

UNILATERAL INITIATIVES: A STRATEGY IN SEARCH OF A THEORY

"We must remember that we have reached our present tense international situation through a long series of unilateral steps in the building up of armaments: the arms race itself is the result of unilateral initiatives by each side, Russia responding to increase in missiles by the United States and the latter deciding to increase its armaments whenever it learns (or suspects) that the Soviet Union has been doing so. The present competition in arms was not the product of international agreement but rather the fruit of a series of unilateral acts which stepped up tension and made a negotiating atmosphere more and more unlikely. The crucial question is not whether to act unilaterally but whether unilateral initiatives for peace can be as effective as unilateral armaments initiatives have been for war." (Mulford Sibley).

I

Unilateralism is a big word. Like Molière's comment on prose, it is something we have been using all of our lives without knowing its exact nature. Perhaps this is because unilateralism is a notion which we have measured in terms of degree rather than

kind. The rub seems to be in the word "degree." Thus, to understand the significance of "unilateral initiatives," and perhaps to appreciate the complexities in working out an intelligent strategy for winning international peace, it might be worthwhile to explain the varied aspects that attach to a concept of unilateralism.

In the first instance, there is *unilateral disarmament*, which refers to the total and rapid dismantling of a military establishment—or at least of a thermonuclear arsenal and delivery system—by "one side" independent of the actions undertaken by an imagined or real opponent. Indeed, there is a clear expectation that the "other side" will act likewise. If the deterrence theorists assume a parity of pure egotism in human transactions, it can be said that the believers in unilateral disarmament believe in the parity of reason. This is not to deny that advocates of unilateral disarmament fully appreciate the military risks entailed in such procedures as they advocate. What they quickly add is that such risks are fewer in number and smaller in magnitude than the dangers posed by the continuation of an arms build-up. There is a further belief, more often implied than clearly stated, that bilateral or even multilateral disarmament is impossible because of long standing mutual antagonisms and fear. The result is that the only hope of eliminating or at least first reducing these antagonisms and fears is for one of the parties to the Cold War to adopt a posture of unilateral initiative by performing an act of unilateral disarmament.

Unilateral initiatives are not simply phases or stages in a disarmament system. As a matter of fact, a unilateral initiative is considerably less encompassing than unilateral disarmament. Involved is a series of steps taken by one side aimed at a reduction in the potency of its own military machinery; even if such a dismantling be disadvantageous to itself. The strategy of unilateral initiatives appears to have five components: first, that plans for such initiatives be clearly presented to the enemy, reducing his fear of hostile military environment. Second, that military expenditures suffer no increase out of an assumption that the enemy has immediate designs on our own nation. Third, that no unilateral initiative be so extensive as to make impossible "rules of reciprocity." In other words, a unilateral initiative only invites the uses of reason and only urges a "do likewise" attitude. It

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does not insist that such will be the case. Fourth, that such unilateral initiatives as are undertaken ought to be announced in advance, and widely published and publicized, in the homeland of the anticipated enemy if at all possible. Fifth, a unilateral initiative is to be considered *bona fide* if, and only if, it is not followed or precipitated by a *demand* for reciprocal action on the part of the other nation.

Both the theory of unilateral disarmament and the strategy of unilateral initiatives imply planning for the prevention of, rather than the regulation of, conflict—which is why they tend to be so easily taken for blood brothers rather than distant cousins. They are both designs for making war less likely by providing machinery for settling disputes between nations by side-stepping rather than trampling over the thorny problem of national interests. A “complete” unilateralist program therefore may be viewed as a comprehensive and coordinated plan involving the progressive reduction of armed forces, the holding of defensive armaments to fixed levels, and the phased elimination of instruments of mass annihilation.

There is, however, a third concept of unilateralism, which is of a sharply different order, namely, a *unilateral arms limitation system*. This represents an effort on the part of one nation to unilaterally develop a comprehensive arms control system which may or may not provide for or stipulate the military performance of other nations. Such an arms limitation system involves a series of propositions concerning the *regulation* rather than the *prevention* of conflict.

