

it? Let us again deliberately educate children to be soldiers of Christ who will go forth to save the souls of others. If we will really be true to Christ till death we must say: "We will go forth and teach Thee to all nations".

JOHN M. TODD.

PSYCHOTHERAPY AND ETHICS:

A POSTSCRIPT

THE present writer had already sent to the printer his reflections on Psychotherapy and Ethics⁽¹⁾ before the opportunity came to him of reading Dr. J. C. Flugel's recent book⁽²⁾ on the same subject. Dr. Flugel's approach is, naturally enough, very different from our own. He writes as a psychologist pure and simple, and with a minimum (at least in intention) of extra-psychological pre-suppositions. He is moreover a convinced and orthodox—though also a "progressive" and by no means uncritical—Freudian; but he is unusually open to interests and considerations outside his own professional province and writes with an ease and urbanity uncommon to his kind. Last but not least, he is gifted with a quality which, as has often been remarked, seems to be singularly rare (but, one might have thought, singularly necessary) among psychologists—a keen sense of humour.

The great value and importance of Dr. Flugel's book lies in the fact that it presents us with a remarkably candid, thorough and comprehensive treatment, from a psychoanalyst's own viewpoint, of the subject which has recently engaged our own attention. In certain important matters his conclusions strikingly anticipate and confirm our own. In particular we would draw attention to the frankness with which he dismisses the contention that psychotherapy, as a "pure science", can confine its attention to the *means* of human conduct and disregard consideration of the ends and values which are the province of ethics (pp. 12 ff., 30 ff.) Indeed it is precisely because he believes that the analytical exploration of psychological means modifies our apprehension of these ends and values that he has written and published the book at all; in the belief, that is to say, that from psychoanalysis (notwithstanding its many candidly recognised insufficiencies) many lessons may be learned "concerning the general nature of human morality

(1) BLACKFRIARS, August, 1945, pp. 287 ff.

(2) *Man, Morals and Society: A Psycho-analytical Study*, by J. C. Flugel, B.A., D.Sc. (London: Duckworth; 21s.).

and the general lines of moral progress" (p. 240, cf. Preface). A student of Aristotle and St. Thomas cannot fail to recognise in the "Cognitive (Psychological)" judgment which Dr. Flugel opposes to "Orectic (Moral)" judgment something very much like what he himself understands by the rational ethics of traditional philosophy; and indeed the "guiding notions concerning the main lines of moral progress and development" (p. 241) which Dr. Flugel believes to be indicated by psychoanalysis conform strikingly with many of the main principles of Aristotelian-Thomist ethics. His contrast between the ethics of "facing and expressing" and the ethics of "avoidance" (p. 29) seems almost identical with that of Aristotle between *ARETE* and *EGKRATEIA*, and his emphasis on the "spontaneous goodness" of *habit* recalls the basic conception in traditional ethics of the "good life" as a life of virtue. His plea for "the epicritic discriminatory power of consciousness" as against "the protopathic methods of the unconscious" is scarcely intelligible except as a modern restatement of Aristotle's conception of the participation by the *ALOGON* of *LOGOS*, and his conception of "autonomy" (pp. 252 ff.) is in principle indistinguishable from Aristotle's "magnanimity". However much we must dissent from many of Dr. Flugel's concrete applications of these "guiding notions", it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in their main direction, they represent a return to those of the "intellectualist" ethics of the *philosophia perennis* rather than (as he himself seems to suppose) some new and hitherto unknown peak of human evolution discovered by psychoanalysis. Indeed it may well be asked whether the "stupidity", "infantilism" and "archaism" of modern man's "super-ego", which Dr. Flugel so ruthlessly exposes, and which he shows to be the root of much of the conflict and neurosis of our time, is not due in considerable measure to the vacuum left by the abandonment of this precious heritage.

