

vealing. It is worth insisting that a university does not exist simply to give undergraduates a chance of picking up miscellaneous bits of "knowledge" and opinion (the resulting assortment being called a liberal education) but to provide a training in each discipline according to the part it plays in human life as a whole (Mr. Knights's "civilisation"). Mr. Truscot would, in general, no doubt agree; but his grip on the proper coordination of the disciplines intrinsic to liberal education is weak. He cannot guide us into all Redbrick's problems. With ways and means, with a host of items contained in the official reports, he is quite equipped to deal, and his instincts are right enough; but governing these particularities there is only, one feels, an ideal of knowledge *in abstracto* and a confused aspiration; and this probably is insufficient.

For Catholics this book raises particular problems by its double insistence upon (a) the continuity of Redbrick with English life as a whole and with preliminary schooling, and (b) the interconnexion and unification of all the Redbricks into a single intellectual élite "the chief educational force in the country". With (a) especially Mr. Truscot concerns himself, and what he says is well-informed and well-argued; but as he leaves us Catholics out of his reckoning (explicitly at one point) we can refrain from immediate comments and questions. Where he says he is *not* referring to us is in the first of two carefully critical chapters on Public Schools; but his remarks, or most of them, might very well have been addressed to us; we can hardly plead an *alibi*. But it is with respect to (b) that the chief difficulties are likely to arise, if as is probable, Mr. Truscot's hopes are going in the main to be realised: if Redbrick becomes a nation-wide system with organised contacts, transfers of staff and students, and inspection. The Newman Association, I suppose, is going to have plenty to do.

One closes the book with a feeling of gratitude. As a piece of writing it is rather undistinguished, but its conclusions are solid, discreet and reasonable to a degree not often attained. It always appeals to reason. It contains scores of remarks that were well worth making, much humane discernment and much shrewd moralising which hits hard and goes home and will be found healthily disturbing by many people not directly envisaged by it (see chapter 4: *The Leisured Professor at Bay*). KENELM FOSTER, O.P.

LA PHILOSOPHIE DE CLAUDE BERNARD. By A. D. Sertillanges, O.P. (Aubier 42 fr.).

Père Sertillanges, whose books it is good to have again in this country, here shows the aptness with which the Catholic doctrine of soul and body can meet modern physiological developments. It is his ably maintained contention, against those who have acclaimed the eminent French physiologist Claude Bernard a standard 19th century positivist, that not only his scientific findings but even the incidental philosophising into which he was led, demand a Thomistic setting. The assertion would no doubt have

surprised Bernard himself, not that he would have disowned the views attributed to him but because he in fact mistook the character of Aristotelianism and of course knew nothing of Thomism. This is indeed the apologetic value of the present book, that it vindicates the true character of the Thomistic theory of the living body against the common misconception that any doctrine, to be Catholic, must be spiritualist or vitalist and must in that much set physiological and medical science at a discount. Perhaps Père Sertillanges, in his zeal for *rapprochement*, passes a little too lightly over Bernard's insistence that metaphysical thought has but a subjective role; moreover in his identifying the physiologist's "*idée directrice*" with the Thomist "*forma substantialis*" he may be thought to surrender substantial reality a trifle too easily to something more like ideal substantiality; could the "*idée directrice*" survive, for instance, as an "*anima separata*"? In the main, however, his case is an imposing one, and not likely to be easily rejected.

Besides the central concern with life, there is an account of Bernard's admirable theory of scientific method ("*l'expérimentateur pose des questions à la nature; mais dès qu'elle parle, il doit se taire*". cit. p. 49); and a discussion showing how freedom of the will is perfectly compatible with the physical determinism justly demanded by science.

C.R.

ORDER AND DISORDER. (A Study of Mediaeval Principles). By the Right Honourable Sir Henry Slessor. (Hutchinson; 15s.).

Before *The Times* had openly advocated the settlement of international problems by pressure instead of principle, Sir Henry Slessor had reminded its readers that there was little hope for European society unless a law transcending national frontiers could be generally recognised. In this book he reiterates at greater length and with abundant illustration his "plea for unprejudiced reconsideration" of the mediaeval outlook, especially of the conception of the *Jus Gentium*. Not that Natural Law alone can be sufficient: in "The Roots of Disorder", perhaps the best chapter in the book, he contrasts the great scientific achievements of the recent past with the moral decline "through a concomitant loss of recognition of the destiny to which God has elected man." Particularly welcome is the evidence here displayed of wide reading and considerable study of the mediaeval thinkers, but the presentation is perhaps too massive for the general reader. On the other hand there are too many sweeping statements and hasty summaries to render the book acceptable to the specialist: those who know the German Catholics of the North and West and remember the struggle of the Confessional Church cannot but protest against the assertion that "apart from the Catholic south, Germany has ceased to be Christian for the last hundred years"; and St. Thomas's view on slavery is at least more complex than that which is here attributed to him.

EDWARD QUINN.