Voting Patterns in a Non-partisan Legislature:

A Study of Toronto City Council*

BARRY J. KAY   *University of Rochester*

The least systematic level of formalized political decision-making in Canada would unquestionably be found to take place in the municipal branch of government. This statement, although admittedly impressionistic, is made with regard to such criteria as consistency among decisions taken, and the relationship of the decisions made to expertise available on the subjects to be decided. This phenomenon is generally attributable to the absence of a regularized structure of party-based decision-making in most municipalities. In the nation's smaller communities, where budgets are not very substantial, this tendency is neither surprising nor particularly disturbing. However, in the larger urban centres such as Toronto, where the municipal budget exceeds that of most provinces, the problems created by this "parish pump" approach to politics has recently led certain elements to favour the introduction of a more consistent form of party-based decision-making.

Party politics at the local level is hardly a new concept. It exists in the majority of American cities, and Jean Drapeau has established its effectiveness as a vehicle for attracting large capital projects with the efficiency of his own civic party in giving order to Montreal politics. In the past, the CCF and NDP have organized candidate slates in Vancouver, but these have been regularly defeated by "non-partisan" slates which were in fact loose coalitions of supporters of the other parties, but without any significant form of party coherence once elected. It is also common in many centres for slates of candidates to be endorsed by various interest groups, notably labour councils. However, these endorsements are generally of independent candidates who appear to be favourably predisposed towards that interest, and these slates have little in common except this predisposition.

The attempt to structure local politics in Toronto was originated by a group of private citizens led by David Crombie, who prior to the 1966 civic election formed a group called Civic Action (Civac), and ran a sprinkling of candidates in various wards but none for city-wide office. They met with little success, but early in the term following the election a number of relatively reformist Council members declared that they were forming a loose alliance on public issues of mutual concern and identified themselves with the Civac label. The opportunity for a test of strength between this so-called Civac group and a gathering of the more established long-term members of Council presented itself when a vacancy

Le vote dans un corps législatif non-partisan : le cas du Conseil municipal de Toronto

L'étude se veut une contribution à la recherche quelque peu négligée de la prise de décision en politique municipale au Canada. Elle est centrée sur le Conseil municipal de Toronto, pour la période antérieure à l'apparition de partis politiques municipaux ; le Conseil est examiné à l'aide d'un modèle de jeu dans un corps législatif non-partisan. La problématique de l'étude emprunte à la littérature traitant du comportement législatif et de la théorie des petits groupes, de manière à permettre un contrôle ultérieur des hypothèses de départ.

Partant du degré d'entente des membres du Conseil issu de caractéristiques communes entre eux ou entre leurs circonscriptions, cette entente étant appréciée via leurs comportements à l'occasion d'un certain nombre de votes relativement serrés et tenus au cours d'une période de deux ans et demie, l'auteur observe la formation de groupes de vote parmi les membres du Conseil ; ces groupements sont par la suite utilisés dans l'examen approfondi des facteurs susceptibles d'influencer le vote au Conseil.

Bien que cette étude ne constitue qu'un premier pas dans cette direction, via l'examen du Conseil municipal de Toronto, elle fournit diverses indications sur des questions intéressantes comme le partage d'antécédents entre membres d'un conseil et le rôle de l'ancienneté et de la popularité électorales dans l'influence qu'on y détient. De même est abordée la question du rapport existant entre le vote, d'une part, et le relatif sentiment d'appartenance à la circonscription et l'influence de celle-ci, d'autre part. L'auteur propose, en conclusion, diverse avenues de recherche ultérieure.

occurred on the Board of Control, due to the death of an incumbent, with the latter group being successful in electing their nominee. This grouping subsequently formalized its own alliance in response to the Civac group, calling itself the City Council Co-operative (CCC); but in its opening policy manifesto its members agreed on nothing more contentious than performing in the city's best interests.

There have been further developments since the period discussed, most notably the direct involvement of national parties in Toronto municipal politics, but the brief outline above should provide a background for the context in which this study was conducted. Some have been led to suspect that these loose municipal affiliations which are subject to no form of enforced party discipline, are simply a façade and do little to affect voting patterns. However, regardless of its present status, party affiliation has not in the past been the chief basis of decision-making as reflected in City Council votes, and this raises the question as to what criteria have then been significant in structuring voting patterns, and what voting blocs have appeared. Furthermore, how closely do these voting blocs parallel the composition of the fledging political parties that have surfaced in Toronto?

Theory and hypotheses

In studying factors which influence voting patterns in a formally non-partisan legislature, the published literature provides little in the way of research upon directly analogous bodies. However, an examination of legislative behaviour with a somewhat broader perspective leads us to the influence of interpersonal relationships and norms that develop among the members of a legislative body.

John C. Wahlke *et al.* account for these in a number of ways: (*a*) social linkages promote compromise and accommodation between legislators of differing persuasions; (*b*) these linkages stem from personal force or attractiveness which gives certain legislators a wide circle of influence; (*c*) this accommodation particularly links individuals with like characteristics; (*d*) these linkages provide cues for decision-making; (*e*) they (the linkages) are reciprocal and facilitate the exchange of influence; (*f*) they follow the lines of force represented by the formal structure of the body.[1]

Therefore, from this theory it seems that legislators with characteristics in common will be more likely to behave in an accommodating manner, and presumably the more they have in common the closer the accommodations become. The following hypotheses, suitable for testing, may be drawn with regard to interpersonal influence.

Hypothesis 1: Members of Council with similar background characteristics will tend to share norms and behave similarly.[2]

Hypothesis 2: The more background characteristics that members share the more similarly they will tend to behave.

