

BLACKFRIARS

simply, in one God, one Lord, one Faith. Further, he disliked assumptions; and the idea of a "graded series of revelations" is an astounding assumption. One wonders what Professor Webb can mean by "revelation." An utterance of God, or a discovery of man? A natural "find" or a supernatural gift? Protestantism attempted to justify itself as a return to the one pure and primitive revelation. Professor Webb's theory provides a far simpler solution. Whether it is "a valuable contribution to religious thought" is another matter. I say "Professor Webb's theory" because, although von Hügel was intensely interested in the strivings and attainments of man which, in varying degrees, point towards man's divine destiny, and although his terminology was not always precise, he was too clear-headed ever to confuse the natural with the supernatural. Besides he accepted the Encyclical *Pascendi* which dealt with the mode of thought implicit in the theory of Professor Webb. That theory was not his.

REVIEWS

THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

LA DOCTRINE DE LA REDEMPTION CHEZ SAINT THOMAS. By L. Hardy. (Desclée de Brouwer; 12 frs.)

A necessary book. The richness, depth and beauty of St. Thomas's thought regarding the Atonement are too little appreciated; and still less is his doctrine sufficiently taught and preached. Here it will be found set out, largely in St. Thomas's own words which have been intelligently selected, arranged and strung together with intelligent, if not always subtle, comments. The author disclaims originality, but his work is none the less valuable on that account.

The aim he first had in writing it was to make a brief comparison of St. Thomas's thought on the subject with that of St. Anselm. He soon found that the richness of the former necessitated a larger book than was originally intended. The bulk of the present book is therefore, as the title implies, an exposition of the Thomist doctrine. But it is preceded by a brief (too brief, perhaps, to be altogether just) summary of St. Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo?* and is followed by a comparison of the two. M. Hardy recognizes that Thomas did far more than develop and perfect the speculation of Anselm, and that comparison of the two involves, in many respects, a contrast. But we do not think he has realized how great that contrast really is: so great, indeed, that the Thomist treatment—notwithstanding the inclusion of many features taken over from Anselm—is almost a radical inversion of the Anselmian.

REVIEWS

M. Hardy himself notes, for instance, that "the word 'satisfaction' has a different meaning in St. Thomas and in St. Anselm," that "the former lays less stress on the concept of strict justice, and that "Anselm, unlike his predecessors and his successor St. Thomas, is preoccupied with explaining the *necessity* of the Saviour's death . . . and that by means of a new idea, that of satisfaction . . . whereas St. Thomas seems to have no such aim, but is content to explain how, *given* the fact of the Incarnation and Passion, it is supremely suitable for the working of our salvation." But this difference between the two doctors is more radical than M. Hardy seems to allow. He fails to point out that at the outset of his treatise on the Incarnation St. Thomas expressly rejects any such absolute necessity for the actual economy of salvation such as Anselm seeks to demonstrate: he will admit only a relative "necessity" in the sense that that economy is supremely suited to supply human needs. Anselm seeks the *raison d'être* of the Incarnation and Atonement in God Himself: in the necessity for the preservation of the *honor Dei* and for the reparation of His *laesa majestas* brought about by the frustration of His Will through angelic and human sin. Not God's free love for man but His necessary love for Himself is for Anselm the compelling motive of the Incarnation and Passion in the main argument of his *Cur Deus Homo?* But Thomas sees that that *raison d'être* must be sought in *man*: or rather in the infinity of God's love for man—it is the response of divine love to human needs which finds its supreme expression in Self-Donation. We do not think, then, that M. Hardy has plumbed the depths of St. Thomas's thought when he says "Saint Thomas range l'œuvre de la rédemption dans les cadres de justice métaphorique." Thomas has, in fact, so far departed from Anselm that he does not range it within the order of justice at all, but simply and solely within the order of love. It is this that enables him to discard the oppressive Anselmian legalism in its entirety. True, the concepts of justice (even strict justice) and satisfaction have their important but subordinate place in the Thomist synthesis; but only because justice and satisfaction are themselves the product of the boundless love and mercy of God which will reconcile us with Himself, not by the ignominy of a gift thrown at a beggar, but in such wise that we may *deserve* His gift by paying its full price, as it were on equal terms with our Creator whom we have injured (cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, i, 2, and parallel passages). The deep roots of this moving doctrine are to be found earlier in the *Summa* where St. Thomas discusses the inter-relation of the divine attributes of mercy and justice (I, xxi, 4), showing how the whole order of justice is dependent upon the prior attribute of mercy. This truth needs particular emphasis at the present time when many are bewildered by popular misconceptions of an incalcul-

BLACKFRIARS

ably whimsical Deity who alternates extremities of mercy with extremities of justice; or whose justice, as the saying is, is "tempered" by mercy and whose mercy is restricted by His justice. God is *all-merciful* and *all-just*; and all-just *because* all-merciful.

This vast theme cannot be developed in a review; but it is, we suggest, the key to a full understanding of St. Thomas's thought on the Atonement and on the whole economy of salvation. A certain failure to penetrate all its depths does not detract from the real value of M. Hardy's book. Nor does what he confesses to be "*le caractère abrupt du style*," which is well off-set by the intrinsic beauty of the truths of which it is the vehicle. But the book which, discarding mediæval technical terminology, will expound St. Thomas's thought on the Atonement in warm and living language has yet to be written, as has also the book which will show to what extent St. Thomas is less the successor of Anselm than the rehabilitator of Anselm's opponent, Peter Abelard. M. Hardy has laid solid foundations for both these books.

VICTOR WHITE, O.P.

HAUPTFRAGEN DER METAPHYSIK. By Daniel Feuling, O.S.B.
(Anton Pustet, Salzburg-Leipzig; RM. 9.80.)

The subtitle defines its purpose: it is an "Introduction to the Philosophic Life." It is intended to provide the reader with the beginnings of that theoretical contemplation which the author considers essential to fulness of life.

For this reason, perhaps, he has aimed at a simplicity of expression which comes near to being overdone; both because he loses clarity by trying to be so clear, and because it gives him a false appearance of naivety.

Philosophy for Dom Feuling is essentially metaphysic, concerned with all the being and relations of the concrete real, and striving always to discover and to answer the ultimate questions that can be asked in its regard. Of such questions he could of course present only a selection, but the selections and arrangement afford us a fairly detailed outline of a complete philosophy. The thirty-seven chapters are further divided into 361 numbered sections, with titles so well chosen that the table of contents leaves but little for the index to do.

The first part of the book is an outline of a "hypothetical" metaphysic built upon the assumption that our everyday beliefs are not entirely wrong. The purpose of this is to provide subject-matter for and to direct attention to the problems to be discussed in the second, epistemological part.

His epistemology is a metaphysic of the concrete real we call the act of knowing, an attempt to develop and present in detail