Boris S. Erassov

CONCEPTS OF

"CULTURAL PERSONALITY" IN THE

IDEOLOGIES OF THE THIRD WORLD

The wide diffusion of the concepts of "cultural personality" or "cultural originality" in the social thought of developing Asian and African countries is determined by a number of circumstances. These concepts, though they claim a theoretical understanding of the processes involved in the "entry of these countries into the 20th century," all boil down to the basic fact that the source, the foundation and the decisive sphere for the processes of self-determination in developing Asian and African countries in the present day world must be their traditional cultures, as opposed to the industrial civilization of the West.

One should emphasize from the very outset that this is not a mere statement about the specificity of national cultures reflecting the logic of the historical development and the social life of a given people in different spheres—beginning with art and literature and ending with the habits and details of everyday

123

life. In their numerous variations the concepts of "cultural personality," notwithstanding all their differences, distinctly reveal two propositions common to them all. The first is the notion that members of a given community (its size may range from a separate tribe to a supra-national body of the "Pan-African" or "Pan-Arabic" type) are all and to an equal degree the carriers of some traditional values and elements of their culture, which weld them into a single whole and transform them into a living organism that manifests itself in the different spheres of life within the community and in its relations with the rest of the world. A second and major characteristic of this concept is the affirmation of the specifically humanistic trend of the "original" cultures which supposedly set them apart from the Western "economic" civilization. Whether such ideas are cloaked in a religious mantle of Indian thought with its rich religious traditions or, on the contrary, whether, as in African ideology, they acquire a formalization that is seemingly completely secular, their main conceptual core remains unchanged. This is above all an appeal to the "human" characteristics of a culture as opposed to the material and economic characteristics of Western culture. (The cultures of socialist countries in as much as they are based on materialism and rationalism are often included in the latter).

The contours of the idea of a "cultural personality" had already begun to emerge during the colonial period of the history of these countries. It was thanks to the clash with the different forms of colonial coercion (including the cultural and ideological spheres) that the social thought of these countries gradually freed itself from the notion that the "Europeanization" of a country was the only way of turning it into an equal partner of more developed states. It was during these clashes that the apologetic image of Western bourgeois culture as the embodiment of the ideals of Reason and Progress were exposed. However, the inherent weakness of the concepts of a "cultural personality" was also revealed with sufficient clarity during the same period. Having arisen as the ideological antithesis to the theory of "Europeanization," they reflected one-sidedly the essence of the process of de-colonization, just as the preceding notions of enlightenment had been based on the possibility of a gradual mechanical ousting of the traditional culture (together with its connected social relations) by formally assimilated Western patterns.

124

The concepts of "cultural originality" are by no means limited to the sphere of culture proper; they claim to provide an explanation for the totality of processes that are characteristic of young African and Asian states, and more specifically of the great unexpected difficulties they have encountered in the course of their economic and social development.

It is now becoming increasingly clear that both the rate of development and the very nature of this development do not correspond at all to the expectations frequently associated with the winning of national independence. Here statistical tables are more eloquent than the most vociferous statements. This specific fact is compelling the most competent Western specialists to renounce the earlier, purely economic models of development for young states and to turn to an examination of the "human costs" of progress and make recommendations with regard to changing socio-cultural values and institutions. This, for example, is the essence of one of G. Myrdal's main propositions in his fundamental work: *Asian Drama. An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations.* Admitting that, as regards the less developed countries, Western socio-economic science has proved to be a set of "prejudices," Myrdal calls for a radical change in the existing ideas of the ways for eliminating the backwardness of these countries; he calls for an admission of the originality of their ways of development and says that special attention should be paid to a purposeful development of social institutions and cultural values.

As a matter of fact Myrdal's conclusions fail to satisfy to a large extent many of his critics in developing countries; these have pointed out that Myrdal's ultimate ideal, as in the case of previous theoreticians, was based on technico-economic and social models copied (and embellished) from contemporary bourgeois society (Sweden in particular). Critics of this category reject the very thesis of the need to "overtake" the developed West, or to equal the quantity of goods it consumes, its production level of electrical power, its employment figures, and so on. In so doing they point out the impracticality of such aspirations since no possible capital investments could ever cover the cost of "human investments," of changing existing habits, customs, ways of life, or of extending to an adequate degree the number of persons employed in modern sectors of production and in public services. But the crux of the matter, as proponents of

125

this point of view warn us, is not only the limited scale of investments. The Western ideal of modernization as such does not correspond to the cultural and social essence of the Third World and attempts to introduce it may lead to profound social and spiritual upheavals and conflicts within these countries as well as on an international plane.

