

and changing her laws. The definition of the Assumption, as the Apostolic Constitution *Munificentissimus Deus* shows, and the changes in the law of the Eucharistic fast are cases in point. She often, too, sets about the correction of abuses in response to public opinion. These are not Protestant but thoroughly Catholic conceptions.

The burden of THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT discussion therefore is mainly confined to a difference of opinion concerning the extent to which it is at present feasible by investigation to be certain of the valid performance of any particular non-Catholic baptism. It also concerns ways by which the necessary evidence for this might be made more readily available. It is in no way concerned to criticize or change the law of the Church itself.



THE ALL SUFFICIENT SACRIFICE

Sidelights from Psychology and Anthropology

VICTOR WHITE, O.P.

THE Editor asks me to write on 'the nature of sacrifice, showing how the Mass is a sacrifice'. It sounds quite simple. It is as if I were asked to speak on the nature of Buttercup, and show that the flower you have picked is a buttercup. I can get a dictionary description of Buttercup, show you pictures of the species of *Ranunculus* called buttercup, compare your specimen with these descriptions and pictures, prove to you that there is no difference whatever between them, and conclude without a shadow of a doubt that you have picked an authentic, genuine sample of the class 'Buttercup'.

We might proceed in the same way with this present assignment. We might look up the word 'Sacrifice' in a standard dictionary; or start from some good definition of 'Sacrifice' from some Doctor of the Church. Then we could take a good look at what happens at Mass, show how it fits the definition, and conclude that Holy Mass is undoubtedly a genuine specimen of the class 'Sacrifice'. Or we could do some original research of our

own: take a look at all the strange rites and ceremonies, the bloody butcheries and slaughters, the cruel burnings and knifings as well as the noble self-denials or trivial losses of income, which men have called 'sacrifices', then find some sort of common denominator of the lot, and finally try and fit Holy Mass into whatever sort of idea of 'sacrifice in general' we have managed to extract.

Some theologians have, in fact, gone about matters in some such way. But it seems to be a very mistaken way. It may perhaps be the right way to go about comparative religion. But it is not theology, and to mistake it for theology can have some odd results.

It is not theology, because to the man of faith just what sacrifice means is not shown in any dictionary, nor by any general conception obtained by induction from any number of pagan or even Hebrew rites. The nature of sacrifice, the meaning of sacrifice, is shown to him in the unique event of the sacrifice of Jesus on the Cross, his dying for our sins, and rising for our justification. Calvary is not just one specimen (not even the best specimen) of the class 'sacrifice'. The man of faith (and the theologian, whose job it is to elucidate his faith) may not judge whether or how what Jesus does is a sacrifice by comparing it with Old Testament or pagan standards, or with *a priori* definitions. Jesus on the Cross is himself the standard whereby other sacrifices, or definitions of sacrifice, are to be judged: it is illegitimate to make *them* the criterion of what *he* does. 'Sacrifice', we see, is not a class of objects like 'buttercup', in which the authenticity of one can be judged by comparison with others or by generalized definitions or descriptions. On the contrary, to the man of faith, the right of other 'sacrifices' to be called such must be judged by the measure in which they approximate to, or resemble, or seek similar results to, what Jesus Christ does on the Cross and in Holy Mass.

But, for the very reason that these 'sacrifices' do approximate to, resemble, or seek similar results to, what Jesus does on the Cross and in Holy Mass, they serve to illustrate, and help us to understand better, what it is that Jesus does. This is the method, the underlying thought, of the Epistle to the Hebrews. This epistle does not set out to show that Jesus is one specimen of the class 'priest' who performs one specimen of the class 'sacrifice', but on the contrary that these priests and sacrifices (here of the Old

Testament)¹ enable us to understand better what Jesus is and does 'once for all', subsuming and transcending them all and thereby rendering them obsolete.

So, it may be said that modern studies in comparative religion, anthropology and depth-psychology about priests and sacrifices may enable us to understand better what Jesus does on the Cross and in Holy Mass; and also what we are to do, and he does to us, at Holy Mass. Truly, these researches do not tell us anything new about the Cross or about Mass that theologians and preachers have not constantly taught us, but perhaps they can help us to see better what the theologians and preachers mean.

