

Wallace is, in fact, the hero of Hardy's book, which is dedicated to Wallace's memory. Wallace's insight that man's consciousness and reasoning power allows him to escape natural selection by altering the environment rather than being altered by it is discussed with great approval. This reference to consciousness is linked by Hardy to the way that, according to many modern biologists, changes in the behaviour of members of a species precede structural variation, preparing them for more specialised limbs and organs, if and when they should arise. Consciousness according to Hardy, is the key to changes in behaviour, and he is prepared to speculate on the presence of consciousness in even unicellular organisms. This is presumably an aspect of what Hardy later refers to as the double nature of the universe, part material, but also mental and spiritual. Considerable disagreement and puzzlement will, I imagine be provoked by this claim and by the last third of the book generally. In contrast to Darwin's belief that the fear of God is a trait deeply and erroneously embedded in the minds of children, and as difficult to throw off later in life as a monkey would find it possible to rid itself of its instinctive fear of snakes, Hardy sees in the humanly pervasive phenomenon of religious experience—which he documents at some length by reference to writers such as William James and Evans-Pritchard, as well as to the work of his own Religious Experience Research Unit—signs that the cosmic evolutionary process may have a plan and that we may be "part of a great system for generating love, joy and beauty in the universe". I find it hard to assess this claim, as I am quite unclear what his notion of the guiding force behind this plan might be, something like a process God perhaps. But Hardy does not show why such a system for love, joy and beauty, has to be developed through so much pain in the world, nor whether the apparently random and profligate mode of variation we find in biological development is consistent with talk of evolutionary goals and plans at all.

ANTHONY O'HEAR

THE JOY OF ALL CREATION An Anglican Meditation on the Place of Mary by A.M. Allchin. DLT. 1984. pp. 162. £6.50

Canon Allchin's concern for the unity of Christ's church is less apparent from his membership of the English Anglican-Roman Catholic Commission, and the Anglican-Orthodox Dialogue; that he sees Mary as a bridge rather than a barrier between divided Christians is evident from his membership of the Ecumenical Society of the Blessed Virgin Mary. In this meditation on the place of Mary in the Anglican tradition he takes the opportunity to examine several basic themes, and to make comments about aspects of Anglicanism he wishes to emphasise.

The work is valuable as a presentation of Anglican writing not otherwise readily available, especially the beautiful Welsh poem, *The Ferment of Birth*, by Euros Bowen. The first part includes four chapters, with liberal quotation, on the seventeenth century divines Lancelot Andrewes, Jeremy Taylor, Mark Frank and Thomas Traherne. A second section, on "Transition", surveys the eighteenth century and the Oxford Movement in separate chapters, while the two chapters of the third part consider three twentieth century poets. The whole is made more valuable by a biographical list of twenty-eight *dramatis personae* following the Epilogue.

The book provides both less, and more, than the reader might perhaps expect from the title. Mary's own person is treated of ex professo in every chapter, but the spotlight rarely falls on her for her own sake. This is in accord with the author's concept of her place in the Christian economy, and with his interpretation of the Anglican tradition, "conscious both of its continuity with the Church of the centuries before the Reformation, and of its indebtedness to certain of the central affirmations of the Reformers" (Introd. p. 9.) Allchin traces a concern for a truly balanced picture of Mary most clearly in the writings of Mark Frank (1613–64, ch. 3) though it is not absent from any part of the book:

Nor should I scarce, I confess, have chosen such a theme today, though the Gospel reach it to me, but that I see it is time to do it, when our Lord is wounded through our Lady's sides, both our Lord and the mother of our Lord most vilely spoken of by a new generation of wicked men, who because the Romanists make little less of her than a goddess, they make not so much of her as a good woman; because they bless her too much, these unless her quite, at least will not suffer her to be blessed as she should.

(Sermons, Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology, ii, p. 35–6)

Elsewhere he cites the "admirable balance" of Reginald Heber (1783–1826, ch. 5) as "representative of the Anglican tradition as a whole" (p. 96). Mary's main function is for the Anglican tradition, as it was for the Council of Ephesus, to underline the reality, and the true doctrine of the incarnation:

If, as the Christian faith has always affirmed, it is in the man Jesus of Nazareth that we find the supreme disclosure, assertion, stepping forward of him who alone sustains our life, our thought, our love, then the person of the woman who was his mother, out of whom, bodily, he came, cannot but be a central theme of Christian reflection. (Introd. p. 8)

This theme, present throughout the work, is especially treated in the chapter on Lancelot Andrewes, where it leads to some interesting conclusions. Quoting Andrewes' assertion that the incarnation puts the human race on a higher level of dignity than *Cherubim and Seraphim*, the author goes on to remark that these words "are evidently an expression of the intimacy with which God and man come together in Christ, and of the infinite distance which has been overcome in order to create that intimacy" (p. 20) Allchin points out that the motherhood of the Church, celebrated in the womb of the baptismal font, commences in the motherhood of Mary, and sees her as a type of the Church in his chapter on Andrewes, in the writings of John Keble (ch. 6) and in the poetry of Euros Bowen (ch. 7).