Even the most general examination of the concepts of "cultural originality" reveals the fact that they are by no means "theories of development." On the contrary, in these concepts problems of development are relegated to second place, although, depending on the attitude towards the problem of development, several variants in these concepts may be singled out—ranging from the neo-traditionalist to the resolutely reformist. While the former consistently reject any innnovation that does not conform to the existing bastions of the culture,[1] the latter admit the need for assimilating the scientific and technical methods of the West, together with new skills and styles of thought. But even in this second case the use of the achievements of an industrial civilization is considered possible only if the previous solidarity is preserved without modification as the basis for the social structure itself.

To many Third World ideologists progress and modernization bring no hope. Is development worth while if it can only result in an imitation of the West with all its vices and conflicts, if progress destroys human relations, replacing them by a heartless utilitarianism? J. Okaku, an important figure in African culture, asserts that only in Third World countries "humanism still maintains overwhelming control over technology."[2] If progress implies a renunciation of humanism, Okpaku continues, then let us forget technology. As a matter of fact such propositions are put forward not only by cultural leaders, but often by economists also, who consider it necessary to subordinate economic activity to the traditional values of their society. The choice is made in favor of "originality," even at the cost of preserving poverty and

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[1] Traditionalist positions are defended, for example, by S. Cudjoe, a Ghanean sociologist, when he proclaims as the inviolable bastions of African society the power of the tribal chiefs, poligamy, the extended family and the cult of the elders. Even the subordinate position of women, from his point of view, is justified because it conforms to the natural function of maintaining the clan. (S. Cudjoe: *The Conflict of Cultures in Africa.* Alger, 1969).

[2] "Présence Africaine," 1969, N. 70, p. 147.

slowing down growth rates. Any attempt to transform industrialization into a self-sufficient aim, these ideologists assert, would threaten society with a huge increase in human suffering, the decline of morals and faith in the future, chaos and disintegration. A direct apology of "original" traditionalism, without reservations, is encountered rather seldom. But an acceptance of innovations is frequently accompanied by the expression of naive wishes to "supplement" materialistic Europe and, in exchange for goods and scientific and technical achievements, to "supply" it with ethical values and a "feeling of solidarity."

The idea of the community of cultural characteristics of the population of a country holds an important place in the ideological makeup of nationalism. Moreover the initial unity of the population is explained not by the existing community of economic relations and economic activity or a desire to establish such a community. On the contrary, the refutation of the Western economic factor becomes a criticism of the whole economic concept of society, and any display of economic activity is seen in direct opposition to traditional solidarity; economic activity is admitted only to the extent to which it ensures the maintenance of solidarity. As in the case of anti-rationalism, anti-economism is an essential feature of any programme constructed on the basis of the principles of a "cultural personality." This kind of "solidarity" is especially intolerant of the presence in its midst of an "alien" commercial population which promotes the development of commodity-commercial relations and is able to derive a benefit from these relations. Ethnic and religious persecution is an inevitable consequence of these attempts to establish "original" solidarity.

It should also be noted that these concepts, as a rule, bypass those major aspects of life in contemporary Asian or African society, of which the city, modern mass media, industry, science and scientific institutions have become an integral part. These elements of social life are not recognized as the property of the society, nor they are assigned the role of "enclaves" fenced off from the sea of originality around them. No less obvious is the desire of the votaries of "originality" to embellish or merely ignore those social conflicts and upheavals, both the present ones and those in the past, which do not fit into the proclaimed solidarity.

127

Concepts of "Cultural Personality"

The attitude to science is also an important line of cultural demarcation between developing countries and the West. In the most extreme variants of the concept of a "cultural personality," science as a whole is regarded as a possession belonging solely to the West, because it expresses the latter's utilitarian attitude to the world and answers its problems. It is thought that an understanding of the problems facing Asian and African countries eludes foreign scholars and is accessible only to men who come from these countries.

In criticizing "scientific prejudices" and the limited nature of the methods of scientism, the theoreticians of these trends of "originality" concepts assert the need for creating their own, national science corresponding to the system of values that serve as a vital basis for their society. At the same time attempts have been made to create a "synthesis" of a scientific rationalist world outlook and the "original" values, either by appealing to the principle of the "duality of truth," or by explaining one or more elements of the traditional culture and beliefs.