But the average reader will naturally look to Dr. Flugel's book to learn what practical recommendations psychoanalysis has to offer us in order to recover it, and it is here precisely that the book is profoundly disappointing. Indeed after two hundred and forty pages, most of which are employed in exposing the intricate complexities and bewildering depth of the factors in human perversity, the author, in a passage of profound pessimism, "passes the buck" back to the biologists. Psychoanalysis, it appears, can show man to how great an extent "even his mental and moral characteristics are far from being completely amenable to conscious will and deliberation", but "our ultimate mental and moral capacities, like our ultimate physical characteristics, can probably be changed

only by biological methods" (p. 241).⁽³⁾

Without cynicism and without disparaging the real positive contribution which Dr. Flugel has made to the study of the aetiology of modern man's moral and psychological problems, it may be said that perhaps the chief value of his book lies in its implicit exposure of the impotence of the exclusively "inductive" and "historical causal" method of treatment, an exposure which is all the more impressive because the method is here followed with unprecedented thoroughness and brilliance. From the very first page Dr. Flugel envisages his task solely in terms of "diagnosis and prescription" with a view to discovering the "origin and nature" of man's moral impulses (p. 9). The bulk of the book is in fact occupied with the quite bewildering complexity of the factors which bring about man's moral problems and achievements, and in particular with the causal factors which contribute to the construction of the "super-ego" and its conflict with the "id".⁽⁴⁾ It shows indeed how very far Freudian psychoanalysis has advanced from what Dr. Flugel himself calls the "crude hedonism" of its early formulations, yet its basic postulates are nowhere abandoned. If the categories of purpose and finality be excluded from the study of psychological phenomena, it is inevitable that the axiological is everywhere confused with the aetiological; what is prior in time is regarded as prior in importance and value, and the most psychology can do is to suggest some knowledge of what we ought to do, it is incapable of showing us how to attain the power to do it.⁽⁵⁾ Religion, art, culture, politics, morality, are logically viewed as "displacements" of infantile sexuality and parental relationships—much as if a grown man were regarded as a "displacement" of an embryo. Invaluable as the book will be to the professional analyst, of whatever school, as a guide to the countless and complex factors to be looked for in the origin of his patient's troubles, the average reader, and still more the neurotic reader, will find little in the book which will not confirm him in the belief that he is the victim of a tangle of intricate mechanisms from which psychology is powerless to extricate him. Never before, perhaps, has the bewildering complexity at the origin of the conflict between the

(3) The biologists, on their side, seem to be increasingly anxious to pass the ball back to the psychologists: Carrel's *Man the Unknown*, Kenneth Walker's *Diagnosis of Man* and the remarkable last chapter of V. H. Mottram's "Pelican" book on *The Physical Basis of Personality* bear witness to the game of shuttlecock which the specialists play with poor Modern Man!

(4) The uninitiated will find no more lucid explanation of these uncouth terms than in Dr. Flugel's own book.

(5) This point has been developed at somewhat greater length in the present writer's *Frontiers of Theology and Psychology* (Guild of Pastoral Psychology).

“law of my members” and the “law of my mind” been so ruthlessly revealed; but Dr. Flugel can offer no glimpse of hope of such reconciliation of the conflict as St. Paul found in the grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ.⁽⁶⁾ The emergence of a “transcendent” or “reconciling” function, a *tertium quid*, such as has been observed by Jung as the vehicle of solution, integration and healing (or its recognition should it emerge) is precluded *a priori* by a psychology whose whole preoccupation is with historical causation, which belittles “intuition” as unscientific (cf. p. 9) and which disregards the “energetic” and “final” aspects of psychological phenomena. Notwithstanding the immense advances which Freudian psychoanalysis is shown to have made in its recognition of the importance of “super-ego” factors in psychological health and disease, it is still apt to conceive the way to health and happiness to lie in the murder (however “symbolic”) of the Father rather than in reconciliation with the Father through the self-sacrifice of the Son. It is only consistent with these presuppositions that Dr. Flugel misses the inner psychological relevance of sacrifice and asceticism, and indeed of Christianity generally, and that he can seriously advocate so sophisticated a product of ego-consciousness as Cattell’s “Theopsyche” as a substitute for God.⁽⁷⁾