In a further theory with direct implications for Toronto City Council, Wahlke states that tenure is in many respects the legislative equivalent of social status, and suggests itself as a possible correlate of friendship choice. He expects to find two tendencies, one for veteran legislators to choose within their own powerful subgroup; the other for freshmen to choose their seniors, using friendship as a channel for upward mobility. He states that, "where veterans form a tightly-knit group, freshmen are thrown back on friendships within their own classmates."[3]

Samuel C. Patterson also refers to patterns of personal friendship and other cliques being important explanatory factors of behaviour within a large legislative body.[4] Richard Fenno and Donald Matthews give more specifically detailed accounts of how norms and special folkways are established in practice in the US House of Representatives and Senate respectively. Furthermore, Matthews states that a small turnover, as was characteristic of the Toronto City Council during the period studied (twenty-one of twenty-three members were holdovers from the previous Council), reinforces a buildup and establishment of norms.[5] The dichotomy in friendship choice that is suggested by this theory seems on the surface to be a major explainant for the development of Civac and the CCC as rival groupings within City Council. Of course, once formalized as distinct entities, the parties would be expected to develop further norms of their own.

[1]*The Legislative System* (New York, 1962), 221.
[2]Similar background characteristics refer to traits that members have in common, and which may be a base for sharing norms and viewpoints on issues that arise in Council. These shared norms may in turn lead to a stronger relationship between members which would be sufficient to influence votes on its own. For our purposes these background characteristics include sex, age, length of service, occupation, religion, and national party affiliation, as made available in biographical data on members.
[3]*The Legislative System*, 223.
[4]"Patterns of Personal Relations in a Legislative Group," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIII (1959), 101–18.
[5]D. R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators & Their World* (New York, 1960), 117.

Hypothesis 3: Seniority is the major correlate of friendship choice, and also the major determinant of municipal party preference.[6]

Small group theory, although not primarily directed to formally elected governing bodies, does provide some comparable bases, particularly in the relations between the leadership and the remainder of the group. According to Sydney Verba, factors which influence the likelihood of individual leadership include: (*a*) the individual's structural position within the group; (*b*) his status in the cultural environment external to the group; (*c*) personality traits; and (*d*) motivation to assume the leadership role.[7] Characteristics indicating the influence of leaders include activism, holding the chief office, and being favoured by group decisions. It is also stated by Verba in a reference to Homans, that "the higher the rank of a person within a group, the more nearly his activities conform to the norms of the group."[8]

Hypothesis 4: The higher the rank of an individual within the group the more closely his actions will correspond to those of the group.[9]
Hypothesis 5: Status of members in the external community will be reflected by the support of other members, and by having their actions correspond more closely to those of the group.[10]

Perhaps the research study that most closely parallels this study was that of Eulau, Zisk, and Prewitt, whose main thesis, based upon a number of municipal councils in California, was that non-partisan representatives maintain the behaviour patterns of their national party affiliations.[11] However, for this theory to be accepted, the national party affiliations should be shown to at least have more influence than the loosely constructed municipal party groupings, which have been mentioned previously in affecting votes on Council.

The argument of Eulau, Zisk, and Prewitt is reinforced by Harold Kaplan when he states that ambitious politicians looking to advance their careers at a higher level of office can do so only through a party organization and therefore cannot act completely independent of national party considerations.[12] Furthermore, Williams and Adrian point out that in certain non-partisan elections the support in selected precincts for a non-partisan candidate who was identified with a national party correlated highly with the support of the gubernatorial

[6]Seniority or the characteristic of length of service, which is defined as years served on Council, operates similarly to the above mentioned background characteristics in terms of friendship. However, it is thought to be decisive in party alignment as it provides a criterion of status on Council, as well as one of shared norms.
[7]*Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton, 1961), 128.
[8]*Ibid.*, 186.
[9]Formal leadership on Council is defined as being the mayor and the Board of Control, and it is hypothesized to be in the mainstream of the group's thinking.
[10]Status in the external community is defined as popularity at the polls. People falling into this category are those members who headed the polls in each ward, as well as the two members of the Board of Control gaining the most votes and the mayor – in other words members of Metro Council.
[11]H. Eulau, B. H. Zisk, and K. Prewitt, "Latent Partisanship in Nonpartisan Elections" in M. K. Jennings and L. H. Zeigler, eds., *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966), 208–37.
[12]*Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto* (New York, 1967), 188–90.

candidate of that party.[13] J. L. Freeman has hypothesized that where national party organizations are weak and party identification is low, localized parties will operate. However, to think that this theory fully explains the previous lack of national party interest in Toronto municipal politics is a tenuous argument. Freeman goes on to state that those local parties that do exist will have their divisions based upon the dominant social divisions in the community.[14]

Hypothesis 6: Members will be more greatly influenced by national party affiliations than municipal party affiliations.

Another area of influence upon members of Council is their perception of the role of representation. A not uncommon jumping-off point in this vein is the theory of representation of Edmund Burke. Burke conceptualized the aggregation of the dimensions of focus and style of representation. The focus concept may be illustrated by whether representatives make their decisions in the interest of their particular constituency or in the interest of the total state.[15] The dimension of style in representation refers to the manner in which the representative arrives at his decision. This style may be trichotomized into (a) the representative deciding on the basis of what he perceives his constituents to want, a perception which as Miller and Stokes point out may be inaccurate;[16] (b) deciding on the basis of what his personal values lead him to believe is correct; and (c) shifting between the two previous roles. This is the basis of the delegate, trustee, and politico roles that have been studied in depth in *The Legislative System* by Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson. Without going further into their extensive work at this time, it should be kept in mind that the focus and style of representation are significant psychological factors in explaining legislative behaviour.[17]

Hypothesis 7: Members will represent what they perceive to be in the interest of their constituencies.[18]

This relationship between an elected representative and his constituency that is referred to above can be developed further. Duncan MacRae, Jr., has

[13]O. P. Williams and C. R. Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics under the Nonpartisan Ballot," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (Dec. 1959), 1056.
[14]"Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and a Case Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (Nov. 1958), 289.
[15]H. Eulau *et al.*, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (Sept. 1959), 744.
[16]W. E. Miller and D. E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *ibid.*, LVII (March 1963), 45–56.
[17]For examples of literature addressed to further psychological role orientations including occupational and religious orientations, the reader is directd to: J. C. Wahlke, 'Behavioral Analysis of Representative Bodies," in A. Ranney, ed., *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana, Ill., 1962), 173–90; D. R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-makers* (Garden City, NY, 1954); and G. Schubert, "The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, LVI (March 1962), 91.
[18]The possible definition of constituency interest is more flexible than that of the other variables mentiond. The best possible definition would take into account the perceptions of the residents of each particular ward as to what is in their interest. However, for our purposes the measure of constituency interest is determined by whether Council members supported challenges to spot rezoning by organized resident groups in their constituency as not being in the interest of their district.

hypothesized that representatives whose constituencies are relatively safe will feel freer to take more extreme positions on issues as they are less fearful of repercussions from their constituency.[19] It might logically be theorized that representatives whose constituencies' residents are of a certain income level will try to reflect that level's economic interests in their behaviour, and literature exists to substantiate this view.[20] Such constituency influence upon representatives should apply also to non-economic interests.

