

main contributions (table 8.1, p. 151), persistent challenges, and future research avenues. Some points, however, deserve further discussion.

The juggernaut theory of repressive spells is intuitive and convincing (chap. 2). Putting repressive cohorts center stage, the authors see violent state behavior as the outcome of a top-down decision-to-implementation process that flows from political authorities to leaders of coercive institutions and, then, to the state's repressive agents (p. 32). This agent-centric focus is a valuable contribution and reflects recent advances in research on state repression. However, the link between agents and the structural determinants of repressive phases is at times difficult to follow and could have been fleshed out more.

Moreover, although it is valuable to think about movements to democracy as bottom-up disruptors to the functioning of the (top-down) juggernaut, more insights into how these mechanisms work would have been desirable. Such a focus might be a fruitful future extension of the theory. Related to this point, the authors dedicate chapter 7 to cases that, based on the empirical results, illustrate specific sequences of the repressive life cycle and democratization. Yet, except for Chile, the cases depict more aggregated repression dynamics, rather than the agent-level dynamics proposed by the theoretical framework. Critical readers may therefore wonder whether the book provides enough evidence on the proposed decision-to-implementation process.

The theory also speaks to and shares great synergies with contemporary research on autocratic regimes. An example is the 2018 book by Barbara Geddes, Erika Frantz, and Joseph Wright, *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse*, which also addresses the central role of cohorts, dubbed seizure groups, in shaping and sustaining autocratic regimes. Although Davenport and Appel's juggernaut theory goes beyond the domain of nondemocracies, incorporating insights from this line of research would have allowed the book to engage in a broader dialogue with the vibrant research program on autocracies and with the work of comparative regime scholars.

The empirical analysis of the book is based on 244 LSSR spells from 1976 to 2006. The authors explain that "during the period, there was popular interest in the subject, and around 2001 ... it was possible that a different type of relationship exists between democracy and state repression/human rights violations" (p. 17). In the concluding chapter, the authors return to this point, inviting future works to scrutinize "whether the results are temporally bound or if they extend up to the present" (p. 156). This, however, does not explain why the book's analysis does not reach beyond 2006, particularly in light of the availability of relevant data. The book's temporal coverage is even more surprising given that the post-2006 years have been marked by increases in the surveillance and coercive capacity of states and by the erosion of various democracies

around the world—both factors relevant to the book's theory and the proposed existence of repressive cohorts.

The book's analysis of the influence of democratization on the onset, termination, and recurrent repressive phases is an important feature. It provides readers with an assessment of policies that many believe to have a direct effect on LSSRs but that actually take effect *through* democratization. The extended analysis of the determinants of democratization draws on two key explanatory variables: past transitions to democracy and democratic regional diffusion (pgs. 80–81, 151–52). The presentation of the main substantive effects, however, seems incomplete, which may surprise some readers. In chapter 5, the figure that presents the results for the determinants of democratization in LSSR spells (p. 106) does not include the two important explanatory factors. In chapter 6 on recurring spells, readers are presented with only a selection of visualized substantive effects, although all the variables are discussed in the text. Finally, it appears that the book presents the same figure twice for different outcomes of interests: determinants of the recurrence of LSSR spells (p. 112) and of electoral democratization after LSSR spells (p. 117). If results are the same for both outcomes, it would be relevant to further discuss them.

There is a lot to like about *The Death and Life of State Repression*. Davenport and Appel provide compelling insights into how domestic and international factors shape the life cycle of state repression. The book challenges readers to think beyond preset standards by providing a novel theoretical framework to study state violence across different phases. *The Death and Life of State Repression* deserves a place on the bookshelf of anyone interested in why states violate the rights of their citizens and under what conditions they stop doing so.

The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance's Relevance and Cohesion.

Edited by Thierry Tardy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. 352p. \$115.00 cloth.

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This edited volume contains 12 chapters on 16 NATO member states that are structured according to these variables: strategic culture, threat perception, public opinion, dependency on the United States and NATO, interests versus values, domestic politics, level of commitment to NATO, and the view of future challenges. This list is so comprehensive that it covers almost every aspect of security and defense policy. Yet, this is also a weakness when wanting to tease out causality.

