiarity with compulsory education (including "propaganda" and "indoctrination") sharpens our awareness of "Teach" as a basic "office." But it is surprising that he has omitted "Entertainment" as a function of his city, in view of what he has written on the "catharsis" supplied by music and poetry and in view of the fact that the Athenian stage was a civic institution.

However, the occupations that are omitted from these two lists are duly considered in the *Politics* as a whole, as they were also in Plato's *Republic* (about Book ii of which Aristotle's discussion in connection with his first list gives a somewhat misleading idea). There Socrates gradually builds up a state by beginning with a minimum of indispensable social functions for dealing with man's sheerly bodily needs. Drawing an analogy between the person and the state, Aristotle holds that Plato's view of primary functions stresses the *soma* at the expense of the *psyche*. Hence, according to Aristotle, even more important than considerations of material utility would be such spiritual parts as the judicial, the deliberative, and the military.

ministry in some particular situation. Also, the seven offices require reciprocals: a certain kind of sovereign would be best suited to a certain kind of subjects; a certain kind of entertainer needs a certain kind of audience; the psychologist who cures Mr. A may not himself have the kind of incipient morbidity that best equips him to cure Mr. B, and so on.

Behind our neo-Stoic view of human offices there lies the muddled area of personal motives that usually have their start in *familial* situations. And while such situations reflect the over-all *public* situations of which they are a part, they are experienced by the child primarily in *personal* terms. Thus, at first, all these seven offices are felt to be performed exclusively and variously by persons within the immediate family or close to it (like the family doctor). Gradually, persons *from outside* (from "beyond"?) are differentiated as to office (the workman who comes to repair some mechanism and makes mysterious motions; the policeman whose functions as "defender" is usually thought of, rather, as that of *punisher;* the circus clown, whose simplified face is a kind of face-in-general, as, indeed, is the face of Great Man barely glimpsed while his limousine whisks past in silence after the motorcycle escort had bubblingly prepared the way; the robes of the man of the cloth; and so on). Here we are back among the whole jungle of human motives that is lying about us however we may reduce our terms for the basic kinds of office.

In this regard, think again of Cicero's tract *On Duties (De officiis)*, which he wrote when deprived of office by the death of the Republic. In his discussion of stately offices, Cicero was mainly concerned with the *virtues* that best fitted a man for the responsibilities of citizenship. Thus, he devoted the major portion of his book to discussing the "four sources of upright living" from which "all duties flow." These are: prudence, justice, high-mindedness, and self-control (while he secondarily considers the motives that lead to the perversion of these virtues). Few would deny that, if such traits of character were in the saddle, all would always be well with the state—particularly since Cicero takes great pains to "prove" (to his own satisfaction, at least) that true expediency is also to be equated with these four virtues, whereas we might otherwise think of expediency as running counter to them.

The buildup is of a sort that attains its culmination in such "strength" as a sculptor would seek to convey by an equestrian statue in a public park. For they are the kinds of traits that, rightly or wrongly, the general public associates with the historical figures whom it clamors to acclaim as its leaders.

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Typical modern theories of motivation, along the lines of Pope's formula, "As the twig is bent, so is the tree inclined," would favor a quite different direction when speculating on the derivation of man's fitness for office. They would look for the future architect in the child playing with his blocks; or for the future policeman in the young delinquent who was given the task of keeping other delinquents in line; or for the world ruler in a morbid child, physically weak, deformed, undersized, or otherwise clearly with a bad mark; and so on.

Yes, in the alembics of history, alchemic transformations of that sort will most likely figure, too. Christianity will have done much for theories of motivation if it but leaves us with the suggestion that, when looking for the handsome prince, we should first of all look for the ugly duckling. Or is this a lesson learned from paganism too? In any case, we note its design in the principle of the Beatitudes.