Hypothesis 8: Members from relatively safe constituencies will be less sensitive to the interests of their districts than members from more competitive constituencies.

Hypothesis 9: Members from constituencies of similar characteristics will tend to behave similarly.[21]

In drawing together the various influence dimensions that are discussed above, it is possible to present a model depicting their relationship to voting as shown in Figure 1.


FIGURE 1. Influences upon Council voting

Research design

The data to be collected and analysed have not been taken from any other scholarly study, nor to the best of the author's knowledge has any of it been used in another study. The reason for this is simply that neither Toronto City Council nor any other Canadian municipal body has in the past been considered for systematic study and analysis.

The actual performance measure that is used in the study is the record of roll-

[19]"The Relation between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," in H. Eulau, S. J. Eldersveld, and M. Janowitz, eds., *Political Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), 317–24.

[20]For example, J. Q. Wilson and E. C. Banfield, "Public-regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (Dec. 1964), 876–87.

[21]Similarity of constituency characteristics takes into account such traits as the average family income and the region within the city of the particular member's constituency.

call votes at City Council meetings as taken from the minutes of the Council. This study takes place in the period between July 5, 1967, when the Council took on the physical composition that it retained for the remainder of its term, and December 31, 1969, when the Council term ended. Not all Council votes are included in the study, but rather those which were resolved by a majority of not greater than 75 per cent of those members present and voting.[22] The 75 per cent figure is arbitrary, and was selected so that a number of issues, whose resolution was beyond question when they were raised in Council and which exerted no real strain upon discipline or the shared norms of members, would not colour the findings of the more competitive and significant votes. Nevertheless, votes of full Council had to be by margins of eighteen to five or greater to be excluded from the study; yet it was also felt that the study should be based on as large a number of reasonably competitive votes as possible. In resolving this conflict of desires, the 75 per cent figure was a compromise between a figure of perfect competition 50 per cent, and a complete lack of competition 100 per cent, with the number of votes that resulted, 187, being considered large enough to produce meaningful results.

Most of the information concerning the background characteristics of Council members, including age, sex, length of service, occupation, religion, and federal and municipal party affiliations, was taken from a special pre-election feature in the *Globe and Mail* of December 2, 1966.[23] A further indicator of municipal party leanings is found in the vote to fill the vacancy for controller on July 5, 1967, which was perhaps the most significant manifestation of Civac–ccc organizational competition that has taken place. This vote is particularly useful because it reveals the sympathies of a number of Council members who were not officially members of either party caucus.[24]

Other information, including results of the 1966 election and the membership on Metro Council, was taken from the City of Toronto *Municipal Handbook*, 1969 edition. The constituency characteristics of average family income were computed from data in *Metropolitan Profile*, a statistical breakdown by census tract published by the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto.[25] Information concerning the behaviour of Council members on challenges to spot rezoning by organized resident groups was taken from the *Toronto City Council Selected Voting Record*, as compiled by the Confederation of Residents and Ratepayers Associations.

Because of the small size of the population in the study, twenty-three, efforts were made to dichotomize the data categories where the level of data permitted, that is, ordinal level or greater. This was to better facilitate us in drawing conclusions from them. The variable categories with their frequencies are listed in the Appendix.

[22]Within the limits of this study no qualitative or issue distinction was made among the Council votes.
[23]A few gaps that were left in the biographical information presented there were filled by information gathered in the News Library of the Toronto *Telegram*.
[24]Although the vote was by secret ballot, all but three Council members disclosed their vote, as was reported by the *Globe and Mail* of July 6, 1967.
[25]Due to certain inconsistencies between census tract and ward boundaries, some boundary approximations were necessary in these cases.

In structuring the major voting groups in Council it is useful to briefly re-capitulate the basic unit of analysis, which is the recorded behaviour of all twenty-three members of Toronto City Council taken from 187 "competitive" votes. The percentage agreement for each of the 253 possible pairings of Council members taken two at a time on these 187 votes was calculated, and the range of scores varied from 25.5 to 87.3 per cent agreement. The mean for all these 253 paired percentage agreements was calculated and found to be 51.8 per cent. This was then subtracted from each of the 253 percentage agreements to produce scored deviations from the mean agreements, and these 253 deviations ranged from +35.5 to −26.3 (see Table I).

This accomplished, we strive to account for the largest possible total positive deviation. To achieve this it is necessary to add all the paired percentage agree-ments which were higher than the mean, that is, all the positive scored devia-tions, some 119 in number; this totals 1,256.6. It should be added that if we were trying to account for disagreement rather than agreement we would perform an identical procedure on the total negative deviation which should also total 1,256.6. It is then the task to determine what combination of voting clusters en-compassing all twenty-three members best accounts for the total positive deviation.

