

responsiveness to central demands. Huang addresses this issue by first arguing that because statistical methods are premised on the existence of random error, there is no requirement that the data be pristine. If they were, he correctly points out, there would be no need to apply statistical methods because the data would, by definition, accurately describe reality. He then notes that his previous work has shown that while Chinese statistics contain considerable random error and noise, there is no evidence of systematic bias. Thus, according to Huang, the data are dirty but not cooked, with the result that proper statistical handling renders them reliable indicators. Proponents of the distintegration argument and those who harbor reservations about Chinese statistics may not be swayed by these arguments, but before they can turn the tables on Huang they will now have to answer Huang's data with hard and convincing data of their own.

Overall, the book is a formidable work of scholarship and an impressive application of social science methodology to the study of central-provincial relations in China. Readers should also not be misled by the rather dry technical-sounding title. Although overtly about economic policy implementation, Huang's book addresses critical political questions about postreform China and is a powerful and important counterpoint to those who would argue that China is on the verge of disintegration.

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The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy. By MICHAEL H. HUNT. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. xiv, 343 pp. \$34.50.

This book could not have been published at a more opportune time, for the reforms set in motion by Deng Xiaoping seem destined to enable Chinese elites to reach a goal that they have sought since the middle of the nineteenth century: to acquire the power and vitality that will permit China to take its proper place among the world's great powers. As China's economic and military power steadily increase, the future foreign policies to be pursued by Beijing are now becoming a central concern in post-Cold War Asia. Thus, a reevaluation of the principles that have driven the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) external relations in the past will assist scholars and policymakers as they prepare for a far more powerful China in the twenty-first century. Hunt's important work, a decade in preparation and drawing upon his earlier essays, is constructed on a framework of three basic concerns: an examination of the ways in which the CCP's external relations fit historical patterns of China's foreign policy; the need to revisit the basic patterns of communist China's policies following the release of party historical documents; and, consequently, the requirement to reexamine some of the core ideas permeating the field of Chinese foreign policy.

Hunt argues that more attention should be paid to the continuities of the past in examining communist China's policies, carefully noting that the CCP inherited not a single model for conducting foreign policy, but has a diverse tradition of statecraft to draw upon. This historical legacy covers strategies ranging from the use of brute force and balance of power principles to compromise and collaboration, and from cultural exchanges and trade to secret alliances and diplomacy. All of these strategies in China's past have close parallels with policies pursued at different times in China's modern history. Of these diverse traditions, which will prove more influential in the future? In seeking to answer this question, Hunt provides a detailed historical analysis that takes the reader from the variety of policies and strategies used by the late Qing as it sought to survive encroachment by foreign powers (1800–1912)

through the early years of Mao Zedong's dominance of the CCP as it developed foreign policy in the years 1935 through 1951. The conclusions drawn from this exegesis will not surprise any student of CCP foreign policy either before or after the party seized power in 1949. Hunt determines that Marxism-Leninism did not and has not imposed an ideological strait-jacket on China's policymakers, nor were communist leaders, including Mao Zedong, driven by a primitive "middle kingdom" complex. Rather, they faced and responded to complex domestic and international influences so interwoven that only by understanding the interaction of the two with ideology and personality can we understand their combined effect on the CCP's policy choices. Casting its shadow over these elements was China's nineteenth-century crisis, which formed the crucible for the CCP's founding fathers.

Hunt contends that in recent years China's foreign relations have been neglected by historians and left to political scientists, who have their own scholarly agenda. At the hands of political scientists, China's foreign relations history has been subjected to theoretical abstractions of little value in understanding Chinese foreign policy and the use of analytic tools designed to overcome the paucity of evidence but which ultimately provide misleading interpretations of the CCP's decision-making processes and the policies it produced. Hunt concludes, however, that the new information now available on both the Republican era and the early years of the CCP, including the role of Mao Zedong, provide sufficient data for political science theories to usefully frame the issues used to order the new data. Further, he asserts that political scientists' concern with contemporary issues can complement the work of historians in that the latter's historical findings can be used to illuminate current problems. In essence, Hunt suggests that these new sources provide sufficient data that the study of Chinese foreign policy can now be more fully integrated into the frameworks provided by comparative foreign relations history.

Hunt performs yet an additional service to the study of Chinese foreign policy by providing a guide to the literature focused on the evolution of CCP foreign relations (pp. 251–72), including sources that have appeared in China over the past decade. Similarly, his discussion of the strengths and weaknesses in the foreign policy scholarship underway within China since the late 1970s will be invaluable to those using the results of this scholarship or who seek to conduct collaborative projects with Chinese researchers already at work on the process of revitalizing the study of China's foreign relations. In short, Hunt uses this superb book to invite discussion and debate over the history and future of China's foreign relations, and of the methods used to explore the many dimensions of this complex topic as new data illuminate the past. I cannot imagine any serious student of Chinese foreign policy not placing this book in a personal library and recommending it to students.

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Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China. By ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. xii, 317 pp. \$39.50.

After generations of scholarship stressing the pacific and humanistic nature of China's Confucian culture, several important recent studies have shifted the focus to violence in China: most notably Mark Lewis's *Sanctioned Violence in Early China*