Cicero would incline to skip the paradoxical possibilities—yet they were all about him, beginning with that very book of his on civic virtues. For it was written to his no-good son, who doubtless knew, as perhaps only his wife knew better, that there was something radically questionable about the old man's oratorical tributes to the equestrian virtues, however true it might also be that the state could prosper only if the virtues he extolled were somehow in the saddle. In any case, about a year after writing his tract *On Duties* the great Cicero was slain, and by assassins apparently hired by the avenging figure (Mark Antony) to whom our sweet Shakespeare subsequently assigns a noble stately role in the tragedy of *Julius Caesar*.

VII

How round things out? Quite as an "official" theory of motives subsumes a purely "personal" realm (generally associated with the "familial" experiences that have their roots in the purely *natural* "services" involved in the generation of offspring and that most impress themselves upon the human animal in the period of emergence from infancy into the early years of childhood), so this "personal" realm in turn shades off into a realm of "prehistory" that requires its own kind of "pontification," if we are to build speculative bridges between the human person and the purely "cellular" organism out of which, according to Darwinian thinking, it has evolved.

Here all is a jungle, literally. And the best we can do would be to propose a fanciful, quasi-scientific myth, designed simply to "give the idea"

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of what might be said to lie behind the animality of man the political, word-using, toolmaking animal. How might the offices of the human community be erected atop the purely "natural" community of the human organism, considered as an animal that somehow retains within itself the motivational traces of its development from "simpler" and "lower" biologic forms?

First, we might imagine an original faint distinction between pleasurable and painful impressions, beginning perhaps in the distinction between a metabolic process that proceeded without interference and one that was in some way impeded or disturbed. Possibly, at this stage, the condition of "awareness" would be greater when the process was disturbed than when it proceeded without interference. That is, "pain" might be "prior" to "pleasure," or stronger, in the sense that the organism would be more aware when something *v*as wrong than when everything was right.

For instance, after a meal, one is more aware of his digestive processes if he gets indigestion than if everything proceeds smoothly; in fact, the "natural" response to a state of digestive euphoria would be for the happily digesting organism to fall asleep. However, one might argue that such "sleep" applies only to the "higher" centers of consciousness and that each of the cells involved in the digestive process may be profoundly gratified and humbly glowing with its own kind of pleasure, the perfection of the digestive process itself being sufficient evidence that the cells are as vigorously "awake" as the vibrant insect life of a swamp.

In any case, whether one thinks of pain or pleasure as primary here, or thinks of them as, from the very start, equally implicating each other, our notion is: The general "feeling tone" that adds up to either pleasure or pain would begin with this preponderantly internal functioning, though its internality would be of a sort that enabled it to have a close reciprocal relation with its placenta-like environment (a relation that our body probably comes nearest to enjoying when rested, sufficiently fed, sexually appeased, free of danger, without ailments, and near water, on a balmy day in spring).[5]

Such rudimentary *pleasure* would also presumably be indistinguishable from the kind of satisfaction that was later to get the name of "love" for an object deemed "good."

Perhaps the essential difference between "pleasure" and "love" is suggested by Stendhal's definition of love as a "promise of happiness." That is, pleasure is a state that *just is*, whereas love involves the element of *desire*,

5. To round out the pattern, we might add: "and just having received news of a legacy."

a sense of union with something with which one is identified but from which one is divided. Insofar as the organism could be estranged from its pleasurable circumstances, its metabolistic process would give rise to a *need*, a need for some element now experienced as more or less *external* to it (as with a desire for more food or shade or warmth than were at that moment actually available).

By the time biological differentiation had developed to the point where there were vertebrate animals preying upon one another and competing with one another sexually, the promissory factor would make readily for complicated situations whereby the immediately painful can have its own kind of pleasure, if the present pain is a sign of future pleasure. Or, insofar as rage equips for combat, competitive "love" contains the rudiments of "hate." Or, again, as with parental care of offspring, the kind of natural "office" that we would associate with "love" points toward the "hate" category as regards the parent's tendencies to protect its offspring by ferocity.