But before we illustrate this, a parenthesis is perhaps necessary. It is, or should be, axiomatic for Catholic theology that the sacrifice of the Cross and the sacrifice of the Mass is one and the same sacrifice. The Council of Trent is very clear about this (Session 9, chapter 2): 'The same Christ, who offered himself by shedding of blood on the altar of the cross, is contained and bloodlessly sacrificed in the divine sacrifice which is performed at Mass. . . . The victim is one and the same, and the same is he who now offers through the ministry of priests, as he who once offered himself on the cross: only the way of offering (*ratione offerendi*) is different.' We do not then have to look in the celebration of Mass for something which will make it a sacrifice *apart from* the sacrifice of the Cross, for it is *not* a sacrifice *apart from* the sacrifice of the Cross. The Council of Trent does not tell us what the 'different way of offering' is; but only what it is *not*: it is *without* blood-shedding. But it implies that it is a *ritual* and *symbolic* way: the body and the blood are offered in the symbols of bread and wine, and 'through the ministry of priests'.²

'In every sacrifice', wrote St Augustine, 'there are four things to be considered: *to whom* it is offered, *by whom* it is offered,

¹ This fact should not invalidate the application of a similar method to other sources. The Epistle itself refers not only to the Mosaic ordinance, but also to the sacrifices of Abel, Abraham and even (*par excellence*) of the 'pagan' Melchisedech. It is just these three non-leuitical sacrifices which are mentioned in the Canon of the Mass.

² This is now authoritatively made clear in the encyclical *Mediator Dei* (Pius XII, 1947), para. 74: 'The divine wisdom has devised a way in which our Redeemer's sacrifice is marvellously shown forth by *external signs symbolic* of death. By the "transubstantiation" . . . both his body and blood are rendered really present; but the eucharistic species under which he is present *symbolize* the violent separation of his body and blood, and so a *commemorative showing forth* of the death which took place in reality on Calvary is repeated in each Mass, because by distinct representations Christ Jesus is signified and shown forth in his state of victim.' (Italics ours.)

what is offered, for whom it is offered.'³ In Christ's sacrifice, St Augustine continues, it is 'one and the same Mediator' who is every one of these four, uniting them all in his one person who is both God and man and also the head of his body, the Church. And it may be said that all other sacrifices, whether Old Testament or pagan, are so many attempts, and also so many inevitable failures, to achieve this identity of all these four elements.

Although by universal consent a 'sacrifice' is offered to some divine being, there seems to be a universal ambiguity (outside the sacrifice of Christ) as to *by whom* it is offered: is it *by* human or divine beings? It almost seems that sacrifices are something which human beings find themselves *obliged* and yet *unable* to make. Miss Levy, in her *The Gate of Horn*, has indicated that, down to the time of the Hebrew prophets, sacrifice was thought to be primarily of God, to God, and *by* God. Sacrifice was not viewed as a human act, but the enactment of a *divine* act, whether of creation, or of the origin or deliverance of a people, or of the annual renewal of nature, the source of the people's continued life. The priest-king was the embodiment of a god; and so also 'the victims were by their nature holy—God to God. Their blood was poured on pillar or earth as a physical bond of union'.⁴ And (as Mircea Eliade has shown to be characteristic of all non-Biblical religion) the participant is there, not as a human being, but 'in full ceremonial action, he abandons the profane world of mortals and introduces himself into the divine world of the immortals'.⁵

C. G. Jung has shown the psychological reason why this had to be so. Every sacrifice is a self-sacrifice; yet purely human self-sacrifice is humanly impossible. This is so, because sacrifice is not any sort of giving or offering but implies the complete surrender of every selfish claim. An offering 'only becomes a sacrifice if I give up the implied intention of receiving something in return. If it is to be true sacrifice, the gift must be given up as if it were being destroyed. Only then is it possible for the egoistic claim to be given up.'⁶ Otherwise it is no sacrifice, no act of worship of God and of recognition of his supreme dominion, but either an act of magic (a seeking of divine power to accomplish our own egoistic ends), or a blasphemous refusal to recognize that God's

3 *De Trinitate*, iv, 14.

4 G. R. Levy, *The Gate of Horn* (Faber, 1948), p. 207.

5 Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (Routledge, 1955), p. 36.

