

Careful scholarship in demonstrating that Jesuit education during the nineteenth and early twentieth century did not—contrary to popular belief—concentrate on the sons of the wealthy and the elite. The education given and received was pragmatically aimed at what minority citizens would need in the Protestant England of those days. This is a fascinating book which gives a careful and accurate view of what it took to establish and maintain the English Jesuit schools, and of the opposition they faced, sometimes even from the Catholic Hierarchy.

Across the Irish Sea the major influence in the establishment of the education system was Edmund Rice, the founder of the Christian Brothers and the Presentation Sisters and Brothers. His beatification (6 October 1996) was the occasion for the publication of his life, *Edmund Rice 1762–1844*, by Dáire Keogh (Four Courts Press, Dublin, 1996). Rice's life spanned a crucial era, from the dawn of Emancipation to the eve of the Great Famine. These were vital years in the formation of the Irish Catholic consciousness, marking the end of the Penal era and the establishment of the modern Church. In all these matters Rice made a significant contribution, fostering confidence and creating a literate modern society. It is well worth reading Keogh's book on Rice hand in hand with Roberts' work on Jesuit collegiate education in England. Together they offer some insight into the way the Catholic education system developed in these islands. They also show how much depended on the inspirational leadership of individuals. I doubt whether present legislation and the dominance by government of education allows for such creativity by the religious orders. Maybe that is why they are in decline.

MALCOLM MCMAHON OP

**KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH IN THOMAS AQUINAS** by John I. Jenkins, CSC. *Cambridge University Press*, 1997. Pp. xv+267. £35.

Lucidly written and with all the appropriate scholarly apparatus, this fine book challenges standard views.

First, Dr Jenkins (who teaches at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana) insists on the difference between modern philosophy and the work of Thomas Aquinas. Post-Cartesian philosophy has been driven by sceptical worries in epistemology which never afflicted Aquinas. Modern philosophy began in doubt, Jenkins quotes Henry Frankfurt as saying; philosophy in the ancient world began in wonder. Thomas belongs to that ancient world. Though the wisdom he and his contemporaries sought could not be had except by living a life informed by love of God and neighbour, a love realizable only if we are elevated beyond our nature by divine grace, there was no separation (let alone conflict) between the philosophical quest for wisdom on the basis of wonder and the theological acquisition of wisdom in response to God's self-revelation. We distort Aquinas's thought, Jenkins says, if we extract

it from ancient philosophy and come at it in terms of the issues of post-Cartesian philosophy. That challenges a century of neo-Thomism from Josef Kleutgen onwards, including the offshoot of transcendental Thomism.

Secondly, Jenkins argues that the notion of *scientia* (Aristotle's *episteme*) with which Aquinas works, is that to be found in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* and in Aquinas's commentary on that notoriously difficult work. Essentially, it has to do with the sort of intellectual formation required for that which is most intelligible in itself to become most intelligible to us—the goal of *scientia* is that we grasp what is *per se notum* and reason to conclusions from that. The only way, however, is to undertake years of training and discipline under the guidance of those more accomplished in the field, so that one may acquire the appropriate intellectual habits. It is a bit like the notion of apprenticeship which Alasdair MacIntyre has highlighted—submitting oneself to a teacher and accepting on the teacher's authority guidance in acquiring the skills necessary to become adept in the craft.

This notion of Aristotle's *episteme* is very much the one insisted on in Myles Burnyeat's marvellous paper in the Berti collection on the *Posterior Analytics* (1981)—thus not just science as a body of knowledge about some subject, organized into a system of proofs on the model of arithmetic and geometry—that, for Jenkins as for Burnyeat, leaves out half the story. As Burnyeat argues, *episteme* is not 'knowledge' but 'understanding'—understanding of knowledge which the students already have, or deeper understanding of knowledge they have in an unsystematic way. One might have knowledge of the propositions of a science in the sense of having grasped them with the knowledge we have of things familiar to us—yet one may not have achieved much understanding (cf. *Ethics* 1139 b 33-5). Indeed this is the condition of apprentice learners (1147 a 21-2)—like our university students, as Burnyeat says: able to connect the propositions of some discipline in an orderly enough way but without yet having mastered them. In other words, what is needed to complete the process of coming to understand is not more evidence, more data—the students have plenty of data, one can imagine—what is required is 'intellectual practice and familiarity'. Furthermore, following Burnyeat: 'There is such a thing as intellectual habituation as well as moral habituation, and in Aristotle's view both take us beyond mere knowing to types of contemplative and practical activity which are possible only when something is so internalized as to have become one's second nature'.

Thus, understanding first principles of some body of knowledge is not some intuition at the outset, as we might be tempted to imagine, but rather the achieved state which is the end and completion of the whole epistemological process. So, for Jenkins, Thomas Aquinas's notion of *scientia* has to do with the understanding of what is *per se notum* achieved in the course of an intellectual apprenticeship. As he says, this invites us to reconsider for whom the *Summa theologiae* was designed

and what sort of enterprise it actually is.

