

often put into servitude or simply killed. In some places, however, democracy was extended to the Indigenous population over time. The European settlers themselves expected to enjoy political rights that were comparable to home institutions when abroad. These demands were most likely to foster actual democracy in areas with a higher proportion of Europeans for three reasons. When Europeans predominated, they had less reason to fear losing political control to the Indigenous population. More Europeans implied greater exposure to the idea of democracy via schools, churches, media, and contact with settlers. Areas with additional settlers also saw higher levels of modernization. Thus, a higher share of Europeans historically implies more democracy today.

This brief outline does not do justice to the book, which has a lot more to say about the specific ways that oceanic access and subsequent European settlement affected political (and economic) development. *The Deep Roots of Modern Democracy* is a compelling read because it not only breaks new theoretical ground but also presents rich and diverse empirical evidence. It provides persuasive and extensive statistical analyses that draw on global, national, and subnational evidence. Moreover, it carefully and systematically considers alternative explanations of democracy, and it contains qualitative evaluations of its arguments based on historical accounts of regime change from across the globe. In sum, the reader is convinced that the arguments rest on solid empirical ground.

However, as with any other academic work, it can be criticized. First, the relationship between the two arguments is not well integrated empirically. According to the authors' causal models (pp. 6 and 233), areas outside Europe with natural harbors were more likely destinations for Europeans. But the book contains no attempt to correlate harbor distance (the preferred explanatory variable in models that test the first part of the argument) with the share of the population with European ancestry outside Europe (the preferred explanatory variable in models that test the second part of the argument). Second, as the authors themselves acknowledge (pp. 220–21), the argument—that areas where European settlement was easier saw additional institutional diffusion—was made before by, for instance, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (“Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” *American Economic Review* 91, 2002) and Jacob G. Hariri (“The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood,” *American Political Science Review* 106, 2012). Thus, this part of the book can perhaps be seen more as an elaboration of mechanisms present in earlier work. And the focus on how sea access and sea power favored democracy, of course, goes back to classical Greece, where it was forcefully formulated by Aristotle, who argued that the Athenian navy manned by the poor oarsmen was a force for political equality (see also Carles Boix, *Political Order and Inequality: Their*

Foundations and their Consequences for Human Welfare, 2015). *The Deep Roots of Modern Democracy*, of course, presents a more developed argument subject to increased empirical scrutiny than these earlier arguments.

Finally, to mitigate issues of causal identification, the authors instrument the share of the population with European ancestry using the Indigenous population density in 1500 (p. 298). Yet, the exclusion restriction assumption is not likely to hold, because early agglomeration has been related to a reinforcing process of institutional development within Europe (e.g., Scott Abramson, and Carles Boix, “Endogenous Parliaments: The Domestic and International Roots of Long-Term Economic Growth and Executive Constraints,” *International Organization* 73 [4], 2019), or to state formation and technological advancement before colonization outside of Europe (e.g., Oana Borcan, Ola Olsson, and Louis Putterman, “State History and Economic Development: Evidence from Six Millennia,” *Journal of Economic Growth* 23, 2018). These processes are unlikely to be captured fully by the controls. However, the authors do recognize the difficulties of specifying the correct data generation process when the analysis spans so many centuries and areas of the world (see pp. 303–4).

These points of criticism are relatively minor. *The Deep Roots of Modern Democracy* is without a doubt a major contribution to our understanding of why countries manage to introduce democratic institutions. It shows that countries with access to natural harbors tend to be more open to trade, migration, technologies, and new ideas, thereby reaping benefits in the form of economic development and democratization. The book ends by looking forward. Openness and connections have made some parts of the world richer and more democratic than others. However, this inequality need not remain. As the authors note (p. 394), the impact of geographical differences has attenuated over time due to advances in logistics and communication. This might foster a convergence if future technical advances favor the ruled over the ruler.

Policing and Politics in Latin America: When Law

Enforcement Breaks the Law. By Diego Esparza. Boulder, CO:

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Under what conditions is the coercive arm of the state in a democracy a source of security and not insecurity? How citizens experience policing significantly shapes their understandings of politics, including their perceptions of the state and of their place in the polity. This underscores the importance of better understanding when the police—the quintessential street-level embodiment of the state—foster citizen trust and state legitimacy or, alternatively, use their

state-sanctioned coercive capacity to extort populations, protect criminals, or engage in extralegal violence. Put simply, when do police enforce the rule of law instead of violating it? This is the question at the center of Diego Esparza's new book on the politics of policing in Latin America.