Attempts to explain somehow in a consistent and rational manner the meaning of "originality," and the meaning of solidarity that arises from it, have proved to be quite difficult. It is usually assumed that solidarity arises as a function of some of the general aspects inherent in all the initial links, whether these are individuals or communal, that go to make up the framework of a given society. These general aspects are well known: namely, common territory, environment, common language, art, beliefs, history, customs and frame of mind. At times color and other strictly racial characteristics are added to them.

But all such definitions of similarity, though they supposedly determine the age-old, fundamental solidarity of the autochtonous population, have not withstood the blows of rational criticism. A common territory cannot serve as the basis for relations of solidarity because migration of the population and political divisions make this a clearly ephemeral factor. Nothing can come of attempts to deduce a community of character and a unity of the African Negroes merely from their close proximity to the vegetable kingdom, nor of the Arabs from their nomadic way of life. In each case too large a proportion of the population of the community considered does not fit into the boundaries of the given ecological niche. Factors such as art, language and traditions

128

are conventional.[3] A closer inspection shows that though they are common they present profound differences in a whole range of more or less essential aspects. A single national language, art and set of traditions appear later, after a period of joint life and joint activity of the population. Lastly, in propounding national originality, references to religion, to which great importance is attached, particularly in Hindu nationalism, are no longer very satisfactory.

Under the pressure of criticism the proponents of the "originality" theory are compelled to admit that a definition of the essence they seek is impossible, that it cannot be expressed in rational categories and is not subject to a study along rational lines. Having abandoned any attempt to offer a rational explanation for the idea of "originality," the Lebanese philosopher Abd al-Latif Sharara writes that it arises from "a complex of mysterious facts of which I am ignorant. But my lack of knowledge does not make reality an illusion."[4] Most theoreticians of this kind are forced to appeal to the "spontaneous vitality" of one people or another, to the mysterious well-springs of its energy. In a final analysis all attempts to explain unity are reduced to a recognition of the importance of will and inner mood of a given people in the struggle for unity. Abdullah al-Alayili, an Arab ideologist, wishes to shift the search for solidarity from the "externality of life to the internality of the soul,"[5] excluding all deviating motives inherent in individuals or in groups of the population. The Senegalese theoretician, L. Senghor, also assumes that the unity of a nation "is not a natural determination and therefore an expression of the *milieu*, but a conscious will to construct or reconstruct... a common will for a life in common,"[6] in which the volitive desire to assert certain cultural values and moral rules promotes solidarity.

The difficulty in correlating the concepts of a "cultural personality" with reality have compelled R. Emerson, a well-

[3] For example, Zambia alone has 73 tribes each with its own different traditions and language, and the life of these "micro-personalities" can only be maintained at the expense of the whole. The campaign for consolidating the "Zambian spirit" launched in that country has run up against obstinate cultural separatism.
[4] *Arab Nationalism. An Anthology.* Berkeley - Los Angeles, 1962, p. 225.
[5] *Arab Nationalism,* p. 120.
[6] L. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, London, 1964, p. 9-84.

129

known British scholar of the problems of nationalism in the Third World, to admit: "The positive content of nationalism is always a difficult matter to identify with any precision. A national culture is as elusive a matter to pin down as national character has proved to be. It forms no consistent and rounded whole."[7] The unreliability of any positivistic definitions of a nation has led Emerson to reach the conclusion that in developing countries the concept of national community is but a myth existing only in the minds of the members of this already formed community, a myth that is absolutely incapable of a rational explanation of its reality.

What is it, however, that imparts such influence and conviction to the concept of "cultural personality," what social phenomena and laws are coded in the references to the "mysterious souls" of peoples?

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Many things in the ideas of "originality" are cleared up when one remembers, as has already been pointed out, that they are a reaction against an earlier cultural ideological position held by the Afro-Asian intelligentsia. The concepts of "cultural personality" have existed not since time immemorial, but came into being only after the society had undergone a period of "Europeanization," which consisted in the zealous assimilation of European culture in its enlightened, liberal-bourgeois forms. As a rule this Europeanization affected a narrow educated stratum, causing it to break away from its own backward population and simultaneously to be debarred from the much coveted European society by a system of bourgeois prejudices. At first the intelligentsia frankly advocated the idea of "Europeanization," but later they became divided and a tendency arose in their midst to return—at times quite literally—from the European capitals to their own native land; the desire to discover a common spiritual ground on which they could come closer to their own people, and the search for social spheres in which to speak on their behalf became manifest.

