

Foot's Natural Goodness and the Good of Nature

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Philippa Foot is a good philosopher. She is a good person too, insofar as her manner of thinking, conversing, and asking questions are evidence of who she is 'as a human being'. I begin with reference to Foot as good philosopher and human being for a few reasons. For one, I do so in order to introduce particular uses of the word 'good'. The guiding question in Foot's recent *Natural Goodness* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001) is whether my 'she is good' is simply equivalent to 'I like it' or 'it strikes me in a favorable way'. Do I have some objective basis to make my claim, in reference not only to 'good philosopher' but also to 'good human being'? Foot argues that I can be objective in both descriptions, that a non-subjective account of 'good' is necessary to make sense of how practical reason is both practical and reasonable. By staking out the non-subjective constraints of practical reason, she suggests that the modern 'turn to the subject' has come to its dead end. This dead end is a leading concern of my remarks on Foot's *Natural Goodness*, and my principal aim is to advance her arguments for a teleological conception of nature, particularly human nature. But first, there is more to say about what is good.

Natural Goodness

For most of Foot's career, she has been arguing that desires and interests of virtuous agents are basic to making sense of practical reason. In *Natural Goodness*, by contrast, she appeals to objective goods, to 'patterns of natural normativity', 'life-functions', and 'species-general categories'. Modern moral theories (e.g. the utilitarian calculus and Kant's categorical imperative) have set about to provide an apparatus that will determine what is right and good. Foot reverses this relation between reason-giving and what is good. She proposes that we see 'goodness as setting a necessary condition of practical rationality and therefore at least a part-determinant of the thing itself' (63). In the context of Foot's work, there is a good bit of continuity in this reversal.

She has consistently argued that what is moral is not some discrete category of description or evaluation. She has been persistently critical of narrow and contrived limits of modern moral philosophy. Her *Natural Goodness* implies that we need to take a step further. If goodness sets conditions for practical reason, then narrowly conceived moral judgments are dependent on more elementary and more comprehensive ways of knowing and willing the good.

While my first reason for calling Foot a good philosopher and person is to put the word good into play, the second reason is to place the question of objective goodness alongside a question about the unity of the good. If Foot were a bad philosopher, could she still be a good human being? If she were a bad human being, could she be considered a good philosopher? Foot's argument, in *Natural Goodness*, is that a common structure underlies these evaluations of good, even though the standards differ. We can agree on 'good philosopher' whether or not her thinking 'strikes me in a favorable way', whether or not 'I like it'. If there are 'life functions' of the species we call philosopher, then we can base our judgments on the facts, on how fitting her thinking and conversing are within the natural teleology and functions of that kind of animal. We could say the same about the facts of being a good physician or firefighter. In fact, to become a physician or firefighter (or to continue as one), a person must be judged objectively as a good one. A bad firefighter ought not be a firefighter at all. Foot calls such badness a natural defect. In other words, virtue, in regard to the firefighter, is a matter of fact. Can we identify similar facts about being a good human being? This is the challenge that Foot takes upon herself.

Foot's inclination to meet this challenge points to the third (and for me the final) reason for referring to her as a good philosopher (leaving behind, for a moment, a reference to good human being). Foot has mastered the craft of philosophy, and after decades of well made points and successful arguments, she continues to probe and ask difficult questions. When looking at her life as a philosopher, one should see, if one looks well, that she has been after an objective evaluation of good practical reason, and that she has been willing to submit her thinking to it. She has sustained the integrity of moral philosophy as reflection on the art of living well. In contrast, some moral philosophers and theologians conjure up in their readers a hope that significant inconsistencies will intrude between their theories, or the terms upon which their theories rest, and how they actually carry on with family and friends. With Foot, there is no gap. In fact, a key aspect of her work has been her effort to overcome such a gap.

