

nificance . . . . The fad flamed, flickered and finally faded.' The Cabalistic doctrine of redemption, in its original form the traditional Jewish doctrine of the Messianic age, excluded the idea of personal redemption. All that had to be done (for the Christian Cabalists) was to substitute the Christian doctrine of the Messiah-who-had-come for the Jewish doctrine of the Messiah-who-shall-come. Thus John Reuchlin based himself on Joseph ben Abraham Gikatilia (1247-1305), who systematised the doctrine of the sephiroth or emanations. 'It is in the form of his systematic presentation that the sephiroth entered Christian thought.' 'Keter, the supreme diadem, represented the Father, chochmah, wisdom, represented the Logos, the Son; binah, understanding, heading the lefthand column of mercy, became the representative of the Holy Spirit of Grace.'

The intention of the earliest Christian interpreters was to seek for new means of confirming the truths of the Christian religion. The author gives Cabala as 'a way of transforming external perceptions into internal perceptions; these into imagination; this into opinion; opinion into reason, reason into intelligence, intelligence into mind, and mind into light which illuminates mankind.' Cabala —'KBL'—means to receive, to hear and to accept. 'Cabala is a divine revelation. It is above dependence upon sense-perceptions and not subject to the rules of logic. It is a technique for achieving salvation.'

I wonder how far it could be compared with the Yoga Way of the East and the modern psychological way of Professor C. G. Jung?

TONI SUSSMAN.

THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, Vol. XIX. Philosophy in Post-War Reconstruction. (Washington, 1943.).

The papers contained in this volume make interesting reading and show a real appreciation of the problems of our time. In common with many contemporary Christian writers the speakers were concerned with a discussion of the nature of man; a discussion which when carried on in a social context naturally leads to analysis of the Nature of Law.

Anton C. Pegis in his paper emphasises man's spiritual nature as an image of God, a truth which has been lost sight of in our preoccupation with the domination and analysis of Nature. His Excellency the Archbishop of Chicago uses this conception of man as the basis for a philosophy of Peace, which can only arise from a realisation of the brotherhood of all men. Arthur J. Kelly finds that one of the fundamental constituents of this brotherhood is the Natural Law, which provides the only stable basis for International Law; that is for an International Law based not on mere agreements but arising from the demands of man's nature. Another vital point is touched on by J. A. O'Brien, who discusses the relation of

the Person to the State. Among the Round Table Discussions at the end of the volume the paper written by Alexander P. Schoral on the Proofs of the Existence of God is outstanding.

I. H.

NATURALISM AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT. Edited by Yervant H. Krikorian. (Columbia University Press; Humphrey Milford; 30s.).

A philosophical manifesto of this considerable compass and penetration deserves a closer analysis than is possible in these pages. It is a volume of essays by American professors (whose names, with the exception of Dewey's, are little known in this country) explaining various aspects of present-day 'naturalism' in the States. Naturalist interpretations are offered of religion, ethics, aesthetic, sociology, theory of knowledge, etc., and a few of the essays chronicle the development of American naturalism. The reader will find it helpful to begin with the last essay, an excellent survey of the others. The contributors have their own points of view, but what is common to them as 'naturalists' is opposition alike to any form of matter-mind dualism (they do not however reduce everything to matter) and to recognition of the supernatural; this may be stated positively as a postulate of 'continuity' which consists in applying unrestrictedly to every realm of knowledge 'scientific method.' If this meant that no knowledge is acceptable but such as is submitted to the test of its appropriate criteria, no exception could be taken. The assumption however made throughout is that the appropriate criteria of all knowledge are of the type found in positive science. This, philosophically, completely begs the question; to claim entire open-mindedness on the ground that, having subjected every experienced phenomenon to analysis by certain criteria and having by these methods found no residue that was not susceptible of such analysis, one is yet prepared to consider any other phenomena whatsoever, so long as it too is submitted to the same criteria,—such a claim is to say the least ingenuous.

The result of this method is the reduction of philosophy to collection of numerically infinite data and classification of it by any selected convenient term of reference. The latter feature is particularly clear in the essays on 'Naturalism and Ethical Theory,' and on 'The Categories of Naturalism.' As to the former point it is not surprising to find that the essays provide us for the most part with impossible, because inexhaustible, programmes for investigation rather than with achieved findings; Professor Boas's essay on 'History of Philosophy,' and Miss Lavine's on theory of knowledge instance this.

We disagree *toto caelo* with the views advanced; but there is much here for the trained philosopher to ponder; and much too with which the Thomist might work, and even agree, especially