The reasons for this metamorphosis may undoubtedly by traced to the behaviour of the West itself, which was so zealous in

[7] R. Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, Cambridge, 1964, p. 153.

130

preaching the worldwide mission of bringing the ideals of freedom and progress to backward countries and peoples. The stronger the faith of the convert in these ideals, the greater his disappointment on discovering that these ideals did not correspond to reality; that he himself, and most others like him, were barred from a civilization that purported to embody reason and progress on the mere pretext that he was an "Asian" or an "African," that he was of a different color, and so on. Even a maximum similarity to his European model did not alter the real position of a man who had his origin in a different culture. He had to undergo a long and intensive period of learning, of formalized assimilation of Western culture, only to discover that it was impossible to enter bourgeois society, in which he was treated as a servant without capital or property, even though he possessed "European manners." Disappointment and criticism of the West were the first stage in the acquisition of the idea of "originality."

The deepest shock for these educated strata was that they felt quite clearly that they were misfits, socially useless and uprooted from their social *milieu.* The loss of those customary personal ties had not been accompanied by an involvement in new production relations. Thus the isolated individual sought at all costs to restore the world of personal ties.

All *belles lettres* of Asian and African countries are full of portraits of "advanced personalities," educated or semi-educated, wealthy or penniless, who attempted to enter the new way of life by assimilating the external attributes of Western culture: dress-coat, manners and education. At this kind of literature, regardless of the orientation of the author, reflected the real situation, it invariably led to conclusions on the hopelessness of attempts such as these, which must result either in a moral downfall, breakdown, a feeling of uselessness, or in a renunciation of former ideals and a "return to the native country," to "their own people," a return which was all the more difficult the more archaic and inert their own culture. After a period of romantic rejection of and flight from the West, this intelligentsia tried to rediscover their own identity by establishing a new solidarity with their people.

Without a doubt, this process of "returning to their people" is historically justified and necessary. It helps to eliminate that acquired cultural veneer that is inevitably of a formal nature and that deprives the individual of his social roots during his vain

131

efforts towards a personal advancement by the assimilation of European culture. In this case the idea of a "cultural personality" may help to overcome the tragic division and solitude that is the lot of even the strongest personalities, and which lead either to apathy and anomy or to futile imitation.

At the same time the intellectual *élite* tried to discover in "originality" the basis for a dialogue with the West, which had rejected it in its earlier quest for self-assertion. Traces of this "secret and agonizing" link with Western culture have already been discovered in as much as the idea of "originality" is expressed in intellectual terms capable of being understood by the West, and of a dialogue with it. Its authors wish to be understood by the West and try to express their "new word" in terms comprehensible to it.

In the initial stages the "indistinctness" of the social situation made it possible to forget the fact that under the influence of the idea of "originality" the intelligentsia see the culture of their own people, not in its real social significance, but as a formalized system of images and symbols used for entirely different purposes, and first of all in the self-assertion of the educated strata in their anti-Europeanism. The formal nature of these constructions allowed the authors to keep silent about both the elements of the productive relation to nature, without which the existence of the most primitive "natural" collective is inconceivable, and also the facts of the backwardness and inertia of social relations.

In fact, different aspects of this idea were soon borrowed by nationalist leaders, and used as some of the main elements of the state superstructure, and this was often encouraged by the intelligentsia.

But in its institutional embodiment the idea of "originality" frequently reveals several aspects at times unexpected and hardly pleasing to the intelligentsia that first propounded it. For the intelligentsia do not see in the idea of "originality" their own reassimilation to the people from whom they have been irrevocably divided by their education and way of life. But in this case the survival of the intelligentsia as a social group is possible only by assimilation to the bureaucratic *élite* which concentrates all effective power in its own hands. The intelligentsia faces this dilemma: whether to serve as a pawn in the hands of the ruling *élite*, and to become "part and parcel" of the state, or to become

132

an object of denunciation and persecution by traditionalist groups.

Of course the concepts of "cultural personality" are by no means put forward with the covert or overt intention of justifying a reinforcement of state power and other institutions of the superstructure. The logical development of the idea of "originality," however, leads inevitably to this. From this we assume that the appearance of these concepts is not only linked with the psychological position of the intelligentsia in a newly-free country. The ambivalent attitude of the intelligentsia to Western culture proves to be only one specific case of a broader and fundamental clash within developing societies—and what is more important this clash not only affects external relations, but is also internal and structural.