This last bit about Foot as philosopher is not merely a statement of

appreciation. After all, I would be undermining her arguments in *Natural Goodness* if I were to settle with the judgment that her philosophy strikes me in a favorable way. By dwelling on the notion of a good philosopher, I wish to interject a point that might be offensive to philosophers. Thinking in terms of a theologian's good, I take for granted that good philosophers are engaged by going after some aspect of reality and satisfied, finally, by pointing beyond where they can reasonably go. Another way of putting this is that when we get to the bottom of practical reason, we find ourselves standing on love. Or, when we have worked out all matters of justice, we see that our lives are a gift.¹

If Foot is right about practical reason, it needs more than what moral philosophy and moral theology, as we have them, can provide. In her introduction to *Vice and Virtues* (University of California, 1979), Foot notes that 'Aquinas on the individual virtues' has been significant for her thinking. In *Natural Goodness*, she has, figuratively speaking, worked through the individual virtues, the *secunda secundae*, so to speak, of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*, thoroughly enough to realize that what is needed is something like the *prima pars*. More specifically, Foot's argument for natural goodness leaves open a wide space for an account of creation, an understanding of nature as made and oriented to the good, and a sketch of the role and purpose of human beings in the good of creation.

Modern moral theory has successfully disentangled itself from a teleological conception of nature. Foot does not make reference to creation, inasmuch as modern theory keeps the term aside for use by theologians. Nonetheless, she does make the problem of our disentanglement clear. Foot argues that ethics is good anthropology, and good anthropology cannot be done apart from inquiry about our nature and habitat. 'Natural goodness', according to Foot, 'is intrinsic or "autonomous" goodness in that it depends directly on the relation of an individual to the "life form" of its species' (26-7). 'Life form' is a thick conception, which avoids a reduction of life-purposes or functions to mere biological reproduction or survival. In modern ethics, as in modern science, purposes have been removed from our natural and social world.

For example, a reductive description of life-purposes is maintained in Richard Dawkins' popular book, *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford, 1976). Dawkins asks questions about people and various other species, but reduces his answers to the purposes of the gene, more precisely 'the unit of heredity'. When considering units of heredity, he argues that 'species' is not a useful as category of inquiry. Dawkins deflects questions like

'what is the life-form of a beaver?' or 'is it natural for beavers to make dams?' Agency is reserved for genes. Likewise, except for genetic drives there is no natural goodness, that is, there is no intrinsic or 'autonomous' goodness of daisies, fruit bats, or human beings.

Foot, by contrast, is looking for 'group-based', 'species-general' descriptions, necessities of the life-form, that is, Aristotelian categoricals. These descriptions pertain to purposes, and they provide for factual evaluations. 'What "plays a part" in this life is that which is causally and teleologically related to it, as putting out roots is related to obtaining nourishment, and attracting insects is related to reproduction in plants' (31). In terms of the human species, Foot's paradigmatic example comes from an essay by G. E. M. Anscombe on promise-making and promise-keeping. A single line from Anscombe's 'On Promising and its Justice' will suffice, 'Now getting one another to do things without the application of physical force is a necessity for human life'.²

Promise-making and keeping are necessary for human beings to get along as human beings, and to agree to this point is to call promise-keeping a natural good. Virtues, then, like the virtues required for promise-keeping, are a cultivation of our natural goodness. Virtue is a natural necessity, and an inability to keep promises is a natural defect.

Foot's arguments in *Natural Goodness* are sweeping and succinct, and I am hardly giving the book its due by giving a brief account of its already tight line of reasoning. Nonetheless, a mere outline of Foot's arguments for teleological descriptions and factual evaluations presents the heart of the matter. Her proposal for objective moral judgments is such that it will be met by equally general and succinct counter-arguments, something equivalent to 'it can not be done' or 'it will not work'. While Foot's opponents will challenge the whole, her sympathetic readers will attend to the details, and that is what I intend to do below.

I will not challenge Foot's constructive proposal, but reformulate her diagnosis of what she calls neo-Humean accounts of practical reason. Indeed, Foot's teleological evaluations will not strike theologians as ground breaking. Even in their most deontological or consequentialist moments, moral theologians have adjusted (or doomed) these theories by setting them within a teleological understanding of human goods.³

By reformulating Foot's criticisms of prevailing theories, I hope to set her *Natural Goodness* within a broader theological framework. I intend to make Foot's account of natural goodness more sweeping than it already is.