Mary's own vocation as maid and mother is displayed at length in the writings of Jeremy Taylor (ch. 2), and joyful, carefree devotion to her is exemplified by the poems of Thomas Traherne (ch. 4). John Keble attests the importance of her free consent to her instrumental role in our salvation, and in chapter 6 the author includes some refined and precise discussion of her intercessory function. Euros Bowen's poem presents a lyrical ecstasy depicting her place at the centre of redeemed creation, a picture which accords with Canon Allchin's own approach, for the greater part of his book is concerned with what Mary stands for, rather than with her individual identity. She is the ikon of that attitude which sees man "as a microcosm placed at the centre of the universe where all is inter-related", an attitude intrinsic to the sacramental dimension of Christianity, and which Allchin believes collapsed under the impact of the philosophy of Descartes (p. 50), leaving the way open for the "unbelievably disincarnate" Christianity of some forms of Protestantism. It is not therefore surprising to find him drawing out the analogies between incarnation and Eucharist throughout the book. The very title reminds us that Mary stands for the earthiness, the animal joy, the particularity of time and place which are inseparable from Christianity. So too these Anglican divines, who dared to preserve her place in the tradition, remind us of the need to integrate intuitive insight and poetic perception into our spiritual lives as a healthy antidote to too cut and dried a theology:

Images speak more powerfully and with greater "awe" than concepts however distinct. In speaking of divine realities, images which can be interpreted at many levels and which do not attempt to say everything, are frequently less inadequate than concepts, which can deceive by their very clarity (p. 107)

Many other interesting themes—grace and merit, episcopal authority, Lourdes and the Angelus—find some mention in this attractive book. Appearance and production

are good, and I noticed only a single misprint.

SR. M. CECILY BOULDING OP

CONSCIOUSNESS AND CAUSALITY by D.M. Armstrong and Norman Malcolm. Oxford: *Blackwell*, 1984. pp. 222. Price £17.50 (Hardcover).

This is one of the first two volumes of a new series of 'Great Debates in Philosophy'. So the first and grateful task for any reviewer is to welcome this project. The second duty is less grateful, yet absolutely necessary if the debt of the philosophical public to Blackwell is to become as great as it should. For the promise of this project will not be fulfilled if future executants handle their assignment as Armstrong and Malcolm have done. What we have here is two very able philosophers for the most part talking past one another. What we might have had, and need, is a sustained dialogue in which by getting at least some things firmly agreed at least some progress is made.

The book begins with a ninety-nine page essay by Malcolm. This is, of course, excellent stuff. But we thus have to wait for too long before we hear Armstrong speaking in his own person. Malcolm's essay ends with what should have been seen by Armstrong as a salutary challenge: "... philosophers ... have lost sight of the bearer of mental predicates ... These destinies and vicissitudes are undergone and suffered by *people ... not* by immaterial minds or brains or machines" (pp. 100–1). Armstrong then has first say, eighty-seven pages of it. This is only fair, indeed twelve pages less than fair. But, because Malcolm is by the rules bound to keep silent until the time comes for his twelve-page Reply, Armstrong is able to start off by accepting "the traditional picture ... of the relation of a person's body to that person's mind" as "by and large a correct one". So all his answers are given in terms of that picture. This is bound to make all who favour Malcolm's starting point want to imitate the disapproving looker over the garden fence in the Pont cartoon: "I suppose you realize that you are doing that all **WRONG**".

Naturally with two participants of the calibre of Malcolm and Armstrong it works both ways. It would, for instance, have been so much better if Armstrong could have come in at once to dispose of the suggestion that two things cannot be identical just because under one description they possess of necessity characteristics which under another they possess only contingently. This is, surely, one point on which agreement might have been reached. In reaching that agreement they might perhaps also have agreed not to agree but to disagree with Elizabeth Anscombe's contention that a brain state could not be a sufficient condition for a belief. For this is true only where 'sufficient condition' is construed in a non-contingent sense. It was exactly thirty years ago that failure to distinguish local and causal from material implication interpretations of 'necessary condition' and 'sufficient condition' misled Michael Dummett to offer an affirmative answer to the Joint Session symposium question 'Can an Effect precede its Cause?'

Finally, I wish that someone had been heard saying that the Cartesian problem is a problem (only) of the relationship between consciousness and stuff. So there is no call for anyone who wants to say that enjoying such and such a sort of consciousness just is being in this or that physiological state to feel bound to maintain that beliefs, intentions, hopes, fears, purposes and you name it are all brain states.

ANTONY FLEW