The criterion that has been selected to determine the voting clusters which are sought necessitates that the member of a voting cluster must have a scored devia-tion which is positive with every other member of the cluster, or a negative scored deviation of no greater than −1.0. In the instance that this criterion would allow a Council member to be placed in either of two groups, the cluster in which he has the highest total positive deviation was selected.[26] The voting clusters which were selected were based around Civac affiliates (this cluster was arbitrarily termed Progressives in Table II), and CCC affiliates (Old Guard), and in both cases all affiliated members of each of these civic party groupings satis-fied the conditions for inclusion in the respective cluster. A third group (Con-servatives) emerged which appeared to be more in disagreement with the Pro-gressives (on the basis of the total scored deviation between the groups)[27] than was the Old Guard, and a fourth group (Independents) consisted of two Council members who did not fit anywhere else but had a positive deviation between them. The scores for each of these clusters are encircled in Table III, and they sum to a total scored deviation of 970.3 which accounts for more than 75 per

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[26]To exemplify this in practice, Alderman Horace Brown had positive scored deviations with each of the five members of the Progressive cluster, and each of the other nine members of the Old Guard cluster. However, his total scored deviation with the Old Guard members as shown in Table II was 107.9, whereas his total scored deviation with the Progressives was only 51.8, and he was thereby included in the Old Guard cluster.

[27]The scored deviations were used to create an index of interagreement which is used in the testing of hypotheses in the following section. However, this same principle can be applied to show that the total deviation of the pairings of each member of one cluster, the five Pro-gressives, with each member of another cluster, the six Conservatives, produces a total scored deviation of −357.8 which when divided by the thirty pairings results in an average deviation of −11.9 as shown in Table III, which is greater than the −2.0 average deviation between Old Guard members and Progressives. In effect, these figures mean that a Council member known to be a Progressive will agree with a Conservative on any specific vote 11.9 per cent of the time less than is the expected norm on Council. Whereas by comparison, if two mem-bers are known to be Progressives they are likely to agree approximately 16.1 per cent of the time more often than is the norm on Council.

TABLE I

SCORED DEVIATION FROM THE MEAN FOR EACH PAIRING OF COUNCIL MEMBERS

	Beavis	Piccininni	Temple	Wardle	Summerville	Brown	Johnston	Sigsworth	Menzies	Lamport	Bruce	Grayson	Horkins	Dear	Grys	Campbell	Marks	Caccia	O'Donahue	Rotenberg	Harris	Pickett	Mean deviation
Dennison	13.3	8.2	4.1	5.7	4.8	2.7	3.1	8.8	17.4	19.1	18.8	−3.1	1.6	7.8	12.8	−3.4	6.2	−5.6	−4.2	−14.4	−14.6	−15.1	3.3
Beavis		15.7	4.7	21.7	17.8	0.5	5.7	9.7	31.7	14.0	1.9	−0.7	4.3	5.8	−0.5	−11.2	−11.1	−21.5	−9.4	−16.4	5.9	−14.1	3.1
Piccininni			6.3	17.1	8.5	14.3	13.8	20.3	35.5	−13.1	−1.8	−18.5	−19.0	−14.2	9.6	−2.2	4.2	−8.0	12.5	4.5	−2.3	−8.9	3.8
Temple				13.5	4.7	33.4	11.4	7.7	11.9	−16.9	−12.2	−19.2	−12.7	−19.8	−3.5	9.9	−1.0	12.3	−1.1	19.3	1.2	−4.7	2.2
Wardle					25.9	9.0	9.7	9.1	19.8	−0.5	−0.3	1.5	−2.1	2.4	7.7	−12.9	−11.8	−3.1	−2.5	−9.3	−1.5	−12.5	3.9
Summerville						1.7	9.7	12.3	10.9	3.1	−6.4	0.9	−3.4	8.2	2.7	−18.9	−19.9	−15.5	−16.3	−17.0	0.0	−2.1	0.5
Brown							10.6	17.6	18.1	−23.3	−11.8	−23.2	−23.3	−22.2	−1.3	11.6	6.0	17.6	6.9	9.7	−5.9	−11.1	1.7
Johnston								27.4	18.9	−18.3	−6.5	−11.1	−8.5	−13.2	−7.3	−2.1	4.8	1.8	−3.2	3.3	−11.2	−4.5	1.6
Sigsworth									22.1	−14.9	−9.9	−17.7	−7.6	−6.1	−3.8	−0.7	4.5	−4.5	−0.1	3.8	−10.1	−3.8	2.6
Menzies										−4.9	0.3	−14.6	−8.7	−7.9	3.2	−5.0	0.8	−7.3	5.2	−0.6	−5.3	−18.0	5.6
Lamport											25.1	20.2	18.5	27.0	14.2	−18.7	−7.4	−23.6	−18.7	−26.3	0.3	−11.5	−2.6
Bruce												13.5	11.4	14.9	27.0	−12.2	−5.6	1.6	−1.8	−16.7	−10.3	−16.0	0.1
Grayson													12.9	21.9	−0.8	−18.9	−15.7	−14.5	−17.7	−23.7	−2.6	−1.8	−6.0
Horkins														5.6	5.1	−4.8	4.7	−15.7	−7.4	−16.5	6.8	−4.5	−2.9
Dear															13.0	−18.5	−13.0	−21.4	−10.8	−26.0	−10.5	−5.0	−3.7
Grys																2.3	−3.4	−1.8	6.2	−11.8	−9.2	−3.6	2.6
Campbell																	16.7	20.6	16.5	21.3	3.4	6.3	−0.9
Marks																		−0.8	15.2	8.8	−7.3	−5.0	−1.4
Caccia																			17.0	32.2	−4.7	−4.6	−2.3
O'Donahue																				13.9	−6.8	−1.4	−0.4
Rotenberg																					5.4	4.2	−2.4
Harris																						6.4	−3.3
Pickett																							−6.0