6 C. G. Jung, 'Transformation Symbolism in the Mass', in *The Mysteries* (Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks, Routledge, 1955), p. 321.

claim is to *all* that we are and have, which can be met by no partial offering. There must be complete alienation of the gift from our own possession and use. To 'sacrifice' means to 'make sacred' or wholly other and *tabu*.

But (as Jung also points out) it is just this total self-giving and total renunciation which is humanly, psychologically impossible. For we can give only what we possess, and we only possess that of which we are conscious. Our actual claims to 'me and mine' always exceed the bounds of our conscious awareness: this is proved by the spontaneous and unconscious resistance with which we meet any threat to 'me and mine'. We do not fully possess ourselves, and therefore cannot sacrifice ourselves. 'The offering of so significant a gift at once raises the question: Does it lie within man's power to offer such a gift at all? Is he psychologically competent to do so?'⁷ Jung, as a psychologist, answers no. And he also knows that 'the Church says no, since she maintains that the sacrificing priest is Christ himself. But since man is included in the gift . . . the Church also says yes, though with qualifications.'

'Yes', because to sacrifice is a human need and obligation. 'With qualifications', because it is a human impossibility, and only the Lord, Possessor and Disposer of all *can* sacrifice. Yet, at the same time, if *man* does not sacrifice, the performance is wholly out of this world, ethically worthless and irrelevant to human behaviour, attitudes and history. Moreover, sacrifice remains an obligation of the creature in recognition of his creatureliness, and one which neither obliges nor befits the Creator.

The Hebrew prophets saw this, in what Miss Levy calls 'The Revolution' in the history of religions.⁸ Israel was called, as no other people was called, to realize that sacrifice was something which their God required, not merely or primarily in the sacred precincts of the temple by his priestly representatives, or by the people when periodically carried 'out of this world' by the ritual. It was to be by and of the people themselves in everyday life and in the vicissitudes of 'profane' history. To sacrifice meant not merely or primarily a periodic retirement from the 'profane' and the personal into the 'sacred' and the archetypal; but (as the Psalmist says) *propter te mortificamur tota die*—on thy account we are immolated all day and every day. Already in the earliest

⁷ C. G. Jung, *op cit.*, p. 320.

⁸ G. R. Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 205 ff.

reign, Samuel tells Saul that 'obedience is better than sacrifices, and to hearken rather than to offer the fat of rams' (1 Kings 15, 22). The later prophets will stress more and more the need for the interior and ceaseless submission of a broken and humbled heart as against the external periodical ceremonials. 'Incense is an abomination to me; the new moons and the sabbaths and the other festivals I will not abide: your assemblies are wicked. . . . I am weary of bearing them. . . . Cease to do perversely. Learn to do well. Seek judgment. Relieve the oppressed. Judge for the fatherless. Defend the widow. . . .' (Isaiah 1, 12ff.) Sacrifice can no longer be only of God to God, but of man to God, and so find expression in everyday relationships, man to man.

Did this mean that divine, ritual sacrifice is now to be replaced by human, interior acts of self-sacrifice or external expressions of altruism; and become only a matter of conduct and ethics? But just this, we have seen, is humanly impossible. The claim to be able to sacrifice ourselves implies the claim to possess ourselves; and it is just this egoistic and illusory claim which sacrifice surrenders. To substitute human, ethical self-sacrifice for divine sacrifice is not to recognize, but precisely to deny, the all-sovereignty of God. It is not to make sacred (*sacrificare*) the 'profane', but to profane the sacred; and atheistic or satanic moral autonomy is the logical outcome of such presumption.

Only a God-Man could resolve the dilemma. We may apply to sacrifice what St Anselm says of satisfaction: 'Only God *can* make it, only man *should* make it; so it is required that a God-Man makes it'.⁹

Jung has shown clearly how, from the psychological point of view, the action of the Mass resolves the dilemma.

'In the utterance of the words of consecration, the Godhead intervenes, Itself acting and truly present, and thus proclaims that the central event in the Mass is Its act of grace, in which the priest has only the significance of the minister. The same applies to the congregation and the offered substances. . . . The presence of Godhead binds all parts of the sacrificial act into a mystical unity, so that it is God himself who offers himself as a sacrifice in the substances, in the priest, and in the congregation, and who, in the human form of the Son, offers himself as an atonement to the Father.'¹⁰

⁹ *Cur Deus Homo?*, ii, 6.