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Despite the stability of their former, pre-colonial structures, the less developed countries find themselves involved today to a considerable extent in relations with the "great outside world," in world economy, thus upsetting inevitably their seclusion and isolation and undermining autochtonous traditions, in other words bringing about a complete disruption of the historically shaped "personality" of the people. Under these conditions any action aimed at a one-sided isolation from the world of today must come up against real factors of involvement, new needs and notions that have sprung up as a result of contacts between these backward countries and the industrial West. Concepts of a "cultural personality" originate precisely as an attempt to reconcile the traditional heritage with exigences of our times, the relations and structures inherited from the past with new demands. They attest to the existence in developing countries of an intricate symbiosis of the principles of social organization which are diverse by nature and can be interpreted as an attempt to find forms that would impart sufficient stability to this symbiotic state.

In present-day Afro-Asian countries the pre-capitalist structures (within the boundaries of which the majority of the population still operates) are marked by the disintegration of those essential features that had already been discovered by Karl Marx in the *Asian Mode of Production.* One of these essential features is the undeveloped nature of commodity relations, the self-sufficient

133

nature of individual economic units and the domination of human labor over material relations. The products of labor in this form of society exist only in natural, concrete form and their social nature, their importance for society as a whole are visible mainly in fiscal elements—in natural duties, "service" and so on. The labor process itself is least characterized by its materialized components and stands out above all as the subjective capacity for work. It is this capacity for work that represents the population's main source of wealth.

Another most essential characteristic of this form of labor is that (in its constituent mass) it is possible only as "communal," collective labor, completely subordinating the life of the individual to the need for personal solidarity among the members of the community. In fact all those forms to which the concept of "originality" appeals—ties of kinship, territorial associations, common language, beliefs, habits, morality, forms of behaviour inherent in a traditional society—often arose simply to promote the cooperation of the labor effort and are deeply rooted in it. This solidarity also served to produce the main component of labor: the collective, together with the individuals that go to make it up, and on which the stability of the society depended. Though it is regarded by the representatives of the society as a "natural" order of things, it nevertheless demands protective mechanisms and the elimination of all forms of non-conformist behaviour, attained only thanks to the most determined and ruthless means.

The penetration of capital and industrial production into a traditional society signifies the depreciation and ultimate destruction of these relations. "Wherever money itself is not the basis of the social connection," Marx wrote, "it inevitably disintegrates the existing social connection."[8] Moreover, the population is deprived of its customary role in social production, and receives nothing in exchange. Social recognition of commodity-money relations results almost automatically in the eviction of a vast proportion of the population from the life of the society, who then become "redundant people." Notwithstanding the existence in contemporary Eastern societies of a large strata for

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[8] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. 46, Part 1, p. 169, 2nd Russ. ed.

whom bourgeois relations are already the foundation of life (to be more exact, precisely because of the existence of this strata), the overwhelming majority of the population connected with pre-capitalist structures of life, now struggling to put up with the heavy consequences of commercial practicality, discover in the introduction of commodity-money relations the cause of a rupture in vitally important connections with other people. Since its own productive forces are undeveloped, the population unwittingly perceives in commercial relations a strictly anti-social force. Instead of expressing social properties and relations, money and commodities rupture these relations (because they belong to other, non-traditional structures), this may be observed specifically in the fact that the agents of the new structures are often newcomers against whom all the wrath of "originality" is directed.

A repugnance for "economism" explains to a certain extent the secret of "originality." To struggle against the subordination of society to the principles of material economic activity is the premise and point of departure for all programmes of "cultural originality," and criticism of this activity as a "dirty business," alien to genuine human relations, permeates their entire content.[9]

However the attitude of the traditional social structure in contemporary Eastern society to industrial production (and the principles of material economic activity connected with it) is not at all simple. To the extent to which industrial production leads to the destruction of that which is basic to the traditional structures (personal solidarity and the preservation of the traditional producer with his way of life that this implies), it is definitely negative. But this attitute changes as soon as it is a matter of producing or reproducing the material conditions of life as such. A representative of the traditional structure in the contemporary world is a consumer of industrial products and cannot visualize himself without this consumption.

