

particularly useful in this context. To allow a discussion of these texts to take into account their 'form, scope and aesthetic sensibility' (11) is perhaps not pioneering, but nonetheless still surprisingly uncommon among modern historians of Byzantium.

It is not easy to write guides or introductions without becoming superficial, but Neville certainly can. In addition to the present guide to historiography, she has also recently written the first introduction to *Byzantine Gender* (Amsterdam 2019), an excellent book that approaches the topic in a similar way: engaging with recurring scholarly prejudices to move on to a more modern and nuanced understanding of important topics. By devoting the final chapter of her guide to Laonikos Chalkokondyles, an avid imitator of Herodotus, she shows how the Graeco-Roman tradition offers meaning rather than a straightjacket to Byzantine historiography. Neville makes it seem effortless (just another dry martini), but this book is quite an accomplishment.

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NEWMYER (S.T.) (ed.) **Plutarch's Three Treatises on Animals: A Translation with Introductions and Commentary** (Routledge Classical Translations). London and New York NY: Routledge, 2021. Pp. xvi + 188. £36.99. 9780203703182.
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This book offers a new English translation with commentary of four works from Plutarch's *Moralia*, focused on animal virtues, intelligence and the ethics of eating meat. *De sollertia animalium* (*On the Cleverness of Animals*, henceforth S.) is a combination of a philosophical dialogue and a rhetorical competition; *Bruta animalia ratione uti* (*On the Use of Reason by Animals*, henceforth B.), or *Gryllus*, is a satirical dialogue between Odysseus and a talking pig advancing compelling arguments; and *De esu carniū* (*On Eating Meat*, henceforth E.1 and E.2) is the common title of two consecutive short orations with strong condemnatory and emotional tones.

Stephen Newmyer's book begins with a preface detailing its methodology, aims and connection to prior editions. Following this, each of the four translated works is presented with an introduction summarizing its content and related scholarly debate, and complemented by clarificatory endnotes. Worthy of appreciation is the inclusion of an analytical index at the end of the book.

Newmyer's version, more legible than the dated, if still accurate, Loeb translation by W.C. Helmbold (*Plutarch's Moralia*, vol. 12 (Cambridge MA and London 1957)), targets not just 'classical scholars', but also 'Greek-less' readers of ancient philosophy, history of ideas and ethics (xii–iv). It is the culmination of Newmyer's three-decade commitment to Plutarch's zoopsychology and moral views on animals, which has been marked by such substantial contributions as *Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics* (New York NY and London 2006) and *Animals in Greek and Roman Thought: A Sourcebook* (London and New York NY 2011). Here, as in these previous works, a central aspect of Newmyer's approach is to reveal the correspondences between Plutarch's viewpoints, arguments, methodology and rhetoric in matters of animal cognition and vegetarianism and those of today's animal rights advocates and cognitive ethologists. In this new book, this operation is carried out selectively (rather than exhaustively) through the introductions to individual translations and several endnotes to specific passages.

Among its results of particular value is Newmyer's overview, in the introduction to *E.1*, of the parallels between Plutarch's defences of the choice to be vegetarian and those in present-day vegetarian literature (132–34). This is well structured and highly informative, but, like Newmyer's other parallelisms, it is not to be read without caveats. One might raise doubts, for instance, about Newmyer's association of Plutarch's flowery words against the act of taking away an animal's 'soul, the light of the sun, the time of life' for only a morsel of flesh (*E.1* 4, 994e, my translation) with today's criticisms of intensive farming and its practice of depriving animals of sunlight (133 and *E.1*, n.26).

Naturally, Newmyer also highlights many parallels between Plutarch's arguments and those in ancient philosophical-scientific texts, enabling the reader to reconstruct the former's antecedents, sources and posterity. Backed by a rich body of earlier scholarly literature, the result of this endeavour is accurate and extensive, albeit not exhaustive (especially concerning some fragmentary evidence from Carneades and Theophrastus).

Of Newmyer's reasoned stances on controversial points among Plutarch scholars, most persuasive is his agreement with Helmbold on the 'overall thesis' of *S.* being 'that non-human animals possess at least a modicum of reason' (3), together with his claim that Plutarch's thought on animals maintained consistency across all his works (an issue linked to the ultimate indemonstrability of whether Plutarch was ever a vegetarian or not, 130–31). On the other hand, when it comes to analysing Plutarch's rhetorical strategies and argumentative progressions, there are instances where Newmyer's explanations appear misaligned with the textual evidence and its overt discourse markers. In these regards, it is an infelicitous choice on Newmyer's part to generally exclude from his translation connective particles such as δέ ('but', 'on the other hand' or 'and'), ἀλλά ('but') or γάρ ('in fact'). In at least three passages, their removal makes Plutarch's argumentation highly ambiguous, or even substantially different from that represented in Helmbold's translation (see *S.* 4, 962a–b and 5–6, 963f–964a, and especially *E.2* 6, 999a–b). Correspondingly, most open to discussion will probably be Newmyer's reconstructions of Plutarch's strand of arguments in *S.*, *E.1* and *E.2* (allegedly aimed at showing that a covenant of justice naturally exists between animals and humans due to their being 'akin' beings united by social *oikeiōsis* ('appropriation' or 'bonding'; a Stoic concept discussed by Newmyer on page 5 with n.17). In these reconstructions, the logical relations between premises and conclusions appear sometimes to be inverted, and the terms' interpretations dubious.

