

who has abused the internationalism of knowledge, he has been perhaps most powerful in spreading this new religion.

The present number of *BLACKFRIARS* contains several articles on the problem of populations and displaced persons because that is one of the fundamental problems behind the struggle between Communism and Christianity. It is no use opposing Communism, which feeds on real injustices, unless we can provide not merely a better redress for these injustices but also a means of re-integrating the people into localities. We must devise some way of re-placing the displaced persons, of slowing down and eventually stopping the movement of populations. One of the few places where any success in this sphere has been achieved is America, where hundreds of nationalities have settled down together and begun to lead a new localised life. The small towns of the U.S.A. should be an example worth studying in detail and *BLACKFRIARS* is here favoured by Mr Geoffrey Stone, an American who is in a position to lead the way in such an investigation. Perhaps the process of re-integration into a place is a thing which cometh not by observation; but certain it is that even should present Russian Communism be defeated it will be succeeded by something equally as unpatriotic and anti-social until populations are once more brought down to earth.

THE EDITOR

MOVING POPULATION

LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

THE population of South Africa has been formed by a series of migrations, all of them, if we except the prehistoric wanderings of the Bushmen and Hottentots, within recent times. The Native Africans came down from the central lakes within recent 'saga' memory. Their genealogies do not, of course, give dates. But probably 400 years covers the main movement. Among them came the invading Dutch and British. Other European races and, in large numbers, the Jewish people followed. There is a considerable number of Greeks and Syrians who, especially the latter but even to some extent the former, occupy a borderline position on the edge of the South African concept of 'European'. Into this mixture large numbers of Indians and Malays, and a small number of Chinese, were imported.

It would take many thousand words to describe the mere categorisation of South African population, in which Natives, Coloureds, Asiatics and Europeans have each a separate position, and each their

sub-divisions. So all that can be done for the purpose of this article, which is to give South African illustrations of the social-moral effects of movement of population, is to take certain special points of interest and let the many-sided background suggest itself in dealing with them.

To begin with, South Africa has no deported populations, no physically crossed immigrants. The only people who might be so called are the Jews, who are in a sense involuntary immigrants wherever they are. But their condition in South Africa is not sufficiently different from elsewhere to be of special interest. All the other migrants have come by that mixture of pressure of circumstance—geographical, economic and cultural—with free choice, which is as near the 'voluntary' as nations or groups (as opposed to individuals) usually reach.

THE PRIMITIVE NOMAD

South Africa takes us to bedrock on the question of men in movement. For, apart from the maladjustments of individual migration, of mixed cultures and racial animosities, which are the common problems of present day movement of population, it shows us the life of a true primitive nomadic people: the African 'Bantu'. The Natives moved south as organised tribes, or at least large clans. They moved in response to a natural urge or choice or circumstance, looking for new pastures and hunting grounds, escaping from natural over-population or war, and looking for war and conquest—as unredeemed man does 'naturally'. There was nothing coercive in the movement. No man moved out of his family and milieu, but his milieu, the whole tribal system, moved with him.

And yet in this most primordial and regular form of population movement we are brought face to face with a principle that should make every true social philosopher a minimalist in encouraging migration. It is that people on the move, living on unsettled and incalculable forms of subsistence, whether primitive hunters or modern work-seekers, tend to hand over their liberties to a highly centralised authority: both economically in matters of ownership and socially in matters of government. They are moved to do this by a sense of insecurity and the need of quick decisions, for they are virtually in a permanent state of crisis, have to be ready to meet sudden emergencies of war, economic conflict, scarcity, etc. People on the other hand who live by a more calculable and regular form of subsistence, such as agricultural peoples, and have a minimum of special accident and war have more opportunity to cultivate economic independence, and so social or moral freedom. The African tribes are but one example of this, although a very interesting one.