If love leads via fight to anger or hate, pain leads more simply to fear. Aristotle makes much of the point that anger and fear are mutually exclusive, but fear can become pleasurable because pain can. (Thus Huysmans in *A Rebours* depicts one perverse route whereby fear, in becoming pleasurable, serves his hero as an aphrodisiac. Nor should we forget the kind of fear associated with the "tragic pleasure.") Further, while the perfect behavioristic counterpart of anger is attack and the perfect behavioristic counterpart of fear is flight, in some species there is also an intermediate state, a kind of sheer immobilization, that happens to serve as a protection insofar as immobility is a way of escaping detection. It has been suggested that this condition is the biologic origin of catatonia, which can also be induced by self-defeating situations, as when conditions are so arranged that a movement which would "naturally" make for the obtaining of food serves rather to push the food beyond reach.

But the talk of "catatonia" might serve well as the step from speechless organisms to the language-using species. For language is itself a kind of midway stage, the sheerly verbal blow and the sheerly verbal flight falling short of these acts physically. With our words for things, in the poet's images or the philosopher's ideas, we somehow half-possess the entities they name. Words are a mediatory realm that joins us with wordless nature while at the same time standing between us and wordless nature.

Once words are added (with the word-using faculty that a more honorific terminology would call "reason"), the purely biological nature

of pleasure, pain, love, hate, and fear is quite transcended, since all are perceived through the coloration that the inveterate human involvement with words imparts to them. And the same is true of all sheerly bodily sensations, which are likewise affected by the new order of motivation made possible (and inevitable!) once this extra odd dimension is added to man's natural animality. From that point on, no matter what man's motives might be in their nature as sheerly animal, they take on a wholly new aspect, as defined by the resources and embarrassments of symbolism.

You could state the matter bluntly thus: Pleasure and pain can no longer be exactly what they would be to us sheerly as animals, and similarly with love and hate (or fear), once we approach problems of "acceptance" and "rejection" through the genius of that specifically linguistic pair, "Yes" and "No" (to which we should add the strategic midway stage of "Maybe"). With the negative, "conscience" is born (as attested in the biblical formula, "Thou shalt not . . . ," conscience being the power to say no to the self, deep within the self; or equally deeply it may say no to the thou-shalt-not's of others).

And the same would be true of our sensations generally (with their range from mere neutral "recording" to the extremes of pleasure and pain) and of imagery generally (with its range from mere neutral attention to the extremes of love, hate, and fear): all this variety of bodily and mental awareness would be colored by the "conscience" (the genius of that exclusively linguistic marvel, the negative).

And the "positives" of "conscience," as translated into terms of social behavior, are the Seven Offices, involving the many ways in which these offices can become perverted.

The ultimate perversion (or, more accurately, the point at which we find it hardest to make sure just where the good office ends and its perversion takes over) comes from the fact that the various offices are made possible only by the regularities of *order;* and, the more closely you scrutinize the conditions required by order, the surer you are to discover that order is impossible without *hierarchy* (a ladder of authority that extends from "lower" to "higher," while its *official functions* tend toward a corresponding set of *social ratings*).

Call this design "Hierarchy" when you are feeling friendly toward it. When you are feeling unfriendly, call it the "Hierarchal Psychosis"—or, more simply, "The Scramble"; or still more simply, "The Rat Race," which is what the conditions of empire add up to in their drearier manifestations.

In sum, then, problem-wise (as seen from the standpoint of the Seven Offices):

1. The over-all aim of secular education would be to discover just what it means to be a symbol-using animal. (Such would be the "grand" aim of education.)

2. The basic educational problem at this stage of history would be: How best adapt the symbol-using animal to the conditions of world empire that are being forced upon us by the irresistible "progress" of technology? (Such would be the "global" aim of education.)

3. Finally, beginning with either of these propositions: to locate the typical source of individual anxiety, in not more than three moves we should get to neo-Stoic contemplation of the "Hierarchal Psychosis" (or "Rat Race"), that is a reflex of the need for a pyramidal or ladder-like order in human "offices."