Foot's Critique

Foot's *Natural Goodness* is set over against a common division between factual description and moral evaluation. The distinction is neo-Humean in the sense that a description like 'that would be a lie' is assumed to lack a motive for either lying or telling the truth. A subjective, pre- or extra-rational, attitude or desire must be added to give the description practical force. 'Lying shows a lack of integrity, and I want to be honest.' Foot is thinking specifically of G. E. Moore, A. J. Ayer, and C. L. Stevenson, but this neo-Human strategy goes far beyond their line of thought. More broadly, Foot intends to challenge the modern gap between the act-description (it is a lie) or the moral rule (do not lie) and the ground for acting (the practical force). She directs the criticism against herself.⁴

Foot presupposes a gap between rules that guide behavior and the attitudes that give them force. Her intention, in the essay, is to show that Kant's categorical imperative does not have special standing as an imperative. Even though a categorical command is supposed to exclude inclinations and desires, Foot argues that the grammar of moral imperatives is the same as in less serious, conditional imperatives. For Kant, the following is hypothetical rather than categorical: 'If a student wishes to attend Mother Seton School, she must wear khaki pants and a white shirt'. Foot holds that 'Tell the truth' and 'Wear khaki pants and a white shirt' are both categorical for the students at the school. Neither imperative depends upon desires and interests of the students (and their parents know this for certain). The Kantian interlocutor will counter that the full grammar of the second imperative includes an implied 'if': 'If a student wants to attend this school, she must wear khaki pants and a white shirt'. Foot agrees. However, she shows that the full grammar of 'Tell the truth' includes an expression of 'if' and 'want' as well. Desires and interests are implied in the categorical imperative inasmuch as it has practical force. 'If you want p, then tell the truth.'

Foot is challenging Kant's antagonism between our desires and our reasons for acting. She reformulates 'Tell the truth' as hypothetical by rejecting Kant's psychological egoism. A virtuous person is likely to be motivated by a desire to live well or to do right by others for their sake. 'If you want to live well, be good, and do right by others, if you want to be a good friend, if you care about others, if you want to sustain personal integrity, if you strive to be just, then tell the truth even when doing so does not serve your interests'. These 'if's are conditions that give practical force to Kant's categorical imperative. We act with ends in view, even if the ostensible end is to act without

an end. Foot refuses to let Kantians extract a moral part from the rest of who we are.

I should admit that upon reading 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives', I was entirely convinced. I did not notice what Foot criticizes later in her *Natural Goodness*. In the earlier essay, she argues that statements like 'Tell the truth' and 'Wear khaki pants and a white shirt' are able to stand as categorical imperatives (regardless of the interests and desires of the agent) because she assumed that a preliminary desire stood outside practical reason in order to give it force. In other words, all categorical imperatives are hypothetical. First, we desire p, and then we reason q. Foot had clothed the neo-Humean gap between fact ('That would be a lie') and practical force ('I should not lie') in non-Humean dress. There are more accurate ways to describe this gap. Aristotle's virtues are read without his or any account of the nature of the human being, and as a consequence, the practical force of living virtuously must be provided by subjective desires of virtuous agents. Or, Aquinas's treatises on happiness and the virtues are understood apart from the natural and supernatural ends of the human being. Again, natural inclinations and a desire for the good must be carried by the subjectivity of the agent.

In *Natural Goodness*, Foot proposes that a teleological consideration of being human is required, on the grounds of practical reason itself. She argues that the modern 'turn to the subject' offers an inadequate account of practical reason, but she also has to show why it has been hard to resist. According to Foot, an appeal to an agent's desires, attitudes, and interests is attractive because it gives a convincing and manageable explanation of motive and cause. First, desires and interests provide clear motives: 'A desire to see the Taj Mahal can in the right circumstances make it rational to plan a trip to India and visit a travel agent; and similarly the knowledge that cigarettes are carcinogenic can rationalize giving up smoking by showing that it is in one's interests to do so' (61). Second, desires and interests give an explanation of cause. They are considered the final word on the source of our actions. For example, my students will tell me that Mother Teresa's work with the dying was deeply self-interested. What is striking about their view is not that they state it without any but a passing knowledge of Mother Teresa, but that they think they are saying something important. Desires and interests have a cultural currency that reasons do not.

In the main, Foot's argument is that, by looking to desires and interests as prior to practical reason, we undermine our intuitions about giving reasons for our actions (62-4). For example, we might

acknowledge that a person has a strong desire to smoke, or a desire for and interests in whatever comes as a consequence of smoking (e.g., pleasurable moments while waiting for the bus, friendship with other smokers, or controlling one's weight). However, we are likely to argue that practical reason trumps these desires, that the smoker should have an overriding concern to live longer and with better health. Here, we assume that reason-giving, based on a conception of our good as human beings, is prior to and carries more practical force than a set of desires, attitudes, and interests. We are likely to think that the smoker's conception of his interests is objectively wrong.