TABLE II
MEAN SCORED DEVIATIONS OF COUNCIL MEMBERS WITH EACH VOTING CLUSTER

	Old Guard		Conservatives		Progressives		Independents	
OLD GUARD								
Dennison	68.1/9 =	7.6	57.0/6 =	9.5	−21.4/5 =	−4.3	−29.7/2 =	−14.9
Beavis	120.8/9 =	13.4	24.8/6 =	4.1	−69.6/5 =	−13.9	−8.2/2 =	−4.1
Piccininni	139.7/9 =	15.5	−57.0/6 =	−9.5	11.0/5 =	2.2	−11.2/2 =	−5.6
Temple	97.7/9 =	10.9	−84.3/6 =	−14.1	39.4/5 =	7.9	−3.5/2 =	−1.8
Wardle	131.5/9 =	14.6	8.7/6 =	1.5	−39.6/5 =	−7.9	−14.0/2 =	−7.0
Summerville	96.3/9 =	10.7	5.1/6 =	0.9	−87.6/5 =	−17.5	−14.6/2 =	−7.3
Brown	107.9/9 =	12.0	−105.1/6 =	−17.5	51.8/5 =	10.4	−17.0/2 =	−8.5
Johnston	110.3/9 =	12.3	−64.9/6 =	−10.8	4.6/5 =	0.9	−15.7/2 =	−7.9
Sigsworth	135.0/9 =	15.0	−60.0/6 =	−10.0	3.0/5 =	0.6	−13.9/2 =	−7.0
Menzies	186.3/9 =	20.7	−32.6/6 =	−5.4	−6.9/5 =	−1.4	−23.3/2 =	−11.7
CONSERVATIVES								
Lamport	−55.7/10 =	−5.6	105.0/5 =	21.0	−94.7/5 =	−18.9	−11.2/2 =	−5.6
Bruce	−28.5/10 =	−2.9	91.9/5 =	18.4	−34.7/5 =	−6.9	−26.3/2 =	−13.2
Grayson	−105.7/10 =	−10.6	67.7/5 =	13.5	−90.5/5 =	−18.1	−4.4/2 =	−2.2
Horkins	−79.4/10 =	−7.9	53.5/5 =	10.7	−39.7/5 =	−7.9	2.3/2 =	1.2
Dear	−59.2/10 =	−5.9	82.4/5 =	16.5	−97.6/5 =	−19.5	−15.5/2 =	−7.8
Grys	19.6/10 =	2.0	58.5/5 =	11.7	−8.5/5 =	−1.7	−12.8/2 =	−6.4
PROGRESSIVES								
Campbell	−34.9/10 =	−3.5	−70.8/6 =	−11.8	75.1/4 =	18.8	9.7/2 =	4.8
Marks	−25.3/10 =	−2.5	−40.4/6 =	−6.7	39.9/4 =	10.0	−12.3/2 =	−6.2
Caccia	−12.3/10 =	−1.2	−75.4/6 =	−12.6	69.0/4 =	17.2	−9.3/2 =	−4.7
O'Donahue	−12.2/10 =	−1.2	−50.2/6 =	−8.4	62.6/4 =	15.7	−8.2/2 =	−4.1
Rotenberg	−17.1/10 =	−1.7	−121.0/6 =	−20.2	76.2/4 =	19.1	9.6/2 =	4.8
INDEPENDENTS								
Harris	−43.8/10 =	−4.4	−25.5/6 =	−4.3	−10.0/5 =	−2.0	6.4/1 =	6.4
Pickett	−94.8/10 =	−9.5	−42.4/6 =	−7.1	−0.5/5 =	−0.1	6.4/1 =	6.4

TABLE III
MEAN SCORED DEVIATIONS OF VOTING CLUSTERS WITH EACH OTHER

	Old Guard	Conservatives	Progressives	Independents
Old Guard	596.6/45 = 13.3	−308.9/60 = −5.1	−101.8/50 = −2.0	−138.6/20 = −6.9
Conservatives	−308.9/60 = −5.1	205.9/15 = 13.7	−357.8/30 = −11.9	−67.9/12 = −5.7
Progressives	−101.8/50 = −2.0	−357.8/30 = −11.9	161.4/10 = 16.1	−10.5/10 = −1.1
Independents	−138.6/20 = −6.9	−67.9/12 = −5.7	−10.5/10 = −1.1	6.4/1 = 6.4

cent of the total positive deviation of 1,256.6. These cluster groupings were verified by the use of an *R*-type factor analysis, the results of which appear in Table IV.[28] Although the determination of the voting clusters on Council is an

[28]The factor analysis program was constructed so that the twenty-three members' measures of agreement with each other could be taken into account. This produced a 23 × 23 matrix similar to that in Table I, with two exceptions based upon the limitations of the factor analysis program. Firstly, because the program did not read negative numbers the mean agreement score of 51.8 was added to each of the scored deviations in the table. Secondly, in allowing for the program's inability to read missing data cells which occur where each Council member's voting performance was recorded against himself, two steps were taken to provide data for those missing cells. This served to create two subtables of Table IV, one of which was to substitute the mean scored agreement based upon the mean deviations which is an average of the twenty-two deviation scores for each member taken with the other twenty-two members of Council. The second subtable which when taken together with the first tended to reduce the error inherent in using either method singly, had had 99.9 substituted for the missing data cell on the theory that this figure represents perfect agreement for a member with himself. However, on the basis of the cumulative proportion of