¹⁰ C. G. Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

It is indeed the God-Man himself who intervenes audibly at Mass, amidst the human prayers and ceremonies, with 'This is my body . . . my blood'. The merely human priest, who is priest only because he 'acts by the power of Christ', only 'lends Christ his tongue and gives him the use of his own hands'.¹¹ And though Christ is God, and his godhead gives his sacrifice its all-sufficiency and efficacy, it is as man that he is priest and mediator.

But why the 'external signs symbolic of death', since the death was real enough, and the self-offering on Calvary all-sufficient? The *res* is already accomplished; why the *sacramentum*—the sacred sign? Why the Mass? Catholic theology and liturgy have always insisted that God accommodates his actions to our sense-bound natures, in order that 'we may be led through visible things to the invisible', and to engage our bodily senses no less than our spiritual understanding.¹² Modern psychology helps us to understand that the sense-symbol is no mere pedagogical device which can be discarded when intellectual understanding has been attained. It is the indispensable carrier and transformer for psychic functions besides those of thought; the bearer not only of conscious and voluntary but also of contents which lie outside consciousness and voluntary disposition. The symbol, moreover, does not only convey ideas: it *does* things. St Augustine remarks somewhere that a handshake not only expresses but also promotes friendship. Sacrifice, to be whole (and if it is not whole it is not sacrifice), *must* find symbolic expression and representation: not indeed for the benefit of the divine sacrificer and sacrificed, but for the benefit of the human. It must not only be thought or felt, but *done* by us. Without the Mass, not only is Calvary not really and sensibly present to us, but it is not at our disposal here and now, to offer and to be offered. The symbol alone can focus and contain the *whole*: that which is within the scope of human volition and disposition as well as that which infinitely exceeds it; that which is conscious and subject to human perceptions and understanding, as well as that which is unconscious, mysterious and infinitely transcends them.¹³ And the symbol must be divinely established, and a divine act:

'Since man, in the action of the Mass, is a tool (though a tool of his own free will), he is not in a position to know anything

¹¹ St John Chrysostom, quoted by Pius XII, *Mediator Dei*, para. 73.

¹² Cf. *Mediator Dei*, paras. 21, 22.

¹³ See C. G. Jung, *op. cit.*, pp. 322 ff.

of the hand that guides him. . . . It is something outside, something autonomous, which seizes and moves man. What happens in the consecration is essentially a miracle, and it is meant to be so. . . . It is necessary that the transubstantiation should be a cause of wonder and a miracle which man can in no wise comprehend. It is a *mysterium fidei*, a "mystery" in the sense of a *dromenon* and *deiknumenon*, a secret that is acted and displayed.¹⁴

The data of anthropology and comparative religion enable us also to view non-Christian sacrifices as approximations to the identification of those *for whom* they are offered with *that which* is offered, as well as with the offerer and the God to whom the offering is made. Miss Levy has pointed out that 'the whole body of ritual . . . was a harmonious aggrandizement of the theme: divine power, animal, man',¹⁵ and that the victim was always regarded as voluntary, itself participating willingly in the ritual slaughter. Following Levy-Bruhl, Jung writes of the *participation mystique* between the offerers and the offered, and explains this in terms of the familiar psychological mechanism of projection, or identification with the symbol.¹⁶ John Layard, writing of 'Identification with the Sacrificial Animal' among the primitive Malekulans, tells how for the participant the animal 'fulfils the function of an *alter ego* which . . . he first rears as a woman would rear a child, then consecrates, cherishes and adores it, thereby investing it with his own most secret and cherished desires'.¹⁷ Too often we talk presumptuously of 'sacrificing' things which we certainly do not cherish or adore, and which we may even despise and are quite content to do without, and with which, more obviously still, we do not identify ourselves. Layard points out how the Malekulan brutally slaughters precisely the animal which 'up to this moment has been cherished and cossetted and communed with and . . . has occupied the position of his most cherished companion'.¹⁸ In the Mass, it is precisely our dearest, adorable and best Beloved whom we offer.