First, there is a consensus within a nation as to the objectives of any military system, an agreement on the control and limitation of manpower and weapons composition. Second, there is an agreement implicitly, if not explicitly, to disclose a maximum amount of information pertaining to armaments: stockpiling of weapons and arms production, weapons research, and the size of the national military budget. This is to be done in a unilateral way. For example, the military budget of the United States and many aspects of its weapons research and development programs are already quite open and very readily cleared if it is “limited access data.” Third, there is a planned phase approach, which involves the publicizing of a time schedule for the reduction to

a fixed level of a nation's armed forces, and the development of efforts at international inspection insofar as another of the contracting parties to the Cold War desire such inspection. There might be an agreement within a nation not to do any atomic testing, whether or not it has become a signatory to the Test-Ban Agreement of 1963, or whether or not such agreements even exist. Fourth, a unilateral arms limitation system oftentimes includes public and publicized statements concerning the course which a nation will follow in the event that advantage is taken of its arms limitation. This makes clear that the unilateralist posture obtains only insofar as other contracting parties to the Cold War take seriously a unilateral arms limitation system and do not act to take advantage of this reduction in the military set-up of a nation.

Unilateral disarmament, unilateral initiative, and unilateral arms limitation systems all share the idea that the world is asymmetrical and that a condition of disequilibrium obtains. Therefore, unilateral initiatives are considered necessary because of the asymmetrical character of the world, conversely, and because of the dangers of assuming perfect symmetry. The unilateralist posture, whatever its specific variety, represents a critique of the concept of deterrence, deterrence being understood as a maintenance or an acceleration of a military establishment for the purpose of preventing war through the extension of the military might of a nation.

The professionalization of peace research has led to a bewildering array of terms. Before we find ourselves engaged in scholastic debates over axiology, we should try to distinguish the implications and the explications of each strategy. The concept of unilateralism has as its most proximate protagonist advocates of multi-lateralism. Both are strategies rather than theories because the underlying assumptions about the nature of the world are the same in each. The theoretical and ideological components of unilateralism, like those of multilateralism, are defined by a positive attitude to disarmament and a negative attitude toward deterrence. For the general theory of deterrence, the assumption is that peace is a consequence of power and of armed strength. For the general theory of disarmament, the chief sociological assumption is that some sort of consensus can be attained,

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whether formalized in international law or simply as an informal state of propositions about the condition of the world. Thus, the argument between disarmament and deterrence necessitates a choice between theories. The same cannot be said concerning the debates between unilateralism and multilateralism—since these are strategies which have a shared acceptance of general disarmament theories and proposals. Doubtless, there may be a spilling over from strategy to theory. But these elemental distinctions ought to be kept in mind, lest the peace movement and its professional byproducts be melted in the heat of its own terminological zeal.

II

Before explaining unilateral initiatives I should like to register my deep uneasiness that unilateralism has undergone a transvaluation. It has become a slogan, a rallying point, in this way taking on the appearance of the goal sought rather than an instrument of gaining meaningful disarmament. Not a small factor in the sharp decline of the unilateral disarmament movement in Britain and elsewhere is that somewhere along the organizational line, strategies hardened while the goals steadily softened and became unclear. It became more important to be defined as a “unilateralist” than as a “pacifist”—or rather, they were simply fused. This, at any rate, is one way of examining the decline of unilateralism within both the United States and England. The tragic aspect of this development is that unilateral approaches have never been in a more favorable position with respect to the ongoing international redivision of power than at present.

The laments and the limits of our subject matter stated, let us examine the operational worth of the “phasing in” of unilateral initiatives. First, it is a mini-max strategy which stands midway between complete and total disarmament on one side and an arms limitation system on the other. In discussing the worth and meaning of unilateral initiatives we are dealing with the work of a relatively few courageous and pioneering scholars.¹

¹ There is an obvious overlap in the literature between unilateralism in general,

However lamentable the paucity of numbers may be, this does make the strategy of unilateral initiatives an accessible topic for analysis.

