THE THEOLOGIES OF THE EUCHARIST IN THE EARLY SCHOLASTIC PERIOD by Gary Macy. *Clarendon Press,* Oxford, 1984. £15.00.

This is an important study because it sets the record straight. What Dr. Macy calls a 'lingering spectre of Reformation polemics', the notion that the early scholastic period had a unified theology of the Eucharist, is convincingly laid to rest. The doctrine of transubstantiation is set in context in the much wider scheme of thinking about the Eucharist which was explored up to the end of the Middle Ages and thus put in perspective (although Dr. Macy does not perhaps illuminate it directly as fully as the study requires).

The author begins with a survey of the early development of Eucharistic doctrine and the first substantial treatises devoted to the subject by the Carolingians Paschasius and Ratramnus of Corbie. He shows how their discussion left a good deal clear which had not been clear before, and at the same time left tensions unresolved. The plurality of views on the Eucharist which were held in the tenth and early eleventh centuries cried for a controversy to focus discussion. Berengar of Tours provided it. It is particularly helpful to have the prologue to the Berengarian controversy so fully set out.

Dr. Macy puts his finger on the nub of Berengar's difficulty. He wanted to insist that the reception of the body and blood of Christ is a spiritual matter, but he could not free his thinking from the mechanical terms of the categories of the physical world. There is useful discussion, too, of the problems of terminology which the scholars who wrote on the matter encountered.

The author distinguishes three broad streams of thought on the Eucharist in the twelfth century and beyond (he confines himself chiefly to the twelfth century in the body of the book). The opponents of Berengar emphasised the importance of the idea that Christ is really present in the consecrated bread and wine and insisted that no one could be saved who did not receive him in the Eucharist. Scholars of the Victorine School and others whom we associate with laon (Anselm, William of Champeaux) appear to have placed a high value on the Eucharist as a sign of mystical union between the true believer and God. This individualist emphasis gave way in some writers of the later twelfth century to a concern with the Eucharist as a sign of unity between Christ and the Church.

These three lines of thought are undoubtedly there, but perhaps Dr. Macy misleads a little in grouping their adherents quite so tidily. The importance of his distinction lies not in the arrangement of scholars into 'schools' on the matter, but in the existence of developed notions in all three areas during this period. Several of his scholars can be shown to have been familiar with and willing to accept conceptions of the Eucharist which he allocates elsewhere.

That is a small quibble, however. This is a substantial, clearly-argued and scholarly study of a subject which ought not to have been neglected so long. There are full notes giving Latin texts, and an excellent Bibliography.

G.R. EVANS

THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE VIRTUES by N.J.H. Dent, *Cambridge University Press,* 1984. Pp. ix + 223. £20.00

Starting from Elizabeth Anscombe's dictum that moral philosophy should be abandoned until we have an adequate philosophical psychology, Mr Dent proposes to help to remedy this defect by an examination of the concept of virtue. His enquiry will be psychological rather than moral or ethical since he will be neither advocating virtue nor deciding what actions are virtuous, but attempting to determine what sort of characteristic we ascribe to a person when we call him virtuous.

Virtue, Dent holds, is distinct from right action or dutifulness or a combination of these; the generous man, for example, acts rightly, but not simply because he

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recognises generosity as a duty in a Kantian fashion, but because of a desire to help people. In this he is adhering to the aristotelian tradition, in which, unless you want to act as you do you are showing self-control or continence and lack virtue. The plan of the book is first to distinguish what Dent regards as three distinct 'active powers of man' or three types of motive, sense-desire, passional desire and rational desire, and second to consider how these desires are related to deliberation and action and thus how they function in the virtuous man.

Sense-desires are, according to Dent, desires for the gratification of our senses; accordingly having such a desire does not involve us in having any beliefs or values or in deliberation, though we can deliberate about when and if to indulge such appetites; such desires are independent of any conception of the good, which is, again, orthodox aristotelianism. But passional desires, which involve the passions or emotions and not merely the senses are, Dent holds, quite different; passion involves judgment (fear, for example, that there is danger, anger that one has been harmed) and also a value judgment (that it would be good to avoid the danger or good to avenge the harm, for example). Thus while reason may merely control sense-desire in a Humean way, it is more essentially bound up in passions than Hume ever realised. Finally, there are rational desires which involve the excitement of no desire whether of the senses or the passions but proceeds directly from a judgment of value. Thus the stage is set for an examination of the ways in which deliberation and practical reason controls and directs these three types of desire in the virtuous man. Finally Dent sees the shaping of one's entire life by rational deliberation makes a person his own master and enables him to express his true self.

There is much worth discussion and careful examination in this well-designed and executed book; here only one topic will be taken up, Dent's distinction of passional desires from those of sense. Surely Dent is right in claiming that sense-desires involve no use of reason, while some sort of judgment, not necessarily explicit, is involved in the passions. But if, as Dent says, anger involves a belief that one has been damaged, why does he insist that the angry person must regard the damage or injury as unwarranted (pp. 54—56)? No doubt the judgment that something is harmful to oneself involves some judgment of value, but surely not the judgment that the damage is unwarranted. I may be angry with someone for catching me out in wrong-doing, or for beating me in a competition or for some quite trivial reason, knowing full well that my anger is unwarranted. Dent treats resentment and anger as being on the same footing, but surely it is only resentment which cannot be ascribed to a person unless he believes that what he resents is unwarranted. In a short phrase, anger is for what I judge bad for me, but not unnecessarily for what I judge to be bad absolutely. I think that in the same way there may be unwarranted, irrational fear, and that Dent's efforts to discount the fear and anger of infants, animals and other possibly irrational cases are unsuccessful (e.g. pp. 67—8).

If this criticism is correct Dent's discussion of deliberation and passional desire in Chapter 6 will require modification, but the whole book is worth careful reading and thought and is never either silly or boring.

J.O. URMSON

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