

divided it, according to three activities of the human mind. Under simple apprehension she expounds the categories, the predicables and definition; under judgment, the conversion, obversion and opposition of propositions; under reasoning, the syllogism and fallacies. Pierre Conway OP has contributed an appendix on the concept and the proposition; the author herself, supplementary material, which includes that old Aunt Sally, the fourth-figure syllogism, a condensed version of symbolic logic, introducing some of the logical connectives and the use of truth-tables with Russell's symbolism, and an account of sorites illustrated with entertaining examples from Lewis Carroll's *Symbolic Logic*.

But all is not well. Apart from these belated concessions to the nineteenth and twentieth century, what is being offered under the guise of an Aristotelian approach is what Peter Geach has often castigated as the bad old traditional pseudo-Aristotelian logic. A crucial case is the talk of distribution of predicates, where, for instance, we are implausibly asked to construe 'Some men are not handsome' as 'Some men are none of the handsome things.' Fr Conway says firmly in his appended note that concepts are not classes. It is a great pity that this insight was not sustained in the author's account of predication. Aristotle himself recognised a radical difference between subjects and predicates, which was discarded in the later doctrine of distribution. There are other confusions too: induction is described in such broad terms as to cover the formation of concepts as well as principles; in the exposition of the categories and elsewhere the line between thought and expression is sometimes blurred. What are we to make also of an analysis of 'The octopus is extremely dangerous' that presents it as offending against the canons of the simple proposition by having two predicates and then leaves us in this plight without any explanation of the everyday complexity of the adverbial modifier?

For all the apparent confidence with which lines are drawn here, we may be left wondering whether that confidence is well-founded. Symbolic logic is relegated to a potted account in seven pages, as a kind of concession to weakness for those who wish to be 'spared the trouble of solving the argumentation on the mental level.' Forty years ago, a braver spirit pioneered the teaching of symbolic logic in the English Dominican Studium. Surely it is time now to take to heart Professor Geach's severe judgment on another putative introduction to logic: 'Those Colleges of Unreason where the pseudo-Aristotelian logic is presented as the only genuine logic, and those lecturers who would like to teach the philosophy of logic without having to learn any modern logic, may well thus have been supplied with a pretext for supine ignorance' (*Logic Matters*, Oxford, 1972, p. 70).

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PROTESTANTISM AND REPRESSION: A Brazilian Case Study by Ruben A Alves.
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Whatever happened to Rubem Alves? In the late 1960s he was one of the first of the new generation of Latin American theologians to attract the interest of the western world. *A Theology of Human Hope* was followed by *Tomorrow's Child: Creativity and the Rebirth of Culture* and his reputation was established. Unfortunately for him the Presbyterian Church of Brazil was moving in precisely the opposite direction and he was forced out of the Church. The account of this affair has been given elsewhere, and in this new book Alves makes no autobiographical references at all. Indeed the subject of the book is not peculiar to Brazil. In his Foreword the American theologian Richard Shaull claims that the book speaks directly to the situation in the USA where there has been an alliance of neo-conservative religious and political interests. In turn I should say that the book is relevant not only to the Americas, but also to the United Kingdom, not simply in the present situation in which a similar neo-conservatism is everywhere evident, but also to Northern Ireland.

Historically Protestantism in Brazil was a progressive force in education, the

development of democracy, and in social and economic transformations. Indeed the Catholic hierarchy regarded it as dangerous and subversive. But at the very time when, under the influence of the Council, Catholicism was becoming progressive in these areas, Protestantism was becoming reactionary. There was suspicion and then rejection of the initiatives in theology and social action. The outcome was what Alves calls Right-Doctrine Protestantism (RDP), and although the analysis originates in Brazil, it provides insights into the nature of the phenomenon as it appears in many other countries. RDP is characterized by 'the fact that it stresses agreement with a series of doctrinal affirmations, which are regarded as expressions of the truth and which must be affirmed without any shadow of doubt, as the precondition for participation in the ecclesial community.' Entry into the community therefore entails the acceptance of the ecclesial view of reality. 'The evidence of individuals' salvation is their spoken repetition of the community's knowledge.' Priority is given to the indicative mood over the imperative mood, and this means the priority of knowledge over morality, wisdom over goodness, of doctrine over life. 'Doing good is less important than thinking correctly.' This has a devastating effect on social ethics and political involvement. In the RDP world view man is sinful, but God has acted decisively in Christ. Conversion means accepting this world view, understanding oneself as a sinner and accepting salvation in Christ, 'A Protestant believer could say everything that ought to be said without once alluding to the necessity of transforming the world.' The only transformation, *metanoia*, is in one's view of oneself and the world in the light of revelation. 'Thus we could formulate the viewpoint of this sort of Protestantism as a reversal of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "Human beings have tried in various ways to transform the world; the point is not to transform the world but to reinterpret it."'

On this view, God is in control of his world. He has appointed magistrates to serve him and he has assigned to people their stations in life. 'It does not really matter that a person is poor. What is of crucial importance is the subjective way in which he or she lives this poverty.' It leads to a sacralizing of the powers that be and the social order as it is. Everything that is becomes a sacrament of the divine intention. 'There is no need to transform anything. All we have to do is understand.' Of course even believers are still sinners, but the sins which are identified are easily dealt with by ecclesial authorities. They concentrate on sexual sins, violations of the Sunday, personal vices, crimes against property, dishonesty, heresy. This list is familiar to anyone who reflects on the enemies of Jesus in the gospels.

It all makes fascinating reading, though it is sad that within the Protestant tradition there should develop a movement which in so many respects contradicts what Tillich called 'the Protestant principle' of refusing the temptation to identify absolutes within the world. Even worse is the fact that there are very specific parallels in this book with Boff's book *Church, Charism and Power*. Independently they both make the point that the Inquisition was not concerned with immorality but with heresy. Alves time and again insists that RDP exhibits the spirit of that medieval Catholicism which it takes as its enemy. It is at this point that his analysis comes close to the situation in Northern Ireland, for he claims that RDP does not and cannot take account of any change in direction by the Catholic Church. The *raison d'être* of RDP is to oppose a certain type of Catholicism, and it has a stake in seeing that Catholicism does not change. Otherwise what would it exist to defend? And would it not then itself have to change?

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