At its most general level, unilateral initiatives is an attempt to bridge the practical and the moral. A *Liveday* response to Herman Kahn's *Doomsday*. It is an answer to a doctrine which postulates what happens after World War Three; an attempt to say that this is not so much thinking about the unthinkable as it is thinking about the absurd. It is a meaningless question in that what happens after World War Three already presupposes the demise of serious social scientific thinking on the problem of prevention and stabilization of the international economy and the international military. As a Utopian longing, at least, it is quite difficult, if not fruitless, to argue with the unilateral initiative position. As a matter of fact, unilateralism is a noble position, one based on the ideas and the ideals that the conscience of free men can never be bought or bartered—even if a nation is invaded and is subject to direct military peril.

The unilateral initiative position is more cogent and more relevant than is oftentimes supposed by its enemies. One thing is perfectly clear: that if we take seriously a notion of thinking about the unthinkable, and we view that kind of sentiment as being a warrant for thinking about unthinkable horrors, then we are already guilty of an ethical default. We will have already

and unilateral initiatives as such. The men and books herein taken account of are restricted to those who have had significant things to say only in the latter, irrespective of the extent of the wider literature on unilateral disarmament.

Erich Fromm, *May Man Prevail? An Inquiry into the Facts and Fictions of Foreign Policy*. Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1961; see also his essay on "The Case of Unilateral Disarmament," *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security*, edited by D. G. Brennan. New York, Braziller, 1961, pp. 187-197.

Charles Osgood, "Assumptions About National Security," *Social Problems*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer, 1963), pp. 6-12.

Bertrand Russell, *Has Man a Future?* Baltimore, Penguin Books Ltd., 1961; also his *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1961.

Mulford Q. Sibley, *Unilateral Initiatives and Disarmament*. Philadelphia, American Friends Service Committee, 1962; see also his "Unilateral Disarmament," *America Armed: Essays on United States Military Policy*, edited by Robert A. Goldwin. Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., pp. 112-140.

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gone far to forfeit the possibility of a world at peace. It is precisely this which unilateral initiative advocates have brought attention to. If one seriously wants to "think about the unthinkable," the best starting place, if not indeed the exclusive and only serious starting place, is a doctrine of unilateral disarmament whereby the nuclear nations of the West would take the initiative in searching for a reduction, if not the total elimination of the World War Three threat.

The utilization of unilateral initiatives has already registered notable successes. The "Hot-Line Agreement" of 1962 (urged first by the United States); the "Test-Ban Agreement" of 1963 (urged first by the Soviet Union); and the peaceful allocation of scarce materials agreement of 1964; each, in some measure, came about as a result of unilateral pressure, if not direct initiative. The possibilities for the future realization of this position are more impressive now, that is, with the serious consideration of reduction for spending in military hardware, reduction in the actual size of the armed forces, and in the not too distant future, self-imposed limits on the kinds of weapons produced. Along a different axis, but with equal legitimacy, it might be claimed that the various Afro-Asian, and Latin American proposals for "nuclear free zoning" is a utilization of unilateralism on the part of the military "have-nots" - a decision to remain a have-not in this sense at least. Although it is now apparent that the conventional arms build-up in the middle east and elsewhere casts grave doubts on the future of such nuclear free testing zones.

The strategy of unilateral initiatives has another potent element that should not be overlooked. It is psychologically consistent with pacifism as such, with a peace theory based on non-violence as such. For all of its naive qualities, it poses a real option for the politically thoughtful person. The options to unilateral initiatives may indeed turn out to be more 'realistic' (as in fact I think is the case). But this realism exposes an immense fault in our character—in our inability to move politics one shred beyond the condition Machiavelli described, a condition where political dominion is based on regicide, genocide, intrigue and plain deceit. In this sense, the reaction to Kahn is not unlike the reaction to Machiavelli. He was denounced for expressing the

realities of the nuclear "dialogue," not for the errors of fact committed. Thus, the notion of unilateral initiatives, however many practical setbacks it may suffer politically, cannot really be overwhelmed any more than the idea of Christianity could be swallowed up by the lions sent into the Coliseum to eat Christians.

