ABSTRACTS FROM SYNTHESE

Volume 17, No. 2

CONTENTS

"PHYSICAL MONISM"
B. D. ELLIS

A theory of perception is usually an attempt to answer the question "What are the immediate objects of awareness when we perceive?" But this question only makes sense to one who believes that there are two distinct compartments of mind or brain (*e.q.* a faculty of perception and a faculty of reason) the job of one being to supply basic uninterpreted information to the other whose job it is to interpret it. The resulting theories of perception may therefore be called epistemologically dualist theories. They include phenomenalism, two kinds of representationalism and direct realism—none of which are satisfactory. The object of this paper is to construct a theory of perception which is ontologically a physicalist theory, but which is epistemologically a monistic theory.

"NEW REASONS FOR REALISM"
JAMES J. GIBSON

If *invariants* of the energy flux at the receptors of an organism exist, and if these invariants correspond to the permanent properties of the environment, and if they are the basis of the organism's perception of the environment instead of the sensory data on which we have thought it based, then there is new support for realism in epistemology as well as for a new theory of perception in psychology.

In this paper the theory of perception is outlined and then, the reasons for realism are presented.

"COLOR CONCEPTS AND DISPOSITIONS"
ROBERT J. SWARTZ

Are colors of physical things dispositions to *look* certain ways to normal observers in normal observation conditions? In this paper I consider two recent ways of analyzing the notion of a dispositional property and use these as models for two types of analyses of being red. In both cases the general proposition "Anything which is red looks red to a normal observer in normal conditions" turns out to be necessarily true. This implies that attempts to explain why something looks red to someone by citing the fact that it *is* red fail to fit into the Hempelian model of explanation. But, I argue, such alleged explanations do fit into Hempel's model. I conclude that the general proposition about the way red things look is contingent and that being red, as ordinarily construed, is not a dispositional property.

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"SOME PROBLEMS IN THE GEOMETRY OF VISUAL PERCEPTION"
FRED ROBERTS AND PATRICK SUPPES

This article deals with the geometry and kinematics of visual perception. Some specific models are analyzed, and an important but too little known theorem of Horace Lamb's concerning the impossibility of perceiving all straight lines as straight is stated and proved. Some attention is given to the problem of concept formation in terms of a template model for processing elementary perceptual properties.

ANNOUNCEMENT
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
Section L—History and Philosophy of Science
Program for Annual Meeting, New York City, December 27-30, 1967

General Topic: *Statistical Explanation*

Wednesday, December 27

9 a.m. Chairman: Arnold Koslow, Brooklyn College
Symposium: The Problem of Statistical Explanation
Isaac Levi, Case Institute—Western Reserve
Richard Jeffrey, Pennsylvania
Wesley Salmon, Indiana

2 p.m. Chairman: Peter Caws, City University
Symposium: Comparative Methodology of the Physical and Social Sciences (joint session with section L3, Society for General Systems Research)
Richard Rudner, Washington (St. Louis)
Sidney Morgenbesser, Columbia
William Sacksteder, Colorado

Thursday, December 28

9 a.m. Chairman: Albert E. Blumberg, Rutgers
Symposium: Statistical Explanation in Physics—the Copenhagen Interpretation
Richard Schlegel, Michigan State
Arthur Komar, Yeshiva
Joseph Sneed, Stanford

Saturday, December 30

9 a.m. Chairman: Stephen Spielman, Hunter College
Symposium: Statistical Explanation in the Social Sciences
Joseph Hanna, Michigan State
Roger Rosenkrantz, City College
Paul Diesing, Buffalo

12 noon. *Luncheon and Vice-Presidential Address*
Structure, Statistics, and the Logic of Discovery
Peter Caws, City University