We must however resist the temptation to examine Dr. Flugel’s book in greater detail in order to consider one of its contentions which, if it could be verified, would completely demolish the position which we have suggested in our previous paper. After showing how, in his opinion, Freudian psychoanalysis has “undermined” (though it has not “disproved”) religion, Dr. Flugel goes on to maintain that in this matter the respective positions of Freud and Jung “are not perhaps very far apart” (p. 267). “In the eyes of some psychologists the emotions are so important that they afford a sort of pragmatic justification for the beliefs, however erroneous or absurd these might appear when judged by a purely intellectual standard. Such psychologists occupy a position obviously akin to that of the pragmatist philosophers, who are also inclined to be tolerant of the ‘truths’ of religion so long as these appear to ‘work’. To others the same emotions, just because they are attached to beliefs that are intellectually suspect, appear to be unhealthy and in need of redirection . . . Jung is an example of the first of these classes, Freud of the second . . . To both (religion) is no doubt satisfying as an object for the contemplation and study of

(6) *Epistle to the Romans*, vii. 7 ff.

(7) *Psychology and the Religious Quest*, by R. B. Cattell (Nelson Discussion Books) may be studied as one of the most honest, candid and ingenious efforts at scientific idol-manufacture; a *reductio ad absurdum* of human endeavour to satisfy man’s own thirst for the Absolute.

the psychologist, but to Jung it is so satisfying that he appears to be undisturbed by its frequent lack of agreement with 'truth' or 'reality' as judged by other standards, whereas to Freud such lack of agreement makes it an 'illusion' and brings it into the category of the primitive or pathological. In becoming a psychologist Freud has not been willing to sacrifice the general criteria of truth observed by other sciences, while Jung on his part has become so enthralled by the psychological significance of religious dogma and symbolism that he seems to some extent to have lost interest in these criteria" (pp. 266—7).

This is, for all its mildness of expression, a very serious indictment, and one which could be adequately met only by a thorough and detailed examination of the whole work both of Freud and of Jung and of the implications of their respective data, methods and theories. Such an undertaking is clearly outside the compass of this brief postscript, but since a similar impression has been gained by others in regard to the implications of Jung's psychology, it may be well to offer a few reflections on Dr. Flugel's interpretation.

It may be asked, in the first place, whether Dr. Flugel does not somewhat extenuate the full claims of Freudian psychoanalysis when he says that it "undermines" but does not "disprove" religion and belief in a transcendent God. Dr. Flugel himself reminds us that for Freud religion is, quite categorically and without qualification, an "illusion", indeed "the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity". And if indeed it be true that religion is nothing but a "displacement" of biologically conditioned attitudes, and "God" nothing but a projection of unconscious contents, which unconscious contents are limited to the repressed acquisitions of the subject's lifetime and explicable as such, then it is difficult to see that any other conclusion can be reached.

Jung, on his side, has been on the whole careful to keep his personal religious and metaphysical beliefs and disbeliefs out of his published writings, (at least in the works subsequent to his own breach with Freud). They are his affair and do not here concern us. What does concern us is the compatibility of the general principles of his psychology and psychotherapy with theistic faith and practice; though we cannot do more in this short space than briefly summarise his position in this matter as we understand it.

In the first place it must be remembered that the very existence of Jungian psychology as a distinct school is due to Jung's repudiation of those premisses on which Freud grounded his assertion that religion is an "illusion". Rejecting the exclusively historical-causal view of psychological data, and insisting upon the importance of the "energetic" and "final" viewpoints, it became