Nonetheless, our discussion should be incomplete without coming to terms with serious debilities in the strategy of unilateral initiatives.

III

When the question of unilateral initiatives is confronted as an on-going political policy, what becomes clear is its fundamental assumption in a rise, not only of peaceful coexistence between the major world powers, between the United States and the Soviet Union, but an economic-social *convergence* between the United States and the Soviet Union. This assumption is uniformly expressed by advocates of unilateral initiatives. Indeed, such a convergence underwrites the political feasibility or empirical credibility of unilateralism. It is predicated on the willingness or the capability of the Soviet Union to follow suit once long-range initiatives were undertaken on the part of the United States.

Several things should be said about this view of peaceful coexistence as convergence between social systems. First, the notion of peaceful coexistence as convergence of economies takes into account only a convergence of commodity demands, and the form of production employed to satisfy such demands. While it is true that the First World of United States development and the Second World of Soviet development have many principles and precepts in common, it is not true that they got there by the same roads—either in terms of economic systems or in terms of geo-political confrontations. The possibility that peaceful coexistence would lead to an intensification of the struggle between East and West is just as likely as a weakening of ideological resolve. And as long as peaceful coexistence does not foreclose on a broad military confrontation, the assumptions of harmony between the United States and the Soviet Union would have to

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be declared greatly exaggerated. It is even questionable whether an outcome of political convergence is desirable with respect to the bargaining position of the developing areas. In any event, there is a substantial difference between a schism between the Soviet Union and China or between France and the United States, and an actual convergence of policies and fundamental economic principles.

From another part of the forest it might be said that even if it were the case that an actual *convergence* between the United States and the Soviet Union were a demonstrable fact, within the framework of the United States, American rhetoric and the American way, the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union at the ideological level has become so standardized, so operationalized, so functional with respect to the motivation of the United States citizenry, and so viable with respect to the American political system as such that it would be highly unlikely that the United States could act on the doctrine of political convergence. The same is probably no less the case for the Soviet Union and its citizenry. This presents a serious problem because unilateralism as a political posture rests upon a certain kind of political realism. The fact that it is more "realistic" in terms of empirical tendencies than the advocates and devotees of arms control systems and Fortress Americana does not itself explain why the policy of unilateralism has been so weak and why it has gained so few adherents in the United States and Britain. The unilateralists have perhaps not taken enough cognizance of non-economic factors in the explanation of the Cold War—the fundamental irrationality of national interests. Thus, even if economic convergence between the two big powers were taking place, or is taking place, the sociological and ideological facets of the Cold War continue to operate in full force, thus restricting the political manoeuvrability of the contending parties. And these limits weaken the case of unilateral initiatives, by exposing the Cold War as a matter of national interests, and not of wills.

A major assumption the strategy of unilateral initiatives makes is that a vast psychological overhaul is needed. It assumes, without having genuine evidence at its disposal, that it is possible to have a world at peace without an overhaul in the

technological, military, and economic thinking that went into the creation of a world at war. Unilateral initiative comes upon the hard fact of irrational behaviour of officials under stress, especially irrational behaviour when the "payoff" for rational behaviour remains so low. The assumption that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself and that we can take all kinds of unilateral initiatives with impunity simply flies in the face of psychology. Irrationalities of politics, phased in the Cold War for a long time, have hardened into general national positions and cannot merely be dispelled by the "light." Thus, there exists a mass psychological variant which is not accounted for in the policy of unilateral initiatives. There is little to prove that a policy of extreme rationality can be imposed upon a sociological context of extreme irrationality. All that has to be said is: what is the rational chance of the Vietnamese Civil War being brought to a peaceful conclusion by the use or extension of American men and weapons; and the next question: what are the chances for a non-military approach in the present period?