Jenkins argues against the standard view—in particular against Leonard Boyle's version of it (1982): far from being a handbook for beginners, for Dominican friars not bright enough to be sent to the great universities to do their theology, the *Summa Theologiae* was written for advanced students, who had already spent years doing philosophy and Scripture, and had now been selected as the next generation of professors. If it is meant as first-level pedagogy, Jenkins argues, the *Summa* is a 'spectacular failure'—it is no good saying with Marie-Dominique Chenu that Thomas perhaps suffered from 'some of that illusion which is common to professors as regards the capacities of their students'. Jenkins compares discussions in the *Summa* and earlier parallel discussions, suggesting quite plausibly that the latter are often more accessible, but his main argument is that, according to the pedagogical principle set forth in the *Posterior Analytics* commentary, 'when any effect is more apparent to us than its cause, we proceed through the effect to an apprehension of the cause'. In the *Summa*, however, Thomas begins, not with effects which are most apparent to us, but with God, first cause and last end of all things—least known to us in this life. From there Aquinas moves to angels, only then to human beings—just the opposite way of proceeding from what he recommends in initial instruction. So why assume that the *Summa* is for run-of-the-mill students? Surely it is structured for intellectual habituation at second-level studies? Thomas was writing a text for postgraduates, so to speak, students at an advanced enough level to have the material presented in such a way that they would grasp effects in virtue of causes and thus acquire understanding. Such advanced students would also be 'beginners'—thus Jenkins deals with the *incipientes/novitii* whom Thomas mentions in the Prologue—not entirely convincingly, it has to be said.

Again, considering assent to the articles of faith as the principles of sacred doctrine, Jenkins argues, against a quite prevalent view, that Aquinas did not think this assent is inferred from any conclusions of natural theology. Rather, with his doctrine of grace, grace as elevating our natural powers, including the theological virtues and Gifts of the Holy Spirit, we need to understand how seriously Aquinas took the transformation of a human being brought about by grace. Thus, Jenkins argues against the naturalist interpretation of Aquinas on the assent of faith (John Hick but also Terence Penelhum, Alvin Plantinga and others—roughly, you assent to the articles of the Creed because you first accept proofs of philosophical theology which show that God exists and arguments from miracles) and against the voluntarist interpretation (the command of the will deals with defective evidence—James Ross and Eleanore Stump). The first view neglects Aquinas's insistence on the need for grace—his opposition even to semi-Pelagian anthropology; the second forgets that, as he repeatedly says, the conclusions of natural theology arguments are significantly less certain than the beliefs of faith

(e.g. 2a 2ae 2,4 and 1a 1,1). One's Christian beliefs are held with greater certainty than one's acceptance of the conclusion of natural theology—it would be odd to suppose that the former rest on the latter as their secure foundation. The virtue of faith and the Gifts of wisdom and knowledge enable the believer to assent to the articles of faith immediately.

As regards the Five Ways: well, if the story about second-level studies is correct, then of course the arguments cannot be there to show us that God exists as though there could be any doubt about this. These arguments cannot be intended to establish a conclusion which is in doubt but must rather be ways to help us to understand something about God—and here Jenkins takes us back to David Burrell, *Exercises on Religious Understanding* (1974) and *Aquinas; God and Action* (1979). Readings of Aquinas diverge considerably: on some issues Jenkins is startlingly innovative; in others he aligns himself with other recent studies; all in all, however, this is a very distinguished contribution to the renaissance of Thomist scholarship in North America.

FERGUS KERR OP

**THE SAINTS OF SCOTLAND: ESSAYS IN SCOTTISH CHURCH HISTORY, AD 450–1093, by Alan Macquarrie, John Donald, Edinburgh, 1997.**

Scotland can be a frustrating place to work as an early medievalist. Far less documentary evidence has survived here than in England or Ireland, respectively our closest neighbour and our next of kin in this period. Such documents as we have are largely ecclesiastical, of course, which makes a history such as this one easier to write than a history of politics or farming. But hagiography is tendentious, highly politically charged material, and the historian must adopt a hermeneutic of extreme suspicion when dealing with it. Macquarrie manages this well for the most part, adding evidence from annals, liturgical works (including the *Aberdeen Breviary*, which is crying out for further scholarly attention), archaeology and folk traditions, to paint a picture of Scotland's church from the fifth to the eleventh century in refreshingly bright colours.

This is a work of history, not hagiography—except for a curious last paragraph in which the author hopes that we will be inspired by the example of these holy men (and a woman), even though our *Vitae* suggest that their subjects were important for their *virtus* rather than their virtue, to be prayed to rather than imitated. It is not only a history of saints, but a collection of historical essays using the lives of a handful of saints as a lens to examine a wide range of topics.

Scotland is certainly in need of such historical writing. Last year we saw the strange spectacle of the Diocese of Dumfries and Galloway celebrating 1600 years of Christianity, based on the mistaken claim that Ninian died in 397—Macquarrie makes a convincing claim for the sixth century.