In the Bantu system the moral freedom of the person is conditioned by the fact that he has practically no economic independence. The traditional wealth of the people is in cattle, and no man can dispose of his own cattle, under real native custom, at his own judgment. He has no real 'dominium'. It is really the clan that owns the cattle—common ownership, part personal use, it might be called, in contrast to St Thomas's personal ownership, part communal use. The individual can have a herd, and use it, but there is a co-ownership of the clan, by which he can be called upon, not as voluntarily but by law and custom, to provide cattle, e.g. for the bride-price of his male relatives. The status of the clan is determined by its cattle. If he slaughtered or gave away cattle according to his individual judgment that status would be affected; it would curtail the ability of the young man to give an honourable bride-price and maintain the position of the clan. He can also be called upon, more irregularly than in our taxation systems, to provide tribute or sacrificial animals, and so the element of personally providing for the future which Leo XIII makes one of the basic points in man's right to private property, is reduced. If he is a younger son, even if middle aged, he cannot alienate cattle without reference to the clan head, father or clan brother; nor can the clan head do so without reference to his brothers. Colonial administration, using our ideas of property, has continually produced illustrations of this. Attempts to register property rights of individuals, or to get chiefs to say how much of their income is 'public money' and how much 'their own', fail to connect. Everything is the chief's or clan head's, and yet everything is in use by someone personally.

This, under heathenism, is sanctioned by religion. The cattle belong to the Ancestors of the clan, are used in the purification of their graves, etc . . . Even native 'philosophy', in so far as it is true to speak of their pragmatic attitude to life as philosophy, upholds it. Men are regarded as the continuation of the totem-force in the clan. For religion in heathenism is very largely a social convention. It is interesting to note how modern collectivist economic ideas, such as communism and Nazism, have encouraged pantheistic ideas in religion in the same way. But the evidence in both cases is the same, that it is really the economic factor that is predominant.

This economic collectivism of the Bantu affects family integrity as we visualise it. The essential parent-child relationship is upset. A child is not wholly under the guardianship of its natural parents. Others are financially responsible: e.g. to give and receive cattle in connection with marriage; to adopt entire financial responsibility if parents die. So they claim authority. A child may belong more

to its grandparents than to its parents, even to an uncle or aunt. Brothers and sisters may be bound, without choice, to step into their elders shoes, e.g. a younger sister to marry the widower of her elder sister.

In all matters as to where he shall live, what he shall do, the native is something less than captain of his soul. Any progress or invention, even the most legitimate, such as, for instance, attempts at better methods of peasant agriculture, are regarded with suspicion as something individualistic, often obstructed by chiefs and headmen. A native, especially a woman, following her conscience in becoming a Christian, may find it morally impossible to keep freedom of conscience on account of a complete economic dependence.

This association of the 'nomad' state of man with communal ownership and absolution of social authority can be paralleled from many spheres, ancient and modern, and in such a way as to show that it is the economic condition of 'mobility', rather than the religious and cultural factors varying in connection with it, that is the determining factor. Anthropology shows us the contrast between the more communal life of the primitive hunters, fishers and food gatherers, and the more 'individualist' ways of life of agricultural people. And the principle makes a key to European economic history, and the present crisis with socialism, much more significant than the factor more frequently recognised: industrialisation. Certainly added complexity of social life leads to periods of absolutism. But where we find the contrast without any complexity of life, as among primitive peoples, this suggests that we have to look further. Actually the nomadic peoples who overran Europe from the fifth century had similar clan-like systems, and in the first age of their settling developed the semi-socialist system of Feudalism, in which every individual ownership had a cover-ownership of the feudal superior. As Europe became solidly peasant living, so more individual forms of ownership were evolved. Now that man is in motion again, whole peoples milling around work-seeking, and in a state of crisis, we see the same phenomenon in the modern nomad as in the ancient: search for communalised forms of security, willingness to surrender individual freedom for their sake.

That once the monks taught, and now the missionaries teach nomads agriculture, is not just an *ad hoc* means of helping them to subsist, it is part of the stuff of Catholic social lore, something to do with the effect of movement on the framework of society and the character of man. The Church (and in this case the importance of factors is reversed) for a philosophic and religious reason made

Europe personalist largely by social stabilisation. That personalism may have tipped over into individualism and need plain moral reform in the redistribution of property. There may be a lot of adjusting to do to meet the conditions of the mobilised man, acceptance of state social-security systems to replace the older local and township co-operation which the scattering of the people has destroyed. It may be necessary to find a *modus vivendi* with socialism in many places—just as the Church finds a *modus vivendi* with the Bantu system which is unsatisfactory in the same way—until man is stabilised enough to have private ownership once more, and the partnership ownership in his industry of which Pius XI speaks. We have to recognise the fact of the mobilisation of man, and its unsatisfactory implications, where they are beyond our control. But fundamentally to personalise man, to assure him moral freedom, we must work for personal ownership for him, and for this we must do all we can to stabilise him.

RACIAL CLASHES IN MIGRATION

South Africa also provides us with more immediate inconveniences caused by migration: the strained relationships of different colours and cultures. In a way the most significant of these is not the obvious one, the situation of the Africans, but that of the imported Indians.