When our smoker disregards good reasons, we say that his reasoning is defective and that he lacks virtues of good judgment and action. Good reasons and a rational concern for good health are not directing his desires. Likewise, a claim that Mother Teresa was self-interested puts the weight of judgment on good reasons for acting rather than interests. I will say to my students: Let us agree that Mother Teresa was as self-interested as someone who has manipulated the stock market for his own benefit. Granting that point, by what standards do we judge their actions? Do we have reason to say that one desire is better than another? Do we have reason to recommend some forms of self-interest rather than others? Foot proposes that those who exemplify the moral virtues 'possess them in so far as they recognize certain considerations (such as the fact of a promise, or of a neighbour's need) as powerful, and in many circumstances compelling, reasons for acting. They recognize the reasons, and act on them' (12).

Extending Foot's Analysis

Foot's criticism of neo-Humean theories might appear narrowly concerned with a single stream of modern ethics (i.e., prescriptivism and emotivism); nevertheless, Hume is an apt figure to represent the modern flight from teleology, both natural and theological. Foot asks why neo-Humean descriptions of desires and interests are almost irresistible, and she concludes that they seem to (but in the end do not) make good, natural sense of why we do what we do. Hume gives us a scheme of moral causation, which, in a manner quite far from Hume himself, has come to look algorithmic. Desire or interest *x* is assumed to issue in act *y*, as though moral judgments were analogous to a desire and plan to visit the Taj Mahal. Foot is right to question this kind of theory, but there is far more to the image of David Hume.

Hume's criticisms of religious ethics and his assault on the empirical logic of causation are well known. Hume sets out to block

any route to theological and rationalist approaches to morality, and once causation is dismantled rationally, he is able to develop a science of moral sentiment. His moral science, however, circumvents a correspondence to the laws of physics or mathematics. Surely he hopes to bring the science of Newton to his inquiry on human life, but he does so by constructing an independent foundation. At the beginning of his *Treatise of Human Nature*, he directs his challenge not only to metaphysics but also to the physical sciences. He claims a scientific prerogative for his inquiry: 'the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences'.⁵

Moral philosophy is not only self-sufficient and self-governing but also invulnerable from the outside.⁶

The Humean distinction between fact and evaluation is attractive, not because it gives a clear understanding of motive and cause (it clearly does not), but because it sets moral philosophy apart from physical causation and theological ends. Hume is clever enough to admit that his success in setting morality apart should be as attractive for social and political reasons as for theoretical ones. He is able to develop his moral science by closing the door on scientific rationality, and by shutting out reason, he is able to exclude the possibility of giving any reasons for a teleological conception of human life, or any reason to have one. He notices, for instance, that natural virtues like generosity and mercy tend toward the good of society, but he is sure to point out that they are likely to work against justice, which has no natural end (precisely because it requires reasons). Through his theory of moral sentiment, Hume retains both a science of causation and a natural teleology, but in each case, he insures philosophical independence. He leaves the Newtonians on one hand, and religious enthusiasts, on the other, with nothing worthwhile to say about morality, politics, and religion.

In this regard, Kant is a follower of Hume. Although Kantians and neo-Humeans have set up opposing camps, they happily share their modern philosophical terrain. As an aside, I should note that a utilitarian, like Peter Singer, breaks ranks when he rejects a theory of moral sentiment. By turning to a physical determination of utility (sentience), he turns away from Hume's 'science of man' and conscientiously works against what he takes to be basic human intuitions (e.g., a desire to protect the bond between parents and children).⁷

Singer is proudly 'inhumane', while Kantians and neo-Humeans are out to protect and refine our common moral sense. Kant divides our inclinations from good moral judgment precisely for this reason, in order to protect the 'science of man'. His distinction between our

desires and the rational will is the distinction between the phenomenal (the naturally determined) and the noumenal realms.