TABLE IV

FACTOR ANALYSIS OF COUNCIL MEMBERS' PAIR-WISE VOTING PATTERNS

Council member	Rotated factor matrix where mean score was used for missing data				Rotated factor matrix where 99.9 was used for missing data			
	"Progressive" factor	"Conservative" factor	"Old Guard" factor	"Independent" factor	"Old Guard" factor	"Conservative" factor	"Progressive" factor	"Independent" factor
Dennison	.191	.558	.491	−.014	.619	.717	.203	−.137
Beavis	−.020	.536	.775	.049	.807	.440	−.178	.147
Piccininni	.424	.092	.828	−.087	.853	.036	.381	−.093
Temple	.675	−.096	.637	.122	.650	−.213	.572	.228
Wardle	.132	.416	.846	.102	.876	.314	−.025	.136
Summerville	−.027	.498	.783	.172	.805	.341	−.248	.307
Brown	.672	−.147	.645	−.010	.667	−.242	.638	.014
Johnston	.494	.055	.812	.042	.807	−.054	.379	.073
Sigsworth	.452	.059	.833	.017	.849	−.036	.356	.037
Menzies	.291	.165	.872	−.043	.932	.114	.223	−.106
Lamport	−.162	.906	.114	.065	.062	.934	−.259	.143
Bruce	.110	.901	.158	−.112	.099	.941	.099	−.126
Grayson	−.096	.935	.063	.113	−.014	.839	−.250	.337
Horkins	.109	.919	.056	.165	−.027	.830	.016	.355
Dear	−.147	.923	.166	.087	.111	.896	−.256	.139
Grys	.307	.825	.319	−.213	.258	.820	.294	−.100
Campbell	.934	.022	.132	.068	.048	−.072	.946	.251
Marks	.875	.195	.256	−.051	.150	.166	.855	.021
Caccia	.896	−.057	.166	.053	.151	−.114	.640	.113
O'Donahue	.898	.106	.284	−.133	.193	.090	.915	−.026
Rotenberg	.880	−.175	.238	.038	.183	−.292	.875	.271
Harris	.544	.506	.319	.471	.208	.241	.263	.811
Pickett	.714	.407	.121	.465	.003	.167	.441	.689
Cumulative proportion of total variance	.499	.751	.852	.876	.390	.669	.800	.860

important finding in itself for the purpose of understanding decisions in Council, our chief use of this information is to establish an ideal voting division for the testing of certain hypotheses.

Results

Hypothesis 1: Members of Council with similar background characteristics will tend to share norms and behave similarly.

In testing this hypothesis there are two methods by which we can proceed. The first, as previously referred to, is to use the scored deviations to create an index of interagreement and thereby measure the strength of voting agreement among Council members who had a background characteristic in common. The scored deviations for all people who had that characteristic in common were added so as to obtain a total scored deviation for that characteristic, and this total deviation was divided by the number of pairings to obtain an average deviation for that characteristic.

Age:	Over forty-five $479.5/78 = 6.1$	Under forty-five $-48.6/45 = -1.1$		Total $4.30.9/123 = 3.5$
Religion:	Protestant $54.4/91 = 0.6$	Catholic $46.6/15 = 3.1$	Jewish $5.4/1 = 5.4$	Total $106.5/107 = 1.0$
Occupation:	Businessman $94.3/55 = 1.7$	Lawyer $-44.8/10 = -4.5$	Housewife $9.7/6 = 1.6$	Total $59.1/71 = 0.8$
Seniority:	Four terms or more $134.7/55 = 2.4$	Three terms or less $-128.2/66 = -1.9$		Total $6.5/121 = 0.1$
Sex:	Men $-33.3/153 = -0.2$	Women $15.3/10 = 1.5$		Total $-18.0/163 = -0.1$
National party:	PC $-100.2/66 = -1.5$	Liberal $41.5/28 = 1.5$	NDP $40.2/3 = 13.4$	Total $-18.5/97 = -0.2$

From the calculations made here we can note that age, religion, and occupation have positive if not overly significant effects upon the likelihood of people who share these characteristics to agree in Council votes while seniority, sex, and national party affiliation seem to have a negligible effect upon voting relationships. However, if we look more closely at the figures we can see that the average deviation for each characteristic taken as a whole masks significant differences between its constituent parts. For example, members over forty-five agree 6.1 per cent more often than the Council mean, but the younger members agree among themselves less often than the Council mean. Similarities occur for each of the other characteristics, leading us to find that simply having some characteristic in common will not necessarily increase voting agreement between members,

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the total variance that was accounted for, this latter method seems to have introduced a greater amount of error than did the method utilizing mean scores. In actually verifying the clusters, it should be noted that the factors that become apparent were commensurate with the cluster groupings that had been delineated previously. For each factor the highest stated number of scores equal to the number in the commensurate cluster was taken, that is, ten for the Old Guard, six for the Conservatives, five for the Progressives, and two for the Independents, and in both subtables, although the ordering was somewhat different, the same Council members corresponded to the factor grouping that had been in each cluster. This was accomplished in a factor analysis program in which maximum variance of the factors was the criterion for factor rotation. For further reference, see R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XI (Dec. 1967), 444–80.

but only if that characteristic has an important common attachment will it influence voting behaviour.

The other method of testing this hypothesis uses a somewhat different technique in determining the relationship between the various background characteristics and voting behaviour among members on Council. This is achieved by correlating the clusters we have found which delineate the chief voting divisions with each of the background characteristics we are studying. The actual measure of correlation used is the Kendall tau A, a gauge of error reduction which was selected because it is not overly sensitive to zeroes appearing in the cells of a small table thereby giving an exaggerated relationship.[29] As with the scored deviation measure, the correlations depicted in Table V show age to have by far the greatest relationship with the voting clusters, the relationships of the other characteristics being somewhat significant but not very strong.

TABLE V
RELATIONSHIP OF DIVISIONS IN COUNCIL WITH BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS, USING TAU A COEFFICIENTS

	Age	Occupation	Seniority	Sex	National party	Religion	Constituency income	Constituency region
Voting clusters	.640	.200	.193	.157	.145	.128	.048	.164
Local party sympathies	.845	.161	.209	.095	.128	.219	.059	.142
Local party affiliation	.550	.169	.092	.071	.053	.177	.072	.146

Hypothesis 2: The more background characteristics that members share the more similarly they will tend to behave.

As has been found in testing the previous hypothesis, our major categories of background characteristics, to a certain extent, distort and gloss over the disparate findings within their subcategories. It might be interesting in another paper to determine the relative influence of various characteristics with controls introduced. For example, are Protestant businessmen over the age of forty-five, who have served four terms or more and belong to the Progressive Conservative party likely to have a higher common agreement among themselves, than members with all the same characteristics in common except that they happen to be Liberals? However, given the limitations upon us, we took the three general categories, age, religion, and occupation, which were shown to have the highest average deviation, and with them determined if members who had an increasing number of these factors in common also had a commensurate increasing average deviation among them.