Important to consider while reading Newmyer's book is that technical psychological terms such as φρόνησις, σύνεσις, δianoia and their cognate forms are not translated consistently (perhaps based on Dyroff's 1897 claim that Plutarch 'appears to employ' these terms 'interchangeably', 17 n.21 and *S.*, n.17). It is consequently not always possible for the reader to infer which intellectual faculties are specifically being mentioned across the four texts: for φρόνησις (defined in *S.*, n.1) and cognates, one can read 'wisdom', 'intelligence', 'understanding', 'thought', 'prudent' and 'mind'; for σύνεσις and cognates (explained in *S.*, n.1; *B.*, n.11; *E.1*, n.24), 'intelligence', 'understanding' and 'sagacity'; and, for δianoia and διανοεῖν (never defined), 'thought', 'understanding', 'intellect', 'intelligence' and 'to reason'. Some of these translations are also used for terms such as νοῦς, γνῶσις and λογίεσθαι, while 'cleverness' sometimes translates without distinction the terms σοφία, πανουργία, τὸ θυμόσοφον and εὐφύα.

All these aspects, including those prompting discussion, confirm the book's potential to stimulate the rediscovery, appreciation and critical analysis of these captivating ancient texts. Their rhetorical and compositional brilliance was already visible in Helmbold's translation, but its inclusion in one of the many Loeb volumes of Plutarch's *Moralia* surely limited its circulation among non-specialized scholars and students. With this new dedicated book, and a paratext that exudes Newmyer's genuine enthusiasm for the four works, one can reasonably expect that they will find a much wider anglophone audience and,

most importantly, foster new and exciting scholarly discussion on their structures, meanings and implications.

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NORTH (J.) and MACK (P.) (eds) **The Afterlife of Herodotus and Thucydides**. London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2019. Pp. xiv + 172. £65. 9781905670871.
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Research into the reception of Herodotus' and Thucydides' histories since the fifth century BC has continued to gather pace in recent years. *The Afterlife of Herodotus and Thucydides*, edited by John North and Peter Mack, constitutes a further entry into this body of work, introducing readers to some of the diverse cultural (and mostly intellectual) contexts in which Herodotus or Thucydides have been received. Some chapters focus on either Herodotus or Thucydides in isolation, for instance Luca Iori's excellent discussion on Thucydides in education during the English Renaissance period, while others look to provide analyses that incorporate both Herodotus and Thucydides.

In their introduction, North and Mack provide a concise overview of each of the individual contributions in the book, which are arranged in a broadly chronological order. The editors also include some general reflections on how both authors have fared since the Renaissance, specifically following the seminal work of Lorenzo Valla, who translated first Thucydides and then Herodotus into Latin. In the first chapter proper, Andrea Ceccarelli examines various humanist scholars' comparisons of Thucydides' celebrated account of the plague at Athens and Lucretius' interpretation of Thucydides' account. Ceccarelli's discussion specifically pivots towards the fierce disagreements that arose from how best to Thucydides' use of the word καρδία, which might be translated either as 'heart' or 'stomach'.

Elizabeth Jeffreys' contribution is the first of several papers that draw on both Herodotus and Thucydides. Jeffreys makes a spirited case for the important contribution made by Byzantine culture in the preservation and transmission of ancient Greek texts, including Herodotus' and Thucydides' histories. She refers to a number of Byzantine authors in order to show that there was some knowledge of both authors amongst the highly educated elite (a rather narrow group), who sometimes drew on phrases, motifs or scenes from Herodotus or Thucydides as part of their own creations. Vasiliki Zali continues this focus on the Byzantine period with her chapter on Herodotean and Thucydidean influences on Procopius and his *Wars*. Attention is drawn to a plethora of passages that contain elements drawn from both Herodotus and Thucydides, such as Procopius' preface, which contains quasi-Herodotean sentiments on perpetuating the memory of the wars fought between βαρβάρων (‘foreigners’, 1.1.1) and the west, as well as a quasi-Thucydidean appeal to ‘complete accuracy’ (ἀκριβολογία, 1.1.5). Similarly, attention is paid to both Herodotus and Thucydides in Ben Earley's chapter on Walter Raleigh's *History of the World* (1614). Earley argues that Raleigh displays a critical interest in reading both historians and their accounts of the Greek *poles* alongside biblical history.