Sociological studies have shown that the former solidarity of primary cells is increasingly dependent on the consumption of

[9] This criticism of capitalism in concepts of "originality" rejects not so much capitalism as such, as its economic productive orientation, opposing it to non-productive ethical solidarity. Bourgeois relations are condemned for sentimental reasons, and with these the "excessively" productive-technical orientation of "European socialism" is also condemned, for supposedly ignoring the individual.

135

goods created outside the boundaries of these cells. Sacrifices to ancestors, presents for relatives and fellow-tribesmen, marriage and burial (all instances in which this customary solidarity is expressed), demand the obtaining of goods from outside, either by selling one's own produce or by going to town to earn money. "Solidarity" is becoming increasingly insatiable, forever demanding new gifts and thereby binding the activity of its members more and more to the laws of a different world. The escape of the African wage-earner from the world of his relatives and family is only one of the consequences of this process.

Under these conditions a commodity is appreciated only inasmuch as it satisfies concrete needs and not for its universal, abstract value. It is therefore never considered by the supporters of traditional structures as a mediating agent for the social ties that continue to keep their "human" nature. Forms of social regulation that ensure the social existence of the traditional individual and his "reproduction" from generation to generation remain the basis for all social ties. Hence the tendency to subordinate the exchange of commodities to these personal relations: a commodity is not sold but is distributed in the form of a gift, a donation, a privilege, a reward and so on. Therefore, in the symbolics of "originality" special significance is attributed to things and objects which embody not the quantity of labor put into them, but the aspirations and hopes with which they are associated. Not only commodities but even labor itself is rejected as a basic element of social contact because it is linked with material factors of life. In rejecting bourgeois concepts of the division of labor, these theoreticians see the latter only as a source of a division of society into professional groups antagonistic one to the other. This proposition has been developed, for instance, in K. Kaunda's pamphlet *Humanism in Zambia.* Emphasizing the danger that arises from the penetration of money relations into society, Kaunda connects this penetration with a greater specialization of labor. He asks: "What effects will the persistently increasing levels of specialization have on our much valued traditional society in our country? This field of specialization drives people to resort to new groups in society. In other words, people with common interests group together... partly as a means of promoting and protecting the welfare of their group." All this gives rise to new tendencies in the disintegration of

136

society.[10] In particular, these ideas lead to an accusation of trade unions and various artistic associations of "selfishness" and "separatism."

It is assumed that the solidarity of relations, claimed as part of "originality," is based on characteristics and traits inherent in individuals belonging to existing social groups, and on qualities formed by collective life, which would be considered superfluous under commodity-money relations. The essence of these human relations are to be found in the rules of mutual understanding, tolerance, love and respect and, what is more important, in the solidarity of relations at all levels of social life, a solidarity which does not depend on the material elements of human activity but comes into being, according to Kaunda, because "we have always had a gift for a man enjoying the fellowship of man simply because he is a man." Man in this case is conceived as strictly concrete, and reduced to his every-day ethical—and ethnical— characteristics.

The assertion of ethnical regulations automatically implies a refutation of judicial law as based on an observation of formal, fixed, written laws. These are seen as a form of "conventionality," the expression of a formal code of rules and "dead justice," not as the unqualified reflection of the inner laws of conscience.

The state, which assumes the role of combined protector, uniter, ruler and distributer of benefits, is proclaimed the heir and successor to these primary forms of personal regulation. Many scholars of the social processes in Asian and African countries emphasize that here the state is frequently the primary condition and prerequisite for the shaping of a nation, the personification of its existence. State power, in as far is it possesses organizational abilities, is able to appropriate and use the force created by a mobilization of all the sources of the population's solidarity.

The mechanism of this kind of cohesion differs fundamentally from any form of consolidation based on the material conditions of labor. State power appeals above all to the "natural" characteristics of individuals, appropriating the functions of solidarity which were previously part of the primary collective. Consolidation of individual scattered efforts into a single whole is achieved by

[10] K. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its Implemetation*, Lusaka, 1967, p. 4.

137

merging the volitive aspirations of the individual in collective activity. Moreover, "originality" ideally precludes coercion, at least with regard to "its own" population. It hopes to find in every individual who is "unspoiled" by foreign influence, a "national soul" that responds to the smell of its native soil, to the sounds of its native tongue, to the symbols of the national faith.[11]

There is no doubt that any power, irrespective of its orientation, is compelled to appeal to these same characteristics at a mass level. Existing structures cannot be rebuilt in a short time. Any movement that wishes to unite the entire population cannot fail to take into consideration images and ideas customary and intelligible to the masses. But it is easy to see that in the case of revolutionary-democratic movements an active struggle agaist the bourgeois West and the appeal to traditional forms of culture are not to be confused with self-sufficient attempts to consolidate the "cultural personality." Ideologists of a revolutionary-democratic trend include traditional patterns and ideas in a different system of values that ensures the participation of the masses in all transformative activity.