Policing and Politics in Latin America is a careful comparative study of the sources of variation in patterns of police misconduct in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Even though organized crime has made Latin America among the world's most dangerous regions, Esparza correctly urges readers not to lose sight of the crucial role that the region's police play in fostering violence and insecurity and, more broadly, weakening institutions and fraying state–society relations. Esparza measures police misconduct through the proxy of levels of citizen trust in police derived from existing surveys and secondary sources. The analysis also draws on data collected during fieldwork that Esparza carried out, including interviews with a diverse range of actors from government, police, and civil society. The book harnesses these different forms of data to trace and explain patterns of police misconduct not only across Chile, Colombia, and Mexico but also within each country over multiple periods of time since the nineteenth century.

The core of Esparza's argument focuses on two factors: centralization and professionalization. As in much of the developing world in the late twentieth century, Latin American governments decentralized the provision of many public goods and services while implementing economic liberalization and fiscal austerity measures. The technocratic logic that accompanied these reforms held that bringing government institutions and bureaucrats closer to society would reduce information asymmetries, making government more efficient while simultaneously better positioning society to hold incumbents and bureaucrats accountable via formal and informal institutional mechanisms. Esparza, by contrast, argues that decentralized rule makes the provision of critical public goods and services, like security, vulnerable to politicization because local political interests have more incentives to compete to capture rents.

Centralization of policing, according to this argument, is better at insulating police from these competing interests while placing the fiscal burden of paying for police on the shoulders of national or mid-level governments, and not on local governments that often lack the resources to adequately support police. The concern for shielding police from capture by external interests, in Esparza's argument, extends to the focus on professionalization. Here Esparza argues that providing police with a dignified standard of living via adequate salaries and benefits, instituting high and strict standards for recruitment and promotion, and putting into place formal and informal oversight mechanisms combine to make police less

susceptible to politicization and corruption. The task of professionalization, however, requires (1) political incentives to pursue this type of reform in a region of the world where local politicians strategically sustain limited professionalization precisely to keep control over police and (2) a level of fiscal resources beyond those available to most local-level governments. For these reasons, Esparza argues that instituting and maintaining professionalization can only occur under a centralized structure of policing controlled by a national or mid-level government. Finally, Esparza is careful to argue that centralized governance and professionalization will only constrain police misconduct when the political regime in place is a democracy. Authoritarianism or autocratic leaders in democratic regimes can politicize police and sanction misconduct under centralized rule, given the police's dependence on the ruler for salaries and social benefits and the comparatively limited oversight mechanisms available in a nondemocratic or weak democratic regime.

This book makes several important contributions. Methodologically it is a fine example of the analytical power of comparative historical analysis—a point that Esparza does not explicitly discuss but one that is evident in the rich analysis of patterns of policing over time in each of the three countries in the study. Esparza generates invaluable empirical points of reference by carefully tracing historical policing trends in each of the three empirical chapters (chaps. 2–4). The theoretical framework is a provocative intervention in a policy-making literature that sometimes dismisses centralized governance without carefully considering the potential drawbacks of decentralized rule. More broadly, Esparza's argument is an important contribution to the social science literatures on the politics of decentralization. In particular, the carefully theorized linkages and interactions between centralization and professionalization provide insights relevant for research on public goods and services areas beyond policing.

Although Esparza effectively uses the historical record to structure and advance comparative case studies, the analysis could have benefited from greater description and more engagement with the methods used to collect and analyze the data from field research. For example, Esparza notes that he conducted a survey of police in training in Colombia (pp. 89–90), but there are few details about the survey instrument or sampling strategy. A methodological appendix could also have provided valuable insight on the challenges of surveying police in Latin America, a population that is often difficult for researchers to access while studying sensitive issues like police misconduct.