impossible for Jung to regard religion, or indeed any of man's cultural achievements, as "displacements" of infantile conditions and attitudes; rather, indeed, are the former the very purpose and fulfilment of the latter, as a mature man is the purpose and fulfilment of the infant. The image of the Father-God is not a substitute-phantasy in which the growing child finds an illusory refuge from the unsatisfactoriness of his physical father; rather is the physical father the first unsatisfactory bearer of the image which the adult will find realised through his image of the Father-God. But neither, for Jung, is the "unconscious" to be limited in its content to the "repressions" of the individual's lifetime, a finite entity which is (at least theoretically) exhaustible by reductive analysis and translation into the terms of consciousness. The idea of a "collective" or "absolute" unconscious is not for him (as for Dr. Flugel) a dubious and optional hypothesis, it is an essential foundation of the whole theory and the resultant practice. To state the emergence of religious symbolism and practice as a process of projection and introjection of unconscious contents, therefore, is for Jung, in no way to "explain" or "invalidate" it. The whole Jungian method of "symbolic" as opposed to "semiotic" interpretation of "unconscious" material is based upon this conception; and in his most recent work Jung has insisted more and more emphatically on the irreducibility of "archetypes" and other epiphenomena of the unconscious to the terms of conscious explanation.⁽⁸⁾

It must be said, therefore, that Jung's whole psychological conception itself "undermines" the underminings of Freud; and this, not on account of any *a-priori* concern for religion or enthrallment with its emotional value (Jung's whole approach to the subject cries out against so facile a dishonesty), but on precisely scientific grounds. It is, of course, perfectly true that, as an empirical and practical psychologist, Jung has been directly concerned with how religion "works" and not with the intrinsic "truth" of any religious doctrine; but this is precisely because he has rightly seen—and has repeatedly said—that the latter does not fall within the competence of empirical psychology. When therefore he says, in a passage which Dr. Flugel quotes as supporting his own alignment of Freud and Jung, that his psychological observations are not to be understood as "a kind of proof of the existence of God: they prove only the existence of an archetypal image of the Deity, which is the most we can assert *psychologically* about God",⁽⁹⁾ there is no tolerance of falsehood or indifference to objective truth. On the con-

(8) Most notably in *Das goettliche Kind* (Amsterdam-Leipzig, 1940).

(9) *Psychology and Religion* (quoted by Flugel, p. 267).

trary Jung is here, as so often elsewhere, simply recognising the limitations of the *kind* of truth that can be yielded by purely empirical science and its incompetence to usurp the functions of theology and metaphysics in the manner of Freud. Time and time again Jung has acknowledged that "a psychological consideration is permissible only in respect of the emotional and symbolical phenomena of a religion, where the essential nature of religion is in no way involved, as indeed it cannot be"⁽¹⁰⁾ and that the empirical psychologist as such can speak "not of God as *Ding an sich*, but only of a human intuition which, as such, is a legitimate object of science".⁽¹¹⁾ The difference between Freud and Jung in this matter would seem to lie precisely in this, that Freud's is a *closed* system which excludes any valid function for theology, metaphysics, mysticism or religion, whereas Jung's is an *open* system which in no way intrudes upon their respective functions and leaves them completely free and untrammelled in their own fields.

Of course it is true that this leaves many questions concerning the relationship of psychology to religion unanswered; questions which the practical psychologist himself cannot evade. For can a religion which is not "true"—or at least be apprehended as true—even "work"? Is not its very "working" dependent upon its "truth"? If "truth" concerning God in Himself and His gracious dealings with man does not lie within the scope of psychology, nevertheless the yearning and need for that truth is an ineradicable and basic element of the human psyche which psychology cannot ignore without self-stultification. It is to Dr. Flugel's credit that he insists on the primacy of the claims of truth, but it is no less to Dr. Jung's to confess that we must go beyond psychology in order to satisfy them.

VICTOR WHITE, O.P.

(10) *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, p. 225.

(11) *ibid.* p. 62.

ALICE REVISITS WONDERLAND

ALICE had often wished to see Wonderland and Looking-Glass Country again, but she had never had the opportunity of doing so. In fact she had no idea how she could set about it. "And, in that case," she told herself, for she was fond of giving herself good advice, "you ought to give up thinking of it, since it is no use wishing to do something if you do not know how to do it." In spite of this, however, the wish remained.

Then, one day, when she was going down to the tube railway, the usual gale of wind met her as she turned the corner. She did not think anything of it at first, as she had experienced it before,