Recalling that members who had age in common had a positive average deviation of 3.5, those with religion in common had an average deviation of 1.0, and those with occupation in common had an average deviation of 0.8, we now look at the average deviations among members who had two of these characteristics in common.

Age and religion:	330.4/56 = 5.9
Age and occupation:	161.4/35 = 4.6
Religion and occupation:	110.3/28 = 3.9
Age, religion and occupation:	85.8/15 = 5.7

[29]A more detailed discussion of the tau A measure may be found in S. Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1956), 213–23.

These findings are all consistent with the hypothesis; however, when we examine members who had all three factors in common we find that they agree 5.7 per cent of the time more often than the mean on Council, but this is fractionally lower than the agreement rate among those who just had age and religion in common. Although this inconsistency does not necessarily preclude the usefulness of this measure, it does raise some question as to its applicability, particularly in a situation where it is based upon only fifteen pairings and is thereby very sensitive to a small number of deviant cases.

Hypothesis 3: Seniority is the major correlate of friendship choice, and also the major determinant of municipal party preference.

In addressing ourselves to this hypothesis it should be kept in mind that, from the information available, friendship choice cannot be isolated from municipal party preference. We have two methods of ascertaining the latter: party affiliation which accounts for twelve members on Council, and party sympathies as recorded in the vote for the Board of Control vacancy which accounts for twenty Council members. Both of these measures of party preference were correlated with each of the six background characteristics, as well as the two measures of constituency characteristics, that is, average family income and region, as reported in Table v.

Although the tau A values do differ somewhat, dependent upon the definition of party preference, in neither case does seniority approach age as being the major correlate of municipal party preference, thereby indicating that relative age has the most significant effect of the variables studied.

Hypothesis 4: The higher the rank of an individual within the group the more closely his actions will correspond to those of the group.

Hypothesis 4 is tested by determining the total mean deviation of each of the highly ranked individuals to be studied, in our case the mayor and the four members of the Board of Control. The reason that chairmen of Council committees were not included is that these posts are not seen to be seats of exceptional power, and are largely held on a rotating basis. The measure of mean deviation is attained by averaging each Council member's scored deviations with each of the other twenty-two Council members.

The mean deviations for each of the five members studied, as seen in Table I, were 3.3 for Mayor Dennison, -0.9 for Controller Campbell, -1.4 for Controller Marks, -2.6 for Controller Lamport, and 3.1 for Controller Beavis. The sum of these is 1.5 which when divided by the number studied results in a mean deviation of 0.3 for the five highest ranked members on Council, signifying that they are likely to be in agreement with some member on a given vote only 0.3 per cent of the time more often than is the Council norm. The lack of significance of this figure becomes more apparent when compared to a 2.8 mean deviation for the ten members in the Old Guard cluster.

Hypothesis 5: Status of members in the external community will be reflected by the support of other members, and by having their actions correspond more closely to those of the group.

This hypothesis is tested in the same manner as hypothesis 4 with the group whose mean deviation is studied being comprised of those members of Toronto

City Council who are also on Metro Council by virtue of having topped the polls in their ward. These twelve members so defined had a total mean deviation based on Table I of −3.3 giving an average of −0.3 for the group, and thereby being inconsistent with the hypothesis, in so far as we were able to test it.

Hypothesis 6: Members will be more greatly influenced by national party affiliations than municipal party affiliations.

This hypothesis is based upon Eulau, Zisk, and Prewitt's theory, seeking to show that national party affiliation is a stronger influence on the voting behaviour of Council than is municipal party attachment. We have already determined in the testing of hypothesis 1 that national party has an average deviation of −0.2 among members that have this trait in common. The average deviation for affiliated members and sympathizers of the local parties is computed as follows:

Local party affiliates:	CCC $528.5/36 = $ **14.7**	Civac $63.1/3 = $ **21.0**	Total $591.6/39 = $ **15.2**
Local party sympathies:	CCC $516.4/66 = $ **7.8**	Civac $25.3/28 = $ **0.9**	Total $541.7/94 = $ **5.8**

These results are incompatible with the hypothesis and show that members who have municipal party in common are much more likely to behave similarly than are those with national party in common; this thereby indicating that, at least in so far as Toronto City Council is concerned, the proposition of Eulau and his associates is inappropriate.

This judgment is confirmed by correlating the ideal voting clusters with both criteria of municipal party supporters. The tau A coefficients which result are .696 between the clusters and affiliates and .661 between the clusters and sympathizers, which both compare quite favourably to the .145 score found previously which correlated the clusters and national party affiliation.

Hypothesis 7: Members will represent what they perceive to be in the interest of their constituencies.

As previously stated, constituency interest is open to a wide variety of interpretations; however, in Toronto there is not too great a number of interest groups specifically devoted to the municipal level of government that have a general scope of focus. Specialized groups such as those devoted to stopping the Spadina Expressway will appear and disband when the issue which gave them their genesis is no longer salient. However, the local Ratepayers Associations are sustaining organizations, and their central structure, the Confederation of Residents and Ratepayers Associations, has perhaps the most visibility of any ongoing civic action group. This organization published a record just prior to the most recent municipal election in December 1969 of the performance of Council members upon what CORRA thought to be the most important challenges to spot rezoning by organized resident groups in the city during the previous term of Council.

Upon the basis of the eight votes selected by CORRA the total proportion of votes on Council sympathetic to the resident associations' positions was 63 out of 163, some 39 per cent of the votes available. However, when examining the performance of the Council members representing each specific ward to which the rezoning challenges applied, it was found that sixteen out of nineteen possible votes were sympathetic to the resident associations' stands, 84 per cent of the

votes available among these aldermen. This clearly shows that even Council members who are often in favour of these spot rezoning decisions will oppose them if they appear to be contrary to the interests of vocal representatives of constituency opinion.

Hypothesis 8: Members from relatively safe constituencies will be less sensitive to the interests of their districts than members from more competitive constituencies.

In testing this hypothesis the Council members representing wards which were directly affected by spot rezoning challenges as reported in the testing of hypothesis 7 were investigated more closely. It was expected that those members within this group who won their seat in the previous election by 15 per cent of the total vote or greater would feel less influenced by the pressures of resident organizations than those members whose districts were more competitive.