There is even a question as to whether in fact unilateral initiatives do not generate even more fear than the present climate admits of; whether they would not inculcate a great fear among wide clusters of people such as factory workers engaged in military production whose jobs and livelihood depend on the continuation of the Cold War. The assumption made by Sibley, for instance, is that if the great fear of the policy of unilateral initiatives dissolves, and when the political élites decide to adopt such a policy of unilateral initiatives, the working class and the entire labor movement would somehow come to the support of the position of disarmament. But this of course makes the assumption that status deprivation would affect only the military, that the industrial working class engaged in World War Three artifacts, who have thus far been one of the most bellicose sectors in the United States, and one of the great beneficiaries of the arms race, would mysteriously see through to a perfect vision of international beatitude and respond to their true interests. The highly volatile and nationalistic behavior of the "broad structure" in France and in Germany during World War One, and in the United States, England, Italy, and Germany during World War Two would indicate that a policy of unilateral

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initiatives based on the principle of the democratic mass is most unlikely in the foreseeable future. Thus, the psychology of politics no less than the competing interests in the economy would militate against a strategy of unilateral initiatives.

This strategy not only assumes the absence of mass hysteria but that altruism is as strong a behavioral impulse as egoism. Much war game theory, much deterrence theory rests on the philosophical premises of pure egoism. Thus, when confronted with a unilateralist position, we must keep in mind that the root philosophical metaphors between altruism and egoism are no less wide than the gap between disarmament and deterrence as such. But this position has introduced for practical consideration the moral components of the East-West struggling to disarm and as such has been highly salutary. It has made us aware that pure egoism or the philosophy of self-interest on which much deterrence policy depends is not an exclusive nor a universally accepted doctrine. On the other hand, the philosophy of altruism admits of no more flexibility than the philosophy of egoism. While it is a cleaner ethical standpoint, it suffers from the same kind of totalistic abandonment of critical thinking characteristic of those who would convert a strategy into a binding principle. From a scientific viewpoint, egoism and altruism are both elements in a continuum of ethical variabilities. This is less forgivable when not understood by the devotees of unilateralism than when such understanding is absent by the devotees of perfect deterrence systems.

IV

What is thus far evident is that it would be premature to abandon unilateral initiatives as a strategy, yet it would be dangerous to consider such initiatives as equivalent to peace as such. In short, there is no need to abandon bilateral or multilateral initiatives as strategies on the road to a disarmed world. It is one of the unfortunate sidelights of the current situation that the advocates of unilateral positions seem to be dogmatic on this point. They make *a priori* assumptions about the impossibilities of more pragmatic postures, such as bilateralism and multilateralism. Hence, there takes place a bifurcation of peace strategists, no

less than strategies. At the same time that a common consensus forms at the theoretical level, there is a crack-up at the strategic level, and the goal of peace is once more separated from the means of getting peace.

Let us first examine the question of bilateralism. By bilateralism I do not mean simply a Pax Russo-Americana. From everything previously said, it is clear that the maturation of the Soviet economy and of the socialist system of production intensifies Soviet will to an economic victory over capitalism. Similarly, the strength of American capitalism has intensified American will to victory over socialist economies. The main point is that bilateralism makes possible such continued competition and even programming of further conflict, without "raising the ante" year by year. Both the United States and the Soviet Union now seem prepared to face the catastrophic consequences of World War Three even though neither side in the Cold War is prepared to face the consequences of a warless world. But this latter premise is not an issue at the moment. We cannot resolve the sociological issues until in some measure we have solved the military issue. While they are clearly inter-related, it is best not to confuse the requirements of one with a desire for the other. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are showing an increased sophistication in thinking about armaments and disarmament. There is a shared understanding that the elimination of the short-run danger of thermonuclear war does not require an ambitious and comprehensive limitation of sovereignty approach that is needed to achieve world government. To eliminate the threat of World War Three, we may need an instrumental approach rather than a "far goals" approach.