Without a doubt the creation of a national community out of the social cells and groups that are still divided in many respects, helps to eliminate the disunity and alienation stemming from an absence of ties between the cells, or from clashing interests. But it must not be forgotten that this kind of unity acquires a particular type of structure. It acquires its shape on the basis of the similarity of primary forms of cultural activity and not necessarily on the basis of a single language, religion, ethnic character, historical tradition and so on. It is not shaped in direct contact with the primary cells, but at a higher level—in the "superstructure"—and is embodied in the activity of the power and organization that overlie these cells and do not merge with them. Unity is achieved at a secondary level of social and cultural regulation and takes the form of a state and a "national"

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[11] N. Z. Nuseibeh, an Arab theoretician, in looking for a more profound definition of the nation, uses for his premise that "man is a social animal and can ill afford to live in isolation from his fellow men." Community of life, he assumes, can arise only on the basis of "a consciousness of fraternity" stemming from a "uniformity of thinking and feeling." N. Z. Nuseibeh, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism*, New York, 1959, p. 216.

138

culture and ideology that are clearly distinct from their primary prototypes. The state and other centralized institutions summon up the human resources their society has at its disposal to help find a solution to problems formulated at the "center." These problems can be formulated differently, depending on the orientation of the center itself, but the nature of the resources the society has largely predetermines the possibilities of its socio-political choice.

No doubt those features of similarity to which we refer are sufficiently essential to mould a general feeling of fraternity when the need arises to uphold the general interests and to organize some joint activity. It is then that those channels of cultural ties begin to function that existed previously only in potential. This kind of circumstance lends justification to the arguments of the ideologists of "Arabism" that Arab unity exists despite economic and state division and lends a certain conviction to the slogan formulated by Michel Aflak that "nationalism is an eternal fact and not a transient phase of history." Pointing to the cultural prerequisites of the community of Arab peoples, a number of theoreticians would like to introduce the idea of nationalism not in an ideological form, nor as a political movement, but as "existing" as such—present since time immemorial and independent from its manifestations. Taken by themselves the various aspects of "original" similarity do not yet imply unity. They may also remain dormant should a movement not emerge that expresses both the common interests and the common characteristics of its participants.

It is in "originality that power discovers the motives for its own activity. Yet the nature of this power itself determines what the "created" future of this "originality" will be. If the state makes use of the possibilities contained in the human resources of society and its system of personal regulation for the general good, if it promotes the development of the productive basis of society with the intention of surpassing the former limited bounds of its economy, and at the same time places this production at the service of society as a whole, this cannot fail to lead a country along the road of progressive development. If the potential of the masses and their labor investments are in fact used to further the interests of the privileged upper crust, for its enrichment or in ambitious schemes on the international

139

scene the idea of solidarity becomes a farce, a means for alienating the individual from his aspirations, resolutions and hopes and converts them into the "interest of the nation" which is then extraneous and hostile to the people.

Experience shows that the bourgeois-reformist programme of modernization can be adapted easily to traditional solidarity and to "supra-class" power itself maintaining both of these as important elements in the mechanism of control over a society that is in the process of industrialization, and as a means for preserving stability in the spheres of social life that had so far eluded direct capitalist influence. The emphasis on a common national spirit and on human relations in primary groups of society must eliminate the extremes of social disintegration and prevent the danger of an increase in the "sum of suffering" of the masses. The recommendations of contemporary Western specialists in modernization tend increasingly to emphasize this point.

The very nature of this solidarity, achieved on the basis of an ethical consolidation, makes it possible either to use solidarity in the development of the productive potential of the society through the organization of its human labor resources, or to counterpose the society to others, and strengthen the idea of solidarity by sanctifying the value of its "own" beliefs, history, language and traditions. While the first path can lead to a creative mastery over, and even the suppression of, "originality" along lines of differentiation and the development of the society's culture, the second inevitably draws the society into a vicious circle, in which consolidation is achieved at the cost of levelling all individuals and at the same time of creating nationalist boundaries between itself and other nations and thus fomenting hostility.

140