The country chapters are the merit of this book: they provide detailed insights into the factors that affect a member state's role in NATO. The contributors are well-

established scholars in the field, such as Marc Webber on the United Kingdom, Alice Pannier on France, Heidi Hardt on the United States, Mats Berdal on Norway, and Sten Rynning on Denmark, to mention only some. The country chapters are comparative because they are structured around the same variables, therefore enabling scrutiny of various aspects of security policy.

However, the chapter on Turkey by Kan Casapoglu is far too modest in describing Turkey's obstinate behavior in the alliance: it almost reads like a diplomatic statement at times, ignoring the problematic role that President Erdogan has assumed in NATO. Although the author hints that Turkish behavior "led to some divergencies between the country and its traditional Western partners at times" (108), this is a fundamental understatement: Turkey is NATO's *enfant terrible*, as seen in its unwillingness to ratify Swedish entry.

There is also a strange structure of analyzing two states in one chapter—for example, Denmark and the Netherlands, and Canada and Norway. There is no logical reason for this. It would be better to have lumped together Norway and Denmark if one needed to, because the Nordics have much in common. Treating the Baltic states in one chapter makes sense because they are similar small states with a common communist history and are located in the same place.

The chapters are useful and thorough, but the sheer number of variables that are included preclude rigorous comparison; the variables also overlap to a considerable degree. "Everything" is to be covered and is equally "important." Standing alone, each chapter is useful empirically as an analysis of a given state. The problem is, however, that there is no clear analytical framework for the book. Why are all these variables important, and how do they interrelate?

Nor are the states analyzed in this book selected according to any method. Yet, that is acceptable: because NATO has 31 members—and 32, if Turkey finally ratifies Sweden's accession—most anthologies on NATO contain a selection of states. But the problem arises when the empirical material in the country chapters yields conclusions that are not warranted. Some states are listed in the group of "non-NATO aligned states with a broad security agenda": the United States, France, and Turkey. Others are "NATO-aligned states with a non-Russian security agenda"—the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Nordics, the Netherlands, and Canada. Finally, there are "NATO-aligned states with a Russian-centric security agenda": Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania. The book is structured in these three categories, but they are very debatable. Norway's defense policy is clearly conditioned by its geopolitical proximity to Russia, and the United Kingdom has Russia as a key parameter of the former. In addition, the first category, organized according to the curious criterion of being "non-NATO aligned" lumps

together France, the United States, and Turkey. The intention is perhaps that these three states are less dependent on the others in NATO than the rest, but this is still awkward. Finally, can one be "non-NATO aligned" as a member of the alliance?

This classification of the chapters exemplifies the major problem with this volume, which is its analytical framework—or rather the lack of a rigorous framework. Chapter 1 is devoted to explaining this framework, but unfortunately it is more confusing than clarifying.

In the introduction the editor, Thierry Tardy, presents the two key concepts of the analysis, *relevance* and *cohesion*. Relevance "is understood as the congruence or alignment of NATO with its security environment" (2), and cohesion is defined in much the same manner: "Cohesion ... reflects how much states agree on what threatens them and how much the Alliance is perceived as an appropriate response to these threat" (4). As Tardy emphasizes, threat perception can be both subjective and objective; hence a state's perception of NATO's relevance becomes its basis for cohesion. To put it simply, states that find NATO relevant also boost its cohesion.

The problem here is that key analytical concepts overlap, and Tardy neither specifies how they differ or how to operationalize them. At times, he discusses "the two levels of cohesion and relevance" (5), and in other places, cohesion seems to refer to subjective concepts like identity (6). Thus, "strong cohesion within the Alliance positively impacts on its relevance" (6): Does this mean that cohesion is the cause of relevance? Or vice versa? Further, common sense dictates that a military alliance that is relevant in terms of threat will have a cohesive membership. But in NATO the importance of Russia as a threat differs in each state for geopolitical reasons.

These concepts are confusing and do not contribute to analytical sharpness. The same goes for the subchapter titled "Methodology" (7) which allows for all sorts of variables to be important but notes that variables may be "essential for certain allies and non-essential for others" (8). Furthermore, each and every theory in IR—realism, liberal theory, constructivism—seems equally relevant. The only hypothesis seems to be that member states determine what NATO does and is, but this is trivial: NATO by definition is an intergovernmental organization. The editor visits the hypothesis that NATO as an organization has an impact on member states, and this is a central area of research in IR. It would have been interesting to pursue.