A less ambitious set of inter-related, interlocking propositions may yield greater fruit than a comprehensive settlement. (1) For a beginning, we need machinery, perhaps of a military type, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond present boundaries—something which the Soviet government is doing with relation to East Germany and China, and something which the multilateral approach of the United States is ostensibly designed to achieve with respect to Western Europe. (2) We need to eliminate the use of foreign territories (though moves in this direction seem emergent) as nuclear missile outposts. This use of neutral

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areas has the political effect of lining up the smaller nations into the contending camps, and thus severely limits their mediating effectiveness. The increase in Polaris missiles on Nautilus-type launching bases has about made most hard missile sites technically obsolete. Arms technology itself opens the way to a bilateral agreement, and ultimately a general agreement on nuclear-free zones; not only in Africa and in Latin America, but decisively in Europe and Asia as well. (3) There is a need for a mutual pact to reduce arms spending by set amounts each year until full disarmament is phased in. This long-range process could also include measures for the joint use of the United States-Soviet funds for aiding developing regions so that the normal build-up in tensions which can be expected from a bilateral system does not come to rest on a pure equilibrium theory. (4) There is a need to effect a non-aggression treaty between North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and Warsaw Pact countries in order to extend and make more meaningful a bilateral settlement. (5) There is a need for accord on measures for further reducing the threat of accidental war between the nuclear powers.

The signing of the hot-line measure, which created for the first time a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow, ought to be viewed as a first step in this direction. (6) Finally, bilateral cooperation at the scientific and social levels is also required. There is a need for joint research and study of peacetime problems. For example, teams of lawyers to study arrangements concerning property rights and airspace rights *vis-à-vis* interplanetary travel; the pooling of medical information on radiation hazards; joint research on communication systems in the nuclear era; the development of educational programs which would make both the Soviet Union and the United States bilingual with respect to the Russian and English languages. These are the kinds of moves on a bilateral level which can supplement the unilateralist strategy for preventing World War Three and institutionalizing peace settlements. Unilateral initiatives are more feasible when a climate of bilateral negotiations obtains. Rather than viewing unilateral initiatives as the opponent of bilateral initiatives, it might really be that a bilateral strategy is that which will make possible unilateral initiatives in the future.

Bilateral strategy also makes possible multilateralism. Insofar as the United States and the Soviet Union still define the ultimate in military strength, still define the various potential postures and possibilities for a world at war, or a war for peace, their implicit agreement at least is needed to make possible multilateral negotiations. Even within the framework of what we have already discussed of the Warsaw Treaty nations and the NATO alliance nations, it is clear that there is an implication of multilateralism. The urgency of the problem is defined by the growing nuclear spread, and by the fact that insofar as the United States and the Soviet Union have a limited number of years in which to define the situation. To this degree, a bilateral strategy has a built-in temporal limit. Whatever the theoretical plausibilities of the two-player gaming situation, these go by the board when there is a rise of other nuclear powers of equal weight to those of the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, on sheer pragmatic grounds the bilateral perspective ought to be considered as the first stage toward multilateral and complete disarmament, and at the same time toward the increased possibility of unilateral initiatives across the board.

This kind of perspective has thus far been overlooked on the part of advocates of disarmament because bilateralism obviously lacks the moral purity of a unilateral initiative. At the same time, bilateral agreements give the appearance of being a Machiavellian style of dealing with the problem of international tensions. There are indeed great risks in a strategy based on bilateral disarmament. But the drive toward disarmament will clearly require whatever strategy is most plausible for a given situation. For this point of view, unilateral initiatives may be a more desirable strategy, but if it is less plausible, less likely to attain its object, then unilateral initiatives could become fanatic rather than an ethical point of view.