But Jung has long ago remarked how, even from the psychological standpoint, Christ's sacrifice and ours transcends the old animal sacrifices, however great their participants' identification with the victims.

¹⁴ C. G. Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

¹⁵ G. R. Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 42, cf. pp. 86, 105.

¹⁶ C. G. Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

¹⁷ J. Layard in *Eranos Jahrbuch*. XXIV (1955), p. 340.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

'The relation between Mithra and his bull is very close. But it is the hero himself in the Christian mysteries who sacrifices himself voluntarily. . . . The comparison of the Mithraic and the Christian sacrifice shows wherein lies the superiority of the Christian symbol: it is in the frank admission that not only are the lower wishes to be sacrificed, but the whole personality. The Christian symbol demands complete devotion; it compels a veritable self-sacrifice to a higher purpose. . . . The religious effect of these symbols must be considered as an orientation of the unconscious by means of imitation.'¹⁹

Or, as the Epistle to the Hebrews puts it: 'If the blood of goats and of oxen and the ashes of an heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled to the cleansing of the *flesh*; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who by the Holy Ghost offered himself unspotted to God, cleanse our *conscience* from dead works [as though we could sacrifice ourselves] to serve the living God?' (9. 13, 14). Human sacrifice, the slaying of the priest-king himself, was a horrible attempt in this direction, which the substitution of the animal never wholly satisfied. The urge to suicide still often shows itself as a misunderstood manifestation of the sacrificial urge.

Correspondingly, our identification with the offering and the offered is to be not less but more than in the old rites. Not that we are able to contribute anything whatsoever to the intrinsic worth of the sacrifice. The Holy Father, in his *Mediator Dei*, has found it necessary to emphasize that our Lord's self-offering on the Cross and at Mass is all-perfect and efficacious, quite apart from our participation. Nothing is added to his self-offering, nor to what is offered, nor again to those for whom he offers, whether they be present or absent, or perhaps present in body but absent in mind. For here the identification is not primarily and essentially a psychological one, nor dependent on any psychic mechanism of our own, nor yet dependent on our volition, intentions or active participation. Rather do these identifications presuppose an identity which the Lord himself has wrought. It is in no sense our achievement, and in the Mass the claim even to that achievement, or any contribution to it, is

¹⁹ C. G. Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious* (tr. B. M. Hinkle, 1915), pp. 475, 478f. Jung has developed, and in some respects modified, this estimate in the expanded and revised versions of this book, *Collected Works*, Vol. V. (1956), pp. 433 ff.

surrendered. 'God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself' (2 Cor. 5, 19): it is all God's work and in no wise ours. It is Jansenist heresy to set any limits to those *for whom* Christ sacrifices himself; and we to whom he has 'given the ministry of reconciliation' (2 Cor. 9, 14) cannot, by our restricted 'intentions' and 'applications', restrict his. St Paul saw no occasion to distinguish between the physical, the sacramental and the mystical body of Christ.²⁰ For St Thomas, the mystical body (i.e. you and me and all 'in Christ') is the *res tantum* of the Eucharist, that which it ultimately signifies and fosters.²¹ And there is a profound sense in which, when the celebrant says on Christ's behalf, 'This is *my* Body', it is also true that it is his own body, and yours and mine, because Christ has made his own body to be his and ours.

So again we ask: why the Mass, why the 'symbolic mode' of offering? It adds nothing, it seems, to the offerer, the offered or to their identity with those for whom the offering is made. Indeed, does not the God in Christ on Calvary show us that there is nothing in the way of sacrifice that we *can* do, but only have faith alone in the blood shed once for all, which rendered all merely human attempts at sacrifice vain and even ridiculous? Is it not shown that the thirty-nine articles are right when they proclaim that the 'sacrifices of Masses . . . were blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits'?—blasphemous as implying that we can still add something to the work of Christ on the Cross, deceitful because such a claim is a lie:

The conclusion seems inescapable if any such claim were made. But we have not told the whole story. Although 'God in Christ' does all, the 'ministry of reconciliation' is still required, and *we* are 'beseeched' to 'be reconciled to God' even though *he has* reconciled us (2 Cor. 5, 18, 20). Even though Jesus Christ discharges our obligation to sacrifice (because we can not), yet it remains *our* obligation; and although he discharges it, he does not abolish it. We may even say he cannot do so; for the obligation arises out of our very nature as reasonable and free *creatures*,²² and even God cannot make his creatures not to be creatures, or annul the obligations which arise from the fact of being creatures. And if *we* do not offer, how is *our* obligation discharged? And

20 See J. A. T. Robinson, *The Body* (S.C.M. Press, Studies in Biblical Theology, n.5) pp. 58 ff.

21 *Summa*, III, 73, 1.