This open-ended framework is not helpful for the authors of individual chapters, although the editor claims that this volume is different from others because "it looks at the policies of NATO nations in a sequential and systematic manner" (8).

Finally, a note on terminology is in order: although NATO uses the term "nations" instead of the correct term

“member state,” scholars should not. There are thousands of nations in the world—none of them members of any international organization—and only 193 states, of which 31 are NATO members. Further, the words “alliance” and “allies” are not spelled with a capital *a*.

Human Rights and Transnational Democracy in South Korea.

By Ingu Hwang. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2022. 360p. \$55.00 cloth.

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South Korea is now known to be a democracy and a state that fully protects all aspects of human rights. However, not as many people realize that the country went through a tough transition from authoritarian regimes to a democracy. During the 1970s and 1980s, authoritarian regimes continually used the supposed communist threat from North Korea and the need for rapid economic development as justifications for their repressive rule that restricted fundamental human rights and inhibited democratic processes. This authoritarianism was reinforced by South Korea's geopolitical location: the country was under the influence of superpowers and strong stakeholders in the region, including Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. But it was also bolstered by the continual provocation from North Korea, which had been an ongoing security challenge since the war that the two Koreas had fought from June 25, 1950, until July 27, 1953. Arguably, the Korean War has technically not yet ended because no permanent peace regime has been put in place on the Korean peninsula, except for the temporary armistice agreement signed in 1953.

In this context, Ingu Hwang's book, *Human Rights and Transnational Democracy in South Korea*, is an excellent resource for those interested in developing a better understanding of the contemporary history of South Korea. Covering Korea's political changes and the development of its human rights and democracy movements from 1945 until now, Hwang marvelously navigates the turbulent waters of South Korean modern history and reviews important incidents from the last 70 years. He looks deep into local demands for human rights and democracy against the backdrop of the “quiet diplomacy” of the United States and the various activities of transnational advocacy networks.

This book successfully connects the political changes in South Korea to the international human rights regime and to the activities of transnational civil society. By comparing local human rights activities under the influence of Amnesty International's minimalist approach with those based on the maximalist approach of the World Council of Churches and the National Council of Churches in Korea,

Hwang offers an eloquent explanation of how human rights and democratization movements developed in South Korea. He also emphasizes that South Korean human rights movements enriched the globalization of human rights by influencing the activities of transnational advocacy networks and their campaigns.

This meticulous account of the process of vernacularization of global human rights within South Korean grassroots movements is a significant academic achievement. The book also describes how Korean people developed a critical stance toward the United States in the 1980s after experiencing the “quiet diplomacy” of the Carter administration and the embrace by the Reagan administration of the authoritarian regime established after the massacre in Gwangju in May 1980.

The experience of the atrocities of the Nazi Holocaust in World War II led the postwar international community to adopt global human rights standards that have become universal norms. After the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945, which was based on the International Military Tribunal Charter, and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948, this movement gained international support. Subsequently, human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil Rights, Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, were adopted. These global human rights norms were introduced to South Korea along with the establishment of the South Korean government around 1948. Several civil society organizations were active as early as the 1950s. Some of these aimed to strengthen Korean human rights movements by establishing Amnesty International (AI) Korea.

However, localizing international human rights norms requires more than the transplantation of global human rights standards. To illustrate this, Hwang draws readers' attention to the disagreement between South Korean human rights activists and the AI headquarters in London and in the United States over issues of political neutrality, nonpartisanship, and prohibition of activities in Korea by the Korean branch. AI headquarters wanted AI Korea to maintain the non-interference principle that would ban AI Korea members from engaging in advocacy activities on domestic issues. However, this principle could not be sustained because the key members of AI Korea were arrested and strongly persecuted by the repressive Park regime. AI was forced to intervene in Korean affairs in the 1970s. AI also had a policy of non-intervention in national security law and espionage cases, but when the regime's emergency decrees created numerous prisoners of conscience, including AI Korea members, they had no choice but to engage in domestic matters, thereby localizing international human rights principles. Because of AI's narrow interpretation of human rights, the human rights approach in Korea was less popular than that of the