More broadly, the book's provocative argument generates several questions. First, although Esparza convincingly shows that decentralized policing generates space for the political capture of police, the analysis omits from consideration the potential role of local society in holding police accountable. One would expect that local levels of

social capital, such as the density of civil society, could mitigate against local political interference and generate countervailing pressure on police and political incumbents to keep police misconduct in check. Second, the argument operates at multiple levels of analysis, from the subnational to the national. Although the empirical analysis effectively uses the historical record to foreground the texture and mechanics of political capture at the local level, more attention to the potential for political capture at higher levels of government would have been welcome. Likewise, the local-level capture of police for instrumental ends may not operate solely according to local-level political logics. It may instead respond to demands issued by politicians and party machines situated at higher levels of government and on whom local incumbents depend for resources and political advancement. Third, the study assumes that citizen trust in police is negatively correlated with police misconduct; however, citizens can also support police engaging in forms of misconduct, including extralegal violence, amidst the politicization of security or the high levels of crime and insecurity in much of Latin America and other developing world regions. It would have been interesting if Esparza had discussed whether and how his argument might apply in such contexts.

In brief, *Policing and Politics in Latin America* is an insightful book that should find a wide audience among scholars of crime, policing, security, state violence, and subnational politics.

Righteous Revolutionaries: Morality, Mobilization, and Violence in the Making of the Chinese State.

By Jeffrey A. Javed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2022.

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Jeffrey Javed's monograph on violence-based political mobilization in China is as thorough as it is ambitious, and as psychological as it is political. The roughly two-hundred-page book (not including notes or references) boils down to a central thesis: establishing the PRC was as much a moral struggle as it was an institutional challenge. In so doing, Javed's book pulls on a thread that scholars have long recognized but never quite untangled; namely, that the PRC's origins contrast with classical patterns of state formation and even from its closest peers.

Whereas classical state-building efforts are defined by incremental gains in institutional capacity, modern China's formative years were punctuated by recursive mobilization. Yes, the PRC was a proto-Leninist state, yet Mao's China achieved that which Lenin and other like-minded leaders never could: penetrating society all the way down to the natural village. Yes, state-building in China was as violent—if not more so—as that of any other

post-revolutionary regime, but whereas the likes of Stalin and Pol Pot quietly killed millions Mao had his enemies assaulted in broad daylight, in the public squares.

Why was violence in China such a public affair? What impassioned those who participated in it? And how did the Chinese communists contain and channel that carnage without being subsumed by it? At first glance, Javed's inquiry may lead readers to recall classical debates on contentious politics, such as that between James C. Scott and Samuel Popkin, who sparred over the mobilizing potentials of morality versus opportunity. Javed goes a step further. In the case of China, he posits, neither collective tradition nor economic utility was sufficient to produce the degree of grassroots mobilization deemed necessary for remolding Chinese society in the Party's image. Instead, CCP agents had to redefine moral boundaries and evangelize the masses into them through their complicity in public acts of violence.

According to Javed, the moralization of violence was necessary for at least two reasons. First, class cleavages and animosities were simply not deep enough to propel and justify the redistributive violence that communists saw as necessary for uprooting the existing elite. Instead, class awareness had to be "forged in the crucible of collective struggle." Second, the shared trauma of perpetrating collective violence cultivated a sense of solidarity between the complicit masses and their CCP instigators. This violent bond would, in turn, render the masses ready and willing participants for future mobilization.

Most of the book is dedicated to illustrating the methods and psychology by which the CCP's brand of morality was constructed and exploited to provoke hatred and justify violence toward target groups, including landlords, rich peasants, rightists, intellectuals, or whomever the Party deemed a threat to the revolution. Specifically, Javed aims to show that the CCP's moral construction not only precipitated mass violence but that this violence reinforced the CCP's moral foundation. In this effort, Javed compiles an impressive array of data and evidence, from extensive archival work and field notes to regression analysis using government statistics gleaned from internal party documents.

Javed's investigation links the origins of moral-mobilizational to traditional Chinese rituals of social propriety and righteous governance that were recognized and expropriated by CCP agitators, in particular Mao, who witnessed examples in the countryside as early as 1927. The rest of the book proceeds by demonstrating how these rituals were repurposed by the CCP to conflate traditional moralities with more contemporary class consciousness. Morality-based violence explains why China often saw higher rates of societal struggle in areas with lower class consciousness, as demonstrated through a case study of the Huabei and Jiangnan regions. Similarly, Javed shows that violence was not limited to those of