The varied concepts of unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral initiatives are in effect strategies which are coverall blankets for rather detailed technical processes. Even at the level of strategy, the concept of unilateral initiatives may be a rather advanced concept—one which can come into being not only after some kind of bilateral perspective has been institutionalized, but long after there is some kind of settlement of political tensions at a

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more immediate level. In this sense, the kind of piecemeal strategies suggested by James Warburg ought to be seriously looked into: the question of the absence of joint foreign-aid credit programs between the United States and the Soviet Union; the need for the development of an international economy in which the United Nations would have a role; problems of a United Nations Development Authority with respect to sovereignty on the national level; the need to abate tensions that obstruct disarmament, such as DeGaulism and the East-West tensions with respect to Germany; the absence of negotiation between the United States and China; the questions of Korea and Vietnam; the India-Pakistan rift and what it does to the major powers; and of course the whole question of United States relationships with Latin America and Soviet relationships with the Middle East. Each of these would have to be separately discussed and resolved if there is to be a genuine content for unilateral initiatives. Clearly, whether we are talking about bilateral initiatives or unilateral and multilateral consequences of bilateralism, these take place in a world where there is some abatement of tensions on a more direct and immediate level at those critical pressure points at which East and West find themselves in direct confrontation and disagreement—Cuba, Southeast Asia, Berlin. These geo-political sore-spots are, after all, priority items with respect to any kind of overall settlement.

Once the framework is set in this fashion, it becomes increasingly difficult to *moralize* over the strategy which should be employed, and it becomes increasingly necessary to *politicalize* the concept of disarmament. This can only be accomplished in a context in which historic differences between major world powers and conflict of interests are fully and seriously understood. Political events have outstripped moral postures at every turn in the Cold War, from 1948 to 1965. We should thus be cautious before insisting on any single strategy simply because old political guidelines and old definitions of the Western alliance or the Eastern bloc are vanishing. It is too facile to attribute every easing of Soviet-American tensions as a victory for unilateral postures. We are entering a period in which new, exciting, and even embarrassing questions are being asked of both sides of the Iron Curtain. Is the conflict between the United States and the

Soviet Union losing its steam? And if it is, can the reasons be traced to a positive functional identity between state capitalism and state socialism? Or to a common front against a military spread in weapon systems? Will the futility of the search for a "perfect" nuclear deterrent compel the United States and the Soviet Union to arrive at international settlement earlier than one might have anticipated? Will the military belligerence of China and France be eased or accelerated by a series of unilateral or bilateral initiatives? These are not unusual questions; indeed they are being seriously studied in military quarters. The United States military establishment respects nothing more than the Soviet military establishment. If the means to maintain international power is great power cooperation, then one can expect the rhetoric of the Cold War, which has so beclouded post-war political thinking, to give way to a new era of mutual toleration and respect. Perhaps this is the prelude to a big power settlement of the Cold War, to an "immoral" bilateral agreement rather than a highly moral unilateral agreement. India may not be the hope of the world. The Third World countries may have little to do with this kind of negotiation and settlement. What we must come to terms with is an inventory of values: is big power bilateral settlement evil because of its retention of a *status quo* in international development? Is any peace settlement, no matter how high-handed and undemocratic in form, endurable by virtue of its promise of an extended period of peace? There are unpleasant aspects to a peace settlement. The cost factor may have to be reckoned with if we are to gain the benefit factor. An end to the Cold War in its present form, at least, may involve an international "spheres of interest" approach that is thoroughly unpalatable to the emergent nations.

The debates between the Soviet and Chinese Marxists on questions of the contradictions between peace and development have shown an appreciation of the dynamics of this problem. Thus far (with the possible exception of the DeGaulle-Kennedy rupture), there has been no comparable dialogue in the West. Until there is such a dialogue, the discussion between unilateral and bilateral approaches will be stalemated strategies in search of a general theory of politics.