

group of problems, which provide particularly delicate work for a Catholic. What is at issue is nothing less than what it is to be a Christian.

It remains to lodge a protest against the translation. Neither of the translators appears to be English, whence incorrect usage occurs repeatedly. Long and obscure sentences occur very frequently, and they should have been divided. Indeed, the obscurity is such that it was not possible for the printers fully to rectify

an accident which seems to have happened to the type shortly before printing. Instead of pages 103 and 107, the first printing as circulated to reviewers contained two pages of an entirely different book, and had to be withdrawn. The printers deserve every sympathy: so obscure were the sentences leading across to the incorrect pages that even the serious reader could not at first be sure of the discontinuity! SWITHUN M'CLOUGHLIN, O.S.B.

MODERN MAN AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE, by Max Thurian. *Lutterworth*, London, 1968. 80 pp. 5s.
THE JOURNEY INWARDS, by F. C. Happold. *D.L.T.*, London, 1968. 12s. 6d.

Of the making of practical handbooks to Christian living there is no end. These two paperbacks are a further addition to the pile. Each is the work of an author, already distinguished for more weighty books, who now produces a popular version for practical living. Max Thurian, the monk, takes the general line that prayer is possible in the modern world only as an attitude in day-to-day living. F. C. Happold, the layman, encourages the reader to set time aside for prayer. Both are anxious to help 'modern man'. Neither, however, says anything new about the spiritual life.

Thurian has written what amounts to a competent survey of traditional themes of the Christian life—unity of man, simplicity in prayer, suffering, liturgy, community—in modern language and in an attractive way. Happold's book is a book on prayer. He knows a lot about it and is conversant with non-Christian approaches. It is useful to read his helpful short descriptions of non-Christian

techniques and aids. Some will criticize his book for being, in fact, insufficiently Christian, savouring rather of the 'perennial philosophy' standpoint. My own criticism would be that the author concentrates too much, for a short book, on techniques and not enough on God. This is always the danger with books on prayer—they tend to be about means and not about the end. Prayer is rather like riding a bicycle. You do it best when you don't go too much into how it's done. Happold has not entirely escaped this pitfall, and throughout gives the impression of a cultivated headmaster discussing with his sixth form the various experiences of prayer that men have had. The living God into whose hands it is dangerous to fall is not central to the book.

Readers of *New Blackfriars* will look in vain in either book for recognition of the socio-political commitment which is inherent in following Christ. This *genre* of book has not yet taken cognizance of that. JOHN DALRYMPLE

FREEWILL AND DETERMINISM—A Study of Rival Concepts of Man, by R. L. Franklin. *Routledge & Kegan Paul*, London, 1968. 340 pp. 45s.

Professor Franklin has written an important book which clarifies the dispute between Libertarian and Determinist by means of a careful study of a wide range of relevant concepts, and suggests that it is based, in the last analysis, on fundamentally divergent concepts of man and his place in the universe.

The so-called problem of freewill arises from the apparent incompatibility of two commonly cherished beliefs: (1) that we can often decide freely, and that this is presupposed by moral praise or blame; (2) that there must be a sufficient reason why one event should occur rather than another. The Libertarian maintains that in the process of deliberation, decision, and consequent action, there is at least one point of time when the total situation

is not a sufficient condition for the immediately subsequent one. The Determinist maintains that every total situation is a sufficient condition for what follows it. The hard-line Determinist draws from the principle of Sufficient Reason the conclusion that we are not free to choose in any significant sense. The soft-line Determinist takes an intermediate position seeking to reconcile Libertarianism with Determinism by giving a Pickwickian sense to freedom of choice. The Dissolutionist stands apart, claiming that the whole dispute is a pseudo-problem resting on conceptual muddles.

The author examines these positions and shows that they may shade into one another. He rejects Dissolutionism. He considers the question whether Determinism and Libertarian