Like Hume's sentiments, Kant's rational will points to a realm to which neither Newtonians nor religious enthusiasts have access. Like Hume, he leaves physical scientists and religionists with nothing significant to say about morality, politics and the nature of religion. The moral sphere is transcendental, beyond empirical determination and Newtonian causation. For this reason, the will must transcend our inclinations, desires and self-interests because these operate in a realm of natural necessity. Likewise, the rational will transcends theological ends. Only the possibility of reason insures the freedom of the will, and because a transcendental precondition, our freedom cannot be managed or constrained by religious doctrine. The freedom of the will is witnessed only through its exercise, so that its exercise must stand alone, over God or any good beyond the will itself. Like Hume, Kant's own dualism between 'is' and 'ought', natural causation and morality, desire and reason, functions to limit scientific rationality and to set morality on its own independent ground. Like Hume, Kant makes the world of human action incomprehensible to Newtonians and out of bounds for teleological interests of theologians.⁸

Natural Goodness, Once Again

If Foot's criticisms of neo-Humean theories are right, then she has opened the door to welcome far more than she introduces in her *Natural Goodness*. Both Hume and Kant undertake a defensive strategy against natural science and an offensive against morality based in religious convictions. The same can be said of their heirs and the greater part of modern ethics, including contemporary Aristotelians and much of moral theology. The success of the defensive and offensive strategies make the basic dualisms (between 'is' and 'ought', fact and value, reason and desire) eminently attractive. Moral theory is set apart from nature, on the one hand, and a teleology of human nature on the other. In *Natural Goodness*, Foot suggests that these gap-making strategies have run their course. She bridges the gaps, first, by arguing that there is a consistent structure of evaluation in the facts about oak trees, bobcats, and human beings, and second, by making a case that judgments about goodness and defect (virtue and vice) depend upon teleological descriptions of the species. Foot meets the challenges of modern theory on the level of practical reason, but there is much more work to be done.

If practical reason requires a sense of natural goodness, then natural goodness requires an inquiry about nature as good. This claim

is grounded in a species-general description of the human being. We ask, 'Why?', and we name life good. We ask purposeful questions about ourselves, turtles, and penguins. We worry about our fate and theirs. We tend to think that it is important to affirm our existence, and we want to do the same for penguins regardless of what they do for us. We find their existence enriching and, dare I say, wonderful. Penguins are an easy mark, but it is accurate to say that we find the 'life-functions' of cockroaches wondrous, if not wonderful. Setting aside the disgust of finding cockroaches in the cereal bin, we are inclined to respect cockroaches, and we think that we should be out for their good. We name their good, even though we have a firm belief that penguins and cockroaches do not worry about their own fate or appreciate their own existence. Certainly, we often fail in calling cockroaches and spiders good, but our failure is a natural defect. That is to say, asking 'Why?' and knowing life as good are natural to how human beings dwell in their habitat.

Richard Dawkins informs his readers, on page one of his *The Selfish Gene*, that questions like 'What are we for?' and 'What is man?' amount to nonsense. Only after dismissing these questions, can his serious scientific inquiry begin. However, by taking 'what we are for' out the equation, he cannot explain what he and other good evolutionary biologists actually do. How do we explain the humanitarian and environmental purposes of works like E. O. Wilson's *Consilience* (Knopf, 1998)? How is it that Wilson asks us to understand nature on its own terms and then encourages us to care about it and work for its good? Why do evolutionary biologists watch over the Galapagos Islands, not only to study various species but also to protect them from, among other things, us? If the answer is to know more about giant tortoises, we still have the question of why should we know, for Dawkins and Wilson are convinced that their inquiries are backed by an unequivocal 'we ought to know the facts'.⁹

A conscientious effort to get nature right is at least one thing people are for, and to reject such an inquiry, in principle, is considered a natural defect.

Foot's arguments imply that scientists as scientists are not able to say enough, not only about human beings, but also about trees, beavers, and fleas. Her response to reductive scientific formulations is not to overturn them, but to properly locate them. Evolutionary biology like other fields of investigation goes after particular things we should know. Beyond these lines of inquiry, Foot proposes that we (cannot help but) evaluate plants, animals, and people as agents who function in specific ways within the world as they should know it.