The Indians first came to South Africa as imported labour for the sugar plantations in Natal. They have multiplied until they are now about 200,000 in number, as against the European 2,000,000, and the Native 8,000,000. In some areas of Natal they are the majority of the population. They are also scattered about the Cape and Transvaal, although excluded by law from the Free State Province. They have restricted rights as 'Asiatics', varying locally, but generally such as follow: they cannot acquire property in 'white' areas; they are not admitted to work alongside Europeans in crafts and business, although they can have independent businesses; they have to travel in separate railway compartments and are under a general social bar; they cannot be represented in Parliament by their own race, nor vote on the common voters' roll. They themselves have kept up a similar bar against the Natives, do not intermarry with them or with the Coloureds (a race of mixed Malay and Hottentot origin in the Cape) and are very much of an in-group, having their own freemasonry and co-operation. Their situation outside all the main currents of South African social life causes them to follow more independent, gipsy-like forms of trading for their living, although some are in regular employment and business.

The special urgency of the Indian question in South Africa is that

the excuse of unpreparedness, which is always given for withholding rights from Natives, has no validity in their case now that India and Pakistan are self-governing Dominions with an international status equal to that of South Africa. Nor do the politicians who talk of 'trusteeship' for Natives, implying that the situation of the latter will eventually change, make any attempt to use the same theories about Indians. They are flatly excluded on grounds of colour, and no hope is held out of their being integrated into the South African system. And there is real time urgency in the question of doing something about them. Many are as 'cultured and educated', by European technical standards, as Europeans. They are wealthy and clever, and use their means and ability to stir up communism in South Africa among the Natives and Coloureds; to humiliate South Africa before U.N.O., where they succeeded in making General Smuts one of the first victims of the court he did so much to plan; to involve South Africa in serious troubles with India.

There is no doubt that the colour-prejudice is so strong that most South Africans would resort to bloodshed sooner than see the Indians admitted to any equalisation. And there is no human or religious force in the country that shows evidence, at present, of seriously altering the situation. Short of a miraculous conversion it means continual bitterness, if not bloodshed, and even the possibility of a return of the Indians to India, or to some country where they might be more acceptable, such as Mauritius, is no solution. For over three or four generations they have lost their roots in India and feel South African. This problem is repeated in various different forms all up the East African seaboard, a permanent testimony to the unwisdom of haphazard emigration, importation of labour, and population movements in general, and in particular where there is a question of colour-bar.

And lest anyone should think such situations are purely a matter of colour, South Africa, land of so many social lessons, provides us with another example of racial clash through migration where no colour question is involved. The Dutch and British, with their Europeanism in common in a land of Africans, living and working together, intermarrying, have yet so fundamental a disagreement on many points as seriously to compromise the welfare of South Africa as a whole. The Dutch are, as a whole, Colonist, Right-Wing, closed-Nationalist, averse to immigration of other Europeans, determined to preserve their language and their local culture intact. There can be little doubt that the majority of them still hope to see South Africa an independent and chiefly Dutch republic. They are determined on segregation of the Natives, and Calvinism gives

them grounds for looking upon the latter as a permanently inferior race. The English-speaking on the other hand are Liberal in religion and politics, commercial-national and ready to receive every immigrant and establish every relationship that may help, but equally determined to remain English in culture and not become Dutch, to see South Africa part of the Anglo-American racial group. They profess a very different attitude in Native affairs, speaking much of 'trusteeship' and a rosy future for the Natives. And this talk, which is hardly justified by any noticeable difference in actual administration, but represents the widely different backgrounds of the two races, was made the subject of an emotional campaign in the recent elections. Native questions, all questions of foreign policy or welfare, cultural activities, even sport—the rivalry of culture enters everywhere. The racial grouping virtually divides the two large political parties and has now succeeded in giving itself permanence by dividing the schools. Without going into the rights and wrongs on each side, which are near enough 'fifty-fifty', one can say that once again migration, without a real foreseeing of its effects and a real will to overcome its maladjustments, has produced a serious social evil. In a way it gives an opportunity to the internationalism of the Church, but it is a sad opportunity.

THE INDUSTRIAL NOMAD

The last example I wish to give of our experience of population movement is that of the Migratory Labourers. Again a social problem found elsewhere is crossed by the colour-bar, and made more difficult. But it contains food for thought for all spheres of labour migrations.

