

In addition, Lavelle holds that Being is univocal. As we saw above, substance is being in the same sense as accidents, and so there is only one Being. We, therefore, would seem to be at the same ontological level as God, whose essence it is, not just to be, but to be participated. This implies that because there is a necessary relation between God and us there is therefore a necessary relation between us and God: the theology of the Trinity would explain the superintelligible truth here sought on a purely philosophical level on the principle that the good is self-diffusive. As the mind ascends the grades of essence it apparently grows remoter from the order of existence, and 'the true world is the world of ideas and not of things'. In short, one could comment, another needless reduction to identity is being effected here, for Being is identified with Thinking.

If the superintelligible is simplified, the infra-natural is ignored. The fact that all knowledge has perception at its base is forgotten. The sensible has to be abolished before we can know, says Lavelle; a half-truth that ignores the whole biological basis of intellect, Pre-conscious activity, the conversion of sensations into images and the final creation of the concept from the image by the mind's activity, in short, this continuity with the concrete through the image, is precisely what establishes our thinking as valid.

Two leading themes deserve to be noted. The universal is made entirely the mind's creation, there being no universal empirically implied in this shadow-world of ours. Secondly, the real primacy is given to 'essences' which are held to be the ground of unity and therefore of reality in things. Against this it ought to be said that things not only participate in Absolute Perfection by their essence, they participate in pure Act by their being (which in our minds divides itself irreducibly into subjective potency, essence, and subjective act, existence). Since the rest of the theory turns on this initial misconception of Lavelle's, it is to be feared that the hopes aroused by the tremendous title are not fulfilled.

JOHN DURKAN.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT ON THE CATHOLIC THEORY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN FRANCE, 1750-1850. By E. C. Elwell. (Harvard and O.U.P.; \$3.50.)

This study is mainly concerned with the influence of the Enlightenment on the matter and form of catechetical instruction, and it illustrates the defensive rôle of the French Church, predominantly Gallican and Jansenist, in face of the disruptive effects of the Encyclopædia (to which the majority of the contributors were abbés, although the most influential, Deists like d'Alembert and Rousseau). Until a few years after Billuart scholastic arguments for God prevailed in religious instruction, then, with the boom in natural science, arguments from 'the spectacle of nature'. There seems to have been a tendency to give practical primacy to morals over religion as the Encyclopædist pressed for moral and civic education in place of the

traditional school with even reading and writing taught from the catechism. Questions about the unity and trinity of God were thought academic, apparently even to doctors of theology subscribing to Gallicanism, the effect obviously of Rousseau's campaign for the 'naturalisation' of the Gospel. What Fénelon described as the core of Christian instruction—the teaching of Jesus expected in the Old Testament and reigning in the New—and which is the classical formula of all such work, was insufficiently practised.

A new stress was laid on reason in religion (a typical apologist uses the *je pense, donc je suis* proof), and later, following Rousseau, on feeling. There was nobody of the standing even of Chateaubriand in the intellectual fight with Voltaire: and when feeling was adopted, it was over-adopted. The interesting point is made that concrete methods in catechetics, dominant in the Middle Ages, were discarded before the abstract prejudices of the Deists: there followed an over-theoretical bias that still vitiates our methods. One might go further and see in these disastrously segregated ways of thinking and feeling the root conflict within the European tradition, and in the lack of constructive dialogue between the two parties, religious and deist, the root reason why men lost those meeting places of the mind characteristic of a culture at one with itself. The de-internationalisation of the university colleges, such as the Collège des Jacobins, helped to promote a separation that started in the late Middle Ages. (The Enlightened had their own contacts: Richardson influenced Rousseau and Rousseau Kant). The force of religious example failed, if the Archbishop is at all typical, and there was no contemporary Monsieur Vincent to win over Voltaire.

What, one asks, had happened to the catechist societies that were everywhere in the 17th century? Were there no equivalents of the provincial *cabinets des lectures* and local academies? The Oratorians had begun to teach science, but new catechists like the Marists, and new preaching methods, like Lacordaire's, had to wait till after 1815.

This statement of Duvoisin's Mr Elwell finds refreshing and startling—and it is certainly startling: *Le dogme d'une autre vie est un des fondamentaux de la politique: sa vérité prouvée par son utilité.*

JOHN DURKAN

ALBERT SCHWEITZER. By George Seaver. (Black; 18s.)

The reason why Albert Schweitzer is so outstanding a figure of our age—and would be in any other age—is undoubtedly the perfect simplicity with which he approaches what is obviously good and true. It is the kind of simplicity which always succeeds in life and which greatly contributes to success in learning. This book is a splendid record of the eminent successes in both spheres of this modest and heroic Alsatian.

Not the least evidence of his greatness is the *pietas* he has inspired in his biographer. Mr Seaver is objective, giving a full and exact