'Agents', 'function', and 'should' are the key teleological terms. Beavers should know where to build dams and the best kind of trees to nibble on. I have set Wilson and Dawkins against their own methodology in order to suggest that an important function of being human is to know about beavers, and to know them as good. In other words, underlying Foot's turn to objectivity in moral philosophy are questions like 'What are human beings for?' 'What is our place in relation to nature?', and 'What is good?'

A conception of natural goodness requires inquiry not only about nature as good, but also about the nature of the good. Foot points out that human beings judge human activities, in moral terms, according to reasonable expectations (the shoulds) of what we know and what we are able to will. Human goodness and moral activity are not natural in the manner of beaver goodness and beaver dams. In order to make judgments about practical reason, we need the virtues of living well. For example, agreeing that promise-keeping is a natural good does not free us from arguments about what we should do with our promises. If promise-keeping is not equivalent to an instinctual or mechanical process, then we have before us some conception of goodness outside the practice. What is the practice for? In other words, promise-keeping is not an autonomous good. The good of promise-keeping fits with other human goods, and any description of the 'fit' will at least imply the unity of this and that good. The goodness of promise-keeping takes footing in a unifying conception of the good.

Foot includes and limits unifying conceptions by arguing that natural goodness is 'autonomous' and intrinsic to the life-form of the species. On these terms, we are able to acknowledge the natural goodness of human beings, cockroaches, rats, bacteria, and the AIDS virus. However, when appreciating the 'autonomous' natural end of anthrax bacilli, we obviously have not understood enough about this life-form. An account of goodness requires some understanding and inquiry about how rats and bacteria fit in relation to a wider sense of good. Rats will sustain the fullness of their natural goodness in my kitchen, but I have good reasons to claim that their existence there is not good. Evolutionary biologists have claimed the same about rats on the Galapagos Islands. The rats are unnatural residents and predators who are feasting, unfairly, on penguin eggs. Alternatively, part of the full goodness of various fish is that the penguins feast on them, and the goodness of penicillin, for us, obviously exceeds the natural goodness of the mold. Likewise, we should ask ourselves if we have been good or bad for various creatures and plant life, and whether 'being bad' for some life-form (like anthrax) is good. These questions about

penicillin, rats, anthrax, and human beings are not subjective, but, in Foot's terms, based on the facts. The facts presuppose a teleology outside the 'autonomy' of the species.

Likewise, Foot's inquiry about our natural goodness goes beyond us, through questions about our fit, 'What is our place and role?' and 'Why people at all?' These questions cannot be asked through the physical sciences and will not be asked in the framework of modern philosophy; yet, these questions are necessary and inevitable if Foot's analysis is right. From a theological perspective, we are able to ponder such questions, not because there is proof for the answers, but because we can ask them with hope in a fulfillment beyond our own making. We are creatures of a good God. Foot's turn to objectivity in ethics comes to a point where it can advance only through attentiveness to our end in God. If the modern turn to the subject has come to its dead end, we have opportunity to rethink the prevailing defensive strategy over against the natural world and the modern offensive against theological conceptions of our natural and supernatural ends. In this re-evaluation, the task of moral theology is to bridge the gap between practical reason, virtue, and our role and purposes in the good of creation. We will be able to recognize the unity of human life when, in the divine image, we name life good, and give ourselves over to it with the love of God in Christ.

- 1 Josef Pieper, *The Four Cardinal Virtues* (University of Notre Dame, 1966).
- 2 Anscombe, *Ethics, Religion, and Politics*, Collected Works, Volume III (University of Minnesota, 1981) 18.
- 3 Lisa Sowle Cahill, 'Teleology, Utilitarianism, and Christian Ethics', *Theological Studies* 42 (1981) 4: 601-29; Jean Porter, 'Basic Goods and the Human Good in Recent Catholic Moral Theology', *The Thomist* 57 (January 1993) 1: 27-49.
- 4 Foot, *The Philosophical Review* 81 (July 1972) 3: 305-16.
- 5 Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Clarendon, 1888) xx.
- 6 John Passmore, *Hume's Intentions* (Basic Books, 1952).
- 7 Singer, *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge University, 1993).
- 8 Richard Kroner, *Kant's Weltanschauung*, translated by John E. Smith (University of Chicago, 1956).
- 9 Stephen Pope, 'The Biological "Roots" of Personhood and Morality', *Josephinum Journal of Theology* 8 (Summer/Fall 2001)2: 93-5.