In fact this did not prove to be the case. Of the nineteen votes involved, fourteen were cast by members who had won their seats by relatively safe margins and thirteen of them were sympathetic to the resident associations' positions, almost 93 per cent of the available votes. On the other hand, of the five votes cast in this situation by members from competitive districts only three were favourable to the resident groups, 60 per cent of the total. While it is undoubtedly true that the number of votes involved was too small to adequately test the proposition, these findings do lead the researcher to wonder about the typicalness of Toronto City Council.

Hypothesis 9: Members from constituencies of similar characteristics will tend to behave similarly.

In determining the degree of similarity in voting patterns among Council members who have in common such factors as average family income of their district[30] and region of their district,[31] the technique of deriving the average scored deviation was again utilized as shown below.

Average family income: Above city average   Below city average Total
                        $-68.3/28 = -2.4$ $98.5/45 = 2.2$ $30.2/73 = 0.4$
City regions:
East   Central   West-central   West   Total
$93.2/6 = 15.5$ $-51.0/15 = -3.4$ $12.1/6 = 22.0$ $19.4/6 = 33.2$ $73.8/33 = 2.2$

While these average scored deviations are not high, the measure which groups constituencies by similar region seems to be somewhat significant. However, if we attempt to determine what proportion of the respective total scored deviations of 30.2 and 73.8 is comprised of that between each of the nine pairs of aldermen sitting for the same ward, we find that these pairings comprise a scored deviation of 73.5. This figure when divided by nine shows that Council members from the same ward will agree with each other 8.2 per cent of the time more often than the mean on Council. However, when this scored deviation of 73.5 is subtracted from the total of these two measures, we find that the average scored deviations

[30]Average family income is calculated from data in *Metropolitan Profile* and the standard for division is based on whether the average ward income was above or below the city average of $5,055 per family.
[31]The regional boundary divisions employed for separating sections of Toronto are somewhat arbitrary. The Don River divides east from central; Spadina Avenue divides central from west-central; and Dufferin Street divides west-central from west.

FIGURE 2. Relationship of influences upon Council voting using local party sympathies

referred to above are largely spurious, and are accounted for by the scored agreement of Council members from the same wards.

This lack of significance can be retested by correlating these classifications of constituency characteristics with the ideal voting clusters. The resulting tau A correlations are a relatively low .048 between members grouped according to average family income categories and the clusters, and a somewhat higher but still not very strong .164 relationship between members grouped according to the regions in the city and the voting clusters. The dubiousness of the hypothesis in light of the type of characteristics studied should not be overly surprising. The categorization according to region, although following rough geographical divisions within the city, was arbitrary. Furthermore, the classification of wards by average family income, although being the best socio-economic criterion available, is somewhat misleading, as ward boundaries during this term of Council were purposely designed to include a heterogeneous area. Also, the low turnout rate at the previous election, 38.0 per cent, as reported in the City of Toronto *Municipal Handbook*, varied disproportionately throughout the various areas in

FIGURE 3. Relationship of influences upon Council voting using local party affiliation

each ward indicating that some aldermen may have been elected by a group of voters within their ward with characteristics quite different from those of the overall ward. Accordingly the elected member might feel his allegiance to the untypical group.

It seems useful in presenting an overall picture of this study to substitute the correlation coefficients that signify relationships between the various concepts studied back into the original model as presented in the theory section of the paper. This is done in Figures 2 and 3 using both definitions of local party preference, that is, party sympathies and party affiliation. The measure of leadership influence used is based upon the correlation of the ideal voting clusters on Council with the split on Council between Metro Council membership and non-membership.

Summary

In summarizing the Toronto City Council findings with regard to hypotheses reviewed, the reader should be mindful of the fact that most of the theory spawn-

ing our hypotheses was borrowed from studies of other than non-partisan legislatures. Accordingly, we should be reluctant to generalize too widely on the weaknesses of said theory – particularly so when in the totality of legislative bodies our study constitutes a sample of but one. However, with these restrictions in mind, it is fair to say that in Toronto City Council during the period studied such factors as seniority and national party affiliation among others were of minimal significance in influencing the votes of members. On the other hand, age and municipal party loyalties were shown to have significant relationships with the voting of members.

With regard to future research, the realm of municipal legislative bodies provides an excellent laboratory for further investigation. Such studies could take the form of closer examinations of the attitudinal orientations of legislative members determined through in-depth interviews. Another investigative vehicle might be a more detailed qualitative breakdown of issue distinctions on matters facing such legislatures. The evolution of a thorough going party system where none existed before in forums such as Toronto City Council could give rise to examinations of the incumbent change of norms and behaviour patterns that accompanied this rise of parties. From the variety of areas remaining for future investigation, it should be gathered that this particular study is but a first step towards clarification of the political and social dynamics of the decision-making process at the municipal level of government.

Appendix

Local party affiliation
CCC	9
Civac	3
Non-affiliate	11

Local party sympathies (based on vote for Board of Control vacancy, July 5, 1967)
CCC	12
Civac	8
Not disclosed	3

National party affiliation
PC	12
Liberal	8
NDP	3

Religion
Protestant	14
Catholic	6
Jewish	2
Greek Orthodox	1

Occupation
Businessman	11
Lawyer	5
Housewife	4
Other	3

Sex
Men	18
Women	5

Age (as of December 1, 1969)
Above forty-five	13
Below forty-five	10

Seniority (number of terms on Council)
Four terms or more	11
Three terms or less	12

Metro Council
Member	12
Non-member	11

Competitiveness of constituency (winning margin 15 per cent or more of total vote was considered safe)
Safe	10
Competitive	13

Average family income of constituency (above or below city average of $5,055 per family)
High	8
Low	10
City-wide	5

Region of constituency
East (wards 1, 8)	4
Central (2, 3, 9)	6
West-central (4, 5)	4
West (6, 7)	4
City-wide	5