22 *Summa*, II-II, 85, 1.

if we do not offer ourselves with his offering of us, how is his offering of *us* meaningful and true, and not an empty sign without significance?

So *he enables us* to offer: that is, as the Holy Father has explained, voluntarily to unite ourselves with the offerer and the offered, drawn thereto by the symbol, by the 'sacramental mode' of offering.²³ We add nothing to him, to the offering or to the victim: we in no way make even our identity with the victim, we only identify ourselves with the identity he has already accomplished. And even that identifying of ourselves is made possible and actual for us only by his grace. It can be a mental identification only, a 'spiritual communion', or the mental *and* physical reception of the body and blood in the symbol.

So *he does all*, and what he does is all-sufficient and of unlimited worth: yet what *he* does profits *us* not at all without our participation. St Thomas holds that though the sacrifice of the Mass is in itself all-sufficient, its efficacy to those for whom it is offered, and also to those who offer it, depends on the measure of *their* devotion.²⁴ And by 'devotion' he understands the basic expression of religion whereby we submit ourselves and all we have totally to God.²⁵ This is what the external sacrifice itself signifies and promotes, and without which it is an empty formality so far as *we* are concerned. But, on the other hand, we have already indicated that such interior 'devotion' is psychologically impossible without the symbol. Calvary is indeed all-sufficient, and the symbolic mode adds nothing to the sacrifice: but it seems that without the symbol our own voluntary and psychological and even physiological identification with the identity there achieved would not be possible.

Possible or not, this 'symbolic mode of offering' is what our Lord in the Last Supper has in fact given us. When we say that the Eucharist is both sacrament and sacrifice, we should not mean that, so to speak, God has killed two birds with one stone: has ingeniously arranged that one rite should serve two different and unrelated purposes. The living Bread which we eat is the living Bread which we have broken; and whenever and however we communicate, it is of the sacrifice we partake. This is so even when, as the Pope says, we communicate before or after Mass or (con-

²³ *Mediator Dei*, paras. 89, 97, 103, 110; cf. 24, 28.

²⁴ *Summa*, III. 79, 5.

²⁵ *Summa*, II-II. 82, 2.

trary to his recommendations, but still usually unavoidably in this country) with particles consecrated at some other Mass.²⁶ And it is, as the Pope also points out, not only with Christ as offering but with Christ as offered that we are identified—'signified and set forth in his state of victim'. It is in this particularly that we may 'discern the body of the Lord' and not 'eat judgment to ourselves' (1 Cor. II, 29).

Yet holy communion is not communion only with the body that was offered, but with the body which is now risen and glorified. It is characteristic of sacrifices, as opposed to magical rituals, that although (or because) they seek no reward and surrender every claim, they are returned, transmuted and divinized, to the sacrificer. And as God showed his acceptance of the sacrifice on Calvary by raising Christ from the dead, restoring his body glorious and immortal, so now he shows his acceptance of our participation in his sacrifice by giving to us, and transforming us into, the body of him who was slain, but who is now the immortal conqueror of death, who lives and reigns in us for ever and ever.



THE MASS AND THE PEOPLE

J. D. CRICHTON

IT might be thought that much, too much, has been said about what the Holy See has for over fifty years called *actuosa participatio* of the people in the Mass, and much of what has been said is often superficial enough. The impression has sometimes been given that all that was required was that you should make the people *vocal*, that it was a good thing for them to be roused, that they should be weaned from 'individualistic' ways of assisting at Mass, that they themselves should say all that the server says, or that they should sing all the plainsong chants of the Mass even when these are not fitted to their capacity. Taken separately most of these things are good in themselves but they do not go to the roots of the matter. The question is: *why* should the people be active at Mass? To answer this question one needs

²⁶ *Mediator Dei*, para. 126.