South Africa has only a few industrial centres, and its land is not very profitable. What land there is, 85 per cent of it, has been parcelled out in large ranch farms to whites, and the Native tribal areas are so poor in land that Natives have to come to the towns for work. Many would come in any case, out of an ordinary human desire for progress, novelty, money, etc. And the Europeans are prepared to pay what is attractive to the rural native. But behind this normal supply and demand is an economic coercion: poverty at home, need for money to buy in the European markets and pay cash taxes. There is no force used on individuals, so it cannot be called conscript labour. But it is virtually such because of the economic pressure, which would be increased if the flow of labour stopped. For the South African white will not do without the Native to work for him in the town. But at the same time he will not have the Native to live with him in the town. Only a few natives employed in Industry are allowed to live with their families in married

quarters in town locations. A small percentage again, perhaps 25 per cent, can live with their families on farms. But the vast majority of the labour force is only allowed bachelor and barrack accommodation in the towns, single quarters built at the back of the European quarters or on the roofs of sky-scrapers, compounds and hostels housing up to 10,000 men in one block. Some 60 per cent of the Native men of the Union are away from home at any given time, living in this way, not only youths but, for instance in the mine compounds, more than half, married men. Girls have started to come to town for work in the same way, and many continue after marriage, leaving their children with grandparents and their husbands in a compound to do so.

The effects of this system are indescribable. The periods of work and return home vary from a few months to anything from one to four years, and the first result is the destruction of family life. The men away, or the women at home, cannot live in this forced bachelor manner, and sex morality has almost disappeared among them. Children barely know their parents, and are posted around to many different schools. As education, so home agricultural development is interrupted. There is no real economic basis to the social life of the Reserves. In the towns the Natives are excluded from social amenities and opportunities; they are unable to form even a consistent underworld society, because there are so many different languages, tribes and customs, and still linked by law with their various home tribes. And behind it all this permanent wandering and sexual maladjustment are forming a restless, ambitious, agitated psychology, a perfect background for communism. So serious is the indulgence in drink and promiscuity that there are signs of the possibility of the South African Natives, like the North American Indians, dying out; or at least being reduced to a pitiful minority, without any weight of numbers to make up for their lack of social influence—like the American negroes.

The colour-bar accentuates all these evils. Nor has any other country in the world, as far as I know, such an universal system of migratory labour. When the family can migrate with the bread-winner things are not so bad, and town living people are becoming so standardised that the change of milieu for British or French workers, for instance, moving around their own countries in search of work, is barely noticeable. But South African experience brings home to us the very serious social dangers in present ideas of directed labour and the mobility of labour. Where it means, as it so frequently means now, that the family cannot move as a whole but is split, it is a menace—the prolongation of war morality and

psychology. Where the family could move as a whole, as far as I can see it would still take us back to the type of the primitive nomad, the man who never has time to know where he is, nor to integrate himself into ownership and co-operation in any one sphere, who is unsettled by a sense of insecurity, who is ready to surrender his individuality for the sake of communal or state security schemes. The industrial nomad is extraordinarily like to the primitive nomad. It is one of the jokes of sociology in South Africa that prefabricated houses are a return to the ways of the Hottentots—because they never knew where they were to stay, they made moveable houses. This is a symbol.

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In this article I have deliberately avoided the purely ecclesiastical point of view, the plain difficulties of the pastoral work of the Church with migrant peoples, mixed languages and cultures, the break-up of local parish organisation. . . . As a matter of fact where 'statistics' of morals are destroyed, even where much freedom is destroyed, the Church can work, and one finds strange virtue, great moral efforts, behind the apparent chaos and frustration. But one must try to work for the kingdom of God on earth as it is in heaven. And in this humanist purpose it is not just an immediately practical point of view, nor a romantic nostalgia for the settled state of Europe in which the Church perfected her administration, but something basic to do with man that we must consider: patience of mind, moral freedom, loyalty, family life, community life as opposed to a forced collectivism. There must be exceptions, specially trained and prepared for their exceptional life, the colonist and settler, the soldier or sailor, the travelling student or specialist, lay or missionary. But, though it sounds unheroic in this age of transport, a true social philosopher must be forced to the conclusion that on the whole man settled is better than man on the move. He is then more adapted for the truest human heroism, which does not consist in excitements and movement and new hunting grounds and wars, in nothing in fact that can be shared with the animals, but in that which is specific of man: mental growth and moral struggle. South Africa, land of migrants, drives this home to your mind.

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