

## PHILOSOPHY

out jointly acceptable policies, he is thereby disallowing appeal to inclination as a ground for non-performance of obligations (cf. 212-214). This might provide a necessary if not sufficient condition, for community, had not the existentialist serious qualms about Kant's view of reason and human nature.

It is at this point one might have wished for a broader appreciation of Kant, but, granting these hesitations, one is left to deal with the existentialist who says: 'To be sure, when I signify to others a desire to work out with them understandings that will then be jointly accepted as norms governing my actions and theirs, I do not thereby surrender the right to criticize or to seek to revise the policies we progressively elaborate' (216).

The question that becomes paramount now is: What criterion of truth and goodness, what presuppositions, underlie the ensuing debate on new policies? Part of Olafson's reply is, 'a disposition to communal living based on something other than force or fear' (218). To this quotation Olafson adds: 'It must also be assumed that the human beings who are so disposed have needs and desires that are not hopelessly disparate . . .' (218). But can this 'something other than force' leave out Kant's realization that persons who are free are also rational (universalizing)? If we try to substitute, say, Hume's feeling of sympathy for Hobbesian fear, can it be as substitute *for* reason rather than a reinforcement of reason? This brings us to our basic query.

In the last analysis, isn't the struggle between the essential in Kant and the essential in the existentialist, the way in which the work of reason is done? Kant would insist that, whatever else is the case, it is only in persons who are *both* free and reasoning that there is foundation for moral dialogue. If one makes the proper distinction between principles, rules, and codes, why could Kant not say, with existentialist support, that, without unquestioning commitment to particular rules and codes, persons who are both free and reason-capable can form a responsible community based on principles?

Indeed, does not Olafson himself remarry both existentialism and Kant, with proper counselling for both? For against authenticity-conserving individualists he would argue: If they, too, are autonomous moral agents, and if they, too, can have obligations only by placing themselves under obligations, then what *could* I offer them except the freedom of self-definition and self-engagement which they, like me, enjoy? (220). Is this not the imperative to universalize? And is there not in Olafson's discussion the appropriate suggestion that both Kant and the existentialists do well to explore other experiential links in which to root, if not justify, community? One comes away from this searching treatment convinced that a remarriage of 'intellectualism' and 'voluntarism', supported by an adequate theory of needs, is required if the person as a whole is to be involved in the discovery and execution of principles.

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## CORRIGENDUM

The concluding sentences of the review by Mr. J. M. Hinton of Mr. Don Locke's *Perception and Our Knowledge of the External World*, in the October 1968 number of *Philosophy*, should read as follows:

Instead of such a clarification, Locke gives us an analysis of weak perception into three elements; sensory awareness, noticing and taking yourself to perceive—weakly.

The book is not, and is not trying to be, the sort of thing I happen to like in philosophy